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THE PRINCIPLES OF PHILOSOPHY

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D. M. Dutta,
Prof.- PATNA COLLEGE.

TO

The Revered Memory of my dear Parents
THE LATE PANDIT KALIPRASANNA SIROMANI
and
THE LATE SREEMATI SASIMUKHI DEVI

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

The present work grew out of the lectures on Epistemology and Metaphysics I delivered to my students. In view of the fact that there are good many well-written works on Metaphysics and General Philosophy, such as Prof. Taylor's *Elements of Metaphysics*, Prof. Paulsen's *Introduction to Philosophy*, Prof. Mackenzie's *Elements of Constructive Philosophy*, Prof. Patrick's *Introduction to Philosophy* and Prof. Cunningham's *Problems of Philosophy*, the publication of a new book on the subject may appear as a superfluity. But my apology for a fresh venture is that the Syllabuses for the Graduate and Post-Graduate courses in Metaphysics and Epistemology prescribed by the Indian Universities do not appear to be covered by any one of the above-mentioned works. An attempt has been made in this work to present almost all the important problems in the simplest possible language with an eye to their historical setting and comprehensiveness ; and the graded method I have adopted in the presentation of the problems, rising from the easier to the more and more complicated aspects of them, is expected to meet not only the requirements of the B.A. Pass students, but also those of the Honours and Post-Graduate students in philosophy as well. My labour will be amply rewarded if such expectation is fulfilled.

The position I have developed in my work is that of Concrete Idealistic Monism in which Reality has been viewed as a dynamic spiritual principle, a concrete universal, embracing within itself the physical, the biological and the conscious levels of existence that it evolves as real self-expressions or elements in its life, and not as having merely an adjectival status as Bradley and Bosanquet take them to do. It is at the same time the home of absolute values that make up its essence. The absolute values in themselves are teleological forces and attract from before the entire existence to themselves as its destined goal. I have laid under contribution the recent developments in scientific and philosophical concepts and have incorporated them after proper sifting, never

with the fad of revolutionary 'modernism', but always with the due moderation of a reconstructive attitude. On the other hand, I have been fully convinced that Logic or Dialectic has no unlimited sphere of its application and should not be allowed to divide Life and Existence without a remainder. Logic is not the whole of Life which ever looks up to 'super-reason' at least for satisfaction, if not for solution of all its enigmas when it faces Reality. While tackling some of the vital problems of Western philosophy I have deliberately introduced Indian parallels, wherever possible, with a two-fold purpose, first with a view to initiating the inquisitive into the high intellectual altitude which the Indian speculative mind has already attained in the sphere of those problems, and secondly, with a view to disillusioning the minds of those who are for the compartmental separation of eastern thought from western speculation—for they should realise that philosophy is not national, nor international, but cosmopolitan and universal. In interpretation of most of the important problems I have made, wherever necessary, an independent approach and I hold myself fully responsible for the views expressed.

In the preparation of the book I have been greatly indebted to many reputed authors eastern and western to whose works I have referred in proper places. My special acknowledgments are due to Professor S. Radhakrishnan whose works I have extensively utilised. In preparing the manuscripts and seeing them through the press I must acknowledge my gratefulness to a number of my students of whom Mr. M. L. Mukherjee, M.A. had the untiring patience and enthusiasm in writing down the manuscripts as I dictated them to him ; and the index is entirely his making. Mr. Harendra Nath Ghosal, B.A., prepared typed copies of the manuscripts and Mr. Bibhuti Bhushan Mandal, M.A., in collaboration with Mr. M. L. Mukherjee immensely helped me in reading the proofs. Mr. Santosh Kumar Samanta, M.A., also lent his services from time to time. My special thanks are due to Professor Katyayanidas Bhattacharyya, M.A., the most brilliant of my students and now an equally brilliant colleague of mine, for many valuable suggestions. I must not also omit to express my thankfulness to my friend and colleague, Professor Mohini Mohan Mukherjee, M.A., who kindly went through a portion of my manuscripts.

I owe a deep debt of gratitude to Professor K. C. Bhattacharyya, M.A., P.R.S., the Late King George V Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy, Calcutta University, and to Professor Haridas Bhattacharyya, M.A., P.R.S., Head of the Department of Philosophy, Dacca University, both of whom took great interest in the book and encouraged me for its publication.

Last, though not least, is my thankfulness to Dr. S. P. Mookherjee, M.A., D.Litt., Bar-at-Law, President, Post-Graduate Council in Arts, Calcutta University, a great patron of learning, for kindly arranging for the publication of the book by the University, but for whose help it would have been difficult in these war conditions for the book to see the light of day.

I must also congratulate Mr. S. N. Guha Ray, B.A., the Managing Director of Sree Saraswaty Press Ltd., on the neat printing of the work.

Asutosh College,
CALCUTTA. }
Dated, the 20th April, 1944. }
H. M. BHATTACHARYYA.

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INTRODUCTION

DEFINITION AND PROVINCE OF PHILOSOPHY

1. *WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY ?*

To define a thing is never an easy task ; for definition presupposes an exhaustive knowledge of the connotation of what is to be defined. The difficulty of the task is great in the case of the definition of the sciences whose subject-matter often involves overlapping and admits of constant extension of boundaries. Geology, for instance, is not always confined to considerations of the earth's crust, but often overlaps mineralogy which studies mineral formations as parts of the earth's crust ; shades off into biology, when it involves considerations of the fossil remains of plants and animals ; and finally, into astronomy or cosmogony when it investigates the conditions and collocations of the first formations of the earth's crust. Similar difficulty attends our attempt to understand psychology as a science of mind when we find that here also problems, biological, physiological and physical, necessarily intervene.

But the difficulty of definition proves even greater when we try to understand what is meant by Philosophy which seems to know no limit to its subjects of investigation and which looks at them from a different angle of vision from that of the sciences. Hence to avoid the hazard of a cut-and-dry definition at the beginning, we would do well, by following the practice of Aristotle, to start with a tentative or provisional definition of philosophy which needs clarification and amendment as we proceed.

2. *PROVISIONAL DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY.*

Philosophy may provisionally be defined as *an attempt to explain and appreciate life and the universe as a whole*. The philosopher does not look at life and the universe piecemeal, but always takes them as a systematic whole, and his entire being reacts upon that whole. His attitude to it is not to be identified with that of a scientist who confines himself to this or that aspect

of existence, not with that of an artist or of a poet whose interest lies in its aesthetic side only, not with that of a businessman who merely calculates in terms of profit and loss, nor again with that of a priest or a preacher whose concern is with the things of the other world. But his attitude includes each and every one of these attitudes and all other possible ones. His searchings are confined not to any particular point of time and space or any particular aspect of existence. He is, in the words of Plato, 'the spectator of all time and existence'. His is a synoptic view of the universe which comprehends all, but excludes nothing. He subjects every item of his knowledge to rational reflection in order to rise to the conception of a First Principle or Principles that underlie everything, and seeks to discover any ulterior worth or significance that life and the universe may have for him. He will start, by way of analysis, with the world as it appears, but will rise to a synthetic grasp of the Reality that makes such appearances. All through his attempt to know the universe his interest lies with what is concrete and complete. Hence he will never separate appearances or phenomena from that which appears, and all through his study of the concrete universe he will be guided by reason which will put to severe tests of criticism all that he will conclude, so that his conclusions may be accepted as valid. But he will also find that his purely rational or logical explanation of the concrete universe is after all a cold analysis of things as they *are*; so he will appeal to his experience of *worth* whereby he will evaluate them as they *should be*; for it is in all these attitudes of mind in combination that philosophy as reaction of the whole mind to the whole of Reality might attain its fullest comprehension and its complete end. We shall see that there is no antagonism between the aspects of the whole of Reality as there is no antagonism between rational or logical knowledge and 'logically unsupported' knowledge. For the philosopher genuine or philosophical knowledge is always knowledge of 'the Whole', the organised totality of reality and value, and such knowledge is not confined within the bounds of reason but may extend beyond it to other elements of experience to include the elements of faith, feeling or emotional intuition.¹

1. Cf. Urban: *The Intelligible World*, Ch. III, also Bosanquet's article: *Life and Philosophy*, in *Contemporary British Philosophy*, 1st series.

3. *SCOPE OR PROVINCE OF PHILOSOPHY.*

From the above provisional definition of philosophy we can form an idea of its Province or Scope. Definition and province imply each other and in fact they are like the concave and convex of a curve. To define a science is to set down its boundaries, and all problems that fall within those boundaries make up its province. Thus while definition of a science gives us its outermost limits, its province tells us its contents which are demarcated by definition against overlapping the contents of another science. Now from our definition of philosophy as explanation and appreciation of life and the universe as a whole, it becomes clear that philosophy is the most comprehensive of all enquiries and as such must have the widest scope of all. It includes within its scope every branch of human enquiry but excludes none. When philosophy claims to study and appreciate the universe as a whole it does not mean to study it in all its details but only in its essentials, for, otherwise the task will be humanly impossible. Now the universe appears in the first instance as a realm of phenomena which the philosopher cannot ignore. But phenomena, we know, form the subject-matter of the sciences. Therefore, philosophy must include phenomenal or scientific study of the universe. But behind phenomena there must be reality from which phenomena spring and by which they are ultimately explained. Now reality is the subject-matter of enquiry for another branch of knowledge which is generally known as Ontology or Metaphysics. It follows then that philosophy which studies phenomena in the light of reality must include within its scope both Science and Metaphysics, Phenomenology and Ontology.

But when philosophy studies the universe both in its phenomenal aspects and in its real character it must justify its conclusions. It will not only know the universe but also show that it knows it correctly. Now the science which investigates into the nature and conditions of correct knowledge is known as *Epistemology*. It follows then that philosophy must include within its scope not only phenomena and reality as its object of enquiry, include not only, in other words, science and metaphysics, but also the science of correct knowing or Epistemology.

We have stated in our definition of philosophy that it is the explanation as well as appreciation of life and the universe. But up to the above analysis we were confined to indicating what

it explains and to the fact that what it explains it explains correctly, implying thereby that philosophy knows the universe and vindicates what it knows. But the term 'appreciation' in our definition of Philosophy includes much more than what we have stated so far within the province of philosophy. Appreciation is the experience of worth which seeks *satisfaction* and goes beyond the cold analysis of reason. Purely scientific and logical explanation analyses things and leaves them as they are, and does not enquire as to what value or worth they have for man. We believe that value or worth is as real as things and their attributes and relations, or to be more precise, Value is Reality, and philosophy cannot ignore it. There have indeed been all too scientific and realistic philosophies which are dead to values but only alive to facts, and indeed equate fact with value. But appreciation of worth or value is not the same as merely logical analysis of facts. In view of this some of the eminent philosophers of to-day have come to recognise the aspect of value as equally important as, if not more important than, other aspects of things, and there have been others again who have made values to be the real and ultimate frame-work of the universe, have equated value with reality. Hence philosophy must also include within its scope the problem of value. And value as identical with reality forms the subject-matter of what is called *Axiology*. Hence the province of Philosophy, as we take it, will comprise under it Science and Metaphysics, Epistemology and Axiology.

4. ONTOLOGY, METAPHYSICS AND PHILOSOPHY.

These three terms are so frequently and familiarly used in any work on philosophy, that they are apt to be confounded with one another unless their meanings are clearly distinguished. The term *Ontology* stands for the study of reality as such, from *ontos* or real thing and *logia* or discourse. By Ontology we mean, then, the science of pure being, or reality as such. Pure being, or reality as such, is what only is or exists, apart from any becoming—any changes, qualities, subdivisions or movements. Parmenides, the ancient Eleatic philosopher, believed that nothing existed except pure Being and to him Philosophy was thus identical with Ontology or Science of Pure Being. The term *Metaphysics* was of accidental origin, but the accident was justified

by the significance it subsequently acquired. Without meaning anything significant by the term, a follower of Aristotle collected Aristotle's writings on first principles into a single work comprising fourteen books and placed it *after the writings on physics* and named it by the term *metaphysics* (meta = after ; physika—physics) whose significance was unknown even to Aristotle himself. To Aristotle philosophy proper was a separate science or the First Science whose subject-matter was Being as such, the Absolute or God, though it embraced all other sciences.

The term ontology has retained up to the present day its etymological meaning and still stands for the science of being or reality as such. But with the evolution of human consciousness, with its growing cognitive and practical relations to life and the universe, the terms metaphysics and philosophy have undergone changes in connotation. Metaphysics gradually ceased to be regarded as identical with ontology or the science of being as it was in the remote past, as it became evident that the problems of knowing were intimately connected with those of being. At this stage metaphysics became wider in scope than ontology and included epistemology or the theory of knowledge. In recent years with the emergence of fresher problems relating to science and life, mind, society and value, over and above the problems of being and knowing all of which must fall within the scheme of the universe, the terms 'metaphysics' and 'metaphysical' are found inadequate and are now less commonly used ; and the terms 'philosophy' and 'philosophical' having larger connotation have been substituted in their place. When they are used, they are taken as synonymous with the latter, though they are, strictly speaking, narrower in their comprehension.

5. ORIGIN OF PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY.

The very nature of human mind is such that it cannot but take to thinking or reflection about what surrounds it. Thinking is man's natural endowment. He may think in one way or another, but think he must. It follows then that reflective thinking or philosophy is as old as the human mind. But the reflective thought of man cannot be expected to have one uniform start, nor to take one uniform turn, when once started. For, both the original start of philosophic enquiry and the subsequent cast

it receives from the philosopher depend upon his personal outlook and the natural and social environment he has to face. It is because of these incentives to enquiry that we have the various developments of philosophy such as realism, idealism, pessimism, optimism, dogmatism, humanism and the like, which will be considered in their proper places. Now, we shall confine ourselves to the estimate of the most important sources of philosophic enquiry.

(a) WONDER AS THE ORIGIN OF PHILOSOPHY.

Plato thought that philosophy begins in wonder. When reflective thought has already been at work for some time and has begun to question its first conceptions of nature, then doubts and perplexities are bound to arise ; but the primitive mind when confronted with the bewildering elements of nature, as the ancient Greek mind was, cannot but look at them with curiosity and wonder as the child's mind would do. The child-like *naïve* Greek mind had thus in the feeling of wonder the first incentive to philosophic enquiry and later developed this feeling of wonder into reflective thought.

(b) DOUBT AS THE STARTING-POINT OF PHILOSOPHY.

Modern philosophy, since Bacon, however, has its start in the spirit of doubt. Bacon with a view to reforming Science and Philosophy started his inquiry by doubting the teachings of the Church and based it on the solid rock of experience which the churchmen had neglected. Similarly, Descartes made doubt the starting point of philosophy. His analysis of doubt was more thorough-going than that of Bacon and pointed to the fact that before philosophy can be based on an indubitable principle, it must go on doubting. Descartes found this indubitable principle in self-consciousness. Kant may also be said to have started philosophy with the doubting of the dogmatic contemporary systems of Hume and Leibniz. So Kant's philosophy, which is better known as Critical philosophy, has its rise in the doubt of dogmatic systems of thought.

(c) PRAGMATIC OR HUMANISTIC ORIGIN.

But mere curiosity and cautiousness in belief have not always furnished the motive-force in philosophy. Another line of thought

which has stimulated modern minds is known as Pragmatism. The spirit of pragmatism consists in this that nothing is true for its own sake, but only in so far as a thing furthers fruitful activity. If we are to have any philosophy or knowledge of the world it must have a reference to practical interest and its fulfilment, not only for its starting-point, but also for its final goal. The same tendency which had made practical fulfilment the basis and origin of philosophy underlies another modern line of thinking known as Humanism. The creed of humanism has, however, a wider outlook than pragmatism in that it makes man, his needs and aspirations to be the central object of all activity, intellectual, practical and religious. Humanists have thus made philosophy rise in the consideration of those practical and useful consequences that lead to human satisfaction.

(d) LOVE OF WISDOM AS THE ORIGIN OF PHILOSOPHY.

It will be seen, however, that if philosophy is not to be a mere external study of nature as it was with the ancient Greek mind in general, nor mere theoretical satisfaction of the intellectual craving of man often leading to barren scepticism, nor again a study of the device for the satisfaction of human desires and interests which look to the outer surface of life, then the real and right fount of philosophic enquiry is to be dug deeper in that attitude of the human mind which seeks wisdom for its own sake. The keynote to philosophy was struck by Socrates in Greece in the fifth century B.C., and it still resounds and will continue to do so unabated for all time to come. The word philosophy comes from the Greek words *philos*, love and *sophia*, wisdom. Socrates liked to be a philosopher, a humble lover of wisdom unlike the Sophists—the wise men, as they called themselves, who paraded their learning. The term wisdom is too rich in connotation to yield to analysis. It is certainly not the sumtotal of empirical and intellectual knowledge but it may be said to include within it these two forms of knowledge as well as appreciation and appraisal of the higher values of life. Philosophy, turned to mere intellectual and empirical knowledge, has often ended in scepticism and agnosticism, or at least has given a partial and incomplete comprehension of life and reality which, when divided by experience and reason, have always left a

remainder. Hence it may be remarked that the true beginning of philosophy in its comprehensive sense may be traced to that self-searching wisdom which Socrates has embodied in his famous sentence, 'Know thyself'. The ancient Indian Upanisadic philosophy too had its start in that searching inspection of the self. For knowledge of the self in its true colour in which true wisdom consists, is the very centre from which all other problems and their solution radiate. Know the self, and all else—from the stocks and stones to the stars and satellites—will be known in their proper perspective. Wisdom tells us that our knowledge of the objective world, its matter and its laws, our external pursuits—science, art and business, our relations, social and political, and the rest of them, is not altogether worthless but has only relative worth ; but that the truer appreciation of life and the universe has its spring in the deeper knowledge of the self, for that alone lends proper significance and value to everything and thought thereof. Philosophy to-day, which has begun to view things in terms of value, has acquired the courage to face the whole metaphysical difficulty of the problems that arise out of the consciousness of the eternally marvellous and unmastered. Thus the Socratic method of wisdom which was the primal passion of philosophy is developed in the present day into a definite attitude to life and reality.

(e) SPIRITUAL URGE AS THE ORIGIN OF PHILOSOPHIC ENQUIRY.

Over and above what has been pointed out as the philosophic incentive, it is worth while to note that in India philosophers have taken to philosophy not as a mere intellectual pastime, nor as a mere source of the solution of doubts and disbeliefs, nor again as a mere pragmatic satisfaction in the European sense of the term, but as something which goes deeper into the more practical needs and their fulfilment in man's spiritual life. The philosophic mind of India finds that life is beset with all manner of misery and discomfort ; this life of misery and discomfort it wants to put an end to by discovering the right means which, it thinks, consists in self-knowledge and self-purification. We must philosophise not for the sake of knowing but rather for a better being. So, in India philosophy arose from the deeper needs of

spiritual life. In this sense, the origin of philosophy may be said to be pragmatic, but here pragmatism is not confined, as it is in the West, to discovery of the criterion of truth but rather to the discovery that life has a deeper root, and that it is not confined to the surface layer of mere knowing but goes down to man's spiritual being itself.

6. *DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF PHILOSOPHY.*

Philosophy, as we now understand it, is the result of a long course of human thinking. Its present connotation is necessarily deeper than what it was in the past. But to understand and analyse the connotation of philosophy, as we have it to-day, we would do well to study the historic development of the concept of philosophy. Turning to the history of European philosophy, we find that in the early Greek period philosophy was mixed up or rather identical with natural science, for to the early Greek mind the objects of the world were of the most engrossing character ; and naturally, therefore, it was busy with the study of the elements of nature separately or collectively as they forced themselves upon their imagination. Hence, the greatest philosopher of the early Greek period was he who had the largest amount of the knowledge of the natural objects. In a word, the early Greek philosophy was objective and theoretical ; but with the rise of Socrates and Plato the objective attitude was supplemented by practical considerations. With them it was the culture of the self and reason and not the analysis of not-self and external experience that became the centre of enquiry, and grew up to be more an art of life than science of nature. It was in Aristotle that we have a synthesis of these two opposite attitudes towards the self and the not-self, towards reason and experience. After Aristotle, however, the emphasis on the self and the not-self, as the counter-parts of reality, was not kept constant but was allowed to oscillate between the one and the other. And the general trend of post-Aristotelian philosophy, specially of the Stoics and of the Neo-Platonists may be said to have been more and more subjective with greater and greater ethical leanings.

In the medieval European philosophy we miss the freedom of thought and imagination of the ancient Greeks. In its place we notice only a slavish dependence of mind on the Biblical

dogmas, on the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy interpreted, and even sometimes misinterpreted, by the Churchfathers who relied on their biases and prejudices, derived partly from their own narrow outlook and partly from the ideas they had received from the Phoenician merchants. Medieval philosophy then was marked by a stagnation and distortion of human thought. And the subject-matter of this distorted thought again was not furnished by things, events and their relations belonging to this world of ours, but by questions, very often imaginary, of the other world, such as 'fall of man', 'heaven and hell', 'original sin', 'predestination' and the rest. In a word, the philosophy of the medieval ages was the philosophy of the inspired preachers, about supernatural problems, stultified by intellectual stagnation.

Modern European philosophy is, however, marked by criticism as opposed to the dogmatic and credulous tendencies of the medieval period. It is more confined to the problems of the here and the now, of what experience and reason reveal to us. It criticises, before accepting, whatever pertains to knowing and being, though the degree of criticism varies from philosopher to philosopher. And in recent years the critical spirit has attained such a large magnitude that on the side of experience philosophy has come to be identical with science, and on the side of reason philosophy has risen to be one of pure intellectualism. Happily, the critical spirit, with its increasing abhorrence against one-sidedness, has in quite recent years been fruitful of a Critical Idealism which estimates the scientific concepts with the help of speculative reason.¹

The development of philosophy in India has not, however, been parallel to that in the West. The philosophy of India, as we understand it, has not been the result of accumulation of thoughts and ideas, promulgated by different philosophers at different periods of history. It is like the organic growth of a full-grown tree into its branches, foliage and fruits from the power of a seed which merely unfolds itself by inner growth and differentiation and not by external accretion. The germinal thoughts contained in the *Rg Veda*, and the earlier *Upaniṣads*, the record of the free and frank experiences of the gifted seers, have differentiated themselves into the well-known six orthodox

1. Broad's article on *Critical and Speculative Philosophy* in *Contemporary British Philosophy*, 1st series.

systems of Indian philosophy which may be said to represent the three ascending orders of human thought, *viz.*, realistic, psychological and spiritualistic or idealistic. And it will not be very far from the truth to say that even the so-called heterodox systems of Jainism and Buddhism and even Cārvākism are traceable in their peculiar emphases to the Upaniṣadic ideas. The realistic or objective attitude is represented by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Sāṃkhya, and the Mīmāṃsā, and the psychological attitude by the Yoga system. The Vedānta schools with all their different shades of opinion are eminently spiritualistic, the Advaita-Vedānta being absolute spiritualistic philosophy in that it establishes absolute spirit as the only ultimate reality exclusive of everything else, of the individual selves and of the objects of the world, conceding at the same time only practical reality to these individual selves and the objects of the world. From an analysis of the nature, method and contents of the different orders of Indian thought, it appears that Vedāntism of the schools of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja gives us the most rational, at the same time the most acceptable, explanation of life and the universe as the Indians understand them.

But all the systems of Indian philosophy have a family likeness in that they all are practical in their outlook, emphasising, as they do, that philosophy is pre-eminently an art of life. Philosophy rises in India, as we think it ought to rise everywhere, from the deepest soil of life. Self-culture amongst others is the highest goal of man, and philosophy, if it is worth anything, must contribute to that end. So Indian mind has viewed philosophy not as mere intellectual gymnastics but rather as a means to spiritual salvation. The proper aim of philosophising according to the Indian mind, has ~~ever~~ been knowledge for its own sake but for the sake of making life better. This objective is subserved more or less by all the systems of Indian philosophy, but Vedāntism, of all other systems, has been the best suited one for this purpose and has therefore been studied in India as at once the best explanation and the greatest solace of life.

7. PHILOSOPHY AND LIFE.

If the essential nature of man is his thought, and if to think is to have some kind of philosophy, then philosophy must be

the essential occupation of human life. There are indeed various other pursuits of man, but if man is to remain true to his own nature, these apparently diverging pursuits must converge to an understanding of true human life. They must not be allowed to go their own way without looking back to life from which they diverge. History of philosophy, however, has shown that this conception of philosophy in relation to life has not been kept in view all through the vicissitudes of man's history. Man's first thinkings originate from the needs of life, but they get transformed gradually with the stress and strain of complex social forces which develop round about him in course of times. These complex social forces lay, as it were, a crust over the essential needs of life. So, there have been in the history of philosophy some times in which human mind has been tempted to turn its face against those essential needs of life and to attach unnatural importance to things and events which are of accidental value. Empirical and realistic urges of life are responsible for this turning back of our mind from life's essential needs. So, philosophy, which has for its primary concern the soul, God, immortality and similar other problems, which again owe their solutions to the proper estimate of life, degenerates under these empirical and realistic influences into something like the consideration and calculation of profit and loss and genuine philosophy comes to be regarded as an idle dream contrasted with which the realistic calculations of profit and loss appear to be stern, waking realities. But proper thinking will reveal that if we can decipher our own real souls, then the philosophy of profit and loss turns out to be not only meaningless but also self-concealing vacillation and futility. As Browning has said, "Life has meaning, to find its meaning is my meat and drink." In the midst of glare and show, the human soul is bound to turn like the magnetic needle, to its own truth, and this rediscovery of its own truth is the philosophy of life. Socrates in ancient Greece and the seers of ancient India touched the vital cord of life and philosophy, and even to-day their keynote rings unabated.

The function of a true philosopher has been portrayed in its proper colour by Thoreau when he said, "To be a philosopher is not merely to have subtle thoughts, nor even to found a school, but so to love wisdom as to live, according to its dictates, a life of simplicity, independence, magnanimity and trust." It

appears then that if philosophy is the expression and fulfilment of life, it cannot be a pastime, a frivolity of thought, skimming over superficialities, dabbling in phenomena or appearances ; it must always be rooted in the deeper soil of the soul which is truth. To dig into the deeper soil of the soul means pain, but there is pleasure in this pain. 'Philosophy does not pay', so goes the general outcry of the present day. But he who has deciphered the soul and its implications, he who has wedded himself to true philosophy is none the poorer if it does not pay. Certainly, truth will not make us rich, but it will make us free. A philosopher is a bearer of the trust which will not only ennoble him but also is bound to edify mankind for whom he bears it.

8. *VALUE OF THE STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY.*

In the above section, we have hinted at the value of the study of philosophy in a way. But to be more explicit we would like to add the following. The plain man with his realistic outlook is naturally tempted to think that philosophy is as useless as a chess-play and is a barren intellectual pursuit leading us nowhere, but simply confusing our intellect in a labyrinth of high-sounding terms. He thinks that the ideas and the ideals which philosophy unnecessarily labours under, have no practical bearing on our life. But against this plain man's disparagement of philosophy it will suffice for our purposes to urge that there is a palpable confusion between the deeper philosophic outlook and the shallow outlook of his own. The plain man and even the scientist are content with the facts of the present without going beyond them to their significance. The outlook of philosophy is not to take the facts on their face-value, but to discover their meaning and significance in the larger whole of experience, in the scheme of life and reality. No philosophical theory is a last word but is after all a hypothesis, accepted so long as it is found to explain the meaning and significance of life and reality, and as such is subject to re-orientation in the light of further and higher imagination. Again, science is supposed to advance day to day, while philosophy seems to remain stagnant, as if it spins round and round itself without coming out of its own charmed circle. This disparagement of philosophy has its root in the mistaken view of the office of science and philosophy. For, while science begins with uncertainty of a

hypothesis but ends in a corresponding art, utilising its experiments in industry and inventions, philosophy from the very nature of it, remains a hypothesis all through. But even here it is worth noting that science which builds on its own conquests is no less precarious, being equally subject to constant revision. Philosophy seems to stand stagnant and perplexed only because it leaves the fruits of its conquest to science, but itself passes on with a *divine discontent* to the yet uncertain and yet unexplained. In one word, philosophy which aims at the ideal cannot satisfy a plain man and a scientist who are confined to the factual. Again, if we look more closely to the position of the scientist and of the philosopher, we find that the discontent which seems to trouble the philosopher is not unshared by the scientist. The claim of the scientist to have exhausted the facts stands still unsubstantiated in view of the fact that there looms still an 'unseen world' never to be conquered by external experience. Life and reality divided by science and reason still leaves a remainder and it is the privileged task of philosophy and religion to tackle this inexhaustible residual of life and reality. If philosophy has no other purpose to serve for life, it has at least to tell us that what we experience here and now, what is factual and actual, has at the back of it an ideal which transcends but yet explains the factual and the actual. And lastly, if man cannot live wholly and solely in and with the actual and the factual, and has in his heart of hearts an unquenchable thirst for the ideal, it is philosophy that only can give him at least a glimmering view of that ideal. But the more immediate benefit which a student of philosophy is expected to derive from it, is the severe intellectual discipline that no mind can afford to do without. A balanced mind, an unbiased judgment and a broad outlook on men and things, which philosophic discipline ensures for man, are the invaluable assets of his life.

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CHAPTER I.

PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER COGNATE STUDIES.

1. *PHILOSOPHY, RELIGION AND ART.*

The subject-matter of Philosophy, and those of Religion and Art, and the mind's reaction to them may be said to be coincident from one point of view, as also divergent from another point of view. In philosophy, religion and art the mind seeks for the universal, not to be got at by mere sense but only by supersensuous consciousness. In art, where our aesthetic sense is roused, it is found on analysis to be an enjoyment of the universal through the individual. The special senses, in so far as they reveal colour, form, harmony and the like, are indeed sources of sensuous experience confined to particularities of the object of beauty, but unless the mind transcends the particularities of sense to visualise with the help of reason and imagination what is universal in them, it cannot be said to enjoy any work of art.

In the province of religion the same supersensuous consciousness is brought into play and the subject-matter of religion is never the individual but always the universal. A man of true religion to-day has certainly outgrown the totemism and fetishism of old in his attempt to grasp the universal and the absolute as his object of worship. The religious experience of the modern man is certainly not analysable into the sensuous experience of the worshipper of stocks and stones. And the history of the development of religious consciousness bears ample testimony to the futility of man's attempts to establish the existence of God through empirical consciousness. The cosmological, the causal and the physico-theological or teleological arguments are no longer held as convincingly establishing the existence of the Divine. It is the supersensuous consciousness or intuition that stands supreme as giving a vision of God. If God of religion is nothing but the absolute and universal reality, it is the supersensuous consciousness or intuition that can be competent to grasp such reality. But although religion and art are thus found to agree in bringing into play the supersensuous consciousness as the competent source of realising both the object of beauty

and that of worship, yet, however, there is an important point of difference in the aesthetic and the religious reaction of the human mind. Man's reaction to the object of art is constituted of feeling alone, while that to the divine reality absorbs his whole being. In religious consciousness man's mind not only feels the sentiments of reverence and awe for the Deity, but knows what it feels for, and finally this intellectual faith in the Divine Being is such that it cannot but issue forth in action which it feels actuated to do in the form of worship. Thus, while in art mind's reaction is partial, being confined to feelings and sentiments only, in religion it is whole and complete, involving its intellectual, emotive and conative reactions all combined.

In philosophy too the subject-matter of enquiry is the universal, the absolutely Real, and the grasp of that universal or absolutely Real is never within the range of the senses, but always within the range of reason or intuition. It is not the sensuous but always the supersensuous experience or intuition that is at work in the mind's attempt to grasp the absolutely Real in philosophy. The realistic systems of thought, which are always pluralistic and individualistic in their outlook, positing an infinite number of existents, make sense-experience to be the organ of apprehending these plural existents. But if philosophy is the experience of the whole or of the universal, such experience must always be supersensuous experience, reason or intuition.

It is often held by some that the aim and attitude of religion and philosophy respectively must be entirely different from one another. But such insistence on the difference between the aim and attitude of religion and philosophy is based on a distorted view of both. Both religion and philosophy, as we have already indicated, aim at the grasp of what is universal and absolutely Real, and if religion is not to degenerate into dogmas, philosophy must be brought to bear upon religion so as to make it a rational living force in human life. There is no real antagonism between reason and intuition, between philosophy and religion, for it is the same reality that intuition synthetically grasps and realises in religion and reason analyses in philosophy. The apparent difference that may be said to exist between philosophy and religion is that while religious consciousness directly experiences Reality as a Divine Being embodying the highest qualities, which are re-oriented into the ultimate objective values of Truth, Goodness

and Bliss to constitute His being, philosophy as theoretical interpretation of experience as a whole, will be pretty coincident with religious consciousness as the vision of that which unifies all values in perfection, but will always keep up its theoretical attitude of rational understanding, distinct from the attitude of practice and conviction that we find in religion, and will thereby free religion from all accidental excrescences so as to reinforce it and enhance the possibility of its acceptance.

2. *PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE.*

Philosophy and science are generally understood to represent two distinct fields of enquiry, the former to give us knowledge of the universe as a whole and the latter to furnish us with the different departmental knowledges of the phenomenal world. The *Scope* of Philosophy is thus widest and will not leave out of account any item of knowledge that the human mind may be concerned with, and will collate and co-ordinate them so as to discover an ultimate principle or principles which underlie and explain all such items of knowledge. Science, being objective and phenomenalistic in its outlook, will confine itself to collecting, arranging and classifying phenomena of all types that will come within the range of external observation and experiment. Thus scientific knowledge will be purely phenomenal knowledge, and so the sciences have collectively been called phenomenology. The universe has been conveniently partitioned into physical, biological and mental sections and the sciences, by division of labour, have apportioned to them phenomena of these three sections to facilitate their enquiry, and as a result we have generally three great divisions of science, physical, biological and mental. But confined as they are to phenomena merely, the sciences cannot supply us with a concrete and complete knowledge of the universe. The noumental principle of the universe always remains inaccessible to the sciences. In this way, scientific knowledge remains always partial and therefore narrower in scope as compared with the philosophic knowledge which is always complete.

But not only do philosophy and science thus differ in their scope as shown above, but they differ in their Method as well. The Method of the Sciences is always *empirical* and mainly *inductive*. They always have recourse to external experience working

through observation and experiments, collect facts as they are externally experienced, arrange and classify them and rise inductively to the laws which govern them. Inductive generalisation from facts of experience is the guiding method of all scientific enquiry. The mind or the subject which carries on this process of empirical generalisation is always thrown into the background, though experience and generalisation of experience are impossible without the active co-operation and contribution from the mind or subject. The *Method of Philosophy*, on the other hand, is alive to the necessity of the joint contribution of both experience and reason for the purposes of knowledge, as all true knowledge combines them. All philosophic knowledge starts with facts of experience and rises into inductions of higher and higher generality, but discovers that the highest possible induction is after all incompetent to furnish us with the kind of knowledge it seeks to attain. But as that kind of knowledge is the final explanation of phenomena, the highest inductions of science are to be referred to reality which is beyond empirical reach, but is open to reason. Hence philosophy has to resort to reason which only can grasp that reality whereby it explains all phenomena. Hence, the method of philosophy is not only empirical but also *rational*. Again, while sciences are generally satisfied with induction as the method of rising to its most general conclusions, philosophy points to the necessity of confirming scientific generalisations by *deductions* of further conclusions from reality it discovers by reason. Thus, philosophy includes induction which is the main method of the sciences, but necessarily supplements and confirms it by deduction.

Another important point of distinction between science and philosophy is that while science is *abstract* in its results, philosophy is *concrete* in its explanation. The abstractness of scientific enquiry is due to the fact that it considers its objects of enquiry purely from phenomenal stand-point in isolation from their concrete setting constituted by both the noumenal principle as well as its phenomenal aspects, which can never be really separated ; and secondly, that it considers them purely objectively or externally as if the internal world, that is, the subject or mind, is wholly passive and is thrown into the background ; and finally, that it does not care to relate them to the whole of the knowledge-system. The aim of philosophic enquiry into any object is never to

understand and to interpret it in isolation from any of its really inseparable elements, *viz.*, its noumenal background, its subjective reference and its place in the whole scheme of knowledge. Scientific knowledge, again, is rendered far more abstract by the tendency of the present-day science to reduce its findings to mathematical formulæ, as we notice in mathematical physics. Indeed the facts of growth and evolution not only of the physical but also of the biological and mental worlds, when reduced to mathematical formulæ, will certainly be ghosts of existence shorn of their concrete throbbing character as mathematical physics hands them over to us. But philosophy shrugs its shoulder at this scientific emasculation of the concrete world.

There is, however, similarity between science and philosophy in respect of their aim. Both science and philosophy aim at the common goal *viz.*, *Explanation*. To explain is to unify knowledge and this unification of knowledge again means bringing particular facts under a law or the universal, or a law of lower generality under a higher general law. Though philosophy and science aim at the common goal of explanation, yet while science stops short at bringing facts and laws under the highest general law it can attain, philosophy goes beyond the law to reality or the concrete universal. Laws are at best the laws of phenomena, but since philosophy includes and explains phenomenal knowledge by reference to noumenal reality, the work of explanation carried on by philosophy necessarily reaches beyond phenomena and their laws. In fact, while science is satisfied with departmental explanations, philosophy is in search of a final explanation. So, in point of explanation too, the attitude of science is different from that of philosophy. Now there have been scientific philosophers, like Spencer, Wundt and others, who think that philosophy is only a continuation of science so that where science stops, the work of philosophy begins in so far as the latter extends the unification of knowledge beyond the limits of science. But this continuity of philosophy with science can only be accepted if philosophy is supposed to be essentially the same with science in so far as its subject-matter is concerned. Spencer, for instance, has defined philosophy as completely unified knowledge as contrasted with science and popular knowledge which respectively refer to partially unified knowledge and completely ununified knowledge. But the point remains that knowledge, even if it is completely unified but

confined within the range of phenomena, cannot rise to be philosophic knowledge proper, so long as it ignores noumenal background with reason as the organ of knowing it. In this sense, therefore, the Spencerian conception of philosophy as continuation of scientific knowledge cannot be accepted. The final explanation which philosophy aims at is never forthcoming from anything except the noumenal reality which is at once the source and explanation of phenomena. We conclude then, that science may be said to study and understand phenomena but cannot give us the final explanation, which task is left to philosophy to achieve. Science not only forgets the noumenal background of all phenomena but ignores the fact that knowledge is a system of which scientific explanation is only an element. Philosophy orients knowledge from the stand-point of a whole which science can never aspire after.

It is interesting to study historically the relation between science and philosophy and then to estimate the proper function of philosophy in the light of what philosophy has come to stand for at the present day. The early Greek tradition that philosophy is but natural science was continued, though not without break, through the writings of Democritus, the Epicureans, Kepler, Hobbes and others, until the middle of the nineteenth century when sciences have grown considerably in scope and depth. Herbert Spencer about this time went so far as to equate philosophy with the sumtotal of scientific knowledge when he defined philosophy as the completely unified knowledge, without however the admission of the possibility of knowledge of a first principle or reality, which underlies and explains all scientific knowledge. Philosophy to Spencer was thus an extension and not explanation of scientific knowledge. He thought that it was similar to science in method and in result, only with this qualification that what philosophy arrived at was only wider than the widest generalisations of the sciences. Philosophy to him was an aggregate of scientific knowledge.

The emphasis on the scientific treatment of philosophy so initiated by Spencer was re-enforced by the contemporary realistic developments. James in his distrust of Hegel and his intellectualist ideal of the 'block universe', or one unified whole of Reality, disintegrated it into shreds of independent realities subjecting them to the rigour of experience and analysis. Bertrand Russell took

his cue from James, and in his conception of philosophy as 'Logical Atomism' in preference to realism, he has insisted on 'the scientific method in philosophy'.¹ "Philosophy," he says, "is more concerned than any special science with relation of different sciences and possible conflicts between them ; in particular it cannot acquiesce in a conflict between physics and psychology or between psychology and logic. Philosophy should be comprehensive and should be bold in suggesting hypothesis as to the universe which science is not yet in a position to confirm or confute. But these should always be presented as hypotheses not as immutable certainties like the dogmas of religion."²

S. Alexander, perhaps the greatest systematic realist of the day, also has taken a scientific view of philosophy. According to him both science and philosophy employ the same empirical method and agree in the same enterprise of bringing connection and coherence into the haphazard facts. "The more comprehensive a science becomes, the closer it comes to philosophy, so that it may become difficult to say where science leaves off and philosophy begins."³ The only element of difference that Alexander supposes to exist between philosophy and science is that philosophy is more far-reaching in its attempt at systematisation of knowledge, in so far as it distinguishes the 'pervasive characters' of things from their 'variable' ones, and these pervasive characters which he calls *non-empirical* or *à priori* make up the subject-matter of philosophy. But Alexander does not clearly distinguish between the empirical and non-empirical elements which according to him are alike the parts of the experienced world, and the result is that the *à priori* elements are as much a matter of experience as the empirical elements themselves. He defines philosophy as "the experiential or empirical study of the non-empirical or *à priori*, of such questions as arise out of the relation of the empirical to the *à priori*".⁴ But one who can read between the lines of Alexander's writings will see that under his apparent, official scientific attitude to philosophy there lurks a visible preference for an irreducible minimum of the *à priori* and rational

1. Russell: *Logical Atomism*, in *Contemporary British Philosophy*, 1st Series, p. 359.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 379.

3. Alexander's *Space, Time and Deity*, Vol. I, p. 2.

4. *Ibid.*

elements in our knowledge of the world—a metempiric and speculative tendency betraying his own position and indicating how during recent years philosophic consciousness is moving, like the magnetic needle, once more towards the right direction.

Among the more recent scientific philosophers none else than C. D. Broad has evinced the spirit of even-balance between the claims of science and philosophy leading to a right understanding of the office of philosophy. He thinks that philosophy should have two distinguishable but inseparable aspects, critical and speculative. In its critical aspect it must first put to severe test the concepts of science and everyday life ; in its speculative aspects it will take over these concepts, reflect upon them, and then try to reason out a view of reality as a whole in which these concepts will have their meaning and justification, and modification, if necessary. But Broad goes further than this and says that a speculative philosophy should also include ethical and religious experiences which, after proper sifting away of their extravagances, reveal deeper aspects of the reality inaccessible to ordinary sense-perception.¹ When all this is admitted by scientific philosopher like Broad it augurs well for philosophy that the philosophic consciousness of the twentieth century is making nearer and nearer approach to the conciliation between romanticism or ethico-religious philosophy initiated by Kant and scientific empiricism of the nineteenth century. Lloyd Morgan and Whitehead, while keeping closest touch with the world of nature and using most rigorous methods of observation and experiment in their analysis of it, admit the higher experiences of ethical and religious values and bring the light of speculative philosophy to bear upon the findings of the sense and the supersense and thus they strike the key-note of true philosophy. Scientific empiricism with all its rigour errs in so far as it confines itself to the surface-view of things and terminates in abstractions from the real throbbing life. The ethical and religious idealism of the romantic philosophers overshoots its mark in so far as it makes too much of life and revels in all about the ideal as against the real. But the business of true philosophy is to take cognizance of experience as a whole —of experience both scientific and religious, of experience of the

1. Cf. *Contemporary British Philosophy*, 1st Series. Broad's article on *Critical and Speculative Philosophy*.

real as well as of the ideal,—without any antagonism between the two. True philosophy will check the vagaries of ultra-religious experience by scientific experience which it will transmute and transfigure. The problem for the philosopher is the whole of experience, experience in its truly radical form which “takes note of all sides of experience, facts of religious faith, moral ideals and spiritual intuitions, as well as the crust of the earth and the stars of the sky.”¹

3. PHILOSOPHY AND EPISTEMOLOGY.

Philosophy, we have seen, is the understanding and appreciation of life and the universe. If philosophy is to understand life and the universe, it must enquire into the conditions and factors which determine such understanding, and must also indicate how far such understanding goes, and supposing that understanding has not gone beyond its limits, what constitutes the validity of such understanding. Now, these questions with regard to the origin, limit and validity of understanding or knowledge are inevitable for philosophy to raise. And these questions with regard to understanding or knowledge and their solution form the subject-matter of a distinct branch of study known as Epistemology. The term epistemology means the science or philosophy of knowledge (from *epistēmē*, knowledge and *logia*, discourse). Epistemology, therefore, may be defined as that science which inquires into the nature, conditions and factors, the limits and validity, of knowledge. In one word, epistemology is criticism of knowledge.

Philosophy and epistemology, as we understand them now, may be said to be interwoven with one another, so that one cannot go without the other. If philosophy wants to know the world as a whole it must see that the means and methods it employs for knowing are valid. Philosophy is satisfied not with mere knowing but with knowing rightly. So right or valid knowledge is one of the main objects of philosophy. In one word, all acceptable philosophy must include epistemology as its integral part. And there is no system of modern philosophy which does not do so.

1. Radhakrishnan's *The Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy*, p. 18.

But the history of thought does not always show this necessary relation between philosophy and epistemology. In the ancient Greek period of European philosophy epistemology is sadly wanting. But this want of epistemology in early Greek thought is not unnatural. Epistemology as a critical review of what is known can put in its appearance only when anomalies and contradictions arise in what we know, and when subjective and logical consciousness has grown enough to be able to discover such anomalies and contradictions. But in the first philosophies of Greece where nature obtruded upon the open and inquisitive Greek mind throwing it into bewilderment and wonder, it was hardly possible for it to look backward and inward to enquire whether there were any anomalies and contradictions in its knowledge of what overwhelms it. So the Greek mind accepted beyond question what was thrust into it and was therefore dogmatic without any critical estimate of what it knew. The medieval European philosophy is also marked by conspicuous absence of epistemic criticism, because the thinkers of this period were more for theology than for philosophy and were, therefore, not for enquiries, but for accepting without enquiry, whatever was contained in the versions of the Bible, and for ruminating over what was transmitted to them of Aristotle's philosophy even in its distorted form. So medieval philosophy, if it could be called philosophy at all, was the philosophy of intellectual bankruptcy necessarily attended with credulousness and dogmatism of the worst type.

In the period of European Renaissance and the early part of the modern period, though marked by sporadic spirit of criticism and doubt, systematic review of knowledge or epistemology as a distinct discipline did not appear on the scene until Locke wrote his *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* in 1690. The apparent reason why the necessity of epistemology was not always felt by the thinking mind is this that criticism or revision of knowledge becomes a necessity only when philosophy has made considerable progress so as to offer problems enough for involving contradictions and antinomies. But when it is said that epistemology did not appear even as late as the seventeenth century it should not be understood that epistemology was entirely absent up to that time. What is really meant is that some form or other of enquiry into the nature and conditions of knowledge must have

been present throughout philosophical enterprise, only that it had not been conscious enough to be ranked with epistemology as a science. Locke's enquiry, however, was more psychological than strictly epistemological, in that he took knowledge as a fact and gave a description of its origin, development and limits, but never enquired into those anterior logical conditions which make knowledge possible. Since Locke, epistemology progressed steadily up to Kant. Kant looked at the problem of knowledge from an entirely different angle of vision. Instead of taking knowledge as a fact, he went beyond and enquired into the anterior logical conditions that render knowledge possible. He is, therefore, described as Copernican in his attitude to knowledge. We see then that while Locke was more psychological in his treatment of the knowledge-problem, Kant's outlook was more epistemological than psychological. He made epistemology in a way identical with philosophy when he defined philosophy as the criticism of cognition. Fichte followed the line of Kant and made science of knowledge or epistemology to be the true soul of philosophy. This critical spirit continued even up to Hegel who gave finality to epistemology in his conception of philosophy as the science of the Absolute Idea, making Logic or the Science of Mind identical with the science of reality. In the systems of Kant, Fichte and Hegel, therefore, epistemology received its culmination. Intellectualism became the dominant spirit of philosophy.

But with the rise of realistic tendencies epistemology began to decline and intellectualism had to make room for anti-intellectualism. It came to be thought by the neo-realists that philosophy must be emancipated from the elaborate idealistic epistemology which has been long tyrannising over it. They simplified knowledge by pointing out that it consisted in the mere immediacy of cognition. Consciousness is in direct touch with its object and knowledge is nothing else than this direct contact between consciousness and its object. There is nothing intermediate between consciousness and its object, both of which are real, so that the so-called factors and conditions of knowledge and limits thereof are but unnecessary elaboration of the simple act of consciousness in direct contact with its object. In this way the neo-realist minimises the importance of idealistic epistemology as a distinct branch of philosophy and marks a

return to the common sense view of a real objective world known in direct perception. But within the fold of the modern realists there has grown a group of dissenters called the Critical Realists who have broken with the main contention of the neo-realists and have pointed out that the real world is not the immediate object of our perception, for we can never go beyond the sense data. The object is not immediately perceived, nor are many of the features of the object given in perception. But they, however, do not deny the objective existence of the world which is revealed by 'faith'. If knowledge were immediacy of cognition then it seems difficult to maintain any distinction between true and erroneous cognition which, however, is a fact. The main difficulty in the neo-realist position, therefore, as pointed by the critical realists, is that neo-realistic cognition cannot account for error or illusion in cognition. To obviate this difficulty the Critical Realists have maintained that since error is a fact and since it cannot be explained away by the conditions of cognition pointed out by the neo-realist, error must be due to something, some conditions intervening between mind or conscious organism and the brute reality. In an erroneous cognition as also in a right one, there is spontaneous projection from the subject-side, of certain factors and intrusion of certain others from the thing, which prevent mind from coming into direct contact with the thing. These factors they describe as *essence* or *character-complex* which stands, as a logical intermediary between consciousness and its object and therefore is responsible for error. In this attempt of the critical realists to account for error there reappears what disappeared in the neo-realistic account of cognition. The fact of the matter is that knowledge is not a result of direct contact of consciousness and its object, it is not an immediacy of perception but always involves certain logical or *à priori* elements evolved by consciousness as Kant had so clearly emphasised. In the critical realistic account of knowledge therefore we have a rehabilitation of those epistemological conditions which are shown once more to be necessary for the purposes of knowledge, though, however, in this the critical realist has unconsciously played himself into the hands of the idealist, to the advantage of epistemology in so far as it is well-nigh restored to its past glory.

4. RELATION BETWEEN EPISTEMOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS.

In epistemology our question was: What are the conditions, factors and limits of knowledge? What constitutes the validity of knowledge? We have discussed in the previous section these questions and their solutions at length. In the present section our question will be: What is the relation between epistemology and metaphysics? But this question again necessarily leads to the further question: Does epistemology lead to metaphysics? Or, does the theory of *Knowing* necessarily imply the theory of *Being*?

To these questions the traditional idealistic metaphysicians have given an emphatic affirmative answer, and even the present-day idealistic metaphysicians, in spite of the opposite issues raised by empirical logicians of the modern times, have maintained the view, perhaps sufficiently rightly, that epistemology, if rightly understood, necessarily leads to the apprehension of reality. The theory of knowing is really so intimately connected with that of reality that metaphysics or ontology was supposed by some writers, like Schleiermacher, to include epistemology, so that epistemology was held indistinguishable from metaphysics. The fact of the matter is that since the conditions, under which knowledge originates, depend in the last resort on the character of the reality which knowledge apprehends, it needs no further arguments to show that the problems of epistemology must be metaphysical in their nature. Hence the metaphysician when he discusses the implications of knowledge,—its conditions, factors and specially its validity—passes over into the problem of reality itself. In other words, epistemology is necessarily implicated with metaphysics, for there is no bar to the faculty of knowing, with its means and implements, preventing it from merging into reality.

But against the view stated above that epistemology leads to metaphysics, that knowing, when its conditions are rightly fulfilled, merges into being, there has developed an empirical distrust of metaphysics in general. Empiricism beginning from the ancient period up to the present day had been at work, employing its psychological method to show that what is known is not anything beyond phenomena of the mind. Empiricism received its culmination at the hands of Hume who established on psychological grounds that the so-called substance, either of the internal or of

the external world, is an illusion of the human mind. Humian epistemology, if it can be called epistemology in any sense of the term, achieved at best the end of an iconoclast demolishing the entire structure of metaphysics. This empirical tradition which received its great impetus at the hands of Hume was diverted from its psychological to a new logical channel by Kant who enquired if metaphysics was possible. But his search for metaphysics ended in phenomenism, because the logical apparatus he brought to bear upon the materials of sense created for him a world of objects which stood in the midway between the knowing mind and reality to be known. To Kant what knowledge knows is the object of its own making and not reality, which lies beyond its reach. Kantian epistemology thus does not really lead us beyond where we were left by Hume. Another and a more recent logical development of Humian and Kantian phenomenism has given rise to a new group of thinkers who are called Logical Positivists of whom Husserl, Carnap and A. J. Ayer are the most prominent. Husserl, of course, does not declare himself as a logical positivist, though his phenomenalist account of knowledge and reality has been developed under the new name of Logical Positivism by Carnap and others, and under the name of Logical Empiricism by A. J. Ayer and his followers. Husserl thinks that there is no reality either of the mind or of the external world, and our knowledge is but a construction out of certain ideas or psychical phenomena not leading to any of the so-called realities maintained by the metaphysician, either realistic or idealistic. The psychical phenomena arise of themselves not in any mental reality, nor do they proceed from any extra-mental reality, but they all arise somehow and somewhen as mere symbols and associate with one another to construct out of themselves the things and events of the world, so that things and events of the world, that we know of, are but mental constructs out of psychical phenomena without reference to any ontological reality, mental or material. This is known as the '*Eidetic Theory*' of knowledge, by which it is meant that knowledge arises in the subject or the mental world and has no objective reference to the world of reality, so that metaphysics must be eliminated. When we say that knowledge is valid with reference to reality it apprehends, we commit a serious epistemological fallacy. It follows then that knowledge even when attained after analysis of its conditions

can never aspire after any ontological reality, so that knowledge knows itself and not any objective reality and is to be expressed in a language known as physical symbolism developed by the Positivist.¹

By way of criticism of this account of knowledge given by logical empiricism repudiating all metaphysic we may urge that if knowledge is composed of mere phenomena and an object is a logical construct out of these phenomena, then the fundamental difficulty of the logical empiricist will be to explain how phenomena, either material or mental, could be possible without any reference to reality of which they are the phenomena. It is difficult to conceive of phenomena as having any meaning apart from noumena. The next difficulty in the way of logical empiricist is: how would he explain construction which means creation of something by something out of certain materials? The phenomena as such can only be materials but cannot serve the function of the creative agency by themselves. So construction, which transforms phenomena into objects, involves at least a reference to the constructive or creative agency which must be mind as a reality. The very position, that at least there should be mental reality to render possible the transformation of phenomena into objects as mental constructs, betrays the logical empiricist. The third difficulty in the *Eidetic* theory of knowledge is that it fails to guarantee the objective validity of knowledge, for if knowledge means knowledge of an object constructed by itself then knowledge is knowing itself with no provision for its validity from anything outside of itself. It is difficult to perceive how such knowledge can really be called valid and can serve any of our practical purposes. Fourthly, our life is not fully exhausted in the aspect of knowing only, for, logic is not the whole of it. There are the moral and aesthetic aspects of our life demanding satisfaction of our moral and aesthetic consciousness with ethical and aesthetic ideals having objective validity of their own. Hence if logical empiricism denies all objective reality then it not only cuts beneath its own ground as a theory of knowledge, but also beneath the ground of ethics and aesthetics.

1. Cf. The views of the positivistic realists like Schuppe, Mach and Avenarius who make objects to consist of phenomena composed of two moments, one subjective and the other objective, but with no metaphysical basis.

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CHAPTER II.

PROBLEMS OF LOGIC AND EPISTEMOLOGY.

1. *RELATION OF PSYCHOLOGY, LOGIC AND EPISTEMOLOGY.*

Psychology, Logic and Epistemology may from one stand-point be said to have the same subject-matter in that all these three deal with cognition or knowledge. The psychology of thinking at least is concerned with the origin and development of thought without reference to the distinction between valid and invalid thought ; logic, with thought, not as it originates, but as it is validated. Epistemology is likewise concerned with thought, with thought, not as it is approached by psychology of cognition, nor even as by logic, but as fulfilling conditions antecedent to its origin and necessary for its validity. Psychology takes thought as a cognitive fact and goes on describing how it originates and develops under certain given conditions. It is indifferent to the distinction between valid thought or truth and invalid thought or error. Truth and error as psychological facts have equal claims to consideration in psychology. This is due to psychology being a positive or descriptive science. In logic, however, in which we are pledged to estimate the facts of evidence, these facts of evidence must have been given by psychology, so that we may discover which of these given facts of evidence do or do not conform to the standard of validity. Now this standard of validity by which logic estimates thought, or distinguishes true thoughts from erroneous ones, is set up by its own rules of consistency. In this function logic thus depends on psychology for data. The colourless thought of psychology is stamped with validity by logic. Thus if epistemology gives us the philosophy of knowledge, psychology gives its description and logic, its standard.

The function of epistemology, however, is deeper and anterior to that of logic. Both logic and epistemology are for the validity of cognition. But the validity which logic discovers in cognition is not possible to attain unless certain prior conditions have been fulfilled. Logic proceeds to discover validity or

invalidity in the facts of evidence presented to it, but epistemology rises and solves the very question of the possibility of the evidences themselves being so presented to logic. The facts of evidence in order to be presented to logical consciousness presuppose that there is the subject or mind to apprehend the facts of evidence, that there is the object or nature which presents such facts of evidence, and further that there is the relation which all knowledge involves between the subject and the object. Now all these elements combine to prepare the ground which renders possible the very presentation of the facts of evidence to logical consciousness. So the very ground or possibility of the facts of evidence being presented is discussed and settled in epistemology. Psychology, too, which takes cognition as a fact and goes on describing its origin and development, presupposes epistemological problems of mind, nature and their relation. Thus, both logic and psychology presuppose epistemology.

There is, however, another stand-point from which it appears that both logic and epistemology presuppose psychology. If psychology is the science of consciousness and if consciousness is the foundation of all knowledge, then logical and epistemological consciousness must come within the wider scope of psychology whose subject-matter is consciousness, be it logical or epistemological. In fact, all science and philosophy which must involve the function of consciousness directed either to knowledge of phenomena or to that of reality as a whole, must be psychological in their origin and essence before being anything else. Psychology is the foundation on which the superstructure of all knowledge, scientific or philosophical, must be erected.

We have stated that epistemology is at the very root of logic because the business of logic as estimating evidences cannot proceed unless the conditions which render such evidences possible are discussed and settled by epistemology. There is, however, another way in which logic and epistemology can be thought as coincident. According to Hegel the subject and the object of knowledge, mind and nature, are identical in essence, though different in degree of reality, because they are evolved from one identical source, namely, the Absolute Idea or Thought.

The metaphysical position developed by Hegel is Idealistic Monism according to which mind and the extramental world are counterparts to each other, so that the laws of one are identical

with the laws of the other. His famous dialectical method is devised to achieve the same end, viz., to establish that both in the mental and the non-mental world development works by way of the triple movement of affirming something, denying it at the next stage and reaffirming a third something which at once includes and transcends what is affirmed and denied. This dialectical movement is the governing principle not only of the mental but also of the material world. Thus the rules of dialectic being common to the development of both the worlds it becomes easy for Hegel to think that the rules and principles which govern mind are identically the same as the rules and principles that govern nature. But the rules and principles of mind are identical with those of logic. Therefore, the rules and principles of logic are identically the same as those of nature. In other words, logic becomes identical with metaphysics and in fact the entire reality of the universe is governed by the rules of logic—a view which he calls 'panlogism' or all is logic. Considered in this way logic goes beyond the stage of methodology where it is busy only with distinguishing truth from error on the basis of evidences presented to the mind, and rises to be dialectic which is the underlying principle of development for both mind and nature. At this stage logic is not concerned with the estimation of evidences supplied by nature to mind but rather with the very character of mind and nature and of the relation that obtains between them, so that knowledge and its validity may be possible. It follows that logic becomes not only identical with metaphysics, but also specially with epistemology which is an integral part of metaphysics. Of the developments of identity between mind and nature carried on by the followers of Hegel, that worked out by Bosanquet seems to us to be the most satisfactory. According to this theory of identity knowledge is a mental construction of reality which unfolds itself more and more as knowledge grows.

2. THEORIES OF THE ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE.

Our problem for the present will be: How knowledge originates and what are its sources? Here, as elsewhere, philosophers differ. Thinkers of the empirical school have traced knowledge to sensations and feelings alone, those of the rational school

to reason alone. Kant traces it to a combination of sensation and reason and founded the empirico-rational school which received different developments at the hands of later rationalistic philosophers. Intuitionists, who form a class of their own, give an account of the origin of knowledge distinct from these all. In the following sections we propose to state and estimate all these theories of the origin of knowledge and their implications for reality which is so closely connected with knowledge.

3. EMPIRICAL THEORY OF THE ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE.

Empiricism as a method of knowledge takes knowledge as a psychological fact and by mere external analysis of its nature and factors comes to the belief that knowledge in the last resort is originated and constituted by sensations and feelings. Empirical philosophers having committed themselves to this purely psychological account of knowledge have been compelled to ignore the logical factors without which genuine knowledge is impossible. In our analysis of the thinking process we have seen that mere particulars of sensation can be only *felt* but never known ; but the empiricists think that knowledge is confined within actual and possible sensations, and is nothing more than, but is exhausted by, these particulars of sense. They think also that although there are universals or principles over and above the particular facts, yet these universals or principles become objects of our knowledge by virtue of their being generalised from sense-particulars with the help of induction. Hence they explain not only individual concrete facts but also abstract general principles in terms of experience and induction. The so-called *a priori* principles like the law of causality, the law of identity, the law of contradiction, etc., are not really prior to and independent of sense-experience but are generalisations from it.

The empirical account of knowledge, making knowledge to be wholly a product of external experience, observation and experiment, commits itself to the position that whatever lies beyond external experience must be unknown and non-existent. Introspection or internal experience being denied by empiricism the existence of the self or the subject as an active principle is necessarily denied and along with it its contribution to knowledge.

Knowledge becomes a completely outwardly determined product in which there is no internal determination of the self. Knowledge will thus be a passive product of external experience generated entirely for the mind and never by the mind, and there will be nothing in the mind which was not already there in the sense. And the most important of the consequences of the empirical theory of knowledge will be that the mind will not only be reduced to be an object amongst other objects, which are all externally determined by one another, but also to a successive series of externally determined sense-impressions. The so-called external world will also lose its substantial character on the analogy of the phenomenal character of the self ; for, if the self is dissipated into a series of momentary bits of sense-experience the idea of substantiality or reality is lost for ever and cannot be extended to the outside world, which can enjoy substantiality only on the analogy of the substantiality of the self, and the result is that all reality, either of the mind or of the world, being necessarily denied by empiricism, metaphysics becomes impossible.

Empiricism because of its exclusive emphasis on sensations as the origin and factor of knowledge is otherwise known as 'Sensationism'. The term 'Phenomenalism' is closely associated with empiricism in so far as the object which empirical theory of knowledge reveals is the phenomenon beyond which it has no access. Auguste Comte renamed it by the term 'Positivism' in so far as he thought that all knowledge has for its origin and content positive experience which is actually attained through the external senses.

In the field of knowledge there are even to this day two main rival schools of philosophy, Empiricism and Rationalism. Rationalism in its radical sense is diametrically opposed to empiricism and is satisfied like its rival with the opposite extreme of supposing that it is reason and its principles that are alone responsible for the origin and content of knowledge. History of philosophy is a history of this rivalry between empiricism and rationalism. In the ancient Greek period we have the Atomists and the Sophists, like Protagoras, Gorgias and others, who were the most ancient promulgators of the first principle of empiricism as a theory of knowledge. They were followed by Cyrenaics and the Epicureans in their empirical theory of knowledge, although the dominant interest of the latter was

ethical. In the modern period it was revived, after a lull during the medieval period, by Bacon who more systematically formulated the principle of empiricism as a theory of knowledge, though after all he relegated metaphysics and theology to a source of knowledge other than experience. The empirical tradition was continued by Hobbes and Gassendi, until it was given an articulate form by Locke, though Locke himself was not altogether free from rationalistic and metaphysical bias. Berkeley's empirical idealism, accepting Lockian sources of knowledge but reducing extra-mental world to phenomena of the mind, made a distinct advance in empiricism though the task of giving finality and perfection to empiricism was left for Hume, whose account of the origin and content of knowledge is purely empirical, purged of all rationalistic and metaphysical predilections. And all subsequent empirical philosophy, from the time of Mill to the empirical philosophy of the present day, has developed the details of the empirical theory of knowledge and has been responsible for the most recent psychological developments of which the extreme form reduces mind and its activities to physiological reactions and responses, and also for logical positivism and logical empiricism reducing knowledge to subjective construction without reference to objective or ontological reality, and dealing a death-blow to ethical and religious values.¹

4. RATIONAL THEORY OF THE ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE.

Just as objective attitude in the study of things and events of the world issued forth through its natural channel of external experience, even so the awakening of self-consciousness shifted man's mind backward and inward into its own powers which it discovered in *reason* or *self-consciousness*. Experience now became internal in place of being external. The immediate reason for such shifting of the mind from the external to the internal was that the revelation of external knowledge or *sense-experience* came to be found not only insufficient and contradictory but also unable to give knowledge of the permanent and the real in contradistinction from the transient and the phenomenal. This difference in attitude became responsible for Rationalism or the theory that the

1. Cf. Ayer: *Language, Truth and Logic*, p. 183.

self is essentially active and rational, and sensations are accidents to it, so that knowledge will be actively produced by the self out of its own inner ideas and will reveal the necessary as opposed to the contingent, and the permanent as opposed to the transient, with the help of reason, the self's true essence. Socrates and Plato were the earliest accredited rationalistic philosophers in the west to make true knowledge to originate in reason and to make the object of such knowledge whatever is real and eternal as distinct from the unreal or the phenomenal and the transient. The cardinal principle of rationalism was thus laid down by Socrates and Plato who pointed out that the self is an active reality that knows and knows through its own innate powers of reason. Sensation and feelings cannot give real knowledge and the so-called knowledge which they are supposed to give is only variable and contingent and is never necessary. Rationalism thus formulated by Socrates and Plato, though not untinged at their own hands with ethical bias, became outspokenly ethical in outlook through the Cynics and the Stoics, but received increasingly articulate form subsequently in the philosophies of Descartes, Leibniz and Wolff.

Knowledge was supposed to have for its origin and content, from the time of Socrates up to that of Leibniz and Wolff, in reason and reason alone, and the sensations and feelings had either no place in genuine knowledge, or had something to do with knowledge, in so far as they were on the way to becoming reason. Rationalism up to the time of Leibniz, therefore, explained the origin and content of knowledge exclusively in terms of reason, as if sensations even as materials of knowledge had no part to play in it, so that, all knowledge became *a priori* and analytical, the sensuous and *a posteriori* elements in knowledge being altogether ignored.

In modern times, the term Rationalism is never used to mean that knowledge is exclusively originated and constituted by reason. Since Kant it has been the expression for that theory of knowledge which makes knowledge to consist of sense-materials organised into intelligible experience by reason. Since Kant who made knowledge to be rationalised experience, all the subsequent rationalistic philosophers even up to the present day are really empirico-rational in their account of the origin and content of knowledge. There are indeed in knowledge *a posteriori* or empirical elements ; but these are always rationalised by the *a priori* elements

or elements of reason evolved from the mind within itself as an active creative principle ; though, however, the account of how the elements of sense are co-ordinated by the elements of reason into knowledge differs in different philosophers, such as Kant and Hegel.

5. CRITICAL THEORY OF THE ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE.

In our account of Empiricism as method of knowledge we have seen that it lays exclusive stress upon sensations and feelings as the origin and content of knowledge ; and in our account of Old Rationalism also which held its sway up to the time of Leibniz and Wolff we pointed out that reason was taken to be sole source and content of knowledge. The one upheld experience at the cost of reason and the other bolstered up reason to the neglect of sense. But proper analysis of a genuine piece of knowledge shows that it is always a perceptual judgment composed of percepts and concepts, sensation and reason, without which no genuine knowledge is possible. It was Kant who first pointed his finger to this important fact and he is, therefore, called a Critical Philosopher. In his account of the origin and content of knowledge which he calls *Critical* he distinguishes the function of both sense and reason, no one of which exclusively can give us genuine knowledge. Knowledge is indeed confined to experience, *i.e.*, sensations and feelings as the empiricist contends, but that should not mean that sensations and feelings are all for knowledge. They are only the matter of knowledge, rough and rugged, to be hewn and polished into intelligible experience by the forms and categories which our mind as rational subject of knowledge must necessarily evolve out of itself. Kant's method of knowledge is called critical because it does not, like empiricism, accept sensations and feelings or purely *à posteriori* elements as the only constituents of knowledge, nor like pure rationalism, makes knowledge to consist only of *à priori* ideas and concepts of the mind, but dissolves the conflict of the opposite dogmas of empiricism and rationalism by tracing it to a source which is at once empirical and rational, *à posteriori* and *à priori*. Viewed in this light empiricism which makes knowledge wholly to be composed of sensations and feelings is dogmatism. Dogmatism as characterised by Kant is the unquestioning acceptance of one or other of the factors of knowledge and of reality,

when there are other factors with equal claim for consideration. Taken in this light rationalism, pure and simple, is another dogmatism as it means a one-sided and credulous acceptance of reason alone as the origin and content of knowledge to the neglect of experience. Knowledge is, as our analysis shows, always formed matter. Empiricism is an account of knowledge where there is matter without form and pure Rationalism is an account of knowledge where there is form without matter. Either of them is dogmatic in its attitude and inadequate in its output.

The above analysis of the nature and factors of knowledge has sufficiently shown that philosophic knowledge is really an organic whole of sense and reason. But to take either of them as constituting knowledge is not only vitiating it into dogmatism but also anatomising it to death and destruction. Kant, however, struck the keynote of knowledge by pointing to the self as the transcendental unity of mental functions, but did not go so far as to establish an organic connection between sense and reason because of his original dualism between mind and the world of things in themselves. The empirico-rational method of subsequent philosophers, like Hegel, emphasising as it does, the necessary and organic relation of sense and reason establishes the point that sense is not antagonistic and foreign to reason but homogeneous with it. Knowledge is not a forced amalgam of sense and reason *ab extra*, but is an organic unity of sense-reason in which these two elements are only logically distinguishable but not really separable. The extreme empirical and rational schools of philosophy prior to Kant took experience and reason respectively to be the sole factor of knowledge ; the empirical school excluded reason, and the rational school sense, from the knowledge-situation. But the merit of empirico-rational philosophy since Kant lies in its attempt to reconcile them in the economy of knowledge and to reconstruct knowledge on the combined basis of sense and reason with an increasing degree of unity as it passes from the dualism of Kant into monism of Hegel.

6. *EMPIRICISM LEADING TO SCEPTICISM.*

In the previous section we have seen how empiricism, pure and simple, leads to dogmatism in so far as it makes knowledge unwarrantably to consist of sensations and feelings though reason

has no less a part to play in it. The term dogmatism used in connection with empiricism has its justification only in its wider sense because dogmatism here does not consist in an uncritical belief in anything for which there are no sufficient grounds in experience. Empiricism is dogmatism only in the sense that it is one-sided, emphasising sense-feeling and neglecting the function of reason in knowledge. But dogmatism in its ordinary and narrow sense is the more appropriate characterisation of old rationalism in so far as in the old rationalistic philosophy reason was endowed with the power of revealing to us anything and everything to which experience has no apparent access. On the pretext of reason human mind was supposed to have knowledge of things beyond sense-experience. Hence rationalism of old was characterised as dogmatic, that is, credulously believing in what could not be proved through experience. Reason in this extreme dogmatic form was hardly distinguishable from revelation. Beginning from the time of Plato up to that of Leibniz rationalism was supposed to supply us with the unwarranted knowledge of noumenal essence of things of this world and many things of the other world like heaven and hell and predestination. But empiricism has its rise in the confidence in our sense. Senses in direct contact with particular objects of the world before us make us acquainted with their particular qualities, and forbid us to go beyond them. Empiricism thus raises the first voice of protest against accepting as true whatever is beyond senses. This attitude of protest arising out of confidence in sense-experience, though already started in the ancient Greek period by the Atomists, did not prove very effective even in the later empirical philosophy of Bacon or of Locke and Berkeley in the modern period, as none of them were unflinching believers in experience as the only source of knowledge. But it is in the philosophy of Hume, in which experience became the alpha and omega of knowledge, that doubt about all that is not given in sense feelings became the established principle, with the result that the noumenal background of the world was subjected to suspicion and distrust. With Hume philosophy did not only begin with doubt, as all true philosophy should, but also culminated in it, resulting in complete scepticism about metaphysical knowledge. And it was left to Kant to attempt reconstruction of metaphysics on the debris of Hume's sceptical ravages.

7. *VALUE OF SCEPTICISM IN PHILOSOPHY.*

If scepticism is the mind's attitude of doubt in which it cannot be decisive as to what to know, but only looks round about itself with an eye of suspicion, it is certainly a detriment to philosophy, whose business is to know and arrive at definite conclusions with regard to what it knows. Apparently, therefore, scepticism does a disservice to philosophy instead of promoting its end. But on the other hand if it has no positive value for philosophy, it has, however, a negative value at least in the sense that doubt stimulates inquiry. If man's mind were always ready to extend unquestioning belief in every thing presented to it, then philosophy is bound to become a catalogue of dull and insipid metaphysical dogmas and not that living intellectual force in which every affirmation and negation stand on its own right gained after proper sifting of beliefs to the contrary. Scepticism is the first step to criticism which all sound philosophy should welcome. All genetic development of ideas in philosophy is an unerring witness to what sceptical attitude of mind can do for philosophy. But when we say all this, we must also take the warning that a persistent scepticism, which only doubts and disbelieves not with the purpose of reaching the indubitable, always destroying beliefs but constructing none, is a menace to philosophy. Thus the scepticism of this extreme form which not only begins with doubt but also ends in it, the type of which we notice in Hume's thought, is a philosophical suicide.

8. *INTUITIONISM AS THE THEORY OF ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE.*

Before trying to understand Intuitionism as a theory of the origin of knowledge we would do well to understand what is exactly meant by the term 'intuition'. The term 'intuition' in western philosophy is one that has received the most varied connotation at the hands of its exponents. Perhaps the reason is that intuition in whatever connotation it may be taken has been generally regarded as opposed to reason on which philosophic explanation is based. On the other hand, there are thinkers who maintain that it is intuition that is alone competent to give us truth in its entirety, and reason, which proceeds by discursive and analytical method, can give us only part-views of truth and reality.

Rationalistic philosophers as a class are of opinion that since all that is real is rational and is susceptible to rational or intellectual construction, reason alone is the fit organ of apprehending truth and reality. Hence philosophy which is always rational explanation of life and the universe cannot accept intuition as the organ of apprehending truth and reality ; if it does, it degenerates into mysticism. One of the senses in which intuition is taken by rationalistic philosophers is that it is that complex psychical phenomenon, composed of certain inherited beliefs and memory, which gives the mystic a super-normal vision of things inaccessible to the normal mind guided by experience and reason ; and they always warn us that we should "remember that what illuminates the soul may darken the world ; and the mystic, in reading his yearnings and feelings into nature, has often made poetry of what should be prose, and has prevented man from gaining that insight into material things on which even his spiritual progress is ultimately dependent. We should, moreover, keep in mind that the peculiar feelings of certainty which attend the mystic vision is not itself a criticism of objective truth."¹

And mysticism is further disparaged by rationalistic thinkers, who point out that mysticism is an abnormality of mind almost akin to insanity and is often common amongst persons living in an asylum, but they argue also that mysticism has the baneful consequences of making its votaries take a pessimistic attitude to life and encouraging ascetic austerities in them. There are other rationalistic philosophers, however, who make some amount of concession to intuition when they say that there is at least one kind of intuition which may be rightly called "imagination touched with conviction." This kind of intuition, they acknowledge, is responsible for discovery of many of the scientific and philosophic truths which are subsequently strengthened by logical or rational analysis. Intuition viewed in this light may be said to have been useful in the case of uncorroborated guesses of a Faraday or a Clark Maxwell and many of the metaphysical discoveries of great philosophers yet untested by reason. These different views of rationalistic philosophers on the nature and function of intuition can only point to the fact that they view with suspicion intuition in any form as an organ of truth and reality. But it is a relief to an unbiased mind to find

1. Montague: *The Ways of Knowing*, p. 58.

that some of the greatest rationalistic philosophers like Bradley, and some of the greatest of empirical philosophers like James, have acknowledged in one form or other the value of intuition as a source of the apprehension of transcendental truth and reality. A curious reader may also find in a number of passages in Hegel¹ how he, though an extreme votary of rationalism, rises at times to mystic intuition of the truth.

Among the most recent of philosophers we find that one of the famous accounts of intuition has been furnished to us by the late Henri Bergson. To him intuition is the only organ of grasping reality which is dynamic, and intellect which is discursive and dissecting in its mode of operation can afford us only static aspects of it. He defined intuition as "the kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible".² Intellectual analysis, however multiplied, will only hover round about the facets of reality by means of its own concepts or symbols without reaching to the heart of it. Reality to Bergson, as already stated, is dynamic and never static. It is the continuous flux and flow, and in order to transport oneself into the midst of this ever-mobile reality which he calls *Change* or *Duration*, intuition or 'intellectual sympathy' can be the only guide, and not intellect or reason which by its concepts or ideas only staticises what is really dynamic.

When Bergson calls upon us to grasp reality through intuition, he does not deny the practical value of ordinary sensations and ideas or concepts with which our mind interprets only the aspects of reality. But in such interpretations, he reminds us, reality loses its own essential mobile character, and holds that all philosophies other than his are distorted views of reality. It follows then logic and epistemology which discuss the function of percepts and concepts in judgements are only fruitless mental efforts directed to the apprehension of reality. All that they do is to degrade the dynamic reality into a lifeless corpse from which mobility has been taken away.

Bradley following up the intellectual scheme of Hegelian logic has come upon another theory of intuition though he does not himself use the word intuition, but 'transcendental experience'

1. William Kingsland: *Anthology of Mysticism*, pp. 183-184.
2. Bergson: *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 6.

or simply 'experience' as the ultimate source of our grasp of the absolute reality. The absolute reality to him is the coherent system of subordinate elements, each of which being subject to intellectual analysis represents a partial truth or appearance and falls short of the totality to be grasped only by "experience" which is supra-rational or alogical. In Advaita Vedāntism, too, *nirvikalpa pratyakṣa* or *aparokṣanubhūti* is perhaps the finest conception of intuition which differs both from Bergsonian and Bradleyian conception of it in two important respects: first, in respect of its nature and secondly, in respect of its object. Advaitist's intuition is a calm state of pure consciousness unlike the thrilling and throbbing intuition of Bergson, and the triplicate fullness of thinking, feeling and willing of Bradley in their sublimated forms. In point of object, too, Advaitist intuition differs from Bergsonian as well as Bradleyian in that while in Bergson's intuition that which is intuited is the dynamic principle of Duration which is itself a 'synthesis' of unity and plurality, eternify and time, and in Bradley 'experience' has for its object the transcendental reality which is a systematic whole of transmuted cohering elements thus admitting of some sort of difference within its unity, Advaitist's intuition has for its object pure changeless unity of Being from which all difference and duality have altogether vanished.

Prof. N. O. Lossky of the University of Petrograd in his works, *The Intuitive Basis of Knowledge*, *Handbook of Logic* and his brochure entitled *Intuitivism*, has developed an intuitive theory of knowledge which is distinct from intuitionism current amongst the traditionally intuitive philosophers like Bergson, Bradley and others in more than one point. Lossky's intuition has neither the 'irrationality' of Bergson's intuition, nor has the supra-rational element as opposed to discursive thinking that limits the being to its aspects shutting out the whole. His intuition does not stand for any special kind of knowledge, but covers all forms of cognition ranging from perception to memory and imagination, in which *things cognised and the self cognising them are always immanent in consciousness*. Lossky believes that the problem of epistemology so far has not been rightly approached either by empiricism or by rationalism or even by Kant's critical philosophy, in so far as each of them in its own way ignores the fact that the external world and the self are *immanently given* in

knowledge. Empiricism confining itself to the *processes* of knowing does not give knowledge proper, for some elements of the real world, such as space and time, remain always beyond the reach of experience and form the subject-matter of metaphysics. Again, rationalism, which makes knowledge to be constructed of the elements of the self which have no community with the aspects of the real world, also fails to give us knowledge proper, for the rationalist's knowledge is virtually the self's symbol of reality other than the self and therefore cannot have a resemblance with the original. And lastly even Kant's theory of knowledge, which makes knowledge a construction of the world out of the empirical elements by means of the forms and categories projected from the self, cannot guarantee the objectivity of knowledge in spite of his insistence on the necessary character of the forms and categories. Besides his original dualism between the self and the not-self or the world of things-in-themselves, necessarily creates an epistemological dualism between sense-data and the *à priori* forms and categories, the result being that knowledge which is like a chemical compound must necessarily be different from the elements that are compounded. The external world remains beyond the access of knowledge. Nor is his theory of schematism by Time helpful here, for time being an *à priori* form, cannot determine the temporal order of the sense-data, and to say that it is determined *à posteriori* by the events themselves would be to admit relations as given from without, which is against the Kantian position. Hence Lossky concludes that if knowledge is to be knowledge of reality, of the world, self and God, the reality must be *immediately* and *immanently* given in it. And Lossky does not shrink from the consequence that his account of knowledge has a mystical tendency. The kind of mysticism he shrinks from is the mysticism which has a religious tinge, and which proclaims that it is only in religious union between the human and the divine self that we have an access to an immediate knowledge of God. Lossky claims that his intuitional theory of knowledge is not inconsistent with but rather fully satisfies the requirements of epistemology, and has an advantage over pure empiricism, pure rationalism and even over Kantian criticism, none of which brings together the self and the not-self and their relation in such an immanent *givenness*, that forms the essence of knowing. Many important

issues are involved in Lossky's intuitional theory of knowledge, and it is not the place to consider all of them fully and show their relations to his general stand-point. But the thing we like to emphasise is that when Lossky claims that knowledge according to his own theory is objective and immediate, he does not mean by his objectivity the same thing as externality. For I may have knowledge of my own self's activity, or I may have memory of an established fact. In both these cases my knowledge is objective, because my self's activity and my revived image of the established fact stand over against myself and I cannot undo them, and they form the content of my judgment. But although they are objective they are by no means external to me. And we cannot conclude our account of Lossky's theory of intuitionism without pointing out the fact that though according to Lossky knowledge is immediate and the criterion of truth lies in this immediacy, yet he has made a provision for the distinction between truth and error. Lossky argues that our experience of one and the same fact may sometimes be accompanied by a consciousness of subjectivity and sometimes by a consciousness of objectivity, and the truth of our knowledge will depend upon the process of careful discrimination, showing which elements of reality possess objective significance and what relation is there between these elements. And the entire progress of science is a testimony to the increasing discrimination between truth and error in so far as the objective world is concerned, and our progressive consciousness of individuality in relation to the universal self, also, helps us to distinguish between truth and error in the internal world of the self.

As we have already stated, Lossky's intuitionism as a theory of knowledge has neither the irrational element of Bergson's intuitionism, nor the supra-rational element of the intuitionism of Bradley and the Advaita Vedāntist. Knowledge to him is intuition because it gives us *an immediate consciousness* of the self and the not-self in the same act of cognition. Reality to him is *known*, and *not felt* as it is to Bradley and Advaitism. It differs indeed from pure empiricism and from pure rationalism, and even from criticism of Kant, and in what points we have already seen. But it seems to us that it is hardly different from the objective idealist's account of knowledge, where also the subject and object and the relation between the two are revealed. It remains for

us to point out therefore that Lossky's account marks an unnecessary engrossment of what we generally understand by intuition. The element of faith or feeling as a suprarational consciousness is the accredited differentia of intuition, and even the staunchest of rationalists like Hegel and the hardest of empiricists like William James have given intuition the connotation of suprarationality which Lossky wants to take away.

The above accounts of the most typical forms of intuition in the West as well as in the East have, in the midst of their diversities, one point in common that they make intuition to consist in a superintellectual consciousness having for its object the givenness of reality which it feels and never argues out. Our ordinary intellectual knowledge makes use of logical concepts and is therefore only competent to picture qualities, aspects and relations in terms of which objects of our every-day experience are made known to us. Intellectual knowledge in which sensation and reason are involved only analyses what intuition feels and discovers. Hence intuitionism as a theory of the origin of knowledge tells us, in the last resort, that so far as the knowledge of reality as such is concerned it has supreme importance and value. When we climb down from the height of reality to objects of our empirical world, intellectual judgments making use of sensations and ideas are the only sources of our understanding and explanation of them. From what is stated here the natural question that may arise is: What is the relation between intellect and intuition? as also the further question: Can there be any intuitional philosophy over against rationalistic philosophy? We have already remarked how intuition has been generally underestimated by all too scientific and intellectual philosophy which makes intellect to be the whole and sole instrument of knowledge, and does not hesitate to equate intuition with an abnormal conscious state that darkens rather than discovers truth. But the saner among philosophers of the present are beginning to find that intellectual analysis and rational reflection are effective only within certain limits beyond which they cannot go. They are beginning to concede that there is a higher form of consciousness which must soar beyond the intellectual level to grasp or realise the absolute Reality and transcendental Truth. This level of supraintellectual consciousness they call intuition. Thus intuition is not against reason but beyond reason. Intellect has its value as an analysis of and

reflection about Reality which has been already synthetically grasped by intuition. When all this is said it remains very little for us to state in detail as to the relation between philosophy and mysticism. If philosophy is not to be a mere intellectual analysis of the facts and phenomena of the universe and their relations where sensation and logical categories have their exclusive play, but must rise to the synthetic grasp of the absolute Reality, then philosophy in the last resort may be said to develop into mysticism,¹ and is none the poorer for it. If we understand this highest development of philosophy the apparent antagonism between philosophy and mysticism dissolves itself into nothingness. In India, too, philosophy has not been thought of as opposed to but necessarily developing into mysticism as the proper attitude to grasp the ultimate reality, though it has never ignored the claims of intellect to demonstrate what is discerned by intuition. The conflict of logic and mysticism is rather apparent than real in Indian philosophy as, we think, it should be in all serious philosophies. Thus our conception of the relation between Philosophy and mysticism is that philosophic consciousness, in so far as it culminates in an immediate grasp of the all-embracing Reality does not fight shy of rational scheme of thought, but rather transcends it for its consummation. And we fully endorse the view of Dr. McTaggart on this point when he says: "A Mysticism which ignored the claims of the understanding would no doubt be doomed. None ever went about to break logic, but in the end logic broke him. But there is a Mysticism which starts from the standpoint of the understanding and only departs from it in so far as that standpoint shows itself not to be ultimate, but to postulate something beyond itself. To transcend the lower is not to ignore it."²

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 6. N. O. LOSSKY: *The Intuitive Basis of Knowledge*; *Handbook of Logic*; and *A Brochure on Intuitivism*.
 7. BRADLEY: *Appearance and Reality*.
1. Cf. Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*, p. 172.
 2. *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, p. 292.

CHAPTER III

KNOWLEDGE OR INTERPRETATION OF EXPERIENCE

1. DEVELOPMENT OF THE KNOWLEDGE-PROBLEM.

The problem of knowledge is the most comprehensive of all problems in philosophy. Its comprehensive character is due to the conditions and factors that have been suggested by different schools of thinkers, not only in the present age but also at the different periods of the history of philosophy. Of the contributions made by the ancient philosophers to the problem of knowledge that of Plato is certainly the most important. According to him *knowledge* has for its object that which has reality or being. Now Ideas or Forms are supported by Plato to have being. The Ideas or Forms are universals, and therefore the universals have being. But the universals of Plato are not like the abstract ideas or concepts of the mind. They are not subjective class-concepts, but are objective forces independent of any mind, and individual things and minds derive their origin from them. Now Plato distinguishes *opinion* and *ignorance* from knowledge which has for its object being. Opinion has for its object that which has both being and non-being or which is midway between being and non-being. In this sense the entire phenomenal world *becoming* which, according to Plato, has half-reality and half-unreality, which is midway between being and non-being, is the object of opinion. Opinion with Plato thus means what we understand by sensuous knowledge. And ignorance which is the opposite of knowledge has for its object the opposite of being, that is, non-being. According to Plato, then, knowledge always refers to the universal, and because the phenomenal or the particular has never been distinctly shown by him to participate in the universal, knowledge refers to an *abstract universal* divorced from particulars, although Plato sometimes makes futile attempts to show that the particulars live in and through the universal. Hence the net result of Plato's thought is that knowledge refers to the abstract universals which have no living, tangible relation with the

particulars, and that the phenomenal world is never an object of knowledge, but only of opinion which is of inferior cognitive value. We notice also that the essence of knowledge is reason, or even intuition, as some interpreters of Plato think. In it there is no element of sense-experience, because sense-experience refers to the transient and the phenomenal, whereas reality which is the object of knowledge is permanent and real.

In Aristotle knowledge receives a different connotation, because to him the universal is not absolutely transcendent, but lives immanently through the particular and the phenomenal. In one word, the universal of Aristotle is what may be called concrete universal and therefore knowledge, which has for its object the concrete world where the universal and the particulars have a living relation amongst them, is not purely rational in character, but includes within it the elements of both sense and reason. In this way Aristotle's theory of knowledge seems to do justice not only to philosophical but also to scientific knowledge.

Locke's *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* brings to the forefront many important problems connected with the character of knowledge. To him the mind and the extra-mental are two independent existences and between them the ideas play the part of a mediator. Our knowledge is always a representation in the sense that the extra-mental object is never directly knowable but always through the ideas of our mind which stand like a screen between the knowing mind and the object known. This is his famous theory of Representationism. He defines knowledge by saying that it consists in an agreement or disagreement amongst ideas. If the ideas of our mind agree, that is, if they are consistently thinkable, then the knowledge which arises out of such agreement amongst ideas is positive in character, and if there is disagreement amongst ideas, that is, if the ideas are not consistent with one another, our knowledge becomes negative in character. For instance 'a horse is a quadruped' gives us positive knowledge because the ideas of 'horse' and 'quadruped' agree with one another and are consistently thinkable ; and 'a horse is not a biped' is an instance of negative knowledge because there is disagreement between the idea of a horse and the idea of a biped. An estimate of Locke's theory of knowledge will reveal that as an empiricist he does not allow any active part to be played by the mind in the construction of knowledge which is thrust upon the mind from

the outside in the shape of ideas coming from the world of objects. Secondly, the relation between knowledge and ideas is no living or inner relation but a mechanical or external relation, because Locke supposes ideas as ready-made elements previous to knowledge which arises subsequently on the discovery of agreement or disagreement amongst the ideas. But we shall see that such a conception of an external relation between ideas and knowledge indicates misunderstanding of the proper function of knowledge. For we shall see that just as knowledge presupposes ideas, even so ideas themselves presuppose knowledge. Thirdly, from his representationist theory of ideas knowledge cannot be shown to be an interpretation of the world, for it has no access to the heart of it. Knowledge supposes that there must be the mind actively knowing the world and the world is a constitutive element in knowledge. But both of these factors, namely, the active function of the mind and constitutive character of the world are absent from the account of knowledge given by Locke.

Berkeley made capital of the difficulty in Locke's representationist theory of knowledge and pointed out that to be an object of knowledge the world must be perceived by the mind. An unperceived world to Berkeley is a non-entity. In the first stage of his philosophy the world is reduced to be an idea of the finite mind, but the objection of solipsism made against him by his critics leads him to modify his view and to hold that the objects of the world are no doubt ideas or perceptions of mind, not finite but infinite. And our knowledge is merely symbolic of the world of objects which has its being in the ideas of the divine mind. But the main difficulty in the theory of Berkeley is that it dissolves all objects into ideas and the distinction between subject and object which knowledge involves is not clearly worked out in its epistemological perspective, and scientific knowledge, which has for its object the real external world in its functions and relations, does not receive from him the due recognition it deserves.

In Kant the problem of knowledge receives almost a unique consideration in so far as he brings in almost all the necessary conditions and factors that help knowledge to attain both scientific and philosophic significance. Kant starts with a dualism between finite mind as a functional unity and the extra-mental world, and develops his theory of knowledge where there is a joint contribution of the elements of mind and the elements of the extra-mental

world. In his theory he refutes subjective idealism of Berkeley to whom the extra-mental world is non-existent. He repudiates also the empirical monism of Hume who reduces the mental and the extra-mental worlds to one and the same kind of a series of sensations hanging, as it were, in the mid-air without their locus or origin either in the mind or in the extra-mental world, but at the same time giving us knowledge of the so-called mind and the extra-mental world by an automatic association amongst them. Kant's criticism of Humian theory of knowledge brings out what he himself understands by knowledge. To Kant knowledge is construction of experience where the materials of sense which proceed from the world of reality or things-in-themselves are organised into intelligible experience by forms of sensibility and categories of the understanding. Now this intelligible experience or knowledge, therefore, involves the elements of sensation and the categories of the understanding, so that knowledge is always an *a priori* synthetic judgment in the sense that categories of the understanding are synthetic because they are only the results of the mind's logical powers which must be necessarily applied to otherwise unorganised sense-manifold to transform it into intelligible experience. In this account of knowledge as given by Kant we get many of the necessary factors of knowledge which we miss in the other accounts given above. We have here both the subject and object of knowledge, the subject being always the transcendental unity of apperception and the objects is not here any extra-mental reality or thing-in-itself, but what our understanding can possibly make for itself. Again it is Kant who for the first time points out that judgment is the unit of knowledge as against the discrete sensations of Hume. Knowledge is a complex which combines in itself the elements of sensation or percepts as well as the elements of the understanding or concepts, unlike that conceived either by Hume as consisting wholly of percepts, or by Leibniz as consisting wholly of concepts.

But impartial criticism of Kantian theory of knowledge will reveal that he retains the original metaphysical dualism between mind and the extra-mental reality and his theory of knowledge brings in the object as something intervening between mind and the extra-mental reality. Nor has he shown how the empirical and the rational elements which enter into knowledge will at all amalgamate so as to give rise to an organic whole of knowledge

in spite of his utmost efforts to do so in his theory of schematism of the categories. In his schematism of the categories he claims that imagination, which is a necessary element of each schema by virtue of which the categories are applied to sensations, explains, with the help of time, the applicability of pure categories to heterogeneous sense-manifold and therefore serves the purpose of amalgamating sense-manifold and understanding into intelligible experience. But against this it is urged that if this were the reason why the elements of sense and the elements of the understanding should unite, then they could unite of themselves in spite of and outside imagination, which holds out no better condition of their unification. The result has been that Kant leaves the matter without explanation which is afforded by post-Kantian idealists, specially Hegel.

At the hands of Hegel the problem of knowledge has received perhaps the most satisfactory explanation inasmuch as he has referred to all those necessary conditions that render possible philosophic knowledge as interpretation of experience or reality. The fundamental difficulty of dualism of Kant is dissolved by his monistic idealism according to which reality is one spiritual whole which evolves the mental and the extra-mental worlds, and therefore the mental and the extra-mental worlds because of their common origin cease to be independent entities by themselves, but stand to each other in an organic relation of duality within the unity of the spiritual whole. The elements which enter into knowledge, namely, percepts and concepts, cease to be antagonistic elements and can unite in knowledge which is an organic whole of them both. Reality being a conscious spiritual principle, its very essence is *Thought* which evolves out of itself the world of things and minds as its necessary objects. Thinking on the part of the spiritual reality means creation or evolution of this world, so that the spiritual reality creates the world as it thinks, and because individual consciousness is a reduplication or reproduction in finite centres of the ultimate spiritual reality, our knowledge is re-thinking of what the ultimate spiritual reality thinks of itself. The further idealistic implications of knowledge are that our knowledge indicates a rising scale of interpretation of the world starting from scientific knowledge and reaches up to philosophical knowledge through art and religion. Science, art and religion mark the different stages of knowledge

in its interpretation of reality until the final goal of knowledge is reached in philosophy. Knowledge in all these different stages involves duality, and never dualism, between the subject and the object. Knowledge is always a whole of which logically distinguishable elements are subject and object, which are not really separable as they are in Lockian theory of knowledge, nor is the object of knowledge a mere logical construct of our understanding as Kant makes it to be, but it is a part of reality as such in which it lives, moves and has its being. Knowledge is thus interpretation, in different degrees, of reality as it rises from scientific conception of the world through art and religion to a philosophic conception of it. Secondly, knowledge, in these different stages, from scientific to philosophic, will give different degrees of reality and for the matter of that different degrees of truth, for if the truth-value of knowledge depends upon its interpretation of reality the increasing unfoldment of reality to knowledge will mean increasing degrees of truth. Thus in this view of knowledge we shall have to admit different degrees of truth, until knowledge will become identified with truth in philosophy which is interpretation of reality as such. Hegel in his characteristic way of explanation has said that our knowledge involves contradiction and the lower is it in the scale, the greater and more numerous is the contradiction involved, so that the kind of knowledge that is lowest in the scale involves the greatest and the most numerous contradictions which gradually disappear in quality and quantity, until they are finally dissolved when philosophic knowledge is attained. Now philosophic knowledge is the knowledge of the absolute reality in which there is a final synthesis of all contradictions, so that it is coincident with Truth and Reality, and is free from all contradictions. It is the knowledge of the whole in which all its elements are finally co-ordinated and reconciled, and this whole is the absolute spiritual reality. It is because of this that Hegel has defined philosophy as the science or knowledge of the Absolute Idea. Knowledge, thus, in the philosophical sense is interpretation of reality.

Bradley and Bosanquet develop essentially the same theory of reality and of knowledge as Hegel does, though not without difference in certain minor matters. To Bradley and Bosanquet as well as to Hegel reality is a spiritual system, and our knowledge is an interpretation of reality. In our knowledge we do not make reality, nor, does our self copy reality as something distinct

in kind from it, but our self and its knowledge being self-expressions of the rational reality, our self and knowledge find themselves at home with reality. So when knowledge interprets reality it interprets itself. As Bradley himself puts it, "In short, our knowledge is such that it can comprehend itself and reality."¹ Both Bosanquet and Bradley agree that knowledge, as an intelligible experience in its comprehensive character, is identical with reality. Knowledge, in terms of Bosanquet, "consists of what we are obliged to assert in thought, and because we are all obliged to think assertorially according to the same methods, the results of our thinking form corresponding systems—systems that correspond alike to each other and to reality."² As to the question whether this correspondence of our knowledge with reality depends on the agreement of the physical stimuli proceeding from nature as well as on the homogeneous character of our intelligence, Bosanquet's answer is that these stimuli which make up nature have no priority in knowledge, that is, do not determine it. The identity between nature and knowledge is a consequence of the identity of our experience, which as a rational whole or a system realises itself through the systems of nature and of knowledge into which it necessarily grows. Thus in knowledge there is "no passage from subjective to objective but only a development of the objective."³

2. KNOWLEDGE AND JUDGMENT.

Idealists are of opinion that judgment is the necessary element of knowledge. We have seen that according to idealists knowledge is interpretation of reality or experience. But this act of interpretation cannot take place without the help of judgment. The mind facing reality indeed receives isolated sensuous impressions from reality through its senses. But the sensuous impressions themselves cannot afford us knowledge of reality. The sensuous impressions as such can only be *felt* but never known. Knowledge arises only when the mind discerns *meaning* in the sensuous impressions. The discernment of meaning in sense impressions consists in their organisation into a system which is another name

1. Bradley: *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 317.

2. Bosanquet: *The Essentials of Logic*, p. 22.

3. *Ibid.*

for knowledge or interpretation of them. Now this organisation of sense impressions into a system or interpretation of them is the act of *judging*. So interpretation of sensuous impressions involves judgment. Or, to put the same thing in different words, judgment is the necessary element of knowledge or interpretation of experience. We conclude then knowledge or interpretation of experience consists in discernment of meaning in our ideas and impressions of reality. But we should not think that ideas and impressions have any isolated or independent values and that they give rise to judgment or knowledge by subsequent juxtaposition. The fact of the matter is that knowledge or judgment is a unitary mental act in which ideas and impressions of reality and discernment of meaning in them are logically distinguishable but inseparable factors.

If knowledge is interpretation of reality or experience, it is never a finished product but it grows as the mind discovers more and more the aspects, factors and relations of which reality is composed. In its growth knowledge works by way of perception, conception and reasoning. But in all these forms which knowledge assumes there is the element of judgment always involved. Perception supposes sensations. But sensations themselves do not amount to knowledge which always consists in discernment of meaning and to discern meaning in sensations is to *judge* them. Thus perception as interpretation of sensation or as discernment of meaning in it is a form of judgment. The sensations of a particular colour, of a particular shape, of a particular smell and of a particular taste, when put together and interpreted, give rise to a definite meaning and are thus transformed into the perception, say, of an orange. But this putting together of particular sensations and interpretation of them constitute the act of judging. It is evident then that *perception involves judgment*. Again when a number of things is found to possess a similar quality or qualities we classify them on the ground of that quality or those qualities. This act of classifying objects on the ground of similar quality or qualities is known as *conception*. A leaf of a tree, a blade of grass, an unripe fruit are classified or grouped together on the ground of a common quality, namely, the green colour, and so we form a *concept* of green. Now in this formation of the concept of green there is the element of interpretation. We see then that *conception also involves judgment*. And it is not difficult

to show how reasoning, in which we pass either from general knowledge to a particular case or from particular cases to a general knowledge, also involves judgment. It requires no elaboration to indicate that all inferences involve premises which lead us on to a conclusion. Now both the premises as well as the conclusion are judgments in themselves. Thus not only perception and conception but also inference in and through which knowledge progresses all involve judgment as a necessary element. Knowledge in any form or any stage involves judgment. And measuring an object we require a unit in terms of which we measure it, similarly in estimating and understanding and acquiring knowledge we require judgment as its necessary element. We may say then that *judgment is the unit of knowledge*.

3. JUDGMENT—ITS DEFINITION AND ANALYSIS.

Kant of all modern idealists is, as we have said, the earliest to discover that judgment is the necessary element of knowledge. In his *Critique of Pure Reason* he has stated that 'the understanding may be defined as the faculty of judging.'¹ He elsewhere defines judgment as the conception of the unity of the consciousness of different representations, or of their relation so far as they make up one notion. A more careful orientation of logical consciousness in relation to the psychological and objective has been attempted by subsequent logical thinkers. Of such attempts that of Bradley is highly significant of and explanatory to the idealistic monism which he has developed. Bradley defines judgment as "The act which refers an ideal content to a reality beyond the act."² Bradley means that judgment is that mental act by which we refer or ascribe an idea to reality, but that such an idea can never wholly comprehend reality. In the judgment 'the table is round' we refer the ideal content 'round' to the table which is Reality. But roundness is not the whole of the table. The table is always beyond or more comprehensive than whatever is conveyed by any judgment whether by the given one or any other. According to Bradley when we assert something we ascribe a predicate to a subject. Now the subject is always the same, namely, Reality and the ideal content is the predicate. The subject and

1. *Critique of Pure Reason* (1881), Part II, Book I, Sec. 1.

2. *The Principles of Logic*, Vol. I, p. 10.

the predicate are brought into relation with one another in the assertion or judgment, they are not separate elements of thought, but are regarded as a whole or unity which is more real and concrete than each of subject and predicate because it transcends each of them. The unity of the assertion is always logically prior to the subject and the predicate in the sense in which the whole is prior to its parts. The above analysis of judgment brings out or lends support to Hegel's idealistic monism that everything is ultimately one and that this one is a whole or a system. It further brings out that manyness or diversity of thoughts and things which is apparent in the world of our experience is due to the fact that the underlying reality of the world, being a system, will include and assign relative reality to the many, but will also transcend the many.

Bosanquet though mainly agreeing with Bradley in his general idealistic position conceives of the whole as a concrete system and therefore approaches more nearly to Hegel than to Bradley. To him the many aspects of the whole which form the content of judgment are not apparent but are relatively real elements in the whole. Accordingly he defines judgment in a little different way and says that *it consists in identifying the content of ideas with reality* and adds that the nature and possibility of such an achievement are explained by resolving reality into a system of tendencies sustained by judgment itself. Each single act of identification which every judgment is, enters constitutively into an ever-expanding structure which in its totality is self-sufficient and self-controlling.¹ But as each act of identification of our ideas with reality is dominated by our purpose or interest and attention, it is necessarily a partial expression of the nature of reality which is thus modified and "the subject will always be reality in one form and the predicate in another form. The ultimate and complete judgment would be the whole of Reality predicated of itself. All our logical judgments are such portions and fragments of this judgment as we can grasp at the moment,"² under the dominance of purpose and attention. "The real subject in judgment is always Reality in some particular datum or qualification, and the tendency of judgment is always to be a definition of Reality."³ Our ordinary logical judgments like, 'This table

1. Cf. Bosanquet's *Essentials of Logic*, p. 22.

2. Bosanquet: *The Essentials of Logic*, p. 41. 3. Ibid.

is round', 'That flower is beautiful' are the partial presentation and interpretation of Reality appearing, under the psychical qualifications of interest and attention, as the particular subject of each such judgment.

4. PROPOSITION AND ITS CONSTITUENTS.

After we have considered the nature and implications of judgment it is but pertinent that we should raise the question as to the relation between Judgment and Proposition. It is generally held that the proposition is the verbal expression of judgment. But a careful analysis of the problem of knowledge we have formulated will at once indicate the difficulty we must feel in pronouncing a mere verbal expression true or false. If judgment is really an incident in the history of the mental development of an individual in relation to reality, then identification of judgment with proposition as a verbal expression not only stultifies judgment but also makes impossible the application of distinction between true and false to propositions. The real relation between a judgment and a proposition is not one of identity between the two, but rather that the proposition is only a factor in the concrete act of judgment, for when we apply the distinction of truth and error we do not refer to the proposition but rather to the *asserting* of the proposition. A judgment as an act or attitude of thought carries with it the idea of asserting, and the idea of asserting is the common and central element in all forms of judgment representing all possible attitudes of thought. Hence the idea of asserting must be distinguished from the idea of the assertible, just as all actuality is distinguished from possibility. Judgment as an act of thought refers to what has been actually asserted in relation to which the proposition is assertible. This distinction between judgment and proposition has been well brought out by Johnson when he has stated that the convenient way of distinguishing between judgment and a proposition will be to call proposition an *assertum* which coincides not with what has been asserted but rather with what a *assertible*. We see then that it is artificial to identify a judgment with a proposition as has been done ordinarily by saying that proposition is the verbal expression of judgment.

But though the above analysis sufficiently indicates that there is between judgment and proposition a real distinction as much as is there between what is actual and possible, yet our customary linguistic usage is such that we use the same terms, viz., subject and predicate, for the subject and predicate of both judgment and proposition. An analysis of the proposition shows that it is composed of apparently three elements, viz., the subject, the predicate and the copula. It is ordinarily supposed as if in order of time the concepts of subject and predicate appear ready-made first in our mind independently of judgments and then they are co-ordinated mechanically in a judgment by means of the copula which appears generally in the indicative mood, present tense of the verb 'to be'. But this is both logically and psychologically erroneous. Each of the subject and the predicate is a concept and may be shown to be the result of the use of a number of judgments. In the proposition 'man is mortal' the concept of man as subject could not have been arrived at without the previous judgments, X is a being possessed of animality and rationality, Y is such a being, Z is such a being and so on, which enable us to put these beings under a class on the ground of the similar qualities of animality and rationality possessed in common by all of them. The concept of mortal as predicate of the given judgment may likewise be shown to be the result of classification of a number of beings on the ground of their being subject to dissolution of cellular functions, under the common notion 'mortal'. It follows then that the judgment 'man is mortal' which combines and co-ordinates the concepts of 'man' and 'mortal' is not the mere product of these two concepts by themselves independent of judgments. No judgment is there which does not involve concepts and no concepts are there which do not involve judgments. The process of knowing is such that it cannot but involve a judgment and judgment is such that it cannot but involve concepts. But to dissect a judgment into concepts and say that the concepts, somehow got ready-made, have entered into a relation to form a judgment is to take a mechanical view of a really living process in which judgment and concepts are interwoven. And even if we try to trace back the process of judgment to its most primitive form in the consciousness of a child, we will not be far from the truth to say that it is coeval with the very conscious life and judgment of some form or other must be present, though this form

is vague and inarticulate as compared with judgments in comparatively grown-up minds, and the progress of knowledge means progress in the formation of more and more explicit judgments. The popular idea that the copula is what is ordinarily taken as a third element connecting the otherwise unconnected factors of a judgment is connected with this mechanical view of the knowledge-process. The copula 'is' in the judgment 'man is mortal' is not really a third element bringing together the apparently unrelated concepts of 'man' and 'mortal', but is really the explicit expression of relation of unity between 'man' and 'mortal' which already existed between 'man' and 'mortal' in an implicit form, so that the judgment 'man is mortal' really stands for a whole of knowledge, viz., man-being-mortal. Such being the nature and constituents of judgment we may naturally ask: Is the judgment always explicit? The answer is that a judgment being a mental act is not necessarily always expressed. For all practical purposes of retention and reproduction a judgment must always be associated with and expressed by language, though theoretically we may think that we may have a judgment without giving vent to it. Now judgment as an indivisible mental act when expressed in language takes the form of a proposition, so that proposition may be conceded to as the outward expression of the inner thinking process or judgment which all knowledge involves.

5. THE GENERAL CONDITIONS INVOLVED IN A JUDGMENT: IMAGE, IDEA AND MEANING.

We shall see that judgment must always refer to reality and much depends upon the conception which we form of reality. Reality may be primarily taken to be of two kinds, relative and absolute, and judgments referring either to relative or to absolute reality will fall within all possible varieties of the theory of judgment including existential, subsistentia or instantia, affirmative or negative, factual or normative. But whatever may be the type of judgment, it involves certain general conditions, partly psychological and partly metaphysical. The most fundamental of all these conditions is *Idea*. But idea is necessarily connected with other two collateral conditions, namely, *Image* and *Meaning*. We propose, therefore, to explain the significance and function of idea in a judgment in relation to image and

meaning, a clear understanding of which has much to do, among other things, with the distinction between a false and a true judgment.

Bradley and even Bosanquet are of opinion that the idea or ideas which are involved in a judgment may have two principal meanings—one, a 'psychical presentation,' the other an 'identical reference.' By the first of these two meanings, namely, a psychical presentation, a judgment is necessarily partial or untrue because it is always the result of the influence of the present moment or of memory, so that it can never occur again with precisely the same elements of detail as before. Such an idea, therefore, cannot refer to anything beyond our particular mental life. For it is our mental life of the moment that gives reality to such an idea. In this sense of a particular momentary presentation the idea is identical with *Image* and all images must be expressed by symbols, so that, propositions symbolic of such ideas cannot involve general names which are expressive not of particular psychical images, but always of something more than psychical images. But there is, however, another type of propositions where ideas involved in them have an 'identical reference' or '*Meaning*' proper. What then is this identical reference or meaning? We have already seen that in one sense an idea is identical with a particular psychical presentation. But in its wider and deeper sense it has an identical reference. Now this identical reference may be said to be constituted by the essential unvarying and universal element that is common to individual psychical images. This unvarying universal element is, however, inseparable but logically distinguishable from particular psychical images. Following Bosanquet's example of the *meaning* of St. Paul's Cathedral in London we may illustrate the distinction between an image and meaning in the following way: "No two people, who have seen it have carried away precisely the same image of it in their minds, nor does memory, when it represents the Cathedral to each of them, supply the same image in every detail and association twice over to the same person, nor do we for a moment think that such an image is the Cathedral. Yet we neither doubt that the same *means* something, and that the same to all those who employ it, nor that it means the same to each of them at one time that it did at every other time. The psychical images which formed the first vision of it are dead

and gone for ever, and so, after every occasion on which it has been remembered, are those in which that memory was evoked. The essence of the idea does not lie in the peculiarities of any one of their varying presentations, but in the 'identical reference' that runs through them all, and to which they all serve as material, and the content of this reference is the object of our thought."¹

What we gather from the above is this that we must distinguish between an image and meaning in connection with an idea, and the distinction between them consists simply in this that while an image has a particular reference depending upon our attention to and interest in a particular object determined by its momentary context, *meanig* is constituted by the unvarying and essential elements of an object which give a constant character to it. As Bosanquet puts it, "It is the typical element only, the element which points to the common reference in which my interest centres, that forms the content of the idea in this sense, taken not as a transient feature of the mental complex, but as definitely suggesting a constant object in our constructed world. And it suggests this object because it, the typical element, is a common point that links together the various cases and the various presentations in which the object is given to us. In this sense, it is a universal or an identity."² Thus an idea in the sense of identical reference "is both less and more than a psychical image. It includes only what is central and characteristic in the detail of each mental presentation and therefore, omits much. But it is not taken as a mental presentation at all, but as a content belonging to a systematic world of objects independent of my thought, and therefore, stands for something which is not mere psychical image."³ The relation between an idea in this sense and a judgment therefore appears to be this that such an idea is not an abstract image but a concrete case of reference to reality. But on the other hand it will be a mere abstraction of analysis apart from a judgment. A judgment is a more or less systematic process of thinking extending through time and dealing with momentary presentation as its material which is the proper field of display of such an idea. From the nature of such ideas it also follows that it

1. Bosanquet: *The Essentials of Logic*, p. 75.

2. Bosanquet: *The Essentials of Logic*, p. 77.

3. *Ibid* p. 78.

is these that can claim to stand for truth, because as already indicated they have reference beyond their mental existence, and point to an object in a system of permanent objects. But it must be noted that the ideas which point to such an object may not always exactly stand for the relation which these ideas claim for the object. In this sense the ideas have been called symbolic and judgment can only be made by the help of symbolic ideas.

The above considerations lead us to the understanding of what is meant by judgment from the idealist point of view and to the understanding of the distinction between the ultimate subject and logical subject and predicate and the parts they play in judgment which is the unit of knowledge. All knowledge in its ultimate aim consists in the apprehension of reality as a whole. The ultimate subject in judgment, therefore, is Reality. It is Reality which is revealed in all knowledge ; but it is not always revealed in its ultimate unqualified character. All of our logical judgments are but revelations of the same ultimate Reality under all possible qualifications or conditions. It appears then that the logical subject is always Reality, though appearing under qualifications or conditions. The logical predicate is always the *meaning* of an idea. A logical judgment to be *true* must consist in the affirmation of the *meaning* belonging to the Reality as modified by the qualification or conditions introduced by the logical predicate and the connection between the logical subject and predicate is always due to the identity of content at the point where the idea *joins* Reality, so that, *the judgment is always a revelation of some meaning or truth which is in Reality*. The first thing in judgment is that we must have a world of reality distinguished from our ideas and the claim of a judgment to truth will depend upon the meaning of the predicate-idea attached to the qualified or conditioned reality which the idea of our logical subject introduces in a judgment. All logical judgments therefore represent some sort of identity between reality and our meaning. It follows then that logical judgments cannot be said to reveal ultimate truth or reality. All that they do is to reveal reality in one or other of its aspects introduced by the logical subject and predicate in the relation of identity. It follows further that judgments, from their very nature of being analytical in respect to Reality, cannot give us the whole of reality or truth but at best can stand for partial truths or aspects of reality.

Bradley also sides with Bosanquet in his view of the nature of judgment. He, like Bosanquet, tells us that judgment is only an ideal qualification of Reality, that is, a representation of reality under certain conditions or qualifications introduced by the particular knower, so that it is the more or less conscious enlargement of an object not in fact but as truth. The object in our knowing is not altered in existence, but qualified in idea. Thus, judgment as ideal qualification of an object does not mean any alteration of the object in fact but only alteration by the knower. This follows from the fact that reality is the whole of experience and the objects, the minds, their qualities and relations are but the constructions of thought by the individual knower under conditions of time, space and causality which do not apply to reality. To know an object is to view reality under these conditions of the intellect which do not affect reality.

6. THEORIES OF JUDGMENT.

We have seen how and why judgment must be the unit of knowledge and have also hinted at that knowledge is always integral to a system of experience. When we say that judgment is the unit of knowledge what we mean is that judgment has not only its own significance but also significance for the whole of our knowledge. The cognitive value of a judgment is not simply immediate, it does not stop short with what it explicitly and immediately stands for, but has both retrospective and prospective reference so as to indicate its function in the development of knowledge which has thus for its subject-matter the whole of experience. Now if this be the implication of knowledge and if judgment so vitally contributes to the development of knowledge, the problem arises as to what are the *implicates of judgment*? What does judgment stand for? Opinions differ as to the implicates of judgment and these differences in the opinion as to the implicates of judgment have been responsible for the theories of judgment.

A judgment may refer to some thing, quality or relation which ~~exists~~ objectively in the sense that it manifests itself in order of time and space; or it may refer to nothing spatially and temporally real but to any one of the above depending on the subject for its manifestation. Again, by means of a judgment we may either affirm or deny the relation between what are spatio-

temporally real or between what are purely ideal or again between one which is spatio-temporally real and another which is purely ideal. Again, the further implication of judgment will entail the question whether it states the relation between the subject and the predicate with or without reference to any ideal. Now these implications of judgment will require of us to consider whether judgment will be existential or subsistent, or whether it is affirmative or negative, and even whether it is one of fact or of value.

7. EXISTENTIAL AND SUBSISTENTIAL JUDGMENTS.

In order to understand the distinction between Existential and Subsistent judgments we would do well first of all to understand the distinction between an existent and a subsistent. By an existent we mean that which is manifested in time or space. In this sense, therefore, an existent is a substantive, or that thing, quality or relation which exists by itself so that that thing, quality or relation is such that it cannot be thought of being used as an adjective to some other substantive, and judgment whose subject is any one of these existents is to be called an existential judgment. But a subsistent is that which can never be regarded as substantive but always as an adjective and which is never manifested in time or space. To put it more simply, a subsistent is that which has no spatio-temporal existence by itself but always depends on spatio-temporal existence of other things, qualities or relations. It apparently follows from the above that an existent is objective or external and a subsistent is subjective or internal, so that judgment will be subsistent if the subject of such judgment happens to be subsistent or that which is never manifested in time or space. Thus the proposition, $3+4$ equals 7 , is a subsistent proposition in the sense that the number 3 , the number 4 and the relation of equality between $3+4$ and 7 , do none of them exist temporally or spatially, but only subsist internally in the mind of the calculator.

But the above distinction between existential and subsistent judgments is not recognised by such logicians as Venn, Keynes and Russell, who denominate above-mentioned cases of existential and subsistent judgments indifferently by the term *instantial*, because they think that in them there is no reference to the

substance of the propositions but only to a certain mode in which all propositions, either universal or particular, must be generally formulated. Moreover, the use of the term existential has been the source of endless confusion and for these reasons the term 'instantial' has been substituted for existential and subsistential to include both of them. But since it was further found that it is not proper to designate all propositions by the general term 'instantial', as the term 'instantial' will cover all cases like the propositions, there is a god, there are horses, there are no sea-serpents, there is an integer between 3 and 5, there are prime integers between 4 and 15, there is no integer between 3 and 4, logicians have been led to qualify the term 'instantial' by adding the terms 'determinately' and 'indeterminately' before it, in order to distinguish between what we understand by existential and what we understand by subsistential. For, an examination of the first three propositions will show that they refer to existents and that the last three to subsistents. Thus it appears that the determinately instantial propositions correspond to existential propositions and that the indeterminately instantial propositions correspond to the last three subsistential propositions. But whatever may be at the root of this distinction, the real point seems to hinge upon what is called the Universe of Discourse. Now, the phrase 'universe of discourse' again is not free from ambiguity. In the most ordinary sense it may refer to what forms the subject matter of a particular discourse or discussion. So that, in this sense, it will mean simply the context of a discussion. But the term 'universe of discourse' may further refer to the actual existence, or non-existence of things in the different parts of the world. And thirdly, the universe of discourse may have a reference either to the universe of imagination or the universe of ideas or the universe of physical reality. To avoid all this ambiguity attached to the term, 'universe' of discourse, some logicians have preferred to think that the universe of discourse can only mean the subject-matter of our *description*. Whether that subject-matter belongs to the world of images or the world of ideas or to this or that part of the physical universe, it makes no difference with the propositions even if we distinguish them as existential and subsistential or as determinately instantial and indeterminately instantial. Hence what holds good of images also holds good of ideas ; and existence or non-existence of the idea of any object can only mean the

occurrence or non-occurrence of an act of thinking about the object during this or that time. In this way the subject-matter of a proposition, however, becomes reduced to ideas of our mind without reference to reality. As opposed to this view Mill insists that the import of any proposition must be understood in relation to ideas, but further provides that although any proposition must be understood in the first instance from the meanings or ideas it stands for, yet we cannot stop with mere ideas but go beyond them to the reality whether mental or physical.

8. AFFIRMATIVE AND NEGATIVE JUDGMENT.

We now come to the question of distinction between an affirmative and a negative judgment and their mutual implication. The distinction between affirmative and negative judgments depends upon the fact whether the predicates of the prepositions like 'A is B', and 'A is not B' are to be taken as contrary or contradictory to one another. In the case of a pair of contrary propositions like, 'this triangle is right-angled' and 'this triangle is equilateral' we find that their predicates oppose each other and become true contraries but as they belong to the same genus or are different combinations of the same angular space, the meaning of one so far does not exclude the meaning of the other. Here the meaning of denial is always of the nature of *contrary* denial and the nature of this denial is that every such denial substitutes some *affirmation* for the judgment which it denies, for here we speak and think, within a general subject or Universe of Discourse. In the given pair of contrary judgments when some body says, "this triangle is right-angled," and another person says, "this triangle is equilateral," there is indeed in the second judgment an apparent denial of the predicate of the first but it is not of absolute character suggesting also that there is the affirmation of the predicate of 'equilateral' of the same subject 'this triangle'. There are indeed cases of negative judgment like 'virtue is not square,' where there is no suggestion of affirmation of any kind. But such judgments are *meaningless*. But if we take a *significant* judgment whose predicate is denied of the subject we find that it suggests along with the denial of the given predicate an affirmation of some predicate other than the given.

The significant negative judgment, 'A is not B' is equivalent to 'A is not B but C' or equivalent to 'A is X, which excludes B'. Thus we see that even a negative judgment suggests an affirmation. Does it follow, then, that negation is always meaningless, and therefore, should be excluded from our speech and writings? The answer is, that negation is not useless, in the first instance, because there are occasions where we may intend to emphasise that a particular predicate does not apply to the subject, but in the second place negation has the importance of giving us more than what is suggested by the denial of the predicate, namely, something that is absolutely necessary to our knowledge. Negation in most cases gives us not merely exclusion but also exhaustion. The negative judgment 'A is not B' forms an exhaustive alternative to the judgment 'A is B,' so that by the Law of Excluded Middle no third case beyond these two is possible and therefore we can argue from the falsehood of either to the truth of the other. But Bosanquet points out that though these two judgments in this abstract form have the logical value of giving us the typical disjunction, yet in the concrete form 'the table is red or not-red', the predicate 'not-red' cannot give us any positive meaning. On the other hand, if we say that it does, such as blue or white, we are led to a mere contrary negation as indicated by the propositions, 'the table is red' and 'the table is blue,' or 'the table is white,' and the inference from the falsehood of the one to the truth of the other becomes a fallacy. We have already seen how meaningless and futile it is to argue, for instance, that the soul is some other colour than red, from the premises 'the soul is red or not-red' and 'the soul is not-red'. Bosanquet therefore concludes, and in his conclusion he is supported by Bradley, that since Reality is a whole or a system and subjects of logical judgments are nothing else than Reality qualified by conditions of the subject's or the knower's intellect, then there will be no possibility of contradictory negation, but only of contrary negation as applied to our objects of knowledge and Bosanquet also points out that all cases of contrary denial are suggestive of some affirmation, so that, according to him all such judgments, representing as they do, the aspects of Reality are negative in appearance but affirmative in substance. In the system of Reality or in the system of Experience as a whole there may be room for negative conceptions, but they are none of them more negative

than another and only each defining the other. Bosanquet illustrates his position by the example of a triangle as compared with two parallel straight lines intercepted by a third. By this example he means to point out that by swinging the parallel straight lines so as to meet each other we get a triangle, but the sum-total of the angles in the case of the triangle as well as in the case of the two parallel straight lines cut by a third remains the same, namely, equal to two right-angles. As the triangle and the swinging parallel straight lines cut by a third though contraries to one another meet at a frontier, so in the totality of Reality or in the totality of Experience contraries shed into one another dissolving denial or exclusion into affirmation. His conclusion is that the negation or opposition of judgments has the significance only of defining the nature of the subjects they represent, but loses all opposition in view of the totality of Reality ; in other words, all judgments are ultimately affirmative. Or, to put the same thing in a different way, all negative judgments imply affirmation.¹

9. JUDGMENT OF FACT AND JUDGMENT OF VALUE.

In the discussion of the theories of judgment so far we were simply concerned with what judgment stands for. We remained satisfied with a description of reality raising and solving the questions whether reality involved in a judgment exists or subsists and whether it is to be apprehended as positive or negative. In all these theories of judgment we were, therefore, concerned with facts as they are, so that the different forms of judgment yielded by these different theories of it all related to facts and therefore may be called *judgments of fact*. But it may also be that there is another and a different way in which reality may appeal to our mental life so that it may not be satisfied with mere description of reality but may rise to the higher level of *appreciation* or appraisal of reality. It may seek to discover its *worth* or *value* for life and the judgments by means of which it will express its appreciation of value or worth of reality will therefore be called *judgments of value*.

The problem of value in modern philosophy has assumed such a large dimension that to enter into any detailed discussion

i. Bosanquet: *Essentials of Logic*, Lecture VIII, pp. 126-136.

of its various bearings will be a stupendous task. Still, however we shall try to give in our Chapter on Values a summary account of the most essential problems connected with values. In the present context it will suffice to indicate the central principle on which judgments of value are based and which distinguishes them from factual judgments. A factual judgment is distinguished from a value-judgment generally by saying that a factual judgment is a judgment *of* or *about* something and a value-judgment is a judgment *upon* something implying thereby that while the first is a simple assertion of what that something is, the latter expresses what ulterior significance that something has for one who judges it. Value in the last resort is an *ideal*, either intellectual, ethical, æsthetic or religious, and judgments of value will not only include, in the first instance, intellectual knowledge of what they evaluate but an 'intuitive acknowledgment' of its *worthiness*. Hence, intuitive acknowledgment of worthiness is the basis of all value-judgments as distinct from judgments of fact which involve nothing else than a colourless intellectual analysis of things. Postponing, for the present, discussion of different implications of this intuitive acknowledgment of worthiness which is at the root of values and value-judgments till our chapter on values, we would like to point out in our present context that according to some realistic writers, there is no real distinction between fact and value and therefore between judgments of fact and judgments of value. Philosophical truth is a colourless result of purely intellectual analysis, and to introduce the question of values into what intellect discerns to be nothing but facts is to misunderstand and misinterpret the world. As Russell puts it, "In such a world, as in the world of Montaigne, nothing seems worth while except the discovery of more and more facts, each in turn the death-blow to some cherished theory ; the ordering intellect grows weary and becomes slovenly through despair."¹ "The philosophy, therefore, which is to be genuinely inspired by the scientific spirit, must deal with somewhat dry and abstract matters, and must not hope to find an answer to the practical problems of life."² But the contention of Russell that there is in philosophy no justification for distinction between fact and value, and between judgments of facts and judgments of value, is based on the narrow and limited

1. Russell: *Our Knowledge of the External World*, p. 39.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 40.

view of our mental constitution and the constitution of reality. The constitution of human mind is such that it cannot remain satisfied with mere intellectual or logical analysis of what it knows, but longs for fuller play of its other forces, such as feeling and intuition, which must be harnessed with intellect so that just as it has the intellectual love for *ideas*, even so it has intuitive appreciation of *ideals* or values which are no less real potencies in life determining its experience and reason. Valuation, though not independent of knowledge, is more than knowledge.¹

We have stated that there are different kinds of value, intellectual, æsthetic, moral and religious. Our judgments, therefore, may also represent these different types of value. An instance will suffice to indicate how a judgment of value differs in nature from a judgment of fact and also to indicate how the very constitution of our mental life feels compelled to judge the one and same fact of our experience both from the standpoint of fact and of ideality. An assassin stabs a man to death. Judged factually the assassination will be interpreted in terms of certain physical and physiological phenomena, namely, the muscular force of the assassin, the weight and sharpness of the knife used, the wound, stoppage of the heart-beat of the assassinated etc., and from this standpoint of actuality the fact of assassination may be expressed by the factual judgment: 'A man has been assassinated.' But from the standpoint of ideality or value we shall appraise its worth from the moral standpoint and express the same by the ethical judgment: 'The assassination of a human being is bad.' Similar remarks hold good when we study the facts of the world in its different spheres and have judgments of fact with regard to them, followed by corresponding value-judgments as they appeal to our æsthetic and religious consciousness. In the judgment of æsthetic value we shall appreciate the ideal of beauty involved in the facts presented to our senses, and in the judgment of religious values we shall appreciate not only ethical and æsthetic, but also intellectual satisfaction of our being in the Divine who embodies, conserves and consummates absolute values in the unity of perfection.

1. Nicolai Hartmann: *Ethics*, vol. I, pp. 184-185.

"The apriority of the knowledge of them (values) is no intellectual or reflective apriority, but is emotional, intuitive."

10. *CHARACTERISTICS OF JUDGMENT.*

In our section on the theories of Judgment we have concluded, after consideration of different views of the nature of judgment, that judgment is that mental act whereby the mind knows Reality under some qualifications or conditions. All our intellectual processes are directed towards the comprehension of Reality as a whole and judgment which is the standard and unit of these intellectual processes of comprehension, taken by itself, also aims at comprehending Reality in its own way. If we are not to give way to scepticism which doubts the very possibility of such comprehension or to subjective idealism which makes reality to be a mere construction of individual experience with no objective counterpart, our knowledge, with judgments as its constituents, must be such that it must refer to reality in which it must find its aim fully realised. Knowledge, we have seen, is a growing process of construction, interpreting and comprehending reality which in its own nature is a rational system. It appears then our knowledge is the process of unfolding, in ever-increasing degree, of what is an already realised rational system. Such being the nature of knowledge and of reality which knowledge seeks to comprehend, it further follows that our knowledge must be *universal, objective and necessary* and must be *constructive of a rational system* by way of analysis and synthesis. These qualities or characteristics of knowledge or judgment however, should not be regarded as distinct and separable from one another, but are inseparable aspects of one and the same process of knowing whose common object or aim is the interpretation of reality.

We may, therefore, distinguish, logically at least, the following properties or characteristics of judgment:

(1) Judgment is *universal*. To say this is to say that what one believes to be true is also so to any other knower, provided the materials of the judgment are the same. There is an objective standard of truth by conforming to which the judgment of one person is true for all. The reason is that Reality is a rational system, and our knowledge is but the rational or intellectual process of interpreting reality with the help of judgment. The subject of every judgment is Reality or a part of Reality. The parts are not mere fragments but are wholes within the larger system. Again if our judgments are to serve the purpose of

interpreting Reality, then the predicates must involve reason which works in different modes or categories which are universals. The predicates as categories or universal ideas present Reality or parts of Reality each of which is a whole or universal. Because a judgment must involve these universal elements it must itself be universal and every thinking mind must acquiesce in what is expressed by a judgment, the result being that it will ensure uniformity of standard and universality of knowledge avoiding scepticism on the one side and individualism on the other.

(2) Judgment is *necessary*. The necessary character of a judgment follows as a corollary from its universality. It may be said to be another aspect only of universality. When we say that judgment is necessary, we simply mean that it is such that we cannot but think it. We feel obliged to think in a particular context in that way and in no other way. The reason is the same as before, namely, that there is an objective rational system and our judgment and knowledge as a rational process of interpretation of reality must conform to it. In one word, our judgment is necessitated by the object it wants to interpret. Thus apart from psychological necessity of which Professor Stout speaks, as 'objective control of ideational processes' the very content of thought is grounded on reality and makes it objective.¹ There is another sense in which the term 'necessity' is used in this connection. Judgment is said to be necessary not in the sense that it is so by its own right, but in the sense that it is connected with other facts known to be true. Now necessity taken in this sense becomes a derived one depending on other judgments. But we may naturally try to discover a direct or immediate necessity independent of other judgments. Our ordinary perceptual judgment cannot but be derivatively necessary, their necessity being dependent on consilience with other perceptual judgments. The only kind of judgment which can claim immediate or direct necessity will be, therefore, those fundamental judgments which are independent of experience. In other words, the necessary truths or self-evident judgments which are *a priori*, can be said to have direct or immediate necessity. No matter whether necessity is derived or immediate it must characterise judgment and

1. Cf. Sigwart: *Logic*, § 1. 6. Also cf. Windelband's remark that necessity of a judgment is 'the truth value of a relation between ideas,' or as Bosanquet says that it is 'the claim to be true'.

indicate that judgments are of different degrees of truth aiming at the same goal, namely, interpretation of Reality.

(3) Judgment involves *the double process of analysis and synthesis*. If the function of a judgment is to interpret Reality and if the subject of an ordinary judgment is a reality under qualifications or conditions, it necessarily involves the subjective processes of analysis and synthesis. In the judgment like 'A table is round', the subject 'table' is reality modified by the predicate 'round'. Reality has an infinite number of qualities, but in the given judgment we select 'roundness' as one out of the infinite number of qualities predicable of the subject. This selection of the particular quality of 'roundness' presupposes analysis of Reality into its all possible qualities. In this way the judgment 'the table is round' involves analysis. It also involves synthesis in that we go beyond mere selection of the analysed property 'round' to connect it as predicate with the subject. When we say that judgment involves analysis and synthesis we do not really mean that they are separate and mechanical processes of the mind, one following the other in order of time, but that they are necessarily connected logical processes one involving the other. The aim of judgment or knowledge, as we have repeatedly stressed, is the interpretation of Reality which is linked up with the scheme of experience. This aim is only furthered by pointing out how the subject and the predicate of our ordinary judgments contribute to the construction of that experience-scheme. Analysis and synthesis as indispensable aids to such construction must form the necessary feature of judgment.

(4) Judgment is *constructive of a system of knowledge*. Judgment is never an isolated mental act, but is always a necessary part of our mental whole. Now it only remains to emphasise the same point once again when we characterise judgment as constructive of knowledge-system. For this purpose it is necessary at the beginning to understand what is meant by a system and consequently by knowledge-system. The idea of a system always involves the idea of a whole of which the parts are not mechanically or externally related to one another and to the whole but stand in a living relation with one another and to the whole, just as the organs are related to an organism. The organs of an organism we know to be such that they have a place and function to fulfil in relation to one another and to

the whole, so that a change or development in the structure and function of one means readjustment and development in the others, the organism as a whole developing by absorption and utilisation of the change or development of its different organs. Now, if knowledge is a system of which judgments are the necessary parts, it is clear that each judgment will act and will be acted upon by other judgments so that the resulting knowledge-system will always be *a moving equilibrium* awaiting further development and a fresher readjustment. We can illustrate the organic conception of our knowledge-system and the part played by judgment in the growth and development of such a system by the following example:

When in the midst of our work we hear all on a sudden a droning sound at a distance, the particular of the auditory sensation is at once changed by our mental reaction into the judgment: "This is an aeroplane." To be more explicit the mind at this stage has outgrown the stage of sense-feeling in so far as it has introduced the class-idea or the universal, namely, 'the aeroplane'. It has not only *felt* the droning sound but also it has come to *think* the sound by means of the universal, and has come to frame the above judgment: 'This is the aeroplane.' Now this judgment cannot remain an isolated piece of information in our mental life but always seeks affiliation to it. This happens because of the living character of our experience whose nature is to receive and readjust and transform any judgment into its own texture just as every judgment has the tendency on its own part to be absorbed and integrated into the constitution of our mental life. In this process of absorption of a new judgment we fully realise how it has become a necessary part of our mental life, which on its part, too, has grown and developed into a new moving equilibrium, involving a new adjustment to Reality which it seeks to interpret or construct. But again this new mental readjustment effected by the newly acquired judgment: 'This is an aeroplane' will not stop there if our mental outlook is keener. Our mind will at once pass on from this incipient construction of Reality to more and more detailed and complex construction by the further judgments like, 'this aeroplane belongs to the British,' 'this British aeroplane is out to reconnoitre the air force concentration of the Axis powers,' and so on: These judgments have the effect of suggesting to our minds the

past and the present positions of the British in the course of their air battles with the enemy and their future plan of attack and defence and other connected ideas. The above illustrations of judgment clearly indicate the function and value of judgment in the construction or rather reconstruction of our knowledge. No judgment remains a foreign element in our mental life, but every judgment gets integrated into it so as to discover its function in the whole of our experience and thereby makes it grow into a readjusted whole. Knowledge is thus a continuous process of construction of reality which is constantly re-enforced and readjusted by other judgments. Reality being a realised rational system our knowledge process can only be a continuous evolution of our experience whose very stuff may be said to be furnished by judgments. If this be so, it appears that *attention* has no small a part to play in the formation and absorption of judgment into knowledge. It is a plain psychological fact that knowledge in origin, content and evolution, depends on attention which again depends on *interest*. But since interest varies from knower to knower it is quite likely that our knowledge or intellectual construction will also vary and therefore, the conceptions of Reality will necessarily vary. But in the varied processes of construction it will not be impossible to arrive at the most satisfactory construction of Reality, or the type of philosophy, which will appeal to reason, the universal element of the human mind, provided, of course, we do not allow ourselves to play into the hands of the naturalist or the realist who reduces reason either to an epiphenomenon of matter, or to a complex of physico-biological feeling.

11. JUDGMENTS AS STAGES IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY.

In the last section we have shown how judgment forms the most important element in the construction of our knowledge-system which refers to Reality. We have done that in most general terms. In the present section we propose to indicate the order in which the construction-process grows from simpler to more complex phases through corresponding judgments. The simplest attempt of the intellect to interpret Reality manifests itself in taking Reality as substantive qualified by attributes. But the growing intellect of man cannot rest satisfied with mere describing

it as possessed of certain *qualities*. It proceeds to inquire whether Reality it wants to interpret is *one* or *many*, or whether it is a whole or whether it is a *fragment* or *fragments* of a whole. In other words, it enquires into the quantitative aspect of Reality. To pass from quality to quantity exhibits on the part of the intellect a process of development that goes on within it. Guided by this urge of development the intellect now enquires whether Reality harbours within it any *change* or *movement* and thus passes on to the further enquiry into the cause of such change or movement. In other words, it now rises on to the level from where it views Reality from the stand-point of causal relation. And finally if the ultimate Reality is a system, then, there must be *purpose* which every factor in it has got to fulfil. In other words, the intellect will now learn to construct Reality in terms of teleology. In the light of the above we shall try to show how judgments of different types will mark different stages of development in the process of construction of reality, each leading to the other as its next higher stage.

(1) JUDGMENT AS QUALITATIVE CONSTRUCTION.

The earliest and the simplest attempt of the intellect to construct Reality is to judge it as possessed of certain qualities. This attempt is manifested or embodied in what may be called judgment of quality where the subject is a substantive and predicate is an attributive term. 'This table is round,' 'This drink is cold,' 'This sky is blue,' are instances of qualitative judgments which are the first attempts of the intellect to interpret Reality. Intellect at this stage is not developed enough to enter into the further intricacies of Reality presented to it and therefore remains satisfied with the mere qualitative description of it which is comparatively easy. But the constitution of the intellect is such that it cannot long remain satisfied with this easy view of Reality and must long to pass over into its quantity.

(2) JUDGMENT AS QUANTITATIVE CONSTRUCTION.

The intellect with its inquisitive and interpretative tendencies goes beyond the qualities of things and likes to view it in terms of quantity. It does not merely think Reality as such and such, but inquires as to whether Reality is one or many and whether

there are parts in it. 'One table is marble-topped,' 'Four tables are square,' 'The top of this table is made of marble though its legs are wooden,' and these and similar other judgments indicate that the mind has developed so far as to consider quantity or parts of Reality along with its qualities. This is a marked complexity into which a mind has grown in the construction of Reality. The next stage in the growth of intellect is manifested when it rises higher to consider objects in their action and reaction with one another.

(3) JUDGMENT AS CAUSAL CONSTRUCTION.

The third stage in the mind's construction of Reality is attained when it begins to think of the world as full of changes or events over and above its qualitative and quantitative aspects. The changes which the mind observes are certainly suggestive of relations of reciprocity. To be able to discover any relation amongst things is indeed a mark of intellectual development and when in the earlier stages, where the mind thought of the world in terms of quality and quantity, recognition of some relation was indeed there, though in an implicit form. In the qualitative judgments the relation between the substantive and the attributive is often of the nature of co-existence and in the quantitative judgments also the mind is aware of the relation of comparison, for the oneness or manyness of things is apprehended only by comparing them among one another. These relations indeed indicate that the mind is growing in its conception of the world, but when it comes upon the reciprocal or causal relation existing between one phenomenon and another it must have made a marked progress towards more and more complex character of the world. The intellect has learned by this time that changes in the world are never isolated and unconnected but rather they form a network of relations, so that any pair of changes implies that that which goes before is the cause of what comes after as its effect. This relation of cause and effect is a specific kind of relation which has not been always rightly conceived in the history of philosophy. Sometimes the causal relation was taken to be a mere sequence of phenomena to the ignorance of the unconditional character of the causal event. But at other times invariable unconditional sequence was discovered to be the proper field of causal relation.

So in the former stage the mind in its construction of the world took any and every case of bare sequence to be a case of causal relation and expressed it by the judgments like, 'The appearance of a comet in the sky, is the cause of the king's death,' 'Eating of mangoes is the cause of boils,' and so on. But the proper conception of the causal relation could not be arrived at, until the intellect discerned that a phenomenon, to be the real indispensable cause of another phenomenon, must not only precede but also produce it, and that there must be an irreversible order of connection between the cause and the effect. Then it learnt to frame its judgments of causality in the proper sense of the term and gave expression to them by the statements like, 'Heat expands bodies,' 'materiality of a thing makes it fall to the ground,' and so on. With this stage of mental developments sciences make their appearance and the scientific world to-day does not encourage any judgment as true unless it embodies a causal relation. If we push forward our causal conception of the world further and further we may indeed have the higher and higher sciences, until the highest science like physics or mathematics is reached ; but within the boundary of sciences we are not required to think about absolute causality giving us the uncaused first cause whose sphere is metaphysics. Nor are the judgments like, 'every event must have a cause,' 'Nature is uniform,' which are the postulates of our understanding of causal judgments, possible to be realised within the sphere of the world of experience, but are only to be believed in by reason or intuition.

(4) JUDGMENT AS TELEOLOGICAL CONSTRUCTION.

So far, from the qualitative to the causal judgment, the intellect is concerned with the objects and the phenomena of the world in their external relation to one another, though that relation has been believed to be rising from an implicit to an explicit character. But in any way the objects and phenomena of the world have been taken externally or as they are determined by external relations. But there is another and higher way of interpreting them if they are regarded as purposive wholes determining their parts from within and making them self-subsistent individuals by a purpose or end working from within. Judgments which represent things as purposive wholes or individuals will be called teleological

judgments, and will have application only when we try to interpret Reality from the stand-point of genuinely idealistic philosophy, though not rejecting the conclusions of sciences but only re-orienting them from the stand-point of reason or spirit. Mechanistic explanation of things and events is quite consistent with science and therefore we welcome causal judgments as interpretation of Reality, but they fall short of the purposive or teleological conceptions of things and events which mark the highest possible development in the interpretation of Reality. This is enough to suggest a reconciliation between scientific and truly philosophic view of things, for while mechanistic interpretation is exclusive, teleological interpretation is inclusive. While science excludes purpose, teleology without denying scientific explanation of things goes beyond them to show that behind and beneath the external determination of things which can make them merely mechanical aggregates of parts, there is the internal purpose which co-ordinates the externally determined parts into an organised whole. This purposive wholeness constitutes individuality of things and minds as distinct from mechanically juxtaposed particulars.

12. *GENERAL NATURE OF INFERENCE.*

(a) *THE RELATION OF JUDGMENT AND INFERENCE.*

So far we have confined ourselves to the nature and function of judgment as an integral part of knowledge and indicated that knowledge is always a growing process of the mind so far as it is a continuous readjustment of our mental life in relation to Reality. When we have done so we have not meant that judgment is entirely an isolated act of the mind having no relationship with inference. What we meant was that inference is related to judgment only implicitly and not explicitly. We can make our meaning clear by pointing out that the very act of thinking involves inference. Our mental life is such an elastic whole that when a sense-particular is made into knowledge by judgment as an explicit act, the mind already bases this judgment on a prior act of implicit inference from an already formed concept. The judgment, 'This is an orange' formed out of the sensations of its colour, shape, etc. is a result of an inference from our preformed concept of 'orange'. Thus just as judgment involves

concepts, so it also involves inference though in an implicit form. Again when we make a judgment we should not think that it stands alone or unsupported by other judgments, nor should we think that it cannot give rise to other judgments as its logical implications. But the supporting and supported judgments, with which a given judgment is related, are sometimes thrown into the background of our mind and the given judgment seems to stand unrelated and alone. But closer thinking reveals that no judgment is really so. In other words, no judgment is there which is not related to inference, either by way of being supported by it or by way of supporting others. In the sense, therefore, we can say that judgment is always an implicit inference and an inference is an explicit judgment, or as it is otherwise expressed by saying that inference is judgment made conscious of its own reason. When for instance, we make the judgment, 'This is a very hot summer day,' taken by itself it appears to be unconnected with judgments which really support it and with those other judgments which can be supported by it. In both the cases it can be shown that the given judgment is related to inference which unfolds reasons both for supporting the given and for supporting other judgments. The judgment, 'This is a very hot summer day' is supported by judgments like, 'Now is the close of the month of May,' 'Rain-fall has been scanty this year,' 'The cloudy weather of these days has made the weather stuffy,' and so on. But this judgment again can serve as datum from which to deduce other judgments like, 'We feel very thirsty,' 'Our bodies perspire profusely,' 'Our sleeps are disturbed' and so on. It is clear then from the above that judgment rightly understood involves inference.

(b) THE MEANING OF INFERENCE.

By *Inference* we ordinarily understand that act of knowing whereby our mind proceeds from the given to what is not given, from something old to something new, from the data to the conclusion. From this definition of inference it must not be understood that the given and the not-given, the old and the new, the data and the conclusion are altogether different from one another. When it is said that in the conclusion of an inference we get the not-given from the given and the new from the old, we do not mean that the not-given is completely different

from the given and that the new has nothing to do with the old, that there is no community whatsoever between one and the other. The Law of Sufficient Reason tells us, among other things, that the conclusion has its sufficient reason for existence in the premises, the not-given is determined by the given, the new determined by the old. If the relation between the not-given and the given, the new and the old, be such, it is evident that to think, as Mill has done, that the conclusion of a syllogistic argument, to have any value, must give us an entirely different truth from the truths of the premises, is to misunderstand the function of syllogistic inference. The point that stands out clear from the nature of inference is this that the conclusion of a syllogistic argument is both *old* and *new*. It is old in the sense that it is determined by the premises which must have implicit connection with the conclusion. It is new in the sense that the idea which is implicit in the premises is rendered explicit in the conclusion. If this implication of an inference is realised then all misunderstanding with regard to deductive syllogistic inference will be removed. Again, if we remember the above explained implication of inference, then inductive inference also will be freed from similar misunderstanding. Empirical logicians, like Mill, believe that in an inductive inference we reach a universal judgment from particular facts of experience. They think that it is by a hazardous leap from some facts of observation that we reach the all or the universal, and our only guide in this leap is the Law of Uniformity of Nature. But can we really leap into the universal with safety under the guidance of the Uniformity of Nature whose universal character, according to their own showing, is only precarious? Hence it is thought by the rationalistic logicians, like Welton and others, that that is not the way to reach the universal. In fact, no universal can emerge out of particulars, however carefully observed. The universal is already there implicit in the mind and what the so-called induction does is to render explicit the universal which is lying already implicit in the mind. Here too, inference does not make our mind pass from the given to the altogether not-given, from the old to the altogether new. The rationalistic thinkers maintain, and very rightly, that all inference involves a universal without which no inference, either deductive or inductive, can at all proceed, only that in deductive inference where we start from the universal,

the universal is explicit and in inductive inference there is the same assumption of the universal intuitively by the mind which only makes the implicit universal explicit in the conclusion. Hence the not-given in the conclusion, either deductive or inductive, is not altogether new.

(c) FORMS OF INFERENCE.

There are two forms of inference, deduction and induction. But the significance of this distinction of inference into deduction and induction was not always recognised in the history of inference. Aristotle stressed the importance of deduction and thought that all valid inference meant passage of the mind from universal to particular or from the more general to the less general judgment and therefore was deductive in character. He was not altogether dead to the value of inductive generalisation from experience though he thought that the ideal form of inference must be syllogistic, and he went the length of supposing even that an inductive inference can be thrown into the syllogistic mould whose conclusion would be a universal proposition. The particular form of syllogism which he thought to be capable of yielding such a universal conclusion must belong to the third figure and he characterised such a form of deductive inference as proving the major of the middle by means of the minor. We need not here enter into the criticism of Aristotle's inductive syllogism, but we will remain satisfied only with this remark that the very major premise of this typical syllogism is itself an induction already assumed, and therefore Aristotle begs the very question. On the other hand thinkers of empirical school all unduly emphasise the importance of induction while they say that induction is the only kind of valid inference. Mill's inductive theory which has been handed down to us is a marked improvement upon the Baconian inductive method which consisted simply in the formulation of certain observational processes, giving us only the table of positive instances, the table of negative instances, the principles of definite variation and the method of exclusion, which he thought to be the implements of discovering the 'form' or essential attributes of things. Mill thought that his own formulation of the inductive method, was more systematic and thorough-going than what Bacon gave us, but he is not entitled to the

claim of having given us the right method of reaching the universal. For among the defects which vitiate the logical method of Mill, the most outstanding is that he minimised the value of deductive inference and more specially of the syllogistic inference, when he thought that syllogistic conclusion embodied no new truth, but only assumed the truth of the major premise and surreptitiously introduced the same truth or a part of that truth in the conclusion, involving itself into the fallacy of *petitio principii*. But here suffice it to say that he easily led himself in this way to be placed on the horns of the dilemma: Either the universal major premise of a syllogism is a perfect induction of the scholastic which he so vehemently criticises, or the conclusion of the syllogistic inference must embody a new truth, and therefore is worth acceptance as a genuine conclusion.

From the above consideration it appears that neither of deduction and induction is reducible to the other, each having importance in its own sphere. Now by deduction we mean that form of inference in which we argue from more general premises to less general conclusions and sometimes to particular truths. We come to the conclusion that 'John is mortal' from the general proposition that 'All men are mortal' through the minor premise 'John is a man'; or to the conclusion, 'Poets are mortal' from the general proposition 'all men are mortal' through a less general minor premise, 'all poets are men'. It follows then that deductive inference specially in its syllogistic form involves transition of thought from more general to the less general or from universal to the particular. Generally speaking, the conclusion in deductive reasoning is never more general than its premises. The same remark holds good even of immediate form of deductive inference, only that in this case the premises are not two but one from which the conclusion directly follows.

The process of induction, however, is marked by just the opposite tendency of the mind which arrives at a general or universal proposition from a number of particular facts of observation and experiment. The conclusion of an induction, therefore, is more general than the data. We come to conclude by induction that 'all men are mortal' from the particular premises, 'John is mortal,' 'James is mortal,' 'Paul is mortal,' 'Peter is mortal,' and so on. In the sphere of science the value of induction consists in the establishment of laws which govern and explain

all facts of like nature within particular department of enquiry. In this connection it is worth while to remember the relation between judgment and inference. In deductive inference a given general judgment supports a less general or a particular judgment, and in inductive inference particular judgments support a general judgment. It is because of this, we have already stated, that an inference is judgment become conscious of its own reason, and judgment is inference in its implicit form.

We cannot conclude the present chapter without referring to the much discussed relation between deduction and induction as the two forms of inference. The most simple relation between deduction and induction appears to be that induction is generally presupposed by deduction. In fact, the universal premise of a deductive syllogistic reasoning is in most cases a result of induction, so that, deduction for its universal premise must presuppose induction, though, however, there are a few universal propositions which are independent of experience and induction, such as the fundamental laws of thought, mathematical axioms, etc. which may form the universal premises of deductive inference. Again, it is also true that deduction in a way is presupposed by induction for the validity of its conclusion. It is held that when an induction establishes its conclusion it is only an abstract formula generalised from particular cases, but attains confirmation and carries conviction only when it is shown to be applicable to further particulars which might not have been included in original observations and experiments. But this confirmation an induction receives only when by deduction we show that the truth embodied in induction is also illustrated in particular cases. The truth that 'all men are mortal' reached by induction from particular facts of mortality, becomes confirmed when it is shown deductively that 'Hamilton is also mortal'. So we see that what is suggested as a general truth by an induction becomes confirmed by reference to a particular case which was not really included in such generalisation. Thus although we distinguish between deduction and induction as two forms of inference, yet one involves the other as its necessary complement.

Again, we know that in deduction we proceed from the universal to the particular and in induction we proceed from the particular to the universal. It is very often said that while in induction our mind ascends, in deduction it descends, and

therefore they must be distinct from one another, the process of one being opposite to the process of the other. But deeper consideration of the spirit of each of these two forms of inference can only lead us to think that the opposition between the two is more apparent than real. We shall be nearer the truth to say that deduction and induction differ only in their starting points, but are identical in their goal. This becomes clearer to us when we see that truth or valid thought is the common goal of induction and deduction. Truth is one indivisible whole, we cannot divide it into deductive and inductive, though we can differentiate the process of one from that of the other. We may start with particular facts of experience and ultimately reach a general truth from them, or we may start with a general truth and find it verified by deduction of particular truths from it; but truth being one and the same, indivisible and undissectible, based upon the fundamental principle of consistency, we can only say that deduction and induction may be different in regard to the starting point, but they have the common goal of attaining truth, just as the summit of a mountain, the common goal of the climbers, may be attained by starting from different places at its foot in different directions.

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CHAPTER IV.

THEORIES OF REALITY

In the foregoing chapters we have tried to explain what knowledge is, how it originates and becomes valid. But the problem of knowledge is intimately connected with the problem of what knowledge knows. In the present chapter we shall be concerned with what knowledge knows. Now what knowledge knows is generally understood by the term 'Reality'. But reality has not been conceived throughout its history in one uniform way, but in different ways by different thinkers. And these ways in which reality has been conceived have given rise to the different *Theories of Reality*. Now these different theories of reality again have developed many a shade of difference within themselves, but they have been broadly classed under two main heads, *Realism* and *Idealism*. It will not be wrong to say that entire metaphysical thought is represented by realism and idealism. Again, one who has kept pace with the recent philosophical developments will find that although realism and idealism seem to represent in broad outlines two apparently different lines of approach to the conception of life and the universe, yet a tendency to reconcile them is not conspicuous by its absence. It has begun in recent years to be thought that the difference between them is not so much in their goal as in their presuppositions and methods of approach. With these preliminary observations we now proceed to explain the theory of Realism and its different forms.

1. *REALISM: ITS TYPES.*

The general tenet of Realism is that whatever is, is real in the sense that it has being and functions as something out and there, independently of any mind and its interference whatsoever. Mind may or may not be there as a distinct existent and is quite indifferent to the real. Realism seems to represent the most primitive and natural tendency of thought to which what is outside it is first to appeal. Historically, therefore, we find that the first Greek philosophers were realists making either water, air, or fire

to be the ultimate principle of the world existing independently of mind, and the world with all its complex contents was supposed to owe its origin and growth to it. We now come to consider the questions whether realism takes the existent to be numerically one, two, or many. Realism will be monistic, dualistic or pluralistic according as it takes the existent to be one, two or more than two. Hence we propose to consider the Types of Realism, monistic, dualistic or pluralistic.

2. MONISTIC REALISM.

If existence independent of mind be the cardinal principle of realism, and the existent be one, then realism will be monistic. The primitive Greek philosophers, Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes and Heraclitus, in so far as they each thought one or other of water, the indefinite, air or fire respectively, to be the one indivisible stuff of reality, were monistic realists. To them all things else, the physical objects, life, mind and the rest, were but products of any one or other of these stuffs, which were all of the nature of *phusis* or matter. These primitive Greek philosophers were, therefore, monistic materialists. With the rise of the Greek Atomists, however, who divided matter into innumerable fragments, monistic realism or materialism has lapsed into disuse. In the next section we shall try to expound pluralistic realism for the sake of convenience, though dualistic realism should have claimed our next attention according to the order in which we have just enumerated the different forms of realism.

3. PLURALISTIC REALISM.

While the first Greek philosophers were satisfied with one indivisible matter as the basic principle of all that is in the universe, later Greek thinkers like Democritus and others thought that the visible objects of the universe are many and independent of one another, and each such object can be divided further and further till we come to a point beyond which our division cannot go. Such limits of division of material objects, which they call *atoms*, must be the ultimate physical or material principles of the universe, from which all else including minds

have been derived. They are the only reals, self-sufficient, self-existent and indivisible, and *independent* of what we call *minds* which originate from them. Thus the realism of the atomist is pluralistic. Pluralistic realism has thus otherwise been called Atomism. Atomism held sway from the time of Democritus up to the nineteenth century, and used to be called Materialism. But since the end of the nineteenth century the conception of atom, either *without motion* as originally conceived, or *with motion* as subsequently modified, come to be replaced by that of electrical forces and their laws. So at present materialism has been attenuated into *Naturalism* which, instead of conceiving the world in terms of atoms and their motion, reduces it to be the result of natural forces and their laws. The reason for this re-christening of pluralistic realism by the term 'Naturalism' seems to be twofold. The one is that old atomism in all its forms was not altogether free from dogmatic introduction, at times, of a creative and directive energy redistributing the atoms for the make-up of this world ; and the other is that modern science has made us acquainted too much with the constitution of atoms or matter to leave us materialists in the old sense of the term, and has given us a more scientific view of the universe in terms of natural forces and their laws. But we shall see, as we proceed in our subject-matter further and further, that neither materialism nor its better substitute, naturalism, can be maintained with any cogency of reason as an explanation of the origin and development, either of the physical or of the biological and even of the mental world, in spite of the best efforts of modern science in this direction.

4. DUALISTIC REALISM.

Dualistic Realism views the mental and the physical worlds as two distinct and independent existences, and may thus be thought to represent the most natural and common sense point of view in metaphysics. It very often seeks an unconscious expression even when the thinker wants deliberately to be monistic and even pluralistic in his conception of reality. The ancient Greek monistic materialists like Thales and others, while making water, air or fire to be the fundamental principle of the universe, showed their readiness to believe in *life* permeating the objects

of the world, or to believe in *divine agency* directing the process of change or growth. Empedocles over and above his four elements of earth, fire, air and water, also believed in the psychical forces of love and hate to explain change, combination and dissolution of these elements. Anaxagoras, admitting *nous* or mind as the central principle of movement and change, was compelled to think of the world of atoms which *nous* presides over and directs. Plato and Aristotle may be said in general terms to have indulged in dualism in spite of their insistence on the reality of the world of Ideas or Forms. Aristotle was perhaps more pronounced in his dualism than Plato, the non-Being of the latter having crystallised into Matter at the former's hands. Medieval philosophy bristles with references to the dualism of body and mind.

In modern philosophy it was Descartes who gave a distinct turn to realism. His definition of substance, as applied to matter and mind, that it is something which can be perceived by itself, indicates a land-mark in the history of dualistic metaphysics. To him matter and mind, nature and self, are independent existences each having a characteristic diametrically opposed to the characteristic of the other. Thus mutual independence and cleavage between the realities of matter and mind, nature and self, became more sharpened than ever. This dualism which appeared in Locke in a somewhat different shape in his distinction between cogitative and non-cogitative substance and which was assumed for all practical purposes by Leibniz, continued up to the time of Kant who, instead of removing it, became guilty of a double dualism—epistemological dualism between sense and understanding and ontological dualism between mind and the noumenal world of things-in-themselves.

In the history of thought dualistic realism has been distinguished into ancient and modern. The ancient character of realism is said to consist in the fact that mind is supposed to copy the world in its entirety, consciousness is competent to cognise the extended in all its qualities without distinction amongst them. As this form of realism fails to distinguish between qualities of the things of the world, and mind is supposed to cognise all their qualities alike, it is called *Naïve* or Simple and Unscientific or Natural Realism. Locke, however brought the distinction amongst the qualities of things into the forefront. The basis of

that distinction is that in the case of some qualities our mind can copy them exactly as they are, while in the case of others our mind creates instead of copying them. Thus some of the qualities of things are objectively real in things and others are dependent on subjective modification of the mind, so that our mind in cognising the world does not take the world with all its qualities without distinction and criticism. Now this distinction amongst its qualities and criticism of their nature, which Locke has emphasised in his realism, have made his realism *Scientific* and *Critical*, as against the uncritical realism of old in which the mind in its cognition of the world does not make this distinction.

We have said that Locke's scientific realism emphasises a distinction between one set of qualities and another. One set of qualities has been described by him as real and objectively existing in things. They are copied by the mind exactly as they are and have been called by him *Primary*. Amongst the primary qualities he enumerates extension, motion, impenetrability, inertia and the rest. The other set of qualities which he has regarded as not existing in things but developed by our minds and therefore depending upon them, has been called *Secondary*. Among the secondary qualities he enumerates colour, taste, smell, temperature etc. We see then that Locke's critical realism is based upon his distinction of qualities of things into primary and secondary, and that the primary character of the qualities is due to their existing objectively in things and our mind's copying them exactly as they are in them, while their secondary character is due to the fact that they are mere modifications of our minds ; that they are not in things but arise somehow out of the primary qualities. And the net result of this distinction comes to be this that the primary qualities are independent of our cognitions and the secondary qualities are dependent on them. But apart from whatever psychological value Locke may claim for his distinction of the qualities, it is quite clear that the distinction is based on an unsound psychology and has been the source of betrayal of his own realistic position. For all qualities, primary or secondary, must equally depend upon our cognition or idea of the mind ; and it is this wrong psychological basis of the distinction between the primary and secondary qualities that gave Berkeley the cue to his *Idealism* which is based upon the view that all

qualities, no matter whether they are primary or secondary, must have their existence *determined* by *our perception or idea* of them. Hence Berkeley has been called the father of modern Idealism.

It will not be out of place, however, to remark that though the distinction between the primary and secondary qualities was proved untenable on cognitive or psychological grounds by Berkeley, yet the distinction can be maintained on *scientific grounds*. The qualities of extension, motion, impenetrability, inertia, etc., may be regarded as primary in the sense that they are invariable, essential and universal to the physical objects of the world which cannot be what they are without them. And the qualities like smell, temperature, colour, etc., may be called secondary in the sense that they are dependent on the primary qualities, but nevertheless they are not subjective, but are equally real qualities of things, though they are not equally important and essential to the conception of their materiality. Science cannot ignore the secondary qualities, any more than the primary ones, and can render a satisfactory account of them in their relation of dependence upon the primary qualities, and can frame laws of their origin and function on the ground of primary qualities. Both the primary and secondary qualities of things are *real*, only that the primary qualities are more essential and necessary to things than the secondary ones. And when the essential and universal character of things is discovered, science can frame its laws to explain not only the essential and the universal, but also its derivatives. So the scientific ground of distinction between the primary and secondary qualities of things, making them both real and objective, but only admitting their relative permanence and essentiality to things, is quite tenable as against Lockian distinction of them merely on psychological grounds.¹

5. NEO-REALISM : ITS CONCEPTIONS OF MIND AND THINGS.

One modern development of realism, better known as Neo-Realism, is said to be a *revival of* the 'antiquated metaphysics', and to assert that the world is *existent* and is *independent* of mind. It does not, however, appear exactly in

1. Cf. Marvin: *Introduction to Philosophy*, ch. IV.

the same garb as the dualistic realism of Hamilton, who seems to make almost no provision for any mediation of ideas between mind and nature, though his language in spite of himself points to such mediation, or even in the garb of Locke's dualism which provides for representation or idea of the mind copying things; but it appears rather in an entirely new setting in which the things are immediately known in an act of perception without the mediation of a representation. Neo-Realism, while it insists like all realism that things are independent, also asserts that when things are known they become immediate objects of knowledge. Things enter directly into the mind and are technically called *sensa* or immediate objects of knowledge, which the neo-realist conceives as physical. So things are nothing else than *sensa* in a certain relation. But when the neo-realist talks of things as *sensa* he does not postulate mind as a self-conscious substance with which Descartes makes us familiar, but only as a cross-section of the physical world. Here it is curious to note that while the American neo-realists are satisfied with the word 'cross-section' merely, the British neo-realists following Meinong add to it the 'act' of minding, or an activity on the psychical side, in their interpretation of mind. In this view of things and minds the neo-realist has tried to undermine the position not only of the old realist, but also of the idealist. It tells us that the idealists are guilty of certain peculiar fallacies some of which he names as 'argument from the ego-centric predicament', 'pseudo-simplicity', 'speculative bias', etc., which we shall explain later. But although neo-realism is a reaction against old metaphysics, yet it aims at being a constructive realistic philosophy and does not hesitate to own its agreement with idealism which is its arch-foe, in so far as most of the realists feel the necessity of maintaining the validity and irreducibility of logic and ethics. It seems, on the other hand, to be an ally to naturalism and pragmatism as it accepts like naturalism the truth of the results of physical science, and like pragmatism the practical and empirical character of knowledge-process and the pluralistic universe.¹

Another tenet of the Neo-realist is that he reduces his universe to ideas which are real. We have stated above that modern

1. Cf. Perry: *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, pp. 271-72.

realism talks about things and minds as independent of one another but suggests that when things are known, mind does not function as a substantive mental reality but as an organisation or rather a feeling of organisation of certain biological, physiological and environmental aspects, namely, interest, nervous system and content, which, though distinguishable, yet are complementary to one another. But if minds and things according to the neo-realist are such, then minds and things must cease to have substantial character and be reduced to ideas, so that modern realism comes closer to the monistic realism of 'ideas' as suggested by Hume.

6. NEO-REALISTIC THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.

From the above general account of neo-realism we now pass on to a brief survey of its theory of knowledge, which is fraught with very important consequences, not only with regard to its own peculiar epistemology but also to the further clarification of its philosophical position. The neo-realists of different shades of opinion have introduced different elements into the problem of knowledge too numerous to receive full treatment in a work like the present. We have, therefore, chosen to give an account of the general realistic theory of knowledge in a line indicated by Prof. Perry. The general neo-realistic theory of knowledge may be divided into two component theories: the *theory of immanence* or epistemological monism and the *theory of independence*. We shall see, as we proceed with the discussion of these two theories, that the theory of immanence will help neo-realism to escape the traditional twofold dualism, one between mind and body, and another between knowledge and things. And the theory of independence will establish the independence of experience by undermining the two forms of half-realism, one which claims relative independence of finite knowledge as we find in objective and absolute idealism, and the other which claims independence of mediate knowledge as we find in some of the pragmatists.

(a) THE THEORY OF IMMANENCE.

The main contention of the *Immanental Theory* of knowledge is that the dualism between mind and body, which Descartes assumed by regarding each of them as an independent substance

and each as having a quality diametrically opposed to the quality of the other, cannot be justified in view of the fact that in the processes of perception and volition the bodily and the mental sides of our life seem inseparably bound up with one another, so much so that one merges into the other. Descartes saw this, but his presupposition of the independent substantial character of body and mind could suggest to him no better solution of this necessary connection between body and mind than his theory of *Interaction* which explained away, instead of explaining, this necessary interconnection between body and mind. The ontological dualism between mind and body obsessed him as a nightmare which could not be removed by his futile theory of interaction, and continued to haunt his followers up to the time of Kant, whom this unlaid ghost of dualism molested in a different way, when he introduced epistemological dualism between sense and understanding in place of the ontological dualism of Descartes. The neo-realist, therefore, suggests by his theory of immanence that things and minds are not to be regarded as two independent realities but rather as *relations* into which knowledge as a fact must necessarily enter. The neo-realist points out that this relational character of things and minds stands out clearly, when, with the help of logical analysis, we come to find that things and minds are nothing but immanent relations of common elements embracing the sensible qualities of things and ideas. As Prof. Perry puts it: "Instead of conceiving of reality as divided absolutely between two impenetrable spheres, we may conceive it as a field of interpenetrating relationships, among which those described by physics and psychology are the most familiar and typical, and those described by logic the most simple and universal."¹ Knowledge is thus a fundamental fact of relation which on analysis yields mind and its object as its two immanent elements.

The second form of dualism which neo-realism seeks to overcome is that between knowledge or thought and things. This dualism is based not only on independence of mind and body as substances, but upon what is called 'self-transcendence' of knowledge. This dualism is, as we have already hinted at, the dualism between knowledge and the world of things-in-themselves, characteristic of Kant. According to Kant knowledge is consti-

1. R. B. Perry: *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, p. 311.

tuted by annexing and abstracting all qualities and their relations from reality which is thus reduced to be a colourless X, and which therefore cannot be the content of knowledge but only hovers round and eludes it. But the neo-realist by his theory of immanent knowledge points out that the distinction between knowledge and its content, between thought and thing, like the distinction between body and mind, is equally a relational and functional difference and not a difference of entities. With a view to establishing his position the neo-realist first of all distinguishes between immediate and mediate or discursive knowledge. In the case of immediate knowledge, say, perception of Mars, Mars is, or combines in itself the characteristics of, both knowledge and thing. It is knowledge in so far as it relates to my perceiving activity, to my other percepts, my memories, feelings, etc., but it is also a thing in itself in so far as it has volume and its distance from the sun. In the case of mediate or discursive knowledge the relational difference, however, is more complete between knowledge and the thing. For instance, instead of perceiving Mars, I try to conceive of it in terms of Mars, Sun and other planets of the solar system. In this case there is no doubt that the thing, that is, Mars, is mediated or represented, but nevertheless the mediated or represented thing does not transcend knowledge but only transcends the representation, at the same time the process of transcendence lies within the field of things immediately presented. It follows then that both in the immediate and mediate forms of knowledge the thing may have transcendence in respect to perception or with respect to representation, as the case may be, but the whole process of the thing's transcendence is immanent within the field of knowledge, so that knowledge never transcends its content. In this way the immanent theory of knowledge of the neo-realist overcomes both ontological and epistemological dualism.

(b) THE THEORY OF INDEPENDENCE.

By the *Theory of Independence* the neo-realist gives a more definite shape to experience, and removes from his theory of knowledge even the last remnant of transcendence as applied to things. The central contention of the theory of independence is that things are directly experienced, and that in that act of direct

experience the things remain as they are without being affected by experience. The objective idealist makes reality independent of finite knowledge, because it is an ideal always to be approximated, but never really makes it enter into any relationship with it and thus misinterprets knowledge as the realist understands it. Reality as conceived by the objective idealist is only an abstract ideal which has no actual connection with knowledge. Further experience must be independent of mediate intellectual processes where we notice, only accidentally, special kinds of relationship which do not determine but only are determined by experience or immediate knowledge. It follows then that experience is an independent function of the mind and should not only have nothing to do with any objective intellectual ideal but also will not be determined by, but will itself determine, conceptual thought. While asserting independence of experience the neo-realist also avoids the difficulty of subjective idealism or solipsism, for, if experience is construed as dependent on finite minds which make and unmake objects by their ideas, then the knowledge of the same thing by different knowers becomes impossible. Experience with the neo-realist gives us immediate knowledge of things as they are presented to it but does not determine them. It is not subjective either, because it is independent of subject, nor is it mediate or conceptual knowledge, which is only a specific and accidental relationship within experience and not the essence of it.

It follows from the above that according to the neo-realistic theory of knowledge things being independent of one another the *relations* which exist amongst things are also *external* and real, and *not* subjective and *internal*. Just as things are outside of mind, so is the relation; and experience in its immediate apprehension of things takes things and the relations as they are, so that, all knowledge of things and their relations become immediate and therefore true.

7. CRITICAL REALISM.

But all these conclusions of the neo-realist, specially that things remain unaffected by knowledge which is always immediate, and that all knowledge is true, have not been accepted by some members of the realist school. These dissenters insist that knowledge is not really immediate and that we cannot go

beyond sense-data to things except by inference. They further point out that if all knowledge were immediate grasp of things then there seems to be no provision for distinction between true and false knowledge, and no body can deny illusions, hallucinations and differences in the degree of accuracy in knowledge. Hence this new group of the realists who want to emphasise these facts of consciousness has been called *Critical Realists*. The main contention of the critical realist is that in our perception things do not directly enter into our consciousness, but only through the mediation of certain elements partly subjective and partly objective, which make the sense-data into the actual objects of perception. These elements are partly of the nature of the subject and partly that of the object and intervene, between the subject and the object, as logical entities which the critical realist calls 'character-complex' or 'essence'. And owing to this character-complex or essence or sensa that intervene between the subject and the object, the object cannot be apprehended immediately as it is, and this, the critical realist thinks, accounts for the distinction between true and false knowledge, between truth and error, and for illusions and hallucinations and degrees of accuracy in knowledge.

But an independent reflection will at once reveal that the critical realist's account of knowledge-situation evinces subjective tendency of his thinking, and it does so at the cost of his own position as a realist, tending him more towards idealism which, he along with the neo-realist, is out to controvert.

From this fundamental point of difference of the critical realist from the neo-realist the further consequences that follow are that things have their independent existence and are not known in their entirety but only in their partial character, because the critical realist thinks that our knowledge of things is determined by our interest which selects certain qualities of things in preference to the rest, and therefore things *as they are known* are really *made* by the interest of the knower as opposed to the view of the neo-realist which leaves things entirely unaffected by knowing. It is interesting to note that the view of the critical realist is a re-habilitation of the representationist theory of perception accepted by Locke but only in a new setting. A more detailed consideration of the distinction between truth and error from the stand-point of the critical realist will be undertaken in the next chapter.

8. IDEALISM: ITS TYPES.

In our survey, in the previous sections, of realism as a metaphysical theory with all its types, we have noticed that in its two extreme types, the ancient monistic realism and pluralistic realism, either of the form of atomism or of the form of neo-realism, mind has been either altogether banished or reduced to be a physico-biological function. Nor in its more natural form of dualistic realism mind has been given the dignified position it deserves, for here it is one of two rival realities each of which competes for supremacy and both are made to shake hands with each other when either of them fails to get over the other. But all these situations created by the different types of realism have fallen short of the mark as an explanation, either of knowing or of being, for which purposes, we shall see, Thought or Spirit must be conceived as the fundamental principle. Those world-views which have conceived of thought or spirit as rooted in the universe and as the ground-principle of knowledge and of reality have been called by the general name of Idealism in which idea, thought or spirit has been taken more or less in the same sense, having more or less the same function to discharge. There have no doubt been idealistic world-views, some making thoughts or ideas to be eternal reals composing the world of transcendental realities anteceding but somehow determining the world of phenomena, others making thought or idea to be the pre-condition of existence and knowledge of objects ; while others conceiving mind as the ultimate creative reality creating the world of subject and object by its own self-differentiation. The first of these types of idealism is Platonic, the second that of Berkeley and Kant, and the last that of Hegel and his followers. But to us the underlying conception of all types of idealism, in spite of variation in their details and methods of treatment, seems to be that Idea, Thought or Mind is a universal principle conditioning the universe, and determining its development and destiny with reference to the ultimate values which as creative spiritual forces ever draw it out from before by way of its progressive realisation of them.

9. PLATONIC IDEALISM.

An emphasis on the Nous or mind as a distinct formative principle presiding over matter was first laid in Western thought by

Anaxagoras. It was utilised by Socrates who made it into a theory of the rational self whereby he formulated his logical and ethical conceptions. The rational self of man is not only the fundamental principle underlying all conceptual knowledge but also freedom from bondage to the senses and the body. Now Plato sublimated the self and conceptual knowledge of Socrates into the rank of Reality by conceiving of it as consisting of an organised realm of Ideas, each of which enjoys immutability and eternality. This organised realm of eternal and immutable Ideas is real in the sense that they are independent entities not depending on mind, either finite or infinite. They are the real metaphysical forces, remaining at the back of and somehow determining our empirical world of minds and things as their imperfect imitations, so that, the world of our experience is only phenomenal and unreal, coming into existence and passing out of it, being *somewhat* determined by them as their eternally antecedent causes. The things and minds of our phenomenal world are only individuals somehow determined by Ideas which are universal and eternal. The idealism of Plato is objective or realistic in the sense that Platonic ideas enjoy an existence in a real world independent of any mind, finite or infinite. The main drawback of Platonic idealism is that it does not establish any tangible connection between the real world of Ideas and our phenomenal world of things and minds, and ends in abstract idealism.

10. IDEALISM OF BERKELEY.

Berkeley may be said to be the founder of idealism in the modern period. It arose as a logical consequence of the unpsychological distinction of qualities into primary and secondary instituted by Locke. According to Locke substance is a hypothetical seat of qualities some of which are primary in the sense that they exist in things and are independent of our cognition of them ; and others are secondary in the sense that they are not in things but in our minds which make and unmake them. Now Berkeley met Locke on his own grounds when he pointed out that if secondary qualities are what they are by means of perception or idea, the primary qualities are no less dependent on the same perception which determines them. A quality whether primary or secondary, to be regarded as such, must be cognised as such, so

that things which are composed of qualities both primary and secondary must be regarded as such only when they are perceived as such. In other words, the existence of things must be determined by *perception* or *idea*: *Esse est percipi*. It comes to this then that things are our ideas and nothing exists except as mind-dependent. Now this is also what Locke practically had admitted in his theory of Representationism, that there is a screen of ideas or representations between mind that knows and the object that is known.

Formulated in these terms Berkeleyan Idealism may be regarded as subjective and psychological because the world of things and minds is appropriated by individual consciousness, with its consequent defect of making us suppose that not only the material world will lose its existence and unity with the cessation of individual cognition, but will also fail to be an object of common cognition by other minds. It is the individual subject alone that will determine its world of cognition, and will fail to afford the possibility of *intersubjective intercourse* and *trans-subjective Reality*. The 'notion' which Berkeley uses to express the organ of knowing the self, for want of explicit and fixed connotation in his system, does not lead us very far in knowing the reality of other selves and of the universal self. In this phase Berkeleyan idealism is subjective through and through and may be equated with *solipsism* or the doctrine that one's self alone exists.

But when the above-mentioned difficulties were brought home to him, Berkeley shifted his ground of idealism from the finite mind to the infinite mind. He began to think that perception was no doubt the determinant of existence, but in order that things may have continuity and unity of existence and their cognition may be sharable by other minds, perception as determinant of their existence must be perception by an objective Universal Mind which perpetually perceives things, and gives continuity of existence and renders possible the commonness of cognition. Our perception of things evidently is the temporal event of transfer into our minds of the divine ideas which are eternally real. Human perception means rendering explicit of what was lying implicit in the divine mind. It follows then that the things and events which make up the world have also regularity and order in their existence and their happenings as determined by the

objective system of ideas of the divine mind. Hence the second phase of Berkeleian idealism may be said to be a revival of Platonic idealism in so far as the latter sometimes conceives of the ideas as the contents of the divine mind. In this phase an idea is not a phenomenon of a finite mind, but a real constituent of an objective mind, with this difference that Berkeley, unlike Plato, definitely and not dubiously makes the ideas to live, move and have their being in the divine reality.

Critics of Berkeley have raised the question whether Berkeley is to be regarded as a subjective or an objective idealist. A few admirers of Berkeley have conceded to Berkeley's idealism an objective character in view of the later development of his philosophy, though, however, the majority of critics are of opinion that idealism of Berkeley lacks that fuller connotation which objective idealism of Hegel and his followers has acquired. We shall have a fuller exposition of objective idealism in its proper place, and it will suffice for our purposes in the present context to hint at the fundamental elements which go to the constitution of objective idealism, and try to pronounce our judgment on the idealism of Berkeley in the light of them. Objective idealism, as Hegel formulates it, consists in postulating the ultimate reality as Absolute Idea or Thought or Mind, which by its self-differentiation and self-objectification makes itself into the world of things and minds, so that the Absolute Idea is the alpha and omega of all that is and is known, and that the relation between the Absolute Idea and the world of things and minds is such that the one cannot be without the other, just as neither of the organs and the organism can be without the other. Now if these be the fundamental points in the conception of objective idealism, we cannot call Berkeley's idealism objective, for certainly he did not make God or the Absolute Idea the beginning and the end of the universe, which is thus a self-differentiation of it. What he did was to start with an apparent dualism of mind and body, but finding that body as body, or as unrelated to mind, cannot be appropriated by the mind unless reduced to its own denomination, he made body to be an idea of the mind which appropriates it. But as he could not avoid the consequent difficulty of gross subjectivism he fell back, by way of an after-thought, on the divine mind as the objective ground of the world in order to rescue himself from the anomaly. In the light of what he did not say,

and of what Hegel said, one would not go far wrong if one denies objectivity to his idealism, but in the light of what he did say, one may concede that he touched upon, at least in the later phase of his philosophy, those fundamental points that go to constitute objective idealism, though his sin was that he began at the wrong end and that he approached the problem of reality only through a psychological avenue and reached the universal through the particulars, while Hegel approached the same problem with the logical and metaphysical outlook, telling us how the particulars are determined by the universal and how the universal becomes concrete by its immanent relation with the particulars.

II. IDEALISM OF KANT.

The idealism of Kant has one point of community with the idealism of Berkeley though it has many important points of difference from the latter. Kant's idealism is a direct result of his epistemological position adopted in his *Critique of Pure Reason*. In this epoch-making work of his he has shown that knowledge or intelligible experience is a complex product of the elements of sensibility and the elements of understanding. Sensations originate from an unknown world of things-in-themselves or reality but must be organised into a systematic whole by the forms of intuition, space and time, and by categories or fundamental concepts of the understanding such as, substance, causality and the like. The sensations are by themselves an unorganised mass or manifold which is reduced to a meaningful system of knowledge by these forms and categories which the mind evolves from within itself. The forms and categories are but *à priori* and abstract frame-works which acquire actuality by application to sense-manifold and thus reduce it to knowledge. Knowledge thus originated applies to the phenomenal world which mind constructs for itself by the help of the understanding, so that the world that knowledge knows is only the phenomenal world constructed by the understanding out of the sense-material. Thus 'understanding makes nature' as Kant himself says. The idealism of Kant, therefore, consists in this that the world of our knowledge is an ideal construction out of sense-manifold to which alone the forms and categories of the understanding are confined and, therefore, is commonly known as phenomenal idealism. It is subjective in the sense that knowledge does not reach out to the world of

things-in-themselves. Again since he admits the objective existence of a world of things-in-themselves but not its knowledge, it is not exactly the same type of subjectivism as is found in Berkeley who denies all extra-mental reality. Kant strongly protests against the identification of his idealism with that of Berkeley and in contrast with his formal idealism he calls Berkeley's idealism 'material'. Kant insists, however, on the justification of scientific knowledge of objects, of the truth of which he is wholly convinced. According to him scientific knowledge, especially of physics and mathematics, has the characteristic of universality and necessity which, he thinks, are the criteria of objectivity. Kant gives us what he calls transcendental idealism which is equivalent to logical idealism, because the world of objects he arrives at is the result of the operation of the essentially transcendental or logical factors that really construct it. But the nett result of Kant's epistemology has been that he has left a great gulf yawning between knowledge and existence, between what our understanding constructs as the world of objects and the real world of things-in-themselves to which understanding has no access.

But Kant might have avoided the above mentioned element of subjectivism as well as dualism between knowledge and reality only if he worked out his incidental conception of 'Consciousness in general' to which he had referred only once in his earlier work *Prolegomena*. For in that case he would have been in a position to show definitely that our individual selves are only reproductions or replica of Universal Consciousness and that the forms and categories are not the products of our individual selves, but are rooted in the Universal Consciousness and are therefore really objective and applicable to reality. But his dim consciousness of 'Consciousness in general' which could not make itself felt in the all too scientific mind of Kant, was made into the 'Absolute Idea' by Hegel, who derived all knowing and being from it and laid down the foundation of Absolute Idealism, in which the mental and the extra-mental, our knowledge and reality, have no dualism but only a duality within the unity of the Absolute Consciousness.

12. PLURALISTIC SPIRITUALISM OF LEIBNIZ.

It may be interesting to note in passing that Leibniz, in his theory of the world as composed of monads or spiritual units, pre-

sents to us a peculiar conception which it is not easy for one to determine whether it should fall under the category of realism or idealism. Traditionally the philosophy of Leibniz is characterised as idealistic, inasmuch as his monads are spiritual entities, and further he recognises the regulative influence of the ultimate values on the constitution of the universe. But the alternative interpretation of his system in terms of realism is suggested by the fact that his monads are 'windowless' i.e., independent of mutual influence, and one monad may remain what it is even if all other monads could possibly be destroyed. To Leibniz indeed all that is is spiritual in principle. Even the monads composing the physical world are spiritual in nature, only that their spirituality is concealed by the influence of *Prima Materia*. Since the monads are exclusive and independent of one another and forced into relation by the law of sufficient reason or God, the relation between them from the very nature of the case must be external. The world is like a box full of spiritual powder without any unity and connection amongst them, in spite of all that Leibniz has said to the contrary. In view of these two parallel tendencies in his system it would be better to characterise it as *spiritualistic pluralism* instead of as unqualified idealism.

13. ABSOLUTE IDEALISM.

Idealism whose psychological foundation was laid in the modern period by Berkeley, and which received epistemological and formal stamp in the hands of Kant, failed to satisfy, by its exclusive emphasis on this or that aspect of experience, the hunger and thirst of the truly philosophic mind for the unity of a basic principle of the universe, the co-ordination of all the sides of experience and conservation and consummation of values, ethical, æsthetic and religious, in one unitary spiritual principle. So after Kant, Fichte with a view to satisfying these spiritual longings of man made an attempt in the direction of establishing the world-view of Absolute Idealism on his conception of the Absolute Ego. But his Absolute Ego as an active spiritual principle of the universe, projecting the world of empirical selves and of things by 'positing' itself, stands out in the end as a predominantly moral principle, satisfying man's craving for moral values alone. But a more pronounced and comprehensive form of idealism we meet with in Hegel.

14. ABSOLUTE IDEALISM OF HEGEL.

The fundamental question before Hegel was: What must be the nature and characteristic of the ultimate principle of the universe in order that we may explain by it the origin, growth and development of mind and nature, their mutual relations, as well as the questions of science, philosophy, morality, art and religion? This ultimate principle of his quest he finds in Absolute Reason, Thought or Idea. The Absolute Idea with Hegel is an active dynamic spiritual principle as it is with Fichte, and as such it must act, grow and develop. In it thinking and being coincide, or what it thinks finds expression in being. For thinking involves an object of thought. Thinking cannot be *in vacuo*. Hence the object of the Absolute thought must be the world which is only its 'other', its heterisation or objectification, and not as a ready-made object supplied to the Absolute Thought *ab extra*, as it is with us. Now the world consists of both mind and nature, subject and object, self and not-self. Thus the world of mind and nature is the heterisation of the Absolute Thought for its thinking, so that the laws of its thinking are also the laws of being. Hegel seems to reserve for his Absolute an immutable and inexhaustible being which always transcends its heterisation or the world of becoming.

15. IMPLICATIONS OF ABSOLUTE IDEALISM.

The Absolute Idealism of Hegel is monistic spiritualism since it postulates one spiritual reality as the source and foundation of all. The world of things and minds which is the objectification of this spiritual principle is nothing different in nature and essence from but consubstantial with it, and has at the same time reality of its own, though limited in character, so that, the unity of the spiritual principle is not an abstract unity but unity in plurality, and that there is no dualism between the absolute spirit and the world of things and minds though there is duality between finite minds and things. The significance of this duality between minds and things is that knowledge, which involves a unique relation between the subject and the object, becomes possible and that knowledge leads to reality. And from this nature of the relation between the subject on the one side, and the Absolute Spirit and the world of objects on the other, it follows that the Absolute

Spirit and the things of the world are not mere ideas of the subject but have objective existence, not determined by the idea of the subject, but can be apprehended by the subject because the world of subjects and objects is the self-objectification of the same Absolute Spirit itself. In other words, the Absolute Idealism of Hegel may also be called Objective Idealism. Again, in the Absolute Idealism of Hegel we have provision for man's freedom, though relative and not absolute, and for his realisation of the Moral Value. Again, since æsthetic consciousness consists in realising the beautiful and the sublime by the super-sensuous consciousness of the Infinite through the finite, or of the universal through the particular, absolute idealism also makes for our realisation of the Æsthetic Value as well. And finally since the finite consciousness is potentially infinite, it lies in the finite consciousness to realise the infinite, it lies in man to realise God by 'gradual and perpetual approximation,' to realise in other words, the Religious Value. But the greatest value of absolute idealism of Hegel is that it has reconciled science with religion and philosophy. The Victorian Age was an age of conflict between scientific consciousness on the one side and philosophic and religious consciousness on the other. It was believed that empirical consciousness which studies phenomena of the universe has nothing to do with the super-sensuous consciousness and, in fact, is antagonistic to it, for the latter has for its object the Reality of philosophy and the God of religion. Hegelian idealism, introduced into England, brought the conflict to an end by pointing out that there was no such antagonism between sense and reason, between the phenomenon and reality and between science on the one side and philosophy and religion on the other.

16. *SOME CRITICAL OBSERVATIONS ON HEGELIAN IDEALISM.*

Hegel's idealism, however, has not universally appealed to the philosophic world in spite of his best efforts to build up a system. The main point, which has raised the feeling of distrust and apathy towards it, is its all too intellectual character. Hegel's idealism is an apotheosis of intellect or reason which has been deified by him. Intellect or reason has been singled out as the main function of our conscious life to the comparative neglect of feeling and will and has been installed as reality, spinning itself out, according to

its own dialectical laws, into the world-system. But the world, in itself may be rich and instinct with many other elements not amenable to intellect. In order to justify his ultra-intellectualism he has laid under contribution the dialectic method which he supposed to be *the* method of intellectual development as well as of the development of life and reality. But it may be that the way of the intellect may not be the sole way of life and reality. Further, if every thing is forced into the one uniform method of dialectic it will be mechanizing the process of growth and development in other spheres than intellect, and will amount to a deliberate neglect of the richer and more concrete manifestations of life and experience to which the dialectic method may be manifestly inadequate. Again, intellect at best is discursive and anatomises reality into its aspects or facets which, if put together, may not, and in fact do not, give us the whole of reality which it is the man's privilege to claim knowledge of. The important expression which this criticism has received is the anti-intellectualistic movement of which Bergson may be regarded as the torch-bearer. Schopenhauer who received his inspiration from Kant was led to voluntaristic idealism as an opposite movement emphasising Will as the fundamental principle of reality, and thought that the highest goal of our philosophic endeavour lay in subjugation and even extirpation of will, the root cause of all misery. Again, as a reaction against idealism of any sort there has arisen the realistic movement whose main contention is that mind, thought or reason, if made the principle of knowing and being, will lead to subjectivism or the theory of mind-made reality. So, in their aversion against idealism or mentalism neo-realists like Perry and others have emphasised that idealism suffers from the delusion of what they call "ego-centric predicament". By it they mean that the idealist has been led to the predicament of subjectivism out of which they cannot escape, because they have started with finite mind as the central principle of knowing and being, though mind or consciousness is one among the order of functional relations which ought to put both mind and object on the same footing, instead of making mind to be the determinant of the object as the idealists do. Further, they argue that the idealist in trying to reduce every thing to mind and its ideas is guided by the 'speculative bias' for unity and simplicity of explanation. They point out that the unity or simplicity, which the idealist reads into the real multi-

plicity of relations, in terms of which one should explain minds and things, is a 'pseudo-simplicity' which can never be found in the world except by false abstraction.

In this way criticisms have been urged against idealism in general not only by thinkers of its own fold, but also by thinkers of its opposite camp. We shall try to consider the merits of these contentions in our concluding section of this chapter and to formulate an idealistic world-view of our own at the sequel trying to steer clear of all that is one-sided and without point, so far as our view is concerned. But in the meantime we would do well to give below a picture of idealism of Bradley and Bosanquet which is admitted on many hands to be the best idealistic view of the world.

17. IDEALISM OF BRADLEY AND BOSANQUET.

The momentum which the absolute idealism of Hegel imparted to philosophic consciousness, instead of running down, has been accelerated through his English and American followers, and has assumed perhaps the largest dimension and magnitude in the absolute idealism of Bradley and Bosanquet in England and that of Royce in America who has given it a rather realistic touch. A complete historical summary of the different developments of Hegelian idealism through all these writers may prove puzzling to students of philosophy for whom the present work is meant. So we think it appropriate to give in general outline the idealism of Bradley and Bosanquet, which represents all that is best in these developments and which will suffice for our purposes. We shall, at the close of our chapter, refer to the realistic touches given to it by Royce.

Following the intellectualist lead of Hegel, Bradley starts his enquiry and finds that the revelation of the intellect can at best acquaint us with the fact that the categories of substance, attributes, causality, time and space, through which it functions in its endeavour to get at the reality, are riddled with contradictions. He also finds that the external relations are meaningless to the conception of the unity of reality, and the internal ones though consistent with its intellectual conception cannot apply to absolute reality, which he thinks to be non-relational. Hence Bradley thinks that the proper organ for the grasp of the absolute reality

is not intellect, but the whole of mental life, which is constituted not only by intellect but also by will and feeling. From this we gather that according to Bradley, the absolute reality is a whole in which the elements cohere not in their own intrinsic character as conceived by the intellect but in their sublimated and transmuted character, so that the Whole as a system harbours them within its bosom in their sublimated and transmuted form and is grasped by transcendental and alogical experience. Bradley thinks that his Absolute may, therefore, well be described as and identified with experience with capital 'E'. Human experience is of a piece with transcendental Experience and can approximate it when it has learnt to transcend the limitations of the intellect. The absolute of Bradley, therefore, is to be *felt*, experienced or realised, and not simply to be known by the intellect as Hegel has insisted.

The implications of Bradleian idealism are that intellect is indeed an important factor of consciousness and cannot ordinarily be prevented from obtruding on facts and modifying them by interpretation and from compelling us to view reality under its own qualifications of categories and relations. Thus it fails to apprehend Reality in itself, which is a non-relational whole. Therefore intellect which yields necessarily categorial cognition of qualified or partial realities, must be transcended, if we are not to remain satisfied with partial realities or 'appearances' as Bradley calls them. Reality as such is therefore to be apprehended by transcendental experience equivalent to what we understand by intuition, though Bradley calls it Experience. It follows then that the world of our ordinary experience which teems with individuality and diversity is the realm of appearances. Now these appearances may form and do actually form the subject-matter of different empirical sciences, but have no tangible affiliation with reality which is metempiric. Thus Bradleian Absolutism seems to take away the relative value and importance of ordinary experience and of science. Further, the Absolute of Bradley is a super-personal spiritual principle as it transcends all contradiction and relation of which the concept of personality is constituted.

Bosanquet following almost the same line of thought as that of Bradley, has come to conceive of reality as a logical or rational whole which he calls Individual. In Bosanquet there seems to be a larger emphasis on intellect or reason. Bosanquet's was a more

synthetic mind which thinks that every phase of our experience giving us every kind of science like politics, sociology, ethics, as also art and religion, has its part to play in the totality of experience. Plato and Hegel seem to him to be the master minds who tackled all the problems of life and reality, though the former oscillated between affirmation and negation of the connection between reality and phenomena, unity and plurality, the absolute and the relative, the latter in a more pronounced form emphasised such connection between these polarities of existence. Bosanquet goes farther than Hegel in his emphasis on thought, though he conceives it in a different connotation, as the central function of mind, and relying upon it builds up a conception of reality such that it cannot but reveal itself through intellect as he understands it. Here Bosanquet seems to follow *Green* more closely than Hegel. While explaining the nature and function of thought Bosanquet says, as *Green* did, "the essence of thought is not in a mental faculty, but in the objective order of things. We bring the two sides together if we say it is the control exercised by reality over mental process."¹ And thought, as Bosanquet conceives it, has for its goal the Whole, which it is, by its very nature, compelled to construct. As Bosanquet himself puts it, "Implicit in all the modes of experience which attracted us throughout, it is now considered in its own typical manifestations, in which the idea of system, the spirit of the concrete universal, in other words, of individuality, is the central essence."²

Thus Bosanquet instead of making intellect cripple and ineffective as an organ of interpreting reality has endowed it with all the possibilities and powers necessary for its understanding and appreciation. Beginning from the knowledge of the plain man through the ratiocinative activities of the scientists and the philosophers, up to the appreciative and imaginative activities of the poet and the lover, intellect in all its possible functions is the all-pervasive force apprehending its different contents and showing their mutual relation within the totality of experience which is to him another name for Reality. In Bosanquet one does not miss the meaning and significance of any one of the contents within the whole, because each of them is an "alternative" to the other.

1. Quoted from Bradley by Bosanquet in his essay on *Life and Philosophy* in Contemporary British Philosophy 1st Series, p. 61.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 63.

Instead of considering any particular content in isolation from the whole as mere appearance or error as Bradley has done, Bosanquet thinks that error lies only in fixing upon one alternative content of thought without knowing other conditions that make other alternatives possible. As Bosanquet puts it: "Error rests simply on inadequate determination without a system, which leaves alternative possibilities open, *i.e.*, dependent on unknown conditions."¹ Bosanquet, therefore, thinks that it is intellect when pursued in its fullest capacity comprehends or constructs the whole of Reality and can supply us with the criterion of reality as a system.

Now, according to Bosanquet reality which is an intellectual system, is also to be identical with the unity of values. Values entail appreciation and satisfaction on the part of mind, but since no part of our experience is separable from others, intellect which is the essential nature of experience, includes or rises into appreciation because the totality of reality is inclusive of or identical with values which our appreciative intellect finds for its satisfaction. "Totality expresses itself in value, which is, as we have seen, the concentration and focus of reality in its essence as real, as a positive centre which is a solution of contradictions, and so far as at any point it asserts itself in experience a satisfaction which rests on the tensions which are harmonised at that point."² The idealism of Bosanquet thus establishes the monism of the Spirit which is at once the unity of experience and the unity of values. The ultimate spirit of Bosanquet is thus the ideal both of the intellect as we understand it and of appreciation, though such a unity cannot be the object of complete realisation but only one of gradual approximation. Bosanquet strikes the key-note of the situation when he calls the ultimate spirit by the term 'the real thing,' meaning thereby that the totality of existence and the unity of values make up the organised whole of reality which is individual and are not mere conceptions of the human mind, but determine not only what is and will be, but also what ought to be.

18. IDEALISM OF ROYCE.

It now only remains for us, after we have shown the lines of highest development of absolute idealism in England, to indicate

1. *Ibid*: p. 67.

2. *Ibid*: p. 73.

in broad terms the other important development of idealism in America in the system of Josiah Royce. The main distinguishing feature of Royce's idealism is that it has greater interest in what is concrete and individual and starts its inquiry with individual conscious centres and particular objects of the world and rises to the conception of the Absolute through them. In this he resembles more closely Green and Bosanquet and differs more widely from Hegel and Bradley whose tendencies were to hypostatise logical concepts. His interest lies more in what is finite and temporal to start with, and he rises gradually to what is infinite and timeless, from the empirical and psychological basis of experience to the metempiric unity of the whole instead of making a fetish of pure logic to lead him to the alogical and the impersonal. He starts seriously with finite experience and thinks that objects of the world to be known must be the contents of finite experience because they have meaning for finite consciousness. But to say so is to say that if finite consciousness has for its direct content objects, then all experience becomes true as it appears to demolish the distinction between truth and error like the immediate perception of the realist. But Royce saves himself from this inconsequence by pointing out that meaning which an object has for consciousness and makes it a content of consciousness, is an ever-expanding process and grows with the growth of the tendency of finite consciousness towards higher and higher unity.

At a particular stage of its growth an object will have its meaning determined by its own development and will be true so far as there is the correspondence at that stage of development between the object and its meaning. But in the light of greater and greater development of finite consciousness towards higher and higher unity the particular meaning of an object will prove erroneous, thus providing for distinction between truth and error based on the presence or absence of the correspondence between meaning and its object. Now, the highest unity of consciousness which it is possible for the finite mind to attain is not a mere possibility but an actuality, so that the higher and higher meanings which this gradual ascent from unorganised conscious levels to an organised unity of consciousness makes possible, provide for the distinction between truth and error and also make for a single universal Thought in which all possible experiences

that mean anything receive their solution. To Royce, therefore, centres of empirical consciousness and objects with their meanings for them are not unreal appearances as they are in Bradley but are real factors in the concrete unity of universal Thought.

In this connection it is worth while to refer to Royce's famous doctrine of the *Internal* and *External Meaning* of *Ideas* which has re-oriented the entire problem of knowledge and its validity in a novel way, though the conclusion he has arrived at is indeed essentially the same as that of the best form of British idealism, such as that of Green or of Bosanquet, if not of Bradley. Royce develops his own theory by starting with the finite centre of consciousness facing reality. The finite centre of consciousness in its attempt to acquire valid knowledge must develop certain ideas, but these ideas are supposed to acquire validity by being merely consistent amongst themselves or being referred to an objective real world with which they would correspond. Now Royce points out that in the first case knowledge will be the subject-matter of formal logic without any relation of these ideas to reality. In the second case knowledge will be valid in so far as it is assumed that our ideas will have correspondence with objects of the outside world. The first alternative he easily disposes of as one that leads us hardly beyond subjectivism. As for the second alternative he tells us that it reduces valid knowledge to correspondence. But the correspondence theory of truth offers a great impediment to philosophic knowledge in that it seems to make ideas and their objects mutually independent, for the realistic metaphysics on which it is based, instead of making ideas the necessary counterpart of objects which together with ideas form the unity of experience, makes ideas and objects independent of one another, so that the ideas will be there without being the ideas of objects, and objects will be there without being objects for ideas. And we may go so far as to say that the objects may be nothing for ideas.

Now, Royce, having shown the difficulties involved in subjective idealism and in realism as described above, proceeds to formulate his own theory of knowledge and its validity. To him ideas and objects are the two necessary elements in the totality of experience in which they are indissolubly bound up. Knowledge is an ever-expanding process of interpretation of reality to which our ideas by continuous widening of their horizon more and

more nearly conform. In this ever-expanding process of knowledge our mind starts with judgments which, as combinations of ideas, weave together our present ideas into more complex structures which Royce calls *internal meaning*. But as an act of judgment has always its 'Other', it must refer to reality beyond the present objects with which our judgments are immediately concerned. In other words, the ideas in any of our judgments have not only internal meaning but a reference to an enlarged realm of external experience which he calls *external meaning*. It is to be carefully noted that the internal and external meanings of ideas are inseparably related to one another. If knowledge has for its object Reality, or as Bradley puts it, if the subject of every judgment is Reality itself then the internal meaning of ideas which weaves together the present ideas into new structures "is a mere incident of the process whereby we regard them as *standing for the valid Reality*, as characterising what their object is."¹ Ideas considered only in their internal meaning may be said to represent truths which are only abstract universals. The abstract universals may be said to represent in the language of Royce, a bare *What*. But knowledge consisting of mere or abstract universals cannot satisfy the inherent tendency of the psychical centre to find something Individual. This something individual is the *That*. Thus the internal meaning of ideas cannot remain wrapt up within its own sphere but must expand itself to coalesce with the external meaning of them. Such a tendency to coalesce is the very necessity of the rational principle, the very stuff of which the individual psychical centres are made. On the other hand, the very constitution of the *That* is such that it always tends the *What* to coalesce with itself. Hence this coalescence is not only imbedded in the very nature of knowledge but also that of being. A careful analysis of our ordinary judgments also reveals that they always refer to Reality. To judge at all is to assert something about a real world. We can never judge "without some sort of conscious intention to be in significant relation to the real."² The 'What' and the 'That' may be distinguishable only through abstraction. But all serious judgments in actual thinking cannot avoid reference both to the 'what' and the 'that' of the universe. An

1. Royce: *The World and the Individual*, Vol. I, p. 271.

2. *Ibid.* p. 272.

inquisitive reader of Royce will note that in this ultimate coalescence of the 'what' with the 'that', of the 'internal' with the 'external' meaning of ideas, he has given us his view of true being of Reality which he calls "the fourth conception of Being"¹ as contrasted with the first, second and third conceptions of Being where he points to the inadequacy of the conceptions of Reality as given by the Realist, by the Mystic, and by the Critical Rationalist respectively, all of which labour more or less under abstractions. In his fourth conception of Being he exposes these abstractions and points out that Being or Reality is an enriched, concrete existence full of contents and meaning in which the psychical centres receive their fullness of being and which is not the mere 'Other' of knowledge but a consummation thereof. It is the Individual, not abstract, but concrete in that the psychical centres are like the beats in the harmony of its being.

Royce does not think it reasonable to conceive of his Absolute as a mere intellectual unity but thinks that his Absolute should also be universal Will. He justifies his suggestion on the ground that the finite consciousnesses in their graduated scale are not merely theoretical elements in the life of the Absolute but they are *individuals* with principles of individuation of their own. Now, these principles of individuation so necessary for both the finite and the infinite, must be found in Will. Thus, the Absolute which comprises finite theoretical consciousnesses must also comprise practical consciousnesses or wills into a Concrete Individuality which is God. And Royce warns us that, 'while the self has thus no reality outside a higher individual life which embodies all the wills represented by finite ideas, nevertheless these finite selves are not swallowed up and abolished in the divine life.'² Now, without entering into a detailed criticism of Royce's idealism we would leave him by just remarking that when he attempts to bring idealism in a line with the facts of the universe and experiences of the finite minds, he seems to emphasise the uniqueness of the purpose of the finite individuals in their intellectual approach to the world, but he rejects the traditional realism which visualises the world as standing in stubborn independence of consciousness. But in spite of his zeal to save the individuals

1. *Ibid: Lecture VIII.*

2. Rogers: *English and American Philosophy Since 1800*, p. 288.

from the all-swallowing absolute as Bradley and even Bosanquet conceived it to be, he failed miserably in his purpose, because if the individuals are the unique expressions of the Absolute Will, they have no individuality of their own, and again if they have not, the Absolute as harmony of finite wills is jeopardised. And if the second alternative is true, then he himself seems to be exposed to the same charge of logical abstractionism that he levels against Hegel, Bradley and Bosanquet. Nor does he seem to give due recognition to 'feeling' either in finite or infinite consciousness over and above thought and will—feeling upon which both Bradley and Bosanquet lay so much emphasis in the apprehension of the Absolute.

19. *NEO-IDEALISM.*

The movement known as *Neo-Idealism*, supposed to be the most significant and original, is one of the most recent developments in modern idealistic philosophy. It is called Neo-Idealism because the idealism it propounds is supposed to be new and different from the idealism of Hegel and his followers. The idealism of the followers of Hegel has been called *Neo-Hegelianism*, which is supposed to bring out the implications of the pregnant philosophy of Hegel. It is in most cases an explication but in some cases an amplification of it. The movement of Neo-idealism is distinguished from neo-Hegelianism, in that while neo-Hegelianism postulates Thought as the ultimate totality of reality and conceives our individual experience in its construction of reality as only participating in that ultimate reality of thought which immanently works within it and accords it intelligibility and meaning, Neo-idealism emphasizes individual experience as an independent function of the knowing subject active, creative and constructive of reality, and not as a mere reproduction of absolute thought. The leading neo-idealists are Benedetto Croce and Giovanni Gentile, the Italian philosophers of the living generation. But the main point in the development of this new movement is that these philosophers think that the Reality conceived by Hegel and his followers, specially Bradley and Bosanquet, is a static one and therefore fails to explain change and history, that the ultimate structure of the universe is a closed unity and therefore cannot become more than what it already is. It is in the language of

James 'a block universe' and is completely immutable. As Prof. C. E. M. Joad puts it, "By locating the Absolute, with which the reality is identified, behind and beyond our finite experience, it makes reality transcend our experience and so precludes the possibility of knowledge of reality ; by making the Absolute the immanent spring, from which all thought rises, as well as the all-embracing sea into which all thought merges, the universal presupposition of experience as well as the final synthesis of experience, it renders progress non-existent and change unreal ; and for this very reason Reality becomes an embodiment of thought as a passive structure and not an expression of thinking as an active principle."¹ The neo-idealists point out that individual *thought* is *creative* and not mere reduplication of passive universal thought, that the evolution of the different elements of the universe should not give us a mere unfoldment of what is given and immutable as the Hegelians conceive it to be, so that, as a consequence, the Hegelian dictum that philosophy is history sounds meaningless. So the neo-idealists concentrate their philosophic energies to vindicate the Hegelian dictum that philosophy is history in the light of their own interpretation of reality as dynamic and of the relation that individual experience bears to reality. It may be said that this is the central point of departure between Hegelian idealism and their own.

We have stated that to the neo-idealists reality is dynamic, growing and progressive, and philosophy as a study by individual mind of this dynamic reality must be creative. Mind to them is active, creative and its creative activity consists in its very interpretation of reality. But to say that the mind creates in its interpretation of reality is to say that it makes reality, and to say that *mind makes history or is history*. But since mind's creation is its interpretation of reality which is philosophy, mind is philosophy. We can go a little further and say that *history* is philosophy and *philosophy is history*. The neo-idealists therefore point out that the Hegelian dictum that philosophy is history is justified only in so far as we take the dynamic conception of reality and regard mind as the active, creative principle of interpretation of that dynamic reality. Reality is thus a perpetually progressive one and knows no final synthesis or conclusion as

1. C. E. M. Joad: *Introduction to Modern Philosophy*, p. 41.

Hegel and his followers would ask us to maintain. Both Croce and Gentile are at one on this fundamental conception of reality, though they differ in certain minor details. The common metaphysical position which both Croce and Gentile have maintained is that mind is the only thing in the world and this mind is not necessarily the universal spiritual reality of Hegel who makes this universal spiritual reality both alpha and omega of the universe, the creative or evolving principle as well as the final synthesis of all. Now whether in this way the Italian idealists have turned out subjectivist or have saved themselves from subjectivism is a question which we shall discuss in the sequel.

Coming to the problem of knowledge and its object we find that although both Croce and Gentile start like most of the idealists with individual experience of which we are all absolutely certain, yet they diverge from each other in their accounts of this experience. While Croce in developing his theory of experience and its object subdivides the activity of the mind in the first instance into the two broad sub-classes, the Theoretical Activity and the Practical Activity, in Gentile we do not meet with any sub-divisions in mind's activity ; for to him mind is a complete unity throughout its transaction with the so-called universe. To both there is no universe in the sense of the Other of the mind. Mind is the universe, and the universe is mind. But when we say this we do not mean that in Gentile's conception of the universe there is no place for multiplicity of experience with which the universe teems. We shall see as we proceed how in both Croce and Gentile the problems of knowledge in relation to objects, of unity and multiplicity, and of subject and object, have received solution in their characteristic ways.

I. IDEALISM OF CROCE.

To Croce the theoretical activity of mind is the name for its knowing activity. Now knowledge refers always to an object of knowledge. But the object of knowledge may be either the material supplied to the mind from outside, or it may be generated from or supplied by mind from within itself. Croce as an idealist believes that mind as a creative principle must be the generator of its own matter of knowledge. He thinks that this act of generation of the material of knowledge on the part of mind has

again two sub-grades, one of which he calls *Intuition* and the other the *Concept*. But when he makes this sub-gradation of the mind's theoretical activity into intuition and concept, we should not understand him as making the sub-grades entirely distinct and independent of one another, but rather as giving us an account of the natural working of the mind in its attempt at knowledge or interpretation of the universe. Mind in its activity as intuition faces the universe as something consisting of unrelated particulars for each of which it has an image, but since bare particularity as intuited or imaged will yield us an unorganised multiplicity of experience, mind will necessarily undertake conceptual thinking of the intuitions and images to discover relations between these different intuitions and rise to the element of universality which all thinking involves. Croce, instinct as he is with the æsthetic sense of an artist, describes perception of an object as identical with the faculty of the artist and says that in our perception of an object our mind acts in the same manner as the artist does in his appreciation of a work of art. The artist first intuits his object of creation and then completes it by giving expression to his intuition in images. Now both these intuitions and images proceed from his æsthetic activity, both the matter and form being supplied by it and not from outside. In our perception, too, our mind does the same thing in that both the perceiving mind and the percept are the two aspects of one and the same active creative mind, the mind generating or creating for itself its own data of perception by way of images and intuitions. But, as we have stated, the theoretical activity of mind in which we distinguish intuition and conception is really unitary, it must pass over from its intuition to conception to complete the circuit of its function. The intuitive element of the theoretical activity of mind in which the particularity of image is apprehended or appreciated is nothing actual in itself, and is only logically separable from the conceptual element which fulfils the theoretical activity of mind by making it rise from mere appreciation or intuition of particularity to the level of rational selection or reflection in which mind universalises what was presented in bare intuition. This universalising process of reflection in the conceptual stage works by way of arranging, classifying and discovering relations amongst the particulars of intuition and image. As Croce himself puts it, "if we think of man at the first

moment of his unfolding theoretic life, his mind as yet unencumbered by any abstraction or any reflection, in that first moment, purely intuitive, he can be but a poet. Art, which creates the first presentations and inaugurates the life of knowledge, also continually keeps fresh in our mind the aspects of things which thought has submitted to reflection and the intellect to abstraction, and so for ever is making us become poets again. Without it, thinking would lack its stimulus and the very material of its mysterious and creative work.'¹

We have already stated that the theoretical activity of mind works through two sub-grades intuitive and conceptual and that these two sub-grades are necessarily bound up with one another. In fact, the theoretical activity of man to complete itself must necessarily pass from intuition to conceptual thinking. For, bare intuition at best gives us the particular images of things intuited, but does not lead us to the relations in which the particular objects of intuition stand to each other. But unless these relations which obtain amongst the intuitions and images of particular objects, are discovered we are not said to have any knowledge proper of such particular objects. Knowledge proper consists in thinking and not in mere intuiting, and thinking involves concepts or notions of the universal, so that if our attitude to the world is to amount to knowledge our theoretical activity of the mind, starting as it does with intuitions, must culminate in concepts. Croce here warns us against those wrong views of the concept which have been taken by many thinkers and which have been responsible for misunderstanding of the true meaning of knowing. Among those philosophers who have taken such wrong views of the concept and have given us 'pseudo-concepts' instead of true concepts, Russell has been his main target of criticism. But we shall be in a position to appreciate his criticism of pseudo-concepts only when we have understood the character of Croce's concept and analysed its characteristics. Croce calls his concept pure and says that the concept is mental and has no reference to the class of qualities in the external world. It is merely a moment or phase in thinking. In his own conception of the concept which is involved in true thinking Croce brings in combination the elements of both transcendence and immanence, which he synthesises into

1. Quoted in Joad's *Introduction to Modern Philosophy*, p. 48.

what he calls *immanent transcendence* as giving us the proper character of the concept.¹ What he means by this peculiar term of his is that the concept is a concrete universal. But the expression 'concrete universal' with Croce bears a distinct meaning from what we are familiar with. When he calls the concept concrete he means that the concept is a thinking of reality, and when he uses the term universal in connection with the concept he means that it is 'a cognitive act *sui generis*, the logical act', and differentiates it from intuition or a group of intuitions which have particulars for their objects. The universality of the concept consists in its transcendence in relation to single representations so that no single representation and no multiplicity of them can be equivalent to the concept. The concept is a whole and as such must transcend its parts or single representations which are supposed to enter into it. The concreteness of the concept means that although the concept is universal and transcendent, yet it is immanent in the single and therefore in all representations. The concept is thus the universal in relation to the representations but is not exhausted in any one of them. Our world of knowledge is the world of representations and the concept would be nowhere if it were not in the representations. Thus the universality of the concept is not abstract but concrete universality or its transcendence is immanent.² Croce has given us another characteristic of the concept in addition to its universality and concreteness, and it is its *expressivity*. The concept as an act of the spirit is a cognitive product and as such must necessarily express itself in symbols. An unexpressed concept is as much a pseudo-concept as an abstract universal. And Croce points out that the second characteristic is nothing different from the first. In fact the first and the second characteristics taken together make up one which is stated only in a double form. His intention is to show that these two together can only repudiate the abstract and false character of the concept that has resulted from taking these two characteristics separately. In the history of thought their separation has all along been responsible for pseudo-concepts as we get in the empirical and abstract idealistic systems of philosophy. Croce in his peculiar view of the concept has gone

1. Cf. Croce: *Logic*, p. 45-56.

2. Ibid: p. 40-43.

so far as to say that 'the concept cannot really have characters in the plural, but *character*, but one character which is proper to it. The concept is concrete universal: two words will designate one thing only, and can also grammatically become one: "transcendental".'¹ There may be, and in fact are, other determinations of the concept but not characters of it. These other determinations of the pure concept are spirituality, utility, morality and the like. They only affirm the relations of the concept with the spiritual activity in general of which the concept is a special form, and with other special forms of this spiritual activity. In the first relation the concept is spiritual; in relation to the æsthetic activity it is cognitive or expressive, and enters into the general theoretic-expressive form; in relation to the practical activity it is not, as concept, either useful or moral; but as a concrete act of the spirit it may be called useful and moral. Thus the exposition of the characters of the concept, correctly thought, resolves itself into what may be called a whole philosophy of spirit, a theory of the pure concept, in which the pure concept takes its place in its unique character, that is to say, in itself.²

The above brief exposition of Croce's theory of the pure concept will suffice for our purposes to indicate how his philosophy of the spirit as embodied in the pure concept is the philosophy of the real and of concrete experience or reality. Experience is the insertion of mind in reality and there is no reality apart from the experience of the mind. There is no real division in experience although our inherent abstract mental tendencies are apt to introduce such divisions within the whole of experience as we find in our empirical sciences. In empirical sciences our thought carves out of the concrete experience objects for their study and finds in them common properties which it catalogues under pseudo-concept and in terms of them it studies these objects, their relations and laws governing their occurrence, as if they were self-subsistent entities existing independently of experience. Sciences in so far as they cross-section experience are abstract in their character, as opposed to philosophy which in so far as it studies experience as a whole, is concrete in its outlook. Prof. Joad puts the entire position of Croce in a very succinct

1. *Ibid.* p. 49.

2. *Cf.* *Op. cit.*, p. 49-50.

and significant language when he writes: "A study of entities formed by abstraction from concrete reality must yield a type of truth which is only true within the limits, and subject to the conditions, which the initial abstraction from the real involves. The only study which can yield results which are entirely true is the study of that which is wholly and entirely real, namely, concrete mind. And just as philosophy is more real than science, so the pure concept studied by philosophy, being an actual moment in the life of mind and not an unreal abstraction from mind, possesses a reality which is greater than that of the pseudo-concept."

"By developing his notion of the pure concept Croce is enabled to take the two further steps which are requisite for the completion of his system. These consist in the establishment, first, of an experience beyond the experience of the individual, and secondly, of the possibility of action."¹

The most important problem that suggests itself here is whether the Mind or Spirit which Croce takes so much pain to establish as existing beyond individual experience is really universal or individual. We shall take up this problem and other connected problems in the sequel. But in the meantime, to follow the thread of Croce's argument, we shall consider what he means by the Practical Activity of the Spirit. We have already seen that Croce is against dichotomising spirit into volition and knowledge because spirit is activity in itself. All that he does is to distinguish between knowledge and action as we understand by them and simply to characterise this activity as theoretical and practical. Nor does he make any distinction between volition and action as is ordinarily done when it is said that action issues forth from volition. He seems to think that it is impossible to imagine an action which is not willed, so that mechanical movements from where the volition is absent are excluded from the category of action, and to call a mechanical movement an action is, according to him, to indulge in a pseudo-concept, to encourage an abstraction from the concrete whole which action is. Another peculiar view of the relation between knowledge and action that Croce adopts is that action is logically dependent upon knowledge. Knowledge may exist prior to and for the sake of

1. Joad: *Introduction to Modern Philosophy*, p. 52.

action, we may know without willing or action but we cannot will or act without prior knowledge. The practical activity of the spirit, like the theoretical one, is also divided by Croce into two sub-grades, the economical and ethical. The economical aspect of the practical activity is based upon the concept of the useful and the ethical aspect upon the concept of the good. Here also Croce makes the second sub-grade dependent upon the first, though the latter is independent of the former. This distinction suggests as if Croce is for individualistic ethics which insists on the satisfaction of personal desires. But Croce guards us against individualism in ethics by pointing out that individual needs and satisfaction have no meaning except in relation to those of others, so that the concept of the good is the concept of utility universalised. The kind of action that we require to satisfy our own needs and desires ultimately merge in and are therefore identical with the kind of action needed for the promotion of desires and aspirations of others. It follows then that according to Croce the economic and the ethical, the self-regarding and the other-regarding, acts cannot be artificially put into water-tight compartments, for in fact the one will be meaningless without the other in which the former necessarily culminates. Ethics should not be fanatically divided into egoism and altruism which represent logically connected elements of experience, so that no action is purely egoistic or purely altruistic, but every action is ego-altruistic in one identical experience.

II. THE IDEALISM OF GENTILE.

In our introductory remarks on the general tenets of Italian Idealism we have already observed that while to both Croce and Gentile Mind or Spirit is the only and ultimate principle of existence, and that it is a unity of experience, Gentile differs from Croce in his conception of the unity of such experience. Though both Gentile and Croce necessarily bring in multiplicity in experience yet Gentile differs from Croce in his conception of the relation of multiplicity to the unity of experience. While to Croce there are grades and sub-grades as so many elements or moments within the unity of experience, to Gentile experience is unitary throughout, and multiplicity as multiplicity is an abstraction without the necessary implication of the unity of

experience. Thus while to Croce Mind or Experience is distinguishable into two forms of activity, theoretical and practical, with their sub-grades, intuition and concept, in the one case, and the economical and the ethical in the other, to Gentile although the multiplicity of forms of experience is there, yet it is only apparent and is no real element in it. Mind to Gentile is the only real and it is identical with the universe. It has no subdivisions into theoretical and practical. *It is through and through practical and it is a Pure Act.* Hence the task before Gentile is to account for the apparent multiplicity of experience which constitutes our everyday world with its degrees and stages of being and our reactions to them.

Our ordinary experience tells us that we are distinguishable psychical centres with diverse objects set over against us and existing independently of us. Or, the objects of the world with which our psychical centres are faced may not be regarded as discrete but as composite something either determining or determined by our psychical centres. In any case the world of objects, either as a discrete multiplicity of existences or as a composite whole, appears to be as something other than our psychical centres and as a necessary condition of our knowing and doing. But both Croce and Gentile agree in supposing that the world of objects is not the other to minds, so that our knowledge of them is not a case of external relations between our minds and the world unaffected by being known, nor is it a relationship in which our minds form of themselves their objects of knowledge out of materials supplied from an unknown source. If experience is the only thing in the universe, we must seek for objects of our experience. But the object of experience need not be separated from it either as something supplied to it from outside or as something projected from the mind, but it must be something which is a necessary element of experience and is inseparable from it. Gentile, however, thinks that in the act of self-consciousness which the mind is, it must so act as to be both the knower and the known, the knowing subject and the known object which are but the two apparent, and not real, phases as Croce holds, of one unitary act which remains one with itself throughout. In thinking the mind is acting both as knower and the known. We must guard ourselves against the idea of division or bifurcation as Fichte has already warned us against it. The real point is,

therefore, that mind as pure act enters as wholly into the knowing subject as into the known object. It is the same mind that makes the subject and the object each to develop fully and wholly in its own line and at the same time keeps itself entire and intact in each of the subject and the object. Self-consciousness, therefore, which is a unity of distinguishable elements of subject and object is a unitary act which mind is and whose apparent elements are the subject and the object. And Gentile thinks that it is only in terms of self-consciousness that we are to interpret Reality as a whole. In the language of Gentile, 'the multiplicity of things, in order to be the multiplicity which belongs to the object of consciousness implies the resolution of this very multiplicity, and this is its unification in the centre, on which all the infinite radii of the sphere converge. The multiplicity is not indeed added to unity, it is absorbed in it. It is not $n+1$, but $n=1$. The subject of experience cannot be one among the objects of experience because the objects of experience are the subject. And when we feel the difference, and only the difference, between ourselves and things, when we feel the affinity of things among themselves, and seem ourselves to be shut up as it were within a very tiny part of the whole, to be as a grain of sand on the shore of an immense ocean, we are regarding our empirical selves, not the transcendental self which alone is the true subject of our experience and therefore the only true self.'¹

From the above statement of Gentile, it becomes further clear that according to him the 'transcendental self' is the ultimate experience which is also self-conscious and that our empirical selves as subjects and their objects of experience are but two phases of one and the same transcendental experience. There is no justification for the distinction of subjects and objects because 'the objects of experience are the subject'. The transcendental self or mind is the only thing in the universe, but itself being a creative act must create its own objects which are necessary for its self-consciousness. It follows then that Mind or Self-consciousness is all that we understand by reality, and also that knowledge of reality is the knowledge of thought or self-consciousness. Mind being creative through and through is itself the principle of development, is itself its own dialectic, but its dialectic has to be

1. Gentile: *The Theory of Mind as Pure Act*, Chap. II, p. 32.

distinguished from the ordinary conception of dialectic in which we posit abstractly the unity outside the multiplicity and thereby make each of unity and multiplicity an abstraction. Because in it we have the tendency either to start with unity and reach out to multiplicity or to start with multiplicity and make multiplicity yield unity. But from Gentile's conception of mind as development, it follows that we should not start with mind as perfect unity, nor as infinite multiplicity tending towards unity. To conceive mind as having unity in the beginning is as much an abstraction as to conceive of it as having initial multiplicity. The conceptions of beginning and of end are meaningless for mind as development. "Its being consists in its becoming, and becoming can have neither antecedent nor consequent without ceasing to become."¹ Mind being the whole of experience, "its infinity which is the essential attribute of the unity is not denied by its multiplicity, but is confirmed by it."² The dialectical or developmental conception of mind thus instead of excluding spiritual multiplicity, requires it as the essential condition of the infinite unity of mind. As Gentile puts it, "Infinite unity is, therefore, infinite unification of the multiple as it is infinite multiplication of the one."³ Gentile thus makes us understand that when we speak of our distinct empirical selves they are not the other or alienation of the transcendental self, in which case our selves would be an abstract multiplicity. Nor is what is other than our selves anything so foreign as not to be also our selves. The dialectic of mind, therefore, does not operate according to the principle of contradiction, as the old conception of dialectic supposed. If mind is considered as the transcendental activity productive of the objective world of experience, then such a world is not an *object* of experience, for it is not a world as thought but rather as the ground and principle of experience, of thinking itself. This conception of dialectic on the part of Gentile clearly marks him out from Plato who conceived of dialectic of thought as thought, that is, as product of thought while the dialectic of Gentile is the dialectic of thought not as thought or product of thought, but as *thought thinking* that is, as thought which is an *act* or *process*. And Gentile thinks that his conception of mind as dialectical development is not only an improvement on the Platonic dialectic of Ideas, but also upon

1. Ibid: p. 40.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

the forms of dialectic that have been current up to our present age, including those of Kant and Hegel. "And yet Hegel himself," so says Gentile, "when he would define, in the moments of its rhythm, the dialectic nature of thought, the thought which understands *itself* as unity of the variety and things as variety of the unity, instead of presenting this dialectic as the archetypal law of thought in act, and thereby its presupposed ideal, could not avoid fixing it in abstract concepts. Thence his concepts are immobile, actually devoid of any dialectical character, and we are left unable to understand how the concepts by themselves can pass one into another and be united in a real continuous logical movement."¹

Thus it is claimed by Gentile that if dialectical development is to be the guiding principle of the world of becoming, thought should not be regarded as thought, that is, thought conceived by us as the necessary presupposition of the world of objects but rather it should be thought as itself developing into the world of objects while thinking. If we take reality to be what we think then it cannot be real and will be nowhere but in our thought. The real dialectical character of thought can be realised in the very act of thinking and in analysing it and then attributing to it the quality of dialectical movement as a translation of our analysis. As he himself puts it, "the dialectical character of the real will then appear as evident and certain as it is evident and certain to each of us, that in thinking we are conscious of what thinks, just as in seeing we are conscious of what sees."²

In connection with Gentile's conception of dialectic we cannot refrain from referring, by way of contrast to Croce's theory of Dialectic which, he says, explains development by the category of 'distincts' unlike Hegel's theory of dialectic which works by way of 'opposites'. Croce thinks that reality presents itself to us all varieties of experience beginning from the scientific up to the economic, æsthetic and philosophical, each of which is distinct in the sense that each of them has a positive and self-contained meaning. He nevertheless points out that these distinct contents are not without an *implication of unity*. No one of these distinct concepts can be posited in separation but each of them must be unified with the rest in their distinction, so that the logical theory

1. Ibid: p. 54.

2. Ibid: p. 56.

of these distincts will not be the theory of classification but that of implication. In the language of Croce, "the concept will not be cut in pieces by external force but will divide itself by a movement internal to itself, and throughout these acts of self-distinction it will maintain its own identity ; the distincts will not be in relation of mutual indifference but of lower and higher degree. The classification of reality must be replaced by the conception of degrees of Spirit or in general of reality ; the *classificatory* scheme by the scheme of degrees."¹

It is interesting to note that the theory of the dialectic working by the category of distinct is not Croce's own, but is only an elaboration of the theory already propounded by his precursor in his own country G. B. Vico, who conceived philosophy, as *eternal ideal history* in which the different moments of our experience are supposed to develop under the principle of unification in distinction, so that philosophy as the history of the spirit is not like a cabinet with separate pigeon-holes but is a universal experience developing as it creates its diverse moments through distinction and unification. It is curious to note that Hegel with his encyclopædic mind did not fail to see this but laid emphasis, as Croce thinks, not upon their distinctness of the different moments but rather upon their character as opposites. To regard the moments as opposites and not distincts is to take away from them the comparative concreteness which Hegel himself does not like to. It follows then that he seems to make no distinction, which is so very important for his philosophy itself, between the theory of opposites and the theory of distincts. It was inevitable for him to overlook the distinction between opposites and distincts owing to the relations, close as they are subtle, which unite the theory of distincts to that of opposites and both to the theory of concrete universal or idea. And Croce illustrates Hegel's confusion between the theory of 'distincts' and that of 'opposites' by reference to Hegel's unqualified application of his dialectic triad of thesis, antithesis and synthesis indiscriminately to Anthropology, Psychology, Ethics, Sociology and even to Philosophy. But an examination of any one of these spheres of experience, say, the sphere of Absolute Spirit, will reveal that when Hegel calls Art

1. Croce: *What is Living and What is Dead in the Philosophy of Hegel*, p. 86.

thesis, Religion antithesis, and Philosophy synthesis, he seems to persuade us to believe that Religion is the not-being of Art and that both Art and Religion are but two abstractions which acquire truth only in Philosophy, the synthesis of both. And Croce thinks that all this confusion on the part of Hegel between the theory of distincts and the theory of opposites is rooted in his 'fundamentally erroneous logical theory'. And the ground on which Croce accuses Hegel of this error is that in Hegel's principle of the synthesis of opposites, either the two terms are not opposed or that their synthesis is not logical, or that it destroys the Principle of Identity or Contradiction and he concludes that the error of Hegel is to be sought in his very logical theory.

CRITICISM

Criticism :

The above is a brief account of Gentile's idealism which has many points in common with that of Croce. We have also seen that Gentile gives us an important point of difference in his philosophy from that of Croce in maintaining, unlike Croce, that self-consciousness or experience is a unity in itself. Although our accounting for the individual consciousness as subjects and their objects demands multiplicity in experience, yet this multiplicity is rather apparent than real. Both Croce and Gentile have made spirit the active creative principle of development which is always dialectical, and on this both of them base their systems of idealism and claim to initiate a departure from Hegelian idealism where the ultimate principle of thought is supposed by them to have been conceived as something really static and immutable. Now we venture to point out first that the entire Italian development of idealism as represented by Croce and Gentile is a result of the combined influence of Hegel and Bergson. Hegelian idealism is too comprehensive and its adequate understanding and representation is too difficult even for the greatest of intellects as is evidenced by the stupendously laborious attempts of his interpreters. The works of interpretation left to us by Green, Bradley and Bosanquet are sure evidences of the enormous difficulty which Hegelian idealism presents to its students. The conception of an ultimately static, immutable spiritual reality which both Croce and Gentile think to have been developed by English idealists,

specially Bradley and Bosanquet, has given the former the starting impetus for developing their idealism. But it remains to be seen how far either Bosanquet* and Bradley on the one side in their static, or Croce and Gentile on the other in their dynamic view of reality may be said to have done justice to what Hegel himself thinks as his ultimate reality. A painstaking student of Hegel will perhaps notice in his writings definite references to the fact that his ultimate spiritual principle has a reality which is both in time and beyond time, which, while objectifying itself into the world of becoming, change and multiplicity, reserves for itself an infinite fund of reality that transcends the realm of the finite. It is at once transcendent and immanent, immutable and changeful. The immutable is no doubt transcendent but at the same time is not out of all relation to the changeful in which the reality of the ultimate spiritual principle is immanent. Dr. Whitehead seems to share in the same view of the transcendental-immanent character of reality when he says that reality by an act of self-limitation or what he calls 'ingression' enters into the realm of the changeful or what he calls 'process'. We see then that if Bosanquet and more particularly Bradley have emphasised the transcendental character of Hegelian reality, Croce and Gentile, the mutable and immanent character of the same Hegelian reality. And it appears to us that their emphasis on active creative character of the ultimate principle is not only a result of their partial view of Hegelian position but may be traceable to the influence of Bergsonian dynamism which might have leavened the contemporary European thought, only that in them the biological conception of Reality could not get the better of the spiritual.

Secondly, Croce's conception of the pure concept in the light of which he has criticised not only the concepts of the empirical philosopher but also those of the idealist, shows on his part an extra-logical bias when he does not shrink from reducing metaphysics to pure logic. He claims that his pure concept is the concept of the spirit which is identical with philosophy and

*The reader is to note that in spite of his logic of evolution and his appeal to higher experience Bosanquet makes his Absolute the 'high water-mark of a familiar fluctuation' in experience, and to have 'stubborn dissociation' from the world of time and space, and then makes it ultimately static in character.

that his pure concept is a concrete universal ; and his arguments for the characteristics that render his universal concrete we have already set forth. But after all what Croce has said is simply this that our world of experience is a creation of our individual thinking over against which there is at the same time a universal experience. This universal experience however is like the Ideas of Plato in which our immediate experience does not participate, though curiously enough Croce as a matter of fact believes that this participation is a fact. We cannot give Croce the credit of showing any logical or metaphysical ground why our immediate experience should participate in universal experience. So, as Prof. Joad puts it, "on his own premises Croce has no right to believe in anything except the immediately given. Experience as a whole or universal experience remains, therefore, like Locke's substance, or the physical objects of the Critical Realists, something which we never know, but which we assume to underlie and to condition what we do know."¹ Studied in this light Croce turns out a subjective idealist, nay, even a solipsist. And the further important consequence that follows from this is that in spite of his insistence that the pure concept as referring to the ultimate spiritual reality is a concrete universal, his attempt proves futile. He refers to the Spirit as the whole of experience but he fails to show how objects and our immediate experience of them have any living concrete relationship with the Spirit or the universal experience. We may say then, in the words of Will Durant that "it is true that he calls philosophy the study of the concrete universal, and science the study of the abstract universal ; but it is the reader's misfortune that Croce's concrete universal is *universally abstract*. He is, after all, a product of the scholastic tradition ; he delights in abstruse distinctions and classifications that exhaust both the subject and the reader ; he slides easily into logical casuistry and refutes more readily than he can conclude."²

Thirdly, it seems that Croce's overenthusiastic criticism of Hegel that the latter's theory of opposites fails to explain development is entirely misdirected. His accusation of Hegel of erroneous Logic seems to recoil upon himself. Croce has the frankness to admit that Hegel means by his theory of opposites

1. Joad: *Introduction to Modern Philosophy*, p. 64.

2. W. Durant: *The Story of Philosophy*, p. 511. (*Italics ours.*)

almost the same as he means by his own theory of *distincts*. But still he makes out a point of criticism against Hegel when he says that unless a dialectic gives us a synthesis of *distincts* it does not really explain development. But to an impartial critic of the contentions of both it appears that the quarrel of Croce with Hegel ultimately amounts to nothing but a luckless logomachy. When Croce contends that the theory of *distincts* and not the theory of opposites can 'really' explain development and assigns degrees of truth to the elements in a synthesis, a careful student of Hegel will at once challenge him with the counter-argument that it is the opposites and not the *distincts* that have in them the real seed of self-transcendence and development. By *distincts* we may mean at best that each of the *distincts* is positive and guarded by the law of identity which makes each of the *distincts* self-identical and when the self-identical *distincts* are brought into relation with one another, they cancel each other with no prospect of synthesis which all development involves. Hegel has never said that in his triple movement of the dialectic the thesis and the antithesis are abstractions and are, therefore, destitute of degrees of truth which they stand for. He has ever emphasised that in the synthesis, the thesis and the antithesis as opposites are included, explained and transcended. In the stages of thesis and antithesis we have indeed affirmation and its negation, giving rise to antinomies but they are never without reaffirmation which is an enriched unity of truth more concrete than each of thesis and antithesis. We may maintain against Croce, therefore, that a synthesis of opposites is the continuation and enrichment of the momentum initiated and developed in the two stages of thesis and antithesis, and contains, therefore, the very seed and principle of development within itself. On the other hand, a synthesis of *distincts* does not develop a tendency to self-transcendence, because each by itself being self-sufficient and self-identical does not stand in a relation of contradiction to the other and each remains a static pattern as it were within the framework of the real. It appears then that Croce's criticism of Hegelian dialectic is not only misdirected, as we have already said, but also involves Croce himself in self-contradiction, in so far as it goes against the very theory of dialectical development which he so enthusiastically advocates.

We cannot conclude our criticism of Italian Idealism without

adding one word to what we have stated with regard to self-consciousness or experience of the spirit as presented to us by Gentile. We have already seen how the self-consciousness of the spirit as viewed both by Croce and Gentile can in no way be regarded as universal, but only as individual, and how it has developed subjectivism or even solipsism. The only point we would like to add here is this that if one is tempted to institute any comparison between the spirit as conceived by Gentile and the Transcendental Consciousness in Advaitism, one will find that in Advaitism development, process, change, and in fact all empirical moments of consciousness are unreal and what is real is pure consciousness which is a *fact* and which has nothing to do with *act* or creativity with which Gentile identifies the consciousness of the Spirit. Philosophy is thus no history creating itself by thinking as an act. In fact it is no thought, either as thought or as thinking but it is pure intuition which requires no distinction, and synthesis of subject and object. It is always the 'that' without the 'what'. It is nothing to be attained or achieved but it is eternally attained or achieved. Attainment or achievement means action and pure intuition is beyond all action. But nevertheless the Advaitist theory of pure intuition makes concession to scientific and philosophic experience and assigns them only practical significance and value which stand cancelled in pure intuition. Advaitist intuition therefore gives us an altogether different dimension of experience from what we are familiar with in Hegelian Idealism or any of its developments. An important point of distinction between Advaitism and the Idealism of Gentile is that while Gentile makes it his sole point that the reality is of the nature of self-consciousness, that is to say, the spirit can make itself object to itself, Śaṅkara strongly opposes such an idea. According to the latter the ultimate reality is a pure subject in which there is no other of objectivity. The classical Upanisadic utterance, "That Am I" does not mean that "That" is different from "I" as the object is different from the subject but it implies a pure identity of the subject. Unlike Kant's transcendental Unity of Apperception which is a mere logical possible—a mere form without content—a pure "I am I" as N. K. Smith beautifully expresses it, the pure intuition of Śaṅkara is a pure Being, the only actual existent fact—a pure content, the nature of which is blissful consciousness.

20. CONCLUSION.

From the accounts we have already given of the types of realism and idealism it will be clear that philosophic consciousness, if it is to explain and appreciate life and reality, cannot afford to be fanatically divided into extreme realism and extreme idealism. Things and events are there, as there are relations amongst them, they are indeed amenable to physical and chemical explanations and refuse to be reduced to mere logical conceptions of the mind. Mind and its ideas also are no less real, equally refusing to be dissipated into principles of physics and chemistry. If these apparently opposite elements in the universe are to be really and rightly explained by philosophy, contributions of minds towards that achievement are too important to be ignored. Again, it is not sufficient that we consider these opposite classes of elements separately in their own spheres without tracing them to one fundamental spiritual principle which philosophic explanation demands. Now, if the above are the facts to be kept in view together with the ideals or values which the human mind must aspire to, then the proper philosophic "ism" will be that which will combine in itself all that is true both in realism and idealism. Such an "ism", call it if you like *Critical Idealism*, will be at once scientific and realistic in that it will, with full justice to experience and reason, face facts and take them for what they are worth, and will be idealistic and speculative in that it will affiliate facts to a rational system of thought for their ultimate explanation and will not hesitate to rise to be intuitionistic, if necessary, to account for experience of values which stand out as unmistakable experiences in the mind's attempt to realise the meaning and significance of the universe. Realism and idealism in their different forms mark how speculative consciousness has developed into what it is now through their errors and misgivings. One cannot better express the service and disservice which realism and idealism in their mutual exclusiveness have done towards the evolution of speculative consciousness than by the following

1. By Critical Idealism, however, we do not mean the Idealism of Kant which is sometimes termed as "Critical Idealism" as has been done by Dr. A. C. Ewing in his Idealism. Kantian Critical Idealism has rather an epistemological significance but here we wish to refer to Metaphysical Idealism.

significant words of Prof. Broad, "The characteristic fault of Idealism is to be unable to see the trees for the wood, and the characteristic fault of Realism is to be unable to see the wood for the trees. The great merit of Idealism is that it really has tried to do justice to the social, ethical, æsthetic, and religious facts of the world. The great merit of Realism is that it really has tried to face in a patient and detailed way the problem of matter and of our perception of it. But neither of these activities is a substitute for the other ; and a genuine speculative philosophy must combine the detailed study of the lower categories with the due recognition of the higher categories and must try to reconcile the pervasiveness of the former with the apparently growing importance of the latter."¹

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CHAPTER V

TRUTH AND REALITY

1. *KNOWLEDGE, TRUTH AND REALITY.*

Having considered at length the theories of the origin of knowledge and of reality, we deem it relevant now to understand the nature of truth which is so closely connected with knowledge. When knowledge of a thing is attained human intellect feels compelled to enquire whether knowledge so attained is equivalent to truth, or whether truth is a quality which when added to knowledge transforms it into being true. Again it is undeniable that the problem of truth is also closely connected with the problem of reality. But the nature of this connection between truth and reality has been variously understood by thinkers of the realist and the idealist school, and by the pragmatist with or without any metaphysical predilection. As a consequence truth has sometimes been equated with reality in some sense, and sometimes reality has been thought of as wider than truth. Now these are the problems which we propose to tackle in the present chapter.

But these problems are such that no full justice can be done to them without reference to metaphysical grounds which underlie them all. Generally speaking, it may be held that there are two main water-sheds of thought that have separated the currents of metaphysical speculation and have been responsible for its division into what we call Realism and Idealism. The metaphysical position of the realist is, that there is the world of objects set over against the world of minds and one is independent of the other. This is the tenet of the traditional realist according to which though mind is different in character and function from the object, yet it is so constituted that it can 'copy' the object in which knowledge consists. The knowledge situation as described by the traditional realist, like Locke, apparently involves an agreement or correspondence between ideas and the objects as their other. The ideas appear as together and the togetherness of ideas is not the result of an active synthesis of the mind

but is due to the unknown substratum from which they proceed. If the ideas proceed from the substratum as all ideas of sensation do, then they must necessarily correspond to the substratum though not known. It follows then that all ideas of sensation which imply correspondence between themselves and the substratum must make knowledge true, except when interfered with by reflection which can only be responsible for disagreement or non-correspondence between the ideas and the supposed substratum in its reshuffling of them. It follows then that according to traditional realism all knowledge is not true and knowledge is wider than truth.

According to the neo-realist though the object is not independent of experience yet it is for all practical purposes the other of knowledge and therefore knowledge which is always an immediate apprehension of the object is, from the epistemic point of view, always true, and there seems to be no provision for the distinction between truth and error in knowledge. The neo-realist, however, maintains that it matters little or nothing from the epistemic point of view, though he does not forget to provide for a criterion of truth and error by asking us to appeal to the conclusions of mathematical and physical sciences. If what is known on the fulfilment of epistemic grounds tallies with what the mathematician and the physicist tell us about what is known then such knowledge is true, otherwise untrue. Here also we find that according to the neo-realist some sort of correspondence is maintained between the subject and the object virtually distinguished, and knowledge is not identical with truth but is wider than it. The same remark applies *mutatis mutandis* to the critical realist account of knowledge and truth. In it we find an express admission of an independent object and an independent subject, and all knowledge of the object by the subject is a complex result of contributions partly from the subject and partly from the object which combine to produce a logical intermediary between the subject and the object known as 'character-complex' or 'essence' or 'sensa' which become the object of knowledge. The brute reality is never revealed in knowledge, but only some of its qualities, indeed its primary qualities. In the knowledge-situation of the critical realist therefore we have correspondence between the knowing subject and its object with its primary qualities. And according to the critical realist the character-complex which

intervenes between them is said to be responsible for the distinction of knowledge into true and false. Like the neo-realist the critical realist, too, refers to the findings of the mathematician and the physicist as the final court of appeal for deciding between the truth and error of a cognition.

From the above accounts of the *Realist Theory* of knowledge in all its shades it is evident that knowledge is wider than truth, so that truth is a species of it. It also follows that truth as correspondence between idea and fact need not be one but may be many and that one truth is as good as another, and finally that since truths are independent of one another there is no place for what is called degree of truth.

Subjective Idealism in which knowledge is said to consist merely in the ideas of the perceiving mind for which all objective basis is denied, takes off from knowledge that objective control which satisfies the demands not only of common-sense and realism but also of objective idealism. Knowledge, unless it has objective support in the heart of reality, however variously conceived, can only secure *formal* consistency and fails to attain the status of truth which always consists in its being controlled by the objective. Knowledge, however, to be true must not merely be a case of formal consistency or consistency among the subjective ideas but also that of consistency between the subjective ideas and objective facts.

In the *Objective Idealism* of Hegel and of Bradley and Bosanquet we have a more plausible view of knowledge in its relation to truth. In Hegelian idealism, which is objective, Reality is a rational system. To Hegel it is a realised whole of *thought* and to Bradley and Bosanquet it is a realised whole of *experience* and knowledge to Hegel and his followers is but the interpretation or construction of that realised system through judgments, the subject of each of which is either a *part* of reality as with Hegel and Bosanquet, or is the *whole* of reality as with Bradley, so that in the accounts of Hegel, Bosanquet and Bradley, knowledge has for its content reality either as whole or in part. Again in the idealism of Hegel and his followers truth has been conceived as consisting in *coherence* amongst different systems of judgments representing different items of knowledge. A judgment isolated and alone has no truth-value of its own. Truth is always a coherent system, large or small, wide or narrow, depending on

our wide or narrow attitude to reality. If knowledge is interpretation of reality our interpretation will vary according to variety of our attitude to it. But in each case truth will be a coherent system of judgments varying only in the width of our attitude to reality, so that there will be more or less limited coherent systems representing different *degrees* of truth. Again in the Hegelian idealism the distinction between truth and error is one of degree and not of kind. Error is partial truth and its falsity is due to our taking it as independent of, and as unrelated to, the system of experience which as a whole always harbours every partial truth or error within it and assigns it a place in it. From the *absolute* point of view error as error is nowhere, nor are there degrees of truth. Our finite intellect cannot conceive of the absolutely coherent system but always of more or less limited systems of coherence and therefore of partial truths. Now the partial character of a truth is due to the point of view of limitation and incompleteness from which the human intellect is bound to look at it and thereby to introduce the corresponding amount of falsity into it. Therefore the real standard whereby our human intellect appraises truth is not really one of truth but rather of falsehood owing to its own inherent limitation and therefore from its own standpoint it may be said that there are not degrees of truth but rather degrees of error which determine its appraisal.

From the above account of knowledge and truth as given by the objective idealism of Hegel and his followers it is easy to see what the relation between knowledge and truth will be. If knowledge has always for its content reality, whole or in part, all knowledge must be true, though the truth of knowledge will vary in degree. If error is after all a partial truth there cannot be erroneous knowledge, so that knowledge and truth can be equated from empirical or human point of view.

The problem of truth and knowledge which has admittedly a theoretical bearing, referring as it does to *existence* or *being*, assumes a practical outlook when looked at from the *Pragmatic* standpoint. To the pragmatist truth and knowledge are not ends in themselves but appear to be means to some other end. It is doubtful how far it is correct to reduce knowledge and truth, which are ultimately theoretical, to will and practice as the pragmatist does. To the pragmatist the knowledge of an object will acquire truth-value if it works or serves some purpose or chosen

end. Reserving for the present our examination of the pragmatist test of truth for a subsequent section we would simply analyse the nature of knowledge and truth as set forth by the pragmatist and estimate its value. If, as the pragmatist claims, my knowledge of a thing is true if it leads me to successful action, one may at once urge that there are cases of many ideas whose truth can never be denied even by the pragmatist, although none of such ideas leads to any successful practice. Take the case of the knowledge of starvation on the part of a man of broken legs. He knows that he is starving but his knowledge of starvation, though a stern truth to him, does not lead him to any fruitful activity by way of reaching where food is supplied. From this and similar other instances it may be clear that it is impossible to replace the theoretical by the practical aspect of our life. But apart from this and taking the pragmatist at his words we further see that his theory of knowledge and truth makes him assume that there is the external object out and there, which must be known first and then such knowledge must be subsequently made true by successful practice. It will suffice here in the present context to say that pragmatic theory of knowledge and truth presupposes correspondence between ideas and objects which are apparently independent of one another. We may ask, Is the object, whose idea is to be subsequently raised to the status of truth by successful volition, already known or unknown? If it is unknown then the correspondence between the idea and the object has never taken place. If it is known then there is no correspondence necessary. In fact, the very fact of correspondence between idea on the one side and the object as an independent entity on the other is the hardest nut to crack. All these problems will reappear for our consideration in connection with the different tests of truth. All that we want to say in this connection is that the pragmatic attitude is apparently based on confusion between knowledge and truth on the one side, which belongs to the realm of *knowing and being*, and practice on the other which belongs to that of *doing*, not to speak of the element of the feeling of satisfaction which is entailed with practice in his conception of truth. But it is clear in the pragmatic theory of knowledge and truth that *knowledge is evidently not co-extensive with truth* which as an adventitious feature is added to the knowledge of an object when successful practice follows it.

We now proceed to the deeper question of the relation between truth and reality, and to offer solution of the same as far as attainable in objective idealism. Here again we shall have to notice differences in the accounts offered by the best forms of Western and Eastern idealism. When we discussed the nature of knowledge and truth it was evident that such discussion necessarily entails reference to Reality. So Bradley puts it very rightly when he remarks, "Except in connexion with a view or views as to the nature of Reality, any controversy as to the nature of knowledge and truth in the end is futile. Such a discussion may be more or less instructive, and it may be stimulating more or less, but it can never deal with the real question at issue, or arrive at any final result whether positive or negative."¹ We may attack the problem of truth by suggesting that truth may be said to have two aspects, theoretical and practical. The theoretical aspect of it certainly consists in the knowledge of its object under conditions which make such knowledge reveal its object as it is. But there is also another aspect which is practical consisting in acting upon such knowledge. In empirical consciousness these two aspects are so very often associated that in some cases the practical aspect of truth has been regarded as a necessary continuation of the theoretical aspect so that our knowledge of truth must issue forth in action. But in other cases the theoretical aspect has to make room for practical aspect as we find in pragmatism which reduces truth to satisfaction of will and desire. But there are metaphysical views of truth in which the theoretical aspect is the only aspect and the practical aspect has nothing to do with it. We shall have to consider therefore both these theoretical and practical aspects of truth and the different emphases laid upon these different aspects and also consider whether there is any standpoint from which it is possible to see that the theoretical aspect of truth is the only important aspect and that truth has very little to do with the practical aspect. In this view truth is, and is not *made* by practice but is discerned when systems of our ideas coalesce more or less with reality which is a coherent system. In the light of the above implication of the problem of truth we may hold that those theories which emphasise the theoretical aspect and make conative satisfaction or practice supplementary to it will include the realistic conception of truth in

1. Bradley: *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 352.

which truth is a copy of reality, and the subjective account of truth in which truth is a mere formal consistency among ideas. The theory which substitutes the practical aspect in place of the theoretical one and makes truth to consist solely in practical satisfaction of will and desire, will give us what is ordinarily called the pragmatic conception of truth whose object will be altogether an amorphous stuff to be shaped according to will and desire. Now it appears that the problem of truth and reality can receive the fullest treatment only if all these implications connected therewith are brought into relief. But as our space and purpose do not allow us of such treatment, we would do well to formulate in brief the realistic, the subjectivistic and the pragmatic views of truth and reality, and estimate their values in the light of the objective idealist view of truth and reality.

In *Realism* in all its phases truth seems to be a case of correspondence between ideas and facts, between the subjective and the objective. The facts or the objects, a correspondence to which reduces our ideas to truth, are evidently independent of the ideas and are a multiplicity of entities each of which may have far more qualities and aspects than are revealed in the correspondence. The copy theory of truth tells us nothing definitely about this. It tells us merely that the facts or the objects to which our ideas, correspond, are copied by the mind not in all their qualities but only in respect of certain qualities which are called primary. So reality in its entirety does not and cannot reveal itself to truth. The neo-realist and the critical realist both take the object to be capable of innumerable qualities, though when we have knowledge of the object our mind selects that particular quality out of the rest in which it is interested and apparently neglects the rest of which also the object is capable. So truth either in the neo-realist or in the critical realist account does not reveal reality in its entirety. But the entire account of truth given by the realist in general is based upon correspondence which, as we have already seen in our account of knowledge and truth, is difficult for the realist to establish. Granting for argument's sake that correspondence between idea and object is an established fact we find that the realist in general gives us a conception of truth in which reality does not stand out revealed in its entirety and the relation between truth and reality is an external one.

The *Subjective idealist account* of truth in relation to reality can be summarily disposed of with this simple observation that in it truth is only a formal affair of the knowing subject which consists only in seeking consistency amongst ideas themselves without any consistency of these ideas with reality in the sense of an objective fact which stands independent of our empirical subject.

In the *Pragmatic conception* of truth we find an altogether different picture as to the relation between truth and reality. According to the pragmatist there is no finished reality with which truth is to correspond. Reality is shaped in accordance with the purpose of the individual. Intellect is not the only decisive factor in the construction of truth. Intellect we know can offer alternative solutions to the same problem and all these alternative solutions may be equally plausible. If we are guided purely by intellect, we are bound to be in a perplexity to determine which of the alternatives is to be accepted. At this moment of indecision *will* comes to our rescue and determines our choice of an alternative that affords it greatest satisfaction. Thus conative satisfaction or utility becomes the criterion of truth for the pragmatist. But the pragmatist, in insisting on conative satisfaction as the determinant of the truth-claim of our ideas, and in regarding experience as a featureless stuff of which things are carved out according to the interest of the knower, reduces truth to a *personal* and *private* affair and fights shy of an objective standard to which truth must conform, if it is not to degenerate itself into caprice. Pragmatism without committing itself to any definite position contents itself with the attainment of utility or usefulness in any thing we may be concerned with. This non-committal attitude of pragmatism has been graphically described in the words of Dr. Radhakrishnan: "In the image of the Italian pragmatist Papini, pragmatism is like a corridor in a hotel which opens into numberless chambers. In one we may find a free thinker worrying himself about the defence of atheism, in another an agnostic thinking out his apology, in a third a devotee on his knees praying to God for faith and strength in his despair and in a fourth a synthetic philosopher trying to reconcile philosophy, religion and science."¹ Thus the pragmatist may be an atheist, or an

1. *The Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy*, p. 224. Also vide James' *Pragmatism*, pp. 53-54.

agnostic, or a religious devotee concerned with religious questions alone, or may also be an absolutist in philosophy without committing himself definitely to any of these and other ethical, religious or philosophical positions. This non-committal attitude of the pragmatist is found on analysis to be due to his sensationalistic psychology in which our self is reduced to sensations amongst which those that are useful, pleasurable and satisfying are naturally preferred to any other ; and to his phenomenism in which experience is reduced to a featureless flux which is naturally devoid of any control over the subject-side, but is always determined by it. In pragmatism, therefore, truth appears to be a private and personal attitude with its necessary consequences of individualism and relativism.

In the Indian systems of thought, too, pragmatism is not a new and distinct 'ism', most of the accounts of truth given by Indian writers having more or less pragmatic bearing. This is quite natural because truth conceived empirically has a practical side of it which cannot be altogether separated from it. When a thing is known correctly the natural tendency of the knower is to put his correct knowledge to practice. He is not content with the mere theoretical knowledge of the object, but he always goes beyond to see if the object so known is either *heyā*, i.e., to be shun or avoided, or *upādeya*, i.e., to be accepted or appropriated. Now in spite of this necessary connection between theory and practice truth has an intrinsic theoretic aspect. The Buddhist seems to replace the theoretic by the practical aspect of truth and is a pledged pragmatist professing that truth consists exclusively in the conative satisfaction of the knowing agent. To him truth consists in the attainment of the object capable of satisfying some purpose of the knower (*arthakriyāsamarthavastupradarśakām-samyakjñānam*).²

The *vastu* or the object according to the Buddhist is made out of momentary experiences by desires or *vāsanās* but experiences with him are without relationship and are only discrete moments of presentation as opposed to experience in James' theory, which assumes relatedness as a given fact. It has thus no unity of its own, nor is there really any unity on the side of the subject, though however, the Buddhist tries to import unity into it by his

2. *Nyāyavindulīkā* (Peterson's edition), p. 4.

conception of the *Ālayavijñāna*. But this *ālayavijñāna* is traceable to an eternal series of desires due to ignorance (*anādyavidyā-vāsanā*) but the desires themselves are a plurality and, therefore, cannot account for unity in the series of consciousness. Now, the point is that the Buddhist has been led on the same grounds as the Western pragmatist to his utilitarian theory of truth. But the one important point of difference between the Western pragmatist and the Buddhist appears to be this that while the former assumes experience to be in itself related and thinks that although it is related yet it is featureless or amorphous, and that out of this related but amorphous experience the object of our cognition is carved and shaped according to the purpose or purposes of the knowing subject, the latter does not assume any relationship within the flow of unrelated experiences, each of which is unique by itself and that the subject and the object are no necessary logical factors distinguishable in any related experience as the Western pragmatist supposes, but only are our illusions and should not be distinguished as they are ordinarily done. The distinction between the subject and the object is only due to an erroneous abstraction, the one universal flow of experience being the fact. Again, while in Western pragmatism there is no express admission of the theoretic aspect of truth prior to conative satisfaction, in Buddhist pragmatism we have a clear admission of the theoretic aspect followed by conative satisfaction (*yacca tena pradarśitām tadeva prāpaniyam*). According to the Western pragmatist it is the practical interest that makes the thing to be what it is out of featureless experience, and practical satisfaction which accompanies it makes the object true. We see then, while to the Western pragmatist practical purpose and its satisfaction exhaust all that is required in knowledge and its truth, the Buddhist, while admitting the logically prior theoretic aspect of truth makes the practical aspect more important for the purpose. But since the psychological grounds on which both the Western pragmatist and the Buddhist base their theory of truth are essentially the same, both of them are subject to almost identical principles of criticism from the idealistic view-point of truth.

In estimating the pragmatic theory of truth one finds that James, the leading pragmatist of the West, takes experience to be an indeterminate or featureless flow and says that it is the subjective purpose or interest that carves out of it a determinate

object, say, a chair, upon which I am now sitting. But it may be asked why should my mind carve out a chair instead of a cat that mews before me, unless there is some distinctive feature in reality itself which compels me to have this choice? Is it not better to think that reality is more than what our subjective choice and interest make it to be, that there is something objective which determines my knowledge and its truth? Science and common-sense ask us to admit an objective determination of our knowledge and its truth. In his *Pragmatism*, while contrasting his position with that of the rationalist and the absolutist James writes: "The essential contrast is that for rationalism reality is ready-made and complete from all eternity, while for pragmatism it is still in the making and awaits parts of its completion from the future."¹ James entirely misreads the real contention of the absolutist, so far as truth from the human point of view is concerned. The absolutist never denies the growth and progressiveness of human truth. If knowledge is interpretation of reality, then truth means the growing consistency amongst the different stages of interpretation which constitute the different systems of coherence giving us a rising scale of truths, and any stage that is higher than any other yields a higher truth in relation to which the lower becomes relatively erroneous.² Now if this growth and development are admitted so far as human truth is concerned the pragmatist should have nothing to quarrel about with the absolutist position. Dewey, as a humanist, with his instrumentalist bias, contends that thought is a function among other functions originating from the needs of life. This is due to his confusion between the psycho-biological and epistemological issues. If truth is made relative to the biological needs, then it is difficult to maintain for long how our ideas can help us in the struggle for existence, for these ideas cannot be said to have any objective rational counterpart. A clearer insight into the real situation points to the fact that there is a structure of reality to which our ideas must conform, and that our ideas and the structure of reality to which they conform have a background in a higher reality or experience which reveals itself in their harmony. The idealist also never denies purposiveness and workability in the attainment of truth. But it is not the purpose, individual and private, of the

1. James: *Pragmatism*, p. 257.

2. Cf. Bradley: *Essays on Truth and Reality*.

knowing agent, but it is the *wider purpose* of a continual adjustment of our growing system of ideas with facts both of which are the elements of reality or experience.

James in his *Pragmatism* and Schiller in his *Riddles of the Sphinx* seem to have confounded in their theory of truth *advantage* with *value*. James says that 'the truth is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief,'¹ and Schiller, in order to bring his conception of truth in a line with Humanism, only adds a biological qualification and he writes, 'nothing more is required of a truth than that it should be relevant to a specific situation, valuable for a purpose.'² The common point between these two writers seems to be that both of them make truth to be a *species of good*. But this good is by no means an intrinsic value, but only refers to a specific purpose, and is at best a value in the sense of *advantage*. Even if it were regarded as a biological value it can only be classed with many other practical values which even many fictions may possess for us. But we are certain that we are not prepared to regard these fictions as truths. What is true should not even be confused with the good or moral value, nor with the beautiful or æsthetic value considered in their intrinsic character, though these three intrinsic values of truth, good, and beauty are the essence of the ultimate reality. Truth is as fundamental as good and beauty, each is co-ordinate with the other two and none is subordinate. So when James makes truth a species of good he forgets the intrinsic character of each of them and this forgetfulness is traceable to his empirical or psychological predilection which prevents him from taking the values of truth and good as objective essences of reality. It is curious to see that good sense prevails over Schiller when he overrides his biological outlook and frankly admits that 'true and false are the forms of logical values'.³ James also is at times found to see the logical aspect of truth as distinct from its practical aspect when he is frank enough to concede that 'the greatest of man's interest is his interest in *consistency*'.⁴ We see then that the pragmatist himself is convinced of the impossibility

1. James: *Pragmatism* p. 75.

2. Schiller—*Riddles of the Sphinx*, p. 133.

3. Quoted by Sir S. Radhakrishnan in his *The Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy*, p. 239.

4. James: *The Meaning of Truth*, p. 211. (*Italics in ours*).

and futility of his attempt to establish the nature of truth on purely empirical or psychological and psycho-biological foundation without reference to the logical. The pragmatist having discarded metaphysical notions cannot fully substantiate or boldly demonstrate the 'logical interest' which moves him at times in the right direction in his quest of truth. The practical or biological needs may set before us special problems and these special problems are riddled with contradiction. But to attain truth of such problems our mind must fall back upon intellect or logical thinking which will seek consistency and shun contradictions arising from specific situations that set those very problems. The pragmatist in making truth to consist in the satisfaction of man's practical and biological needs confounds it with psycho-biological accidents and ignores the essence of pure intellect which underlies them. Human constitution is indeed a complex involving psychological, biological and intellectual structures. But the quest of truth can only vibrate the intellectual structure, which is essential and invariable in the midst of the variable structures of life and practice. The intellectual structure of our constitution is essential and invariable and harmonises with the structure of reality because it is the counterpart of reality which is a rational whole, and truth in the relative sense means agreement or coherence which our intellectual structure discerns amongst its different experiences representing different aspects of reality. Truth in the absolute sense will be an ideal coalescence between our entire intellectual structure and reality as a whole. But this highest consummation of truth is not attainable to human thought as human, for it ceases to function there, or in the words of Bradley, it commits suicide. It is within the confines of human thought that truth has its meaning and is necessarily relative. Conative satisfaction may be, and in fact is, an attendant consequence of truth which in its nature is always an agreement of man's intellectual structure with that of reality.

In our above criticism of the pragmatic conception of truth from the standpoint of Hegelian Idealism we have suggested, only in an outline, the *Coherence Theory of Truth* in which the logical and metaphysical elements are the determining factors. This theory of truth cannot afford to confound psychological or biological manifestations of the human life with its rational structure, nor can it ignore Reality or Experience as a whole in which truth in the absolute sense is. Truth cannot be made by conation or

interest as is done in pragmatism, nor can it be read into a correspondence between ideas and facts considered as different entities. Reality which is constitutionally rational harbours within itself minds, ideas and facts and binds them together as elements of itself. Reality as a rational system of experience involves these elements in itself and human thought is interpretation of what reality is in itself. Now if logical thinking is the essence of human constitution it will always raise and solve contradictions involved in its thinking of reality, and truth is removal or solution of contradictions that necessarily emerge in the way of mind's attempt at grasping reality. Reality has infinite aspects or elements and therefore truth will mean attainment of solution, in different degrees, of contradictions raised by the different aspects of reality. Truth thus becomes coherence or consistency among the aspects of reality comprehended by the intellect.

Here a point of great importance at once arises—a point which has been a seat of great confusion among different thinkers. Russell raises the objection against the coherence view of truth by saying that coherence may be purely formal without the least touch with reality. If, as a matter of fact, coherence has no touch with reality, it can be purely imaginary coherence—e.g. the coherence of dream experience or purely the coherence of an imaginary story. James too raises a similar objection against the coherence view of truth and on the basis of this objection he rejects the coherence theory altogether. But Bradley is on his guard against all these sorts of objection and refutes these and similar other objections by saying that coherence should never be interpreted as purely formal coherence. Coherence must be supplemented by *Comprehensiveness*. To be comprehensive coherence refers to experience as a whole. Our fancy may be coherent but it is not coherent with experience as a whole, and cannot therefore be comprehensive and hence it is regarded as erroneous. Full coherence with all-comprehensiveness is found only in the Ideal Experience which is Reality and the more *our* experience approximates to that Reality, the more true it becomes.

Contradiction means isolation and independence between the aspects, and error is contradiction or isolation amongst such aspects. In Reality there is no contradiction or incoherence amongst the aspects, for reality is in itself a coherent whole in which each aspect in its own place contributes to the coherence

of the whole. Human intellect though logically or rationally constituted is limited and can attain only limited consistency or coherence amongst the aspects of the whole, so that while it attains truth it does not make or determine it, for truth is in Reality. And since human intellect can attain more or less limited systems of experience, truths are different in degrees and any narrower system of experience may be regarded as error in relation to a wider system. Absolute or independent truths and sheer errors are without meaning. A sheer error even contains some truth as it has a content that belongs to the universe. Any error is thus a partial truth. Truth in the absolute sense in the objective idealism of the Hegelians is thus the complete coherence or perfect harmony of all the infinite aspects that Reality is capable of. To Bradley Reality is the whole of experience in which the consummation of intellect feeling and will is an accomplished fact. Human intellect, in its aspiration for truth can only approximate to that ideal consistency which is ever realised in Reality, just as the ideals of feeling and will are also ever realised in it. Hence Truth in the absolute sense, as an ideal consistency, cannot even be said to be equated with Reality as a whole, but only in its aspect of intelligibility, in its ideal form. As Bradley says, "The end of truth is to be and to possess reality in an ideal form." "Truth must include without residue the entirety of what is in any sense given, and it means next that truth is bound to include this intelligibility."¹ It follows then that Truth even in its absolute sense is not identical with Reality ; it is in Reality. Reality is Experience which includes and transcends the ideal of intellectual consistency, just as it includes and transcends the ideals of Feeling and Will. Bosanquet, also, maintaining as he does, that Reality is the unity of all experiences and of all values gives us the same conception of Reality or what he calls the 'Real Thing' that includes and transcends Truth or rational unity.² As for the conception of the relation between Truth and Reality that can be gathered from the writings of Hegel we may state that to Hegel with whom all that is real rational, Reality is rational through and through. Absolute

1. Bradley: *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 114.

2. Bosanquet: *Life and Philosophy* in *Contemporary British Philosophy* 1st Series, pp. 67 and 73.

Truth which is the perfect coherence of the system of categories each representing a different aspect or degree of reality exhausts the entire content of Reality and is thus equated with Reality.

As for the question of the *Degrees of Reality* it may be pointed out that to Hegel and Bosanquet degrees of reality are the natural corollaries of their conception of reality. Reality to Hegel is a rational or intellectual system in which there are real elements which constitute its unity. His dialectic method which explains evolution not only of human consciousness which rises to higher and higher syntheses and thus to higher and higher systems of truth, also indicates stages in the dynamic development of reality itself. The concepts or categories which attain higher and higher synthesis mark not only attainment of higher and higher systems of truth on the part of human intellect but also represent different wholes of being or reality which our different systems of thought discover as the different degrees within Reality. When the highest synthesis is reached in the Absolute Idea the lower syntheses with their corresponding categories are not reduced to abstraction but remain real elements in the highest unity or synthesis, so that the categories and their syntheses represent different grades of being or reality through which Reality realises itself. Hence, if, as Hegel thinks, human thinking is reproduction in finite centres of what Reality as a rational system thinks of itself, the different degrees of truth as marked by different syntheses in the dialectical development of consciousness represent different degrees of reality within the systematic unity of the ultimate rational principle or Reality. The degrees of reality will thus be nothing else than the more or less synthesised systems of the elements of reality reproduced in the more or less widened systems of human thinking. According to Bosanquet also Reality admits of degrees. To him Reality is a systematic whole of experience. In the wider sense in which he takes intellect, it comprehends greater and greater degrees of reality as it includes systematic unities within the different spheres of knowledge, of ethics, politics and art and of values, all of which make up the unity of Reality which is Individual. Each such systematic unity is a part of the whole, but the parts themselves are not as parts, but are wholes within the larger whole of experience, and each of such wholes as known by our intellect is a real element but varies in degree of reality as they are known by more or

less coherent systems of our experience. Hence, just as our more or less coherent systems of experience give us different degrees of truth, even so the different degrees of reality manifest themselves in the process of self-expression of Reality itself.

Bradley also is an advocate of different degrees of reality. But in the conception of Reality in relation to 'appearance' as given by Bradley, there is an apparent difficulty in making out the possibility of degrees in such conception. To Bradley appearance, as appearance, is an unreality, but at the same time he is never tired of warning us that an appearance is the appearance of Reality or that *Reality appears in appearances*. But the appearances cannot remain isolated from and opposed to one another because they contain in them, from their very nature of being appearances of reality, the implication of their coherence. Our knowledge of appearances implies in the first instance isolation between one appearance and another; but this isolation or contradiction is at once transcended by any judgment in the unity which all knowledge implies between its subject and predicate. From this it appears that appearances have an implication of unity or coherence in the act of our knowing them. But our knowledge could not have achieved this unity or coherence amongst appearances unless they were imbedded in the bosom of Reality. Our knowledge being a progressive discovery of wider and wider coherence among appearances and therefore of higher and higher truths, the absolute or highest truth will mean complete coherence among all the aspects or appearances of Reality. From this it follows that corresponding to the different degrees of truth represented by more or less limited systems of coherence in the aspects or appearance of Reality there will be different degrees of reality as well. If reality is a coherent system and if appearances stand transmuted and transfigured in reality, then any system of appearances as more or less transfigured will approximate reality more or less, giving rise to what may be called different degrees of reality. We see then that here is the sense in which Bradley may concede to degrees of reality. Unless this more fundamental implication of appearance is realised, namely, that no one single appearance is conceivable by itself without calling forth others with which it must be made coherent in order to ensure the unity of subject and predicate in a judgment which all knowledge and truth involves, degrees of reality in the theory of Bradley seem at

first sight to be an impossible conception. Appearance *qua* appearance ultimately involves contradiction and hence it can never retain the character in which it appears. When reset in reality the appearances become altogether transformed and transmuted.

The above discussions point to the fact that Reality in the last resort cannot be conceived as other than a whole—a perfect system of experience. So with reference to this perfect system which is the *whole* there cannot be any question of degrees. As Bradley picturesquely puts it: "Nothing perfect, nothing genuinely real can move. The Absolute has no seasons but all at once bears it leaves, fruits and blossoms" The question of degrees of reality arises only when we refer to the finite centres which by their very nature fall short of perfection and tend towards the realisation of that whole. The 'appearances' of Bradley, the 'self-expressions' of Bosanquet or the 'elements' of Hegel with their inherent implication for system or coherence can alone be conceived as representing degrees of Reality.

We cannot conclude our discussion of the nature of truth and reality without referring to the contributions made by the Absolutist systems of Indian thought. The metaphysical position of Rāmānuja is that the ultimate reality is the concrete unity of the self-conscious principle of Viṣṇu which is immanent in the universe just as our soul is immanent in our body. Though the spiritual principle is the only reality, yet it is qualified by the physical which is adjectival to its being. Now Rāmānuja is an advocate of the doctrine of *Saikhyāti* according to which whatever is cognised is real (*Yathārtha*). All perceptual knowledge involves judgment which involves the distinction of subject and object each of which is real and each of which is a concrete unity of relations and attributes. The subject as a unity is *cetana* or conscious whose attribute is *jñāna* or cognition and the object as a unity is *acetana* or unconscious and is a complex of attributes. To Rāmānuja the ultimate reality is the concrete unity of the world of self and the world of not-self and all perceptual experience is *savikalpa* or determinate, for all knowledge involves categories and relations. *Jñāna* is ever associated with a subject, for *jñāna* always belongs either to the *jīva* or *Iśvara*. Throughout mundane or unliberated existence the self as subject is never without *jñāna* which manifests the object as it comes into contact with it, only that it is limited in its power of manifestation. But in the liberated state all

limitations being removed *jñāna* or cognition of the self becomes all-pervasive so that there is nothing to which it does not extend.

Epistemologically the position of Rāmānuja is that of the realist for the objects of cognition are real. They do not depend upon the self or knowledge which brings them into relation with it. Their *esse* is not determined by their *percipi* but rather their *percipi* by their *esse*. This position of Rāmānuja is consistent with his doctrine of *Satkhyāti* which he shares with Prābhākara school and which maintains that objects are real and existent independently of our knowing them. Whatever exists is alone cognised and cognition without a real object is impossible. Cognition is thus always a case of correspondence between the self as knowing and the object as known which already exists, and is always a process of transformation from the stage of *nirvikalpa* or indeterminateness to the stage of *savikalpa* or determinateness in which it always culminates. But when we say so we must distinguish Rāmānuja's *nirvikalpa* stage of cognition from that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. To the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika the *nirvikalpa* stage is prejudgmental and is only inferrible as something which must have gone before any judgmental stage which all knowledge involves. To Rāmānuja however, *nirvikalpa* as purely uncategorical knowledge is an impossibility for it is always judgmental, however inchoate it may be. The socalled *nirvikalpa* is really *savikalpa* involving, as it does, a reference to a class-concept.¹ A student of comparative epistemology may note that Rāmānuja here fully resembles the Jaina and differs from Hobhouse who while admitting 'simple apprehension' as a 'primitive' form of knowledge, denies its judgmental character.

We have seen that according to Rāmānuja all knowledge is true (*yathārtham sarvavijñānam*) for all knowledge shows or reveals some object. Even knowledge in the dream-state is so, only with this difference that the dream-objects as revealed by dream-knowledge are comparatively dim and hazy. But the question may be raised as to how we are to account for illusions where we seem to have knowledge without corresponding objects. Rāmānuja in answering this question sticks to his own position and maintains that even in so-called illusory perception, such as that of shell-silver, there is *yathārtha jñāna* or true knowledge in so far

1. *Srībhāṣya*, pp. 68-69.

as its content is real. But we may say that Rāmānuja seems to evade our ordinary distinction between *pramā* or truth and *bhrāma* or illusion in his statement that all knowledge is true. But Rāmānuja here makes his position clear by referring us to the Upaniṣadic theory of *pañcikarāṇa* or quintuplication and of the theory of *sarvam sarvātmakam*. The constitution of a thing, according to this Upaniṣadic doctrine, is that everything is composed of all the five elements of earth, water, fire, air and ether which enter into its composition in the following proportions. The one-half of everything is composed of one or other of the five elements and the other half, of one-eighth of each of the remaining four. Thus the objects of the experienced world are all compounds composed of all the five *bhūtas* or elements in varying proportions. Now illusory perception of an object, as that of a mirage for instance, is due to the apprehension of the element of *ap* or water which is presented to the eye but which is only a subordinate element in the sandy waste whose preponderating element is *prthvi* or earth. Illusion therefore may be said to be due in this and similar other cases to the apprehension of the subordinate to the neglect of the preponderating element. Rāmānuja, in explaining other cases of illusion, such as shell-silver, where neither is designable as a *bhūta* or an element by itself, only extends the principle underlying *pañcikarana* on the basis of similarity between the two things, namely, their peculiar lustre. The similarity which is responsible for confounding the shell with silver is due to the presence of a substance common to the shell and silver which goes to constitute partial identity between the shell and silver¹. Rāmānuja here is guided by the principle that everything is of the nature of every other thing (*Sarvam sarvātmakam*), consistently with his doctrine of *satkhyāti* which tells us that all that is real is cognised, so that the cognition of a so-called illusory object such as silver, is true, for the cognised element even of the illusory object is also real because of the structural affinity which characterises all objects, real or so-called unreal. Illusion of Rāmānuja is not therefore a case of preception of the unreal, for all perception is of the real, but it is only a case of confusing of one object with another due to partial identity based on our perception of a common substance which is present in the confounded objects in different proportions.

1. Srībhāṣya (Sāhityapariṣat edition), p. 200.

Rāmānuja, however, brings in defects of the sense-organs, such as the eye, over and above partial identity, as the source of the so-called illusory perception. Defective vision which blurs the property of the shell may also be responsible for misleading us to identify the object with its silver-part alone and to undertake efforts for its attainment, and adds that when the defect of the eye is removed the shell-part of the object is realised and our efforts for its attainment cease. In any case the silver-part which is present in the shell is after all an object of right cognition. Hence cognition is never really to be distinguished into true and false, for all cognition has for its object a real presentative element, which however by its being perceived in greater or lesser proportion determines the so-called distinction between truth and error. It comes to this then that all perception is true, but its truth varies only in different degrees.¹ Rāmānuja's doctrine of *satkhyāti* is thus a lie direct to the theory of illusion of the Advaitin according to whom the object of illusory perception is unreal, having no status even in the world of empirical reality. The apparent silver of illusory perception is cognised by the witness—self alone and like pleasure and pain, is entirely subjective.

But one may at once raise the question that if according to Rāmānuja all knowledge is of the real and if the so-called error in knowledge is due to our emphasis on the subordinate element of the thing presented, the distinction of truth and error becomes a matter of omission and incomplete knowledge of the thing presented to our consciousness. But since such omission and incomplete knowledge may occur in as many ways as there are individual knowers the distinction of truth and error becomes entirely individualistic and private. Rāmānuja, therefore, has recourse to a pragmatic test and says that the individual percipient undertakes or refrains from conative efforts when the validity or errorousness of his knowledge is realised. When the shell-part of the shell is realised and the illusion of silver is removed he does not undertake any effort to take up the shell. This pragmatist satisfaction or serviceableness which he introduces as a necessary criterion of truth has been more fully worked out by his followers, like Prakāśātmayati, who expressly add the condition of *Vyāvahārānuguna* or 'adapted to practice'. Again Rāmānuja's examples of yellow conch-shell and

dream-elephants, where we have apparently erroneous knowledge, are meant for showing that error in cognition in these cases occurs because our cognition does not tally with social experience or experience of our fellow beings. Certainly the cognition of the yellowness of the conch-shell or the cognition of the dream-elephant is not shared by any other person for the time being than the individual suffering from jaundice or dreaming of the white elephant. It is curious to note that as an advocate of *satkhyāti* Rāmānuja maintains that the yellow conch-shell is objectively real as well, and as much as the dream-elephant to the individual concerned. In the case of the yellow conch-shell he defends himself by saying that the yellowness of the conch-shell for the time being is due to the transmission of the real property of yellowness of the eye of the percipient to the conch-shell so that the conch-shell during perception of the jaundiced percipient is really yellow, and in the case of dream-perception of an elephant the elephant is also real because God for the time being presents the elephant to dream-consciousness as a real object of perception and, the illusory character of both these two perceptions is brought home to us when we find that they do not tally with experience of others. From what we have stated we may now gather that according to Rāmānuja not only correspondence is a necessary condition both for the nature and test of truth but also it must be supplemented by the pragmatic condition or adaptability to practice as well as by consilience or some sort of coherence with social experience.

In Advaita Vedāntism we are told that what is ultimately real or existent is Brahman and that this ultimate reality is undifferentiated unity admitting of no difference either internal or collateral. Quality, diversity, and relation are all meaningless to it. It is identical with Absolute Truth. The Advaitin, however, makes concession to empirical consciousness by admitting relative truth and reality within the empirical or practical universe which of course has no truth in reference to the ultimate reality. Within the empirical sphere the Advaitin distinguishes the subject and the object, and judgmental knowledge in which the subject and the object and the process form a unity, though psychological distinction amongst these moments is not denied.

Pramā or truth to the Advaitin consists in knowledge which is *abādhita* or uncontradicted. He also adds another condition,

viz., *anadhibitatva* or the quality of not being previously cognised. But this second condition is not agreed upon by all advocates of Advaitism and is therefore not made much of. Now, the term, uncontradicted cognition, ordinarily means that it is not opposed to, but is consilient with, other cognitions. The cognition of a thing is true if it is not incompatible with other cognitions of one's own and with cognitions of others. In other words non-contradiction is in this sense the basic principle of consistency. We must however resist the temptation of deriving from it the theory of coherence in the sense of Hegel and the neo-Hegelians as some enthusiastic writers have done, for the simple reason that in the Advaitist non-contradiction there seems to be no suggestion of a systematic whole of experience in which our experiences become re-arranged so as to form what Bradley, for instance, calls a coherent system. When we say this, we do not of course deny the larger experience of *Isvara* which, though having no transcendental reality contains these cognitions as so many units. In the empirical realm, where truth with the Advaitin means non-contradiction, it refers not to the fact that the experiences are within the larger experience of *Isvara* as so many consilient units, but to the fact that their *objects* stand only unsublated within the empirical sphere. This seems to amount to thinking that truth is consistency. And we must of course be on our guard against supposing that such consistency as purely formal. The Advaitin admits the psychologically real character of the subject and the object, of ideas and facts, and that knowledge to be true must take the form of the object known (*Tadākārākārīta*) ; so this directly points to the fact that the Advaitin admits the empirically real basis of knowledge and provides against the charge of logical formalism and subjectivism. The real trouble lies in this that some modern enthusiastic interpreters of Advaitism have misunderstood the import of *abādhita* which distinctly and unmistakably refers to the *object* (*abādhita viṣaya*) which is subject to gradual sublation (*bādhā*) and never to cognition as such which is *svatahpramāṇa*. Cognition therefore does not stand in need of consistency or coherence unnecessarily thrust upon it. The accredited advaitist doctrine of *svatahpramāṇa* definitely militates against coherence or any other feature that may be introduced into the nature of truth. It is worth noting further

that the Advaitist conception of absolute truth is just the reverse of Bradley's. To the Advaitist absolute truth is equated with Absolute Reality which is an *undifferenced unity and never a system* of coherent experience as it is to Bradley.

The Advaitist doctrine of *Adhyāsa* or transcendental superimposition brings out another important point of distinction between itself and the western Absolutism in so far as the question of the degrees of truth and reality is concerned. If the Advaitin's Reality is a non-relational unity, the question of difference is shut out altogether and therefore the question of degree which involves relations and differences has no occasion to arise with reference to it. A pure unity cannot admit of any degree either of truth or of reality. The doctrine of *Adhyāsa* tells us that our empirical world and our experiences of it are but products of illusion, so that neither experience, nor its object, can have any truth or reality when viewed from the standpoint of the ultimate Truth and Reality. Our experience or any system of experiences has no reality for its object, nor are the different systems of experience representative of different grades of reality in order that we might have more or less wider systems of truth representing higher and higher reality. The entire system of empirical experience is illusory and has no reference either in degree or in entirety to the Ultimate Reality. All that we have is that our systems of empirical experience are more or less false, as they are sublated, one by the other, as we rise from illusory experience to an empirically real experience or from one empirical system of experiences to another and higher empirical system, until we reach the highest knowledge or intuition which is identical with reality and which eternally cancels the lower ones. We see then that there is no question of the degree, either of truth or of reality, from the standpoint of ultimate experience though we can only speak of degrees of unreality and of error.

2. TESTS OR 'CRITERIA OF TRUTH.'

Here the question before us is not about the nature of truth but about the test or the criterion which makes for the truth-claim of knowledge. Now this question again resolves itself into the further question whether the test or criterion of truth means anything additional to the nature of truth itself, so that it must be introduced from outside into the truth-situation to establish its

claim or it is either identical with or an integral part of it, so that nothing extraneous to truth itself is necessary for its evaluation. In fact in the theories of truth that have been propounded by the different schools of philosophy, we notice that the test or criterion in some cases is hardly separable from the nature of truth itself, though it is in some other cases distinguished from it. It will be seen that excepting in the pragmatic and the hard and fast correspondence theory of truth the test or criterion is either coincident with the nature of truth or is an integral part of it. In the pragmatic theory of truth, as we have analysed above, we have already noticed that conative satisfaction, which the pragmatist thinks as constituting the nature of truth, is really a sign or symbol of truth to be added on to its nature. And in the hard and fast form of the correspondence theory of truth also test or criterion will be regarded as an extraneous condition which when fulfilled will give rise to truth-claim for knowledge. The theories of coherence and self-evidence will be found to require no test or criterion as a feature distinct from the nature of truth, so that in these two theories of truth, nature and criterion will coincide. We propose to give our analysis of test or criterion of truth as conceived in the different theories of it and to begin our analysis with pragmatism.

(a) PRAGMATIC TEST OF TRUTH.

According to Pragmatism ideas or judgments have nothing in themselves of a truth-claim but something must be added on to them by way of conative satisfaction to convert them into truth. James himself admits that ideas and judgments are not valid in themselves but they are *validated* by the satisfaction of purpose of the agent that follows upon them. Truth happens to ideas and judgments and not that ideas and judgments have any claim to truth by themselves. Now, apart from psychological elements which are introduced in the appraisal of truth in preference to logical and metaphysical ones that are indispensable, pragmatism apparently assumes correspondence between ideas and facts of experience, for satisfaction seems to follow upon some sort of correspondence. But the question is, if correspondence is thus involved in pragmatic theory of truth, is this correspondence between ideas and known facts or is it between ideas and unknown facts? In the first case correspondence is unnecessary, in the second case

correspondence is an impossibility as we have already noticed. The pragmatic test of truth in so far as it assumes correspondence suffers from these inconsequences. Further if correspondence is to stand it will call forth another correspondence to substantiate itself and so on *ad infinitum*. It is apparent therefore that pragmatic theory of the test of truth in its necessary dependence on correspondence cuts beneath its own ground. Again making satisfaction of a purpose the test of truth pragmatism lays itself bare to individualism if the purpose is private to the knowing agent. But if the pragmatist with a view to freeing himself from the charge of individualism has recourse to the wider purpose of the society then it tacitly goes over into the camp of the advocates of coherence. For, to prove that the purpose which is satisfied by conative fruition is not individual but social, the pragmatist has to show its harmony with the purposes of other knowing agents. But this is equivalent to coherence theory of truth which the pragmatist is out to controvert. We see then pragmatist test of truth by itself cannot stand on its own ground.

(b) CORRESPONDENCE AS TEST OF TRUTH.

In our analysis of correspondence as nature of truth we have seen that so far as truth is concerned there must be some sort of correspondence between ideas and facts. Truth requires for its very being a form of perceptual experience in which we must be aware of a form of correspondence as its minimum condition. But this correspondence cannot be one between ideas and facts which have no community or mutual determination between them. Ideas are, at least in the case of knowledge of an adult mind, already determined by facts in so far as they are representations of such facts, and facts are facts for ideas and they are already determined by ideas. Now this mutual determination of ideas and facts in any knowledge-situation is only incipient or implicit but becomes articulate in a judgment in which truth-claim appears. Correspondence or contact between ideas and facts does not occur as a subsequent result and therefore as a criterion added extraneously to the situation of truth to vindicate its claim. Correspondence studied in the above light, that is, studied as a necessary fitness of facts to become idealised in every situation of truth, or as *Accordance* in the language of Dr. Ewing, is a neces-

sary incident in the truth-situation. In this sense, therefore, correspondence may be conceded to as a condition necessary for truth though it is not itself truth. But the traditional correspondence theory of truth starts with a rigid dualism between ideas and facts making us believe as if ideas have no element of actuality in themselves as they have no reference to facts, and facts are brute enough to be devoid of all ideality in them ; and truth emerges from correspondence between ideas and facts, which were originally undetermined by each other. According to this hard and fast correspondence theory, therefore, not only the nature of truth but also its test depends on correspondence considered as contact between ideas and facts without incipient mutual determination. In this hard and fast correspondence truth seems to happen to ideas and its test becomes an additional element to be tacked on to it externally. But both the nature and the test of truth from the standpoint of hard and fast correspondence crumble to the ground, when it is pointed out that such correspondence is either unnecessary or impossible by the dilemma to which it exposes itself. For, we can ask the advocate of correspondence : Is the correspondence between ideas and facts, known or unknown ? If it is known then correspondence is unnecessary to establish for the purposes of nature and test of truth. If it is unknown then it is impossible to establish it, for in so doing the advocate of correspondence will have to bring in another correspondence, and to establish the second correspondence he will have to bring in a third, and so on, and will thus involve himself in an infinite regress. We see then that correspondence in the traditional sense, which makes out an external relation between ideas and facts, fails to give us not only the nature of truth but also its criterion or test. Correspondence in the sense of *Accordance* as formulated above can serve only as an incident in the nature of truth whose full articulation and test are met with in the theory of Coherence.¹

(c) COHERENCE AS TEST OF TRUTH.

In our exposition of the nature of truth as Coherence we have already shown how ideas and facts and their correspondence in the sense of Accordance fall as elements within experience as a

1. For a fuller criticism of correspondence see Joachim: *The Nature of Truth*, Ch. I.

system. In the objective idealist theory truth is coherence amongst our experiences or systems of experiences. Any psychical centre facing the universe cannot be aware of an object without implication of other objects with which it makes up a system and within that system even the psychical centre itself falls as an element. This *implication* which every object bears in regard to every other object is the basis of agreement or harmony or coherence as a system. For all experiences are the elements of a coherent system which is already self-realised. Having thus shown why coherence is a necessary conception of truth in objective idealism which we have accepted, we need not go over into the details that are involved in its conception of truth, for we have already done it. Here we shall confine ourselves to the question as to what constitutes the test of truth as coherence. But as the question of the nature of truth is indissolubly bound up with the question of its test in the theory of coherence, we crave indulgence of the reader to allow us of repetition, whenever necessary, of some of the ideas without reference to which coherence as the test of truth cannot be thoroughly understood. The coherence theory itself is replete with so many implications delucible from the Coherence Principle and its application that we cannot, within the limits of this book, undertake an exhaustive consideration of them. All that we can do is to refer the reader to Dr. Ewing's *Idealism* Ch. V. where his inquisitiveness may be satisfied. To pursue our own point we must state that the coherence theory of truth assumes that reality is a system such that it includes within its bosom all possible experiences which stand in a relation of agreement with one another. These experiences are but so many aspects of Experience as a whole. The subject and the predicate, idea and fact, have all reciprocal implication without which they cannot be what they are as elements of this whole of Experience. Any one of these elements considered in isolation involves contradiction and therefore error. Now such being the underlying Principle of Coherence it determines the nature of truth as that in which we are to understand that every experience is in harmony with the rest in an ideal coherence which is Experience or Reality. To guard against the view that coherence may be a case of formal consistency as has been taken by Russell and others, Bradley has reminded us that ideal or perfect coherence includes *Comprehensiveness* which goes beyond formal consistency of ideas and judgments to consistency

with Reality which is a whole. Now we venture to think that without supposing, like Dr. Ewing, that the coherence view of reality can only logically follow from the assumption that our universe is a *causally* determined system, the theory of coherence can be maintained in the light of Bradley and Joachim that reality is a rational system and possesses "self-coherence in proportion as every constituent element of it *logically* involves and is involved by every other ; and in so far as the reciprocal implications of the constituent elements, or rather the constituent elements in their reciprocal implications, constitute alone and completely the significance of the system."¹ It appears to us more consistent to take the principle of Ground and Consequent as the principle of explanation of the relation between the elements or 'appearances' and Reality in preference to that of cause and effect. The principle of causality no doubt has its application in the sphere of appearances as they are conceived by our thought. But the ultimate sphere which is the sphere of consummation is beyond the spatio-temporal and causal determinations. When we speak of the principle of ground and consequent, it must not be interpreted in the light of Spinozistic philosophy where the consequents are taken to be grounded on the very nature of Substance from which the consequents follow as a matter of necessity. In Bradley Reality is all-complete and self-realised. While Spinoza is never tired of reminding us that consequents must necessarily follow from the ground of Substance, just as the equality of three angles of a triangle to two right angles must necessarily follow from the very nature of a triangle, Bradley confesses his ignorance on this point and the question why there should be appearances remains an 'ultimate doubt' to him. The Reality is complete and perfect without the 'appearances' but still why the appearances are there in Reality remains an enigma to him. Having thus seen that Bradley's system is through and through logical, we can say that truth can only be complete coherence amongst experiences, not without reference to, but always including coherence with the whole of experience, which is comprehensiveness. It does not stand in need of any extraneous condition for its test, for test of truth is here coincident with its nature. The same remark holds good also of relative truths only that in their cases coherence

1. Quoted by Dr. Ewing from *Mind*, 1905, N.S., No. 53. p. 9. in his *Idealism*, p. 230. Italics is ours.

amongst experiences, as also comprehensiveness, is more or less complete.

Criticism of Coherence as Criterion or Truth.

Various criticisms have been offered against coherence as the test of truth and all of these criticisms proceed from the empirical character of our knowledge and the pragmatic interest which we are tempted to bring in whatever we know. Our analysis of the coherence theory of truth has, we believe, already made it clear that these objections are due to failure to see the logical and the metaphysical conditions which are indispensable for a correct understanding of truth. We, however, distinguish some of the important criticisms and try to offer answers to these criticisms as follows:

(i) The empiricist might argue that when in experiencing a table, I am not under the necessity of referring the table to any larger system of experiences for the truth of my knowledge of the table, and so coherence is a *gratuitous assumption*. An advocate of the coherence theory will refute this objection by pointing out that even here no guarantee to the truth of the perceptual experience of the table can be had without presupposing a whole system of interpreting sensa in accordance with previous experience. For the same sensa if presented in an environment where there is no chance of experiencing a table, will never give an adequate clue to justify our experience of a table, unless our thought presupposes the whole system of classification of objects which renders intelligible the structure of a table in this queer environment, that is, unless we think that the presented sensa form part of a coherent whole of previous experiences.

(ii) It is objected that the coherence theory is based upon mere *assumption of pre-existent self-evident truth*. But the advocate of coherence theory will reply that the truth of a proposition is not to be taken as based upon self-evidence of a system which has no *objective* basis however implausibility realised. As Dr. Ewing has very ably pointed out, the proposition $2+2=5$ is rejected as false because it does not consist with our whole idea of the number system and the proposition $2+2=4$ is accepted as true because it coheres with this system, and the meaning of these propositions cannot be understood except as involving this system.

(iii) Dr. Schiller stresses against the coherence theory the objection that granting that an absolutely coherent system of propositions must be absolutely true, it does not follow that of two imperfect theories the more coherent one must be nearer than the other to the complete truth. For out of the two roads apparently leading to the summit of a hill, one may be a very promising one whereas the other may appear to be quite disappointing. But it may be discovered afterwards that the promising road instead of leading us to the goal suddenly ends in an unclimbable cliff whereas the disappointing one may ultimately take us to the destination. Similarly out of the two theories the promising and more coherent one may be found afterwards erroneous, whereas the less promising and less coherent theory may suddenly turn out to be more systematic and coherent and bring us to the highest truth. Dr. Schiller's argument is really a formidable one as Dr. Ewing admits. His objection serves as a strong warning against the over-enthusiastic advocates of coherence theory. It is really to be admitted that sometimes a less coherent theory is found to be truer on subsequent investigation and it then becomes more coherent than the views hitherto recognised as satisfactorily coherent and therefore true. But in our search after truth we must proceed on the basis of probability leaving the ultimate truth a matter of open question. We may accept the more coherent theory as true for the time being as it has less chance of misleading us than the less coherent one. So ultimately the coherent theory stands, but in the search after the absolute coherence we must proceed very cautiously measuring every step we take, and Dr. Schiller's merit consists in warning us against over-enthusiasm. So, of two imperfect theories that one will really be more acceptable which has greater numerical evidences in its favour along with its coherence with the system of our experience. It is thus evident that the very principle of accepting our experiences as evidences in favour of a theory is also based upon the principle of coherence itself.

(iv) Another objection to the coherence theory put forth by Dr. Schiller is that coherence being an all-comprehensive system has to include the assertion of a person who denies coherence and therefore cannot be coherent as it contradicts itself. But the advocates of coherence theory can easily refute it by stating that as an all-comprehensive system it, of course, includes the denial

not as a true proposition but only as a psychological fact which may be a case of an error or contradiction, and, as already elaborately shown, it is the very spirit or principle of coherence to resolve contradictions or errors in the light of higher and higher organized systems of experience. An error is not certainly denied in coherence theory but is regarded as only a partial truth and has a place in a coherent system without contradicting the principle of coherence itself.

Without multiplying objections to the coherence theory of truth which will be found to proceed from the misunderstanding of the Principle of Coherence itself, we would like to point out that empirical thinkers regard experiences as independent facts. Purely formal thinkers conceive, too, a form of coherence which is hardly more than self-consistency amongst facts of experience. But neither of these two classes of thinkers goes deeper into the principle of coherence proper, which includes isolated experiences, discovers self-consistency amongst them but goes further to show that individual experiences and logical consistency are only incidents in a larger whole of experience which, as objective rational Reality, comprehends them all and provides for future experiences and their consistency to be tested as true by reference to this comprehensive whole of experience. Coherence is thus regarded not only as *a* criterion but as *the* criterion of truth, for coherence is not only inherent in our assertions of true propositions but also is in the nature of the Real which lends the character of truth to our true assertions. We have already noticed how the theory of coherence does justice, so far as, it is due, to the pragmatic and correspondence views of truth in that it recognises the purposiveness of the quest of truth in its advance from narrower to wider systems of experience and as also some incipient form of correspondence in the shape of Accordance.

(d) SELF-EVIDENCE AS TEST OF TRUTH.

As applied to truth the term 'self-evidence' admits of more than one interpretation which we undertake to analyse. The common element in all these interpretations seems to be the immediateness of knowledge of what is regarded as self-evident, so that 'intuition' may be a very near approach to what is called self-evidence, though it may not be exactly identical with it. For

the knowledge of a self-evident datum may be due to intuition as opposed to intellect in some cases, but in other cases it may be forced upon our intellect. But immediateness of knowledge is the common character of all self-evident data. Thus the term 'self-evidence' involves immediate cognition either by intellect or by intuition.

According to self-evidence as test of truth the truth of a judgment is self-certified and never depends for its certainty upon anything extraneous to the elements of the judgment. It maintains that ideas and concepts involved in a judgment shine by their own light. The basic principle of self-evidence is therefore constituted by intrinsic validity of the data of our knowledge. In modern European philosophy, Descartes is the exponent of the self-evidence theory of truth and his guiding principle is, "never to accept anything for true which I did not clearly know to be such ; that is to say, carefully to avoid precipitancy and prejudice, and to comprise nothing more in my judgment than what was presented to my mind so clearly and distinctly as to exclude all ground of doubt."¹ If we are to pass a true judgment we must affirm or deny only that content which we clearly and distinctly apprehend. Affirmation or denial which every act of judgment involves depends upon the free choice of our will. But the datum which we affirm or deny is presented to the intellect as a passive recipient to which its truth is immediately given, and it remains for the active will freely to affirm or deny. The contents of judgments whether affirmative or negative are always self-evident to the intellect, so that they may be equally true. But error will result from the intervention of the will which of its own initiative will regard as clear and distinct what is not really so. Intellect operating by itself will comprehend truth and nothing but truth unless interfered with by will. The perceptual judgment, 'this piece of paper is red', contains the ideas of 'piece', 'paper,' and 'red,' each of which is so clear and distinct to the intellect that it does not require any other evidence for the truth of the judgment composed of these ideas. Mathematical propositions, axioms and postulates are true because they are self-evident. Knowledge of the self, causality and God, is also true because these ideas are all innate. The basic principle of truth in all these

1. Descartes: *The Method, Meditation, etc.*, edited by Veitch, p. 19.

different cases is immediacy of cognition or intuition. We may say, therefore, that self-evidence which lends truth-claim to these different kinds of knowledge, perceptual and innate, is based upon distinctness and clearness of the data presented to the intellect. And to say this is to say that true ideas must be clear and distinct in order that it may be manifest that they are free from self-contradiction. We may also put it in the way that self-evidence is another name for absence of self-contradiction in the ideas. We have already stated that immediacy of cognition is entailed with all that is self-evident. Descartes is also of opinion that all true knowledge must be immediately cognised as the eternal and necessary truth or at least must be deducible from such truth by a formally or mathematically conclusive process. We may say then that the philosophy of Descartes is guided by the principle of non-contradiction. In this respect Descartes differs from Leibniz who points out that all truths cannot be tested by the principle of non-contradiction, that is, there are some truths where non-contradiction or the absence of self-contradiction need not be self-evident. The perceptual truth, 'the piece of paper is red,' for instance, may be perfectly true without being reducible to self-evidence, as Descartes supposes. Leibniz therefore feels the necessity of distinguishing between necessary and contingent truths. Truths that are necessary are certainly grounded directly in the eternal nature of things, but contingent truths demand for their certainty not self-evidence or absence of self-contradiction, but rather what he calls sufficient reason why they should be so and not otherwise.

An examination of Descartes' criterion of truth, namely, self-evidence, which is due to its being clear and distinct, will reveal that for clearness and distinctness he ultimately appeals to the veracity of God. Without entering into the question whether Descartes renders himself open in this connection to the charge of circular reasoning, we may say that the criterion of clearness and distinctness or self-evidence is evidently extrinsic in that it ultimately proceeds from God's veracity and is not an integral part of the epistemic ground of truth itself. God makes truth to be what it is. Ideas and judgments are not ultimately valid by themselves on their own account, but are made so on theological grounds.

The above is an account of Descartes' criterion of truth so far as it is gathered from the general trend of his *Methods and*

Meditations and *Principles of Philosophy*, and the traditional view that Descartes is an advocate of self-evidence as the criterion of truth seems to be based on these two works. But if one is curious enough to go through his other work, *Regulations*, along with the above-mentioned works, one will notice that Descartes' full meaning of the ideal of knowledge would make him rather an advocate of the coherence theory of truth to which his self-evidence theory leads him. Adamson, and following him Joachim, as also Norman Kemp Smith, agree in their interpretation of Descartes as an upholder of the theory of coherence rather than that of self-evidence pure and simple. The general trend of argument of these interpreters is that immediate apprehension of the indubitable, an intuition, is the condition precedent to the truth of judgment. Descartes thinks that what we intuit as self-evident is a simple idea or proposition. But the idea or proposition though simple is not without inner distinction, that is, not without elements or constituent ideas. Such a simple idea or proposition may in fact be expanded into a hypothetical judgment in which the antecedent necessarily implies the consequent but not *vice versa*. For instance, Descartes' *cogito ergo sum* may be expanded into the hypothetical judgment, 'if self-consciousness, then existence,' but not conversely, that is, 'if existence then self-consciousness'. So $2+2=4$ is another instance of intuition which may be expanded into the hypothetical judgment, 'if 2 be added to 2 there must be 4,' but not conversely, because if there be 4, it does not follow that it is necessarily a case of addition of 2 and 2, for it may also be a case of addition of 3 and 1. Thus 'the elements in the content of an 'intuition' cohere by the immediate necessity which binds consequent to antecedent in a hypothetical judgment of the kind explained. But the content *as a whole is grasped intuitively*, or immediately, as an indubitable self-evident *datum*. Such self-evident indubitable truths constitute the foundation on which the structure of scientific and philosophical knowledge is built. They are the principles, from which the whole system of demonstrated and demonstrable truth must be derived.'¹ Thus Joachim thinks that Descartes gives us a system of truths which has a rigorous logical coherence from the self-evident datum, so that it forms a net-work or chains of propositions, each of which is grasped by

1. Joachim: *The Nature of Truth*, p. 71.

the intellect as the necessary consequent of a link or links intuited as indubitable truths. Joachim of course does not give Descartes the full credit of an advocate of the theory of coherence, but only says that an interpretation of the coherence theory may be put upon Descartes' position as a whole, though Descartes does not go far enough to give us the cardinal principle of coherence which lies in the organisation and not in mere colligation or linking of propositions even if they are intuitively grasped. We can conclude then that although a careful collation of Descartes' writings in his different works may lead one to attribute to him an inchoate conception of the coherence theory of truth, yet one would hesitate to interpret Descartes as a full-fledged advocate of the theory of coherence for the simple reason that his ideal of knowledge does not mean a really coherent system of truths, but only a system in which different self-evident data stand out as relatively self-dependent truths unaltered by their position within the whole.

In some of the systems of Indian philosophy, too, self-evidence is regarded as the test or criterion of truth. In these systems self-evidence does not exactly mean the same thing as it does in Descartes ; and even the term *Svataḥprāmāṇya* or self-validity of cognition which is used by the Advaitins, the Mīmāṃsakas and the Sāṃkhya philosophers to mean the self-evident character of truth does not stand for exactly the same thing. To the Advaitin all knowledge from the very conditions of its origin is valid and its validity is grasped immediately or intuitively by *Sākṣicaitanya* which, self-luminous in itself, immanently pervades and lends its luminosity to all knowledge. In the empirical sphere knowledge is indeed constituted by *antāḥkaraṇavṛtti* or modification of the inner sense, but although *antāḥkaraṇavṛtti* is not in itself self-luminous, yet in all knowledge-situations *antāḥkaraṇavṛtti* acquires self-luminosity from the *Sākṣicaitanya* or transcendental consciousness which, as self-lucent, brings within its range of illumination all *antāḥkaraṇavṛttis* just as the search-light illumines all that falls within its range. Hence all empirical knowledge in its origin is self-valid, for its validity it does not require any extraneous condition but the very same conditions that determine its origin also determine its validity. Hence the validity of knowledge according to Advaitins is imbedded in its very origin and when knowledge proves erroneous, its erroneous character is due to conditions other than those that determine its origin. Error results

from a prevalence of certain extraneous conditions like the defect of sense organs, distance of the object, absence of sufficient light etc., so that erroneousness or invalidity of knowledge is due to conditions extraneous to its origin (*paratah-aprāmānya*). The Advaitin of course denies the ultimate validity of all empirical knowledge and to him ultimately valid knowledge means knowledge of transcendental reality which is free from all extraneous conditions to invalidate it. The point worth noting is this that according to Advaitins self-validity of knowledge is based on the postulate that knowledge in itself, proceeding as it does ultimately from transcendental consciousness, is self-luminous. The Mīmāṃsaka, too, agrees with the Advaitins in his view of self-validity of knowledge and the intuitive or self-evident character of the apprehension of its contents, except in this that the Mīmāṃsaka admits independent character of the empirical or spatio-temporal modes of consciousness which is denied ultimate validity by the Advaitins. Another point of difference between the Mīmāṃsaka and the Advaitin is this that the Mīmāṃsaka distinguishes between *pramāṇa* or validity of knowledge and *Pramāṇaphala* or result of valid knowledge, which the Advaitin does not. The Sāṃkhya philosopher also agrees both with the Mīmāṃsaka and the Advaitin in so far as self-validity of knowledge is concerned. To the Sāṃkhyist as well as to the Mīmāṃsist and the Advaitin validity of knowledge is not due to anything extraneous but is rooted in the very conditions of its origin. But the Sāṃkhyist differs from the Advaitin and Mīmāṃsist in his view of the conditions of invalidity. While the Advaitin and the Mīmāṃsist assign invalidity to extraneous conditions (*paratah-aprāmānya*) the Sāṃkhyist urges that even invalidity of knowledge is traceable to the very same conditions. The Sāṃkhyist theory of self-validity and of self-invalidity (*Svataḥ-aprāmānya*) is based upon his fundamental ontological position and specially on his view of the identity between cause and effect (*Satkāryavāda*). Effect means manifestation of what lay unmanifested, unfoldment of what was enfolded. The effect is nothing else than redistribution of the cause which already prefigures it. Now validity or invalidity of knowledge as an effect therefore must depend upon the very same conditions that operate in its manifestation. Hence the Sāṃkhyist says that not only is the validity of knowledge self-originated but also its invalidity. Our point is then that according to the Sāṃkhyist as well as to the

Advaitin and the Mīmāṃsāist self-validity of knowledge is not due to any conditions extraneous to its origin or manifestation as the case may be, but always to those conditions that determine its origin or manifestation.

3. *OBSERVATIONS ON THE TESTS OF TRUTH.*

After having given the main views of the nature and test of truth we now undertake to evaluate these views. It appears to us that these different views have arisen from the different angles of vision from which the problem of truth has been looked at. In our analysis of the different views we have noticed that they depend upon assumptions which the advocates of different views have made. Assumptions are indeed necessary for philosophical procedure itself, but there are assumptions and assumptions. The problem of truth being the essential problem of philosophy must proceed on such an assumption as would help us to explain more satisfactorily than others the conditions that are involved in the evaluation of truth as such. The different conceptions of truth and of its tests such as pragmatic, correspondence, coherence, and self-evidence, and mutual difference and quarrel amongst them, have, we think, been due to laying over-emphasis on one or more of these conditions to the neglect of the rest. Human constitution is a complex, composed of psychological as well as rational structure. When truth presents itself to the human mind, not only do these different structures of the human mind come into play, but also it is faced with reality which does not fail to influence the mind's evaluation of truth. In a more plain language, we would well express the conditions of truth-situation when we would say that the evaluation of truth involves psycho-biological and rational or logical structures of the human mind on the one side and metaphysical structure of the universe on the other.

In the pragmatic theory there seems to be an undue emphasis on the psycho-biological structure of the human constitution to the neglect of the logical and the metaphysical which should play the essential part in the origin and evaluation of truth. In the correspondence theory an absolute line of division is drawn between the logical structure of mind and the metaphysical structure of reality and a forced co-operation or contact is introduced to give rise to truth out of it. But the advocate of correspondence

theory forgets that the ideas are never absolutely separate from facts, nor are facts absolutely out of all relation to ideas. We have already seen the difficulty which besets the hard and fast correspondence theory which tries to achieve the impossible task of mutual contact between facts and ideas without incipient mutual determination of the one by the other. The theory of coherence perhaps goes farthest into the problem in so far as it strikes the very key-note in that the Universe is a whole, in which facts and ideas and their accordance are never isolated from one another, but are necessary aspects or elements which form themselves into more or less co-ordinated systems within the whole. Its importance lies in the fact that it establishes the essential character of the intellectual or logical structure of the human constitution, exposes the inessential or accidental contributions of the psychological and the biological, and points to the metaphysical structure of the universe that vibrates the intellectual structure of our constitution. In plain language, for the problem of truth logical consistency among the elements of experience is certainly necessary, but it cannot stop there and must go beyond and refer to Reality as a whole for its comprehensiveness. Self-evidence or intuition seems to us to play a very valuable part in the situation of truth. When we say so, we do not mean that self-evidence by itself is the best substitute for all other theories of the nature and test of truth, but what we mean is that self-evidence is involved in some form or other wherever we apprehend and evaluate truth. We are of opinion that truth *is* and is *never made* and for the apprehension of truth that is, self-evidence or intuition is the only organ. The truth of presented data, whatever may be other conditions involved in their presentation, is immediately grasped by an act of intuition. The pragmatist, according to whom truth is made by conative fulfilment, cannot escape the contributions of self-evidence in so far as his very conative activity presupposes intuitive knowledge of correspondence between his idea and the object or fact he effectively deals with. The pragmatist must admit, in spite of himself, some sort of prior correspondence between his ideas and objects upon which he directs his conative activity. Now he cannot account for this incipient correspondence except by an intuitive knowledge of it. So it appears that the pragmatist has to admit a distinct contribution to the problem of truth made by self-evidence or intuition. The

advocate of correspondence theory has been subjected to many criticisms, the most outstanding of which is the infinite regress to which he is led to establish correspondence, but he might have avoided this criticism simply if he fell back upon the self-evident character of correspondence. But committed as he is to his own theory of correspondence, however hard the task of establishing it may have been, he does not see eye to eye with self-evidence which he unconsciously assumes. Bradley in his exposition of the theory of coherence has never denied the importance of self-evidence as revealing the truth of the elements within the system just as he is never tired of admitting some sort of correspondence between ideas and facts in our quest of truth. Bradley in his characteristic way has stated that in the situation of truth which is always a system, self-evidence and correspondence are the necessary incidents which we must transcend to reach a coherent system of experience which is truth. We have already seen also how Descartes has made much of self-evidence as criterion of truth though fuller understanding of his position by reference to all his works, including *Regulations*, has led us to the view that his self-evidence theory of truth logically leads to coherence of some sort. Without further elaborating our arguments for showing the importance of self-evidence as a criterion of truth we may rest contented with simply pointing out that truth is a revelation and not a manufacture, and the fit organ for such revelation is intuition. When we say so, we do not minimise the value of the accordance, nor that of the coherence theory, but what we like to point out is that self-evidence is necessary for the apprehension of truth either individual or universal. Apart from what is contributed by the correspondence and coherence theories of truth by way of its *analysis* and *structural synthesis*, we think we may not be wrong to assert that for the apprehension of truth as it is, self-evidence is of indispensable value. Even from the point of view of Bradley according to whom the absolute truth is Reality in its ideal form, if realisable at all, it is realisable not by thought which has already committed suicide, but only by intuition.

There is, however, a traditional objection against the theory of self-evidence that it reduces truth to be something private and personal. It is urged that a truth may be self-evident to one but not so to others. It, however, appears that the objection has

arisen from the misunderstanding of the term self-evidence. A truth that is self-evident does not mean evident to a self. It rather means that it contains within itself the conditions of its own validity. So the validity of the self-evident truth is not a private affair but is imbedded in the very nature of the elements of the truth itself. Hence if the validity of truth is imbedded in its very elements, it is not made by any cogniser of the truth ; in fact, validity is never made by a cognition but is only revealed, as it is there in the object, by immediate knowledge or intuition. If this is kept clear in view then self-evidence theory does not make truth private or personal. We must remember also that what is self-evident is, as Descartes calls it, 'indubitable'. What is indubitable cannot be subjective and the indubitable character of truth means that truth has an objective basis. Now this objective basis can be furnished in some cases by accordance and in other cases by coherence. We see then that if self-evidence in the sense of immediate knowledge does not constitute but only reveals what is indubitable, the objection of subjectivity, as is often laid against it, is altogether misdirected.

Another objection against the self-evidence theory of truth is urged on the ground that the principle of non-contradiction which governs it leads not only to a negative conception of truth but also involves reference to another conception, the understanding of which helps the understanding of truth. The principle of non-contradiction as applied to truth will mean that 'truth is not not-truth' and 'truth is not false'. Now we can refute the objection by pointing out that it is purely formal, in the sense that we cling here to the form which the principle of non-contradiction gives us when fully expounded. But it must be remembered that non-contradiction is identity only in another form, for a thing which is identical with itself cannot allow its contradictory. The content of the principles of identity and of non-contradiction is identically the same. Hence when it is urged by the objectionist that the conception of truth governed by the principle of non-contradiction is only negative, we can turn the table against him and say that the principle of identity which represents the positive aspect is different from the principle of non-contradiction only in its form and not in its content, and very well gives us truth as it is in its positive aspect, and we thus avoid the negative definition of truth, as also the understanding of the term

'false' by negating which we are said to reach the conception of truth. We see then that the above-mentioned objection is only a formal one and does not stand when the principle of non-contradiction is understood in the light of the principle of identity which has identically the same content as the principle of non-contradiction.

We conclude then that the different tests of truth as considered above have only relative value and contribute to the conception of truth and its evaluation according to their emphasis on the different conditions that enter into the situation of truth. We however think that since truth retains always a theoretical character, pragmatism which altogether ignores it and reduces it to practice, seems to us to have the least value in the consideration of the problem of truth. And, as we have maintained, since truth is, and never made, it refers to *being* or existence and never to *doing*, its *structure* can be explained and analysed by *accordance*, or by *coherence* which includes accordance, but for its *apprehension* we have to fall back upon *self-evidence* or intuition.

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CHAPTER VI.

PHILOSOPHY OF THE WORLD

PROBLEMS INVOLVED

In the present chapter our endeavour will be to consider the nature, contents and development of the world as it presents itself to us. If philosophy is our attitude to reality, the world must be understood as some form or other of reality as we conceive it. But the world as representing reality strikes our mind in the first instance in the more familiar form of 'substance.' But neglecting for the time being to consider what some of its historical definitions have made it to be, we find that the objects of the world appeal to our mind as 'substances.' Again, these 'substances' form part of a system and act and react upon one another through what are called their attributes, and their action and reaction determining one another involve the notion of cause and effect, and the principle underlying cause and effect is known as 'causality.' A substance with its attributes in its causal relation with other substances must involve 'space' and 'time' for its existence and interaction with other substances. But a scientific view of the world prefers the conception of 'matter' as a better characterisation of the physical world than the somewhat vague conception of substance, so that we shall have to consider also the problem of matter as science conceives of it. Again, both matter and substance being somehow suggestive of static character of the world which really involves process, change and growth, we are to bring in the concept of 'motion' to account for the changing and growing world of ours. These will therefore be the *Problems of the Inorganic World*. But this is not all. Since our world presents to us, along with material objects, innumerable types of living beings, we cannot ignore the 'problem of life' as it originates and grows. Hence, considerations of the nature, origin and growth of life will give rise to the *Problems of the Organic World*. Further, in the philosophy of the world we shall have to face another important problem, namely whether the world as a whole with all its contents was created at a point of time and has continued unchanged since its creation, or, whether it has come to

be what it is as the result of a long and continuous process of change or evolution. and, lastly as evolution in all its types may either be due to the operation of purely blind natural forces and their laws or may be supposed to be guided by an intelligent purpose, we shall have to consider whether such evolution is blind or purposive, 'mechanical' or 'teleological'. These considerations will give us the different *Theories of Evolution*.

1. PROBLEM OF REALITY AND APPEARANCE.

The fundamental problem of philosophy is undoubtedly the problem of Reality. If reality is considered as *one* spiritual principle underlying, evolving and sustaining the universe, then our view of the universe will be monistic idealism. If, on the other hand, we suppose that there are *two* opposite ultimate realities, one physical and the other spiritual, and one acting and reacting upon the other and therefore one limiting the other, then it will be dualistic realism. If, again, on the other hand we conceive of an infinity of ultimate existences, each independent and outside of the other, our view of reality will be pluralistic, which again will be spiritualistic or materialistic according as we conceive of these realities as conscious or unconscious. But since philosophy has for its aim the explanation of the universe, and since explanation means unification of our knowledge, the purpose of philosophy is best served if it can trace all the diversities of things and relations to one ultimate principle, that is, if it is monistic in its conception of the universe.

Dualistic conception of reality labours under the fundamental difficulty of explaining how two independent realities will at all co-operate with each other. If this difficulty of co-operation be merely ignored by assuming the fact of co-operation, the difficulty of one limiting the other and that of explaining knowledge which involves appropriation of the object by the subject remain unobviated. And in the case of the supposition of a plurality of realities the metaphysical and epistemological difficulties are no less serious than what they are in the dualistic conception of reality. It follows then that the view of reality, which can steer clear of the above difficulties, will only be monistic. Now, whether this one reality should be material or spiritual can be decided if we take into account the metaphysical and epistemological ques-

tion that are involved here. Metaphysically the conception of one material reality will be ruled out of court in view of the fact that life and mind exhibit features which are qualitatively different, and cannot really be shown to be mere complex developments out of the features of the physical reality. Conscious and vital powers cannot be satisfactorily shown to be out-growths by way of increasing complexity from the features of physical reality. Again, as physical reality for its very conception as such requires mind or spirit the latter must, therefore, be foundational to all knowledge and existence. It follows then that the ultimate principle or reality which must at once be the explanation of minds and things and of knowledge which involves a relation between them, cannot but be spiritual. Now, if the ultimately one reality be Thought or Spirit then minds and things of the universe will only be relative realities deriving their existence from it and such a conception of reality will have the advantage of explaining the nature of mind and the world and the relations between them, while establishing the possibility of knowledge. Such a fundamental spiritual reality will be a creative and synthetic principle, according relative reality and function to minds and things, and serving as foundation for knowledge and other relations between minds and things, and those between minds and things on the one side and its own nature on the other. We see then that Reality in its absolute and ultimate sense must be One and Spiritual and that if we are to concede reality to minds and things they can only be relative realities deriving their existence and function and mutual relation from the one Absolute Spiritual Reality.

It appears then that a consistent metaphysical view of the universe must be based upon monistic spiritualism postulating one spiritual reality which is at once the creative and co-ordinating source of the entire existence. Now when this is said the question needs further elaboration as to what must be the nature and function of the multifarious details of existence that make up the world we live in. There are the physical objects, the living beings and conscious human minds with their attributes, functions and relations. If reality cannot but be one and spiritual then things, minds, their functions and relations can only be supposed either as comprehended within that one ultimate spiritual reality which stands to all these multifarious details of existence

in a living and concrete relation as life-power does to organs and functions of a living being, or as unrelated *appearances* born of human ways of understanding the universe through sense and reason. The term 'appearances' stands for all that is other than the one spiritual reality according to the polarity of our dialectical thought. The term 'modes' has also been used in the history of monistic spiritualism to designate all that is different from the unitary spiritual reality. The terms 'being' and 'thing-in-itself' are also historical expressions for reality with which the terms 'becoming' and 'phenomena' are contrasted in the same spirit of differentiating the real from the unreal as is responsible for the distinction between reality and appearances.

History of metaphysics is a record of attempts to show the relation between these two apparently different poles of thought. And antithesis rather than harmony between them has been in some cases so sharp, that some systems of thought have denied outright all reality, making the entire universe as composed of 'becoming', changes, phenomena, modes or appearances without the locus of reality that becomes, changes or appears. The present-day phenomenalistic positivism with its logical development is an extreme representative of a tendency to think of the universe in terms of appearance. The difficulties involved in such an extreme view we have already pointed out in our estimate of the relation between epistemology and metaphysics and in our very definition of philosophy. So the more important issue involved in the problem of the relation between reality and appearance seems to be concentrated on the question namely, granting the one spiritual reality what place the appearances occupy in the scheme of the universe. To decide this question we have got to consider two typical forms of monistic spiritualism, one the monistic spiritualism of Spinoza which is definitely abstract and of Bradley which is more or less concrete, and the other, the definitely concrete monistic spiritualism of Hegel, Bosanquet and others. As an exponent of the first form of spiritualism Spinoza reduces individual objects, individual minds, their functions and relations, to unreal modes of one spiritual substance which is unaffected by them. Bradley also almost in the same strain but with a far more dialectical acumen demonstrates that the one spiritual reality by its very transcendent nature cannot harbour plurality, attributes, changes and relation as such. Reality is one,

and the world of many as such cannot be true along side of the one, but can only be the world of appearances which are all false. According to Bradley everything is experience and experience is a whole. Experience of every psychical centre involves intellect, will and feeling, and there is an antagonism and outwardness amongst these theoretical, practical and æsthetic aspects of experience. The result of this antagonism and outwardness amongst these aspects of experience is that things and events, their attributes and relations as cognised by the intellect, and objects of volitions and emotions that occupy psychical centres, appear as independent entities. But all these independent entities as cognised, willed and felt, with their outwardness and antagonism represent reality only in its aspects. Reality however being always the whole of experience according to Bradley these partial aspects fall short of reality as such and are therefore appearances. And if these partial representations standing for separate and independent entities could be so transmuted and transfigured as to resolve all outwardness and antagonism and to reduce the 'adjectival character' of these entities to the identity of Reality, then Reality as a whole will be *felt* or experienced as such, in which all contradictions will be dissolved, and such an experience will be supra-intellectual. Reality is a coherent whole in which appearances as presenting outwardness and antagonism are not ultimately negated but are preserved on transmutation.¹

The Advaita-Vedānta of Śaṅkara has given us a view of Reality and appearances which goes a long way along with Bradley's view but parts company with it when it reaches the heart of relation between Reality and appearance. To Bradley all that is for any psychical centre as well as the psychical centre itself, is appearance and no appearance, nor any combination of them amounts to Reality. But on the other hand, paradoxical though it may sound, Reality to Bradley is its appearances, Reality really is all and every one of them. Any experience in its isolation or any combination of experiences by itself is an appearance, but experience as a whole or in its entirety is Reality ; so that to Bradley Reality is not negation of content but rather coherence of transmuted contents, of contents re-oriented from the stand-point of the Absolute. Śaṅkara, however, does not agree with

1. c.f. Bradley: Appearance and Reality—Ch. XXVI.

Bradley in his view of appearance. To him all experiences of psychical centres involve an inherent antagonism between the subject and the object, but a process of transcendental superimposition (*adhyāsa*) of the not-self on the self makes the apparent appear to be real. This super-imposition is as unreal as appearances themselves are. Reality is contentless Spirit. Contents are appearances and cannot ever be reality even when they are taken in their totality and in their transmuted state in the Bradleyan sense ; for transmutation as a process is illusory or unreal as any process is. In view of the difficulties attaching to the Idealism, both of Bradley and Śaṅkara, which leads us to formulate a concrete view of the universe, we would like to state, by the way, that Bradley has involved himself in an apparent contradiction which Śaṅkara has skilfully avoided. When Bradley says that 'Reality is its transmuted appearances in their totality' and that it is the coherent whole of experience, can the Bradleyan Reality be any longer non-relational unity of experience? It does not come to much to say that the appearances are transmuted, for however transmuted they may be, they are retained to form a coherent 'system' of experience and the cohering elements will necessarily entail some sort of plurality and relation to the detriment of the non-relational unity of experience. So Śaṅkara, it seems, is more consistent in relegating plurality and relation altogether to empirical consciousness which must be transcended in the differenceless unity of intuition or pure consciousness which is Reality. Reality of Śaṅkara has nothing to do with appearances nor appearances with Reality, which thus turns out unique.

We have mentioned above that the difficulties of abstract or dubiously concrete Idealism have led us to take a definitely concrete view of Reality. It behoves us to point out some of these difficulties which a concrete view should avoid. The most outstanding difficulty of the abstract view of Reality is this that it creates a hiatus or gap in our experience and between appearances and Reality. The universe is undoubtedly a whole of parts entailing different forms and relations of experience, psychological, moral and religious. It is not a static whole but is dynamic and is subject to change and evolution and with it our experience is also subject to change and evolution. Human consciousness marks a gradual growth and ascent in its attitude to the contents

of the universe. Every detail of existence, physical or psychical, as an object of consciousness as well as of the subject's reaction to it as an 'ideal content' is no doubt an appearance. When we call these details appearances we should not mean them to be accidental, false and unreal, either in the sense of Spinoza or of Bradley or of Śaṅkara, but what we should mean is that they are only relatively real and have a part to play in the organic whole of Reality. Reality must be conceived as a concrete universal of which the particulars or the so-called appearances form the content. The particulars or appearances are no doubt the realm of antithesis and contradiction, but all the contradictions are contradictions amongst unrelated particulars and get themselves dissolved in the concrete universal, the ultimate Reality, which includes and organises the particulars as its content. The ultimate Reality in its dynamic character evolves the particulars or appearances, which taken by themselves create contradictions, but which as organic parts of the ultimate Reality are bound to yield their contradiction to the harmony and unity of the concrete whole. And the growing human consciousness realises the harmony between particulars and particulars and between the particulars and the universal in philosophy and religion. For here man approximates to the highest possible unity between his own consciousness and consciousness of the Absolute. In it all particulars and all experiences including the experiences of absolute values, Truth, Goodness and Beauty, are unified into a totality without losing their individuality, meaning and significance. The absolute Reality to metaphysical and religious consciousness is a concrete universal which is individuality, including and unifying but never stultifying or absorbing particulars or appearances as such. Hegel and Bosanquet in the west and Rāmānuja in India have taken this concrete view of the universal without robbing the particulars or the so-called appearances of their meaning and importance but retaining them as relative reals in the life of the absolute Reality.

2. PROBLEM OF SUBSTANCE AND ATTRIBUTE.

The concept of substance was for a long time hardly distinguishable from the concept of reality. It used to be taken in its absolute as well as in its relative sense ; and in fact many philo-

sophers of the past took reality to be interchangeable with substance, using both the concepts in the same sense. Hence, just as we have reality both absolute and relative, so we can have substance both absolute and relative. The Eleatic background of thought that Reality was opposed to change which was unreal, had considerable influence on Plato who took Ideas as substances or permanent essences of things with which however they hold no living relation, and also took the soul as a simple spiritual substance and considered it to be eternal and real. To him every Idea was real and eternal and our individual consciousness and the objects of the world, which made up the realm of change were unsubstantial and phenomenal. Aristotle used the expression 'Forms' in place of the Ideas of Plato and made the Forms to be the substances or essences of things with this difference that his Forms, unlike the Ideas of Plato, have a living relation with particulars and that each particular is concrete and real composed of form and matter, permanence and change. Descartes and his dualistic followers thought of God as the Absolute Substance and the world and the self as relative substances depending upon the Absolute Substance, though Descartes involved himself in self-contradiction by his own definition of substance that it is something which can be conceived of itself. Because, though this definition can refer only to a self-existent and self-sufficient absolute, yet he applied his definition of substance to things and minds which could not be conceived as absolute. And it is Spinoza who corrected Descartes by applying the Cartesian definition of Substance to the Absolute Reality alone which is the only reality to him and reducing the dependent substances of mind and body to the parallel attributes of the substance which is self-existent and self-subsistent reality.

But the conception of substance throughout its history has suggested the idea of passivity making substance to be the static receptacle of attributes or the substratum in which the attributes are held together. It was Liebniz who for the first time in the history of philosophy conceived substance as a principle of spiritual force. His monads are dynamic soul-substances. Now Leibniz's dynamic conception of soul-substance is an antithesis to the dubious attitude of Locke and negative attitude of Berkeley to the idea of extramental substance, the one postulating it for explaining why sensations appear to us in groups but denying any

positive knowledge of it, and the latter categorically denying both existence and knowledge of a substance as unrelated to mind. But the final touch of disbelief in a passive substance was given by Hume who reduced both the mental and the extramental substance to a dynamic flow of impressions. Causality becomes his supreme category, explaining how existence is a net-work of causes and effects, so that to think of either the mental or the extramental world as a static substance is to confound the numerically successive phenomena with permanence and identity.

But supposing the idea of substance to be the idea of something static and changeless, what must be the relation of substance to its attributes? It was held by the advocates of the theory of substance that though substance was something permanent and changeless yet the fact of change could be explained by means of attributes whereby a substance acts and is acted upon by other substances. Hence it was held that the attributes were the powers of reaction of substances. Descartes and Locke thought that such was the explanation of changes which substances as such underwent in spite of their intrinsic static character and this view was responsible for the supposition that a substance was something transcending its attributes. It was thus suggested that substance was something mysterious not to be caught in its attributes, though it somehow manifested itself through attributes. Attributes were, therefore, mere accidents and not the essence of substance. Spinoza has been regarded as holding in an extreme form this transcendental view of substance not affected by its attributes. On the other hand, empirical and common sense view of the relation between substance and attributes has been led to the opposite extreme of thinking that experience never reveals anything like a mysterious transcendental substance, which lying as a background or substratum is supposed to make attributes possible. In our experience of things we get knowledge of sensible qualities into which things are exhaustively analysable, leaving no residuum in the sense of a transcendental substance to be known not by sense, but by reason or intuition. In fact, reason or intuition over and above experience is never acknowledged by the empiricists as a distinct source of knowledge. Science which is based upon common-sense and experience, therefore, disbelieves in anything like a substance as lying beneath or beyond the sensible qualities of things. In Alexander we have an admirable ap-

proach to the problem of substance from the point of view of modern science. According to him the stuff of the universe is Space-Time or pure Motion and hence all existents are motions or "complexes" of them. Every object can be viewed from two angles of vision, static and dynamic. Viewed in its static aspect an object is called a substance whereas viewed in its dynamic aspect in so far as it is continued into some other motion, it becomes a cause. When we say that an object viewed statically is a substance, we must not mean that it is purely static. No object is really static in the world for reality is motion. But in spite of the changes that a particular object is undergoing, the object maintains its peculiar plan of construction or identity of structure in a spatio-temporal contour and as such it can be referred to as the identical substance. Thus according to Alexander the *concept of substance becomes a categorial feature of things* and every existent becomes a substance in so far as it preserves its peculiar configuration in Space-Time.¹

Russell thinks that the question of substance belongs to the realm of physics, though it may be considered from three different angles of vision, logical, physical, and epistemological. *The idea of substance* logically considered is a *category* through which we necessarily express our idea of a thing. Substance in this logical sense is therefore that which enters into a proposition as a subject but never as a predicate or a relation. But it is the convention of language at least to the civilised people that sentences are to be analysed into subject and predicate, and logic cannot avoid this linguistic convention. Again the structure of a sentence has the tendency to the structure of fact which it asserts, and even false sentences suggest that corresponding facts would have existed if the assertions were true. It comes to this then that sentences through which we express our logical understanding refer to the structure of facts. Russell argues that since a sentence is a physical occurrence and since it may be either spoken or written, the written sentence rather than the spoken one, which only gives rise to a temporal series of events, namely, noises, suggests substantial elements that have permanence for some time. Their permanence is due to the fact that matter arranged in certain form or pattern will retain that form or pattern at least for some finite time.

1. Cf. Alexander's *Space Time and Deity*, Vol. I, pp. 269-78.

We need not enter here into the details of criticism against the metaphysical or objective structure of reality which the advocates of the philosophy of symbolism put forth ; it will suffice for us to say that Russell also agrees with the philosophers of Symbolism and equally believes that language, whether spoken or written, being a series of physical events cannot give us any idea of substance as representing metaphysical entities. Neither the things nor their relations can be represented by language as substantial, no matter if the words are used to represent either the so-called things or relations. For really speaking words are after all physical events which happen in time though in a particular order. The assumption that the physical world consists of substances as permanent bits of matter with qualities and relations, may satisfy the popular but not the scientific view of it. Science tells us that things of the world are resolvable into groups of electrons and protons which are not quite permanent, for they are known to annihilate each other. Further perception also tells us that the physical object is only a group of events and we need not suppose a substance in the centre about which the events are to be arranged. The modern theory of space-time substituted in place of that of space and time has lent further support to the view that matter is nothing else than a group of events. To-day physics does not start with a permanent piece of matter but with a four-dimensional manifold of events connected with each other by the concept of matter in motion. Thus that there is no substance in the physical world in the sense of something static and permanent is also corroborated by perception. Our percepts are always events and do not refer to a real as anything like a permanent substance. Hence Russell concludes that if we put together the findings of physics and results of perception, the theory of substance as something permanent becomes not only unwarrantable but also unnecessary.¹

Idealistic thinkers, like Bradley and his followers, also think that a thing, say, a lump of sugar, when analysed into its qualities of sweetness, whiteness, etc., exhausts itself into these qualities leaving nothing besides which may give unity and inherence to these qualities. Experience refuses to admit anything like an unknown X which may be called substance. He

1. Russell: *Analysis of Matter*, Ch. XIII, pp. 238-248.

goes further as a rationalist and with the help of his dialectic comes to the same conclusion, namely, that a substantive over and above its attributes or adjectives is nowhere to be found. His argument is that if a substantive as distinct from its adjectives is to be at all conceived, we can proceed dialectically in the following way only to be disappointed. An attribute or adjective is related to another attribute or adjective by means of a third something which is the relation itself. But this third something cannot be predicated either of the first or of the second attribute. If we are to predicate this third something of either of them it will require a fourth something to make this predication possible. Now, this fourth something will be another relation. So in this way we are to go on supposing relation after relation *ad infinitum* which is impossible. Thus if we are to establish a substantive in which all attributes are related to one another and to the substantive, this sort of *regressus ad infinitum* or infinite regress will result. Hence, substance as founded on the reality of relation is dissipated into the 'adjectives' which by their very character cannot encourage relation. Thus, the idea of substance as something unifying but at the same time transcending the qualities is shown to be broken through both by experience as well as by reflection.¹ The futility of the concept of substance giving unity and constancy to attributes and relations was also exposed by Lotze in his *Metaphysic* when he spoke of a substance as "communicating to the properties gathered about it the fixedness and consistency of a thing,"² though we always miss the inner essence of a thing. Among the most recent writers, Whitehead, who embodies in himself the spirit of science and of philosophy at its highest, refutes the idea of substance in the sense of the changeless identity of being when he says that the *being* of a thing consists in its *becoming*, reality in its 'process'; it is never apart from process but is always with process. In fact, the entire nature consists of *events* or *processes* and when we call a thing a substance what we only mean is that it is our emphasis of interest that makes us call it so. Hence, it is out of *logical and practical necessity* that we regard a thing as a self-identical reality which is always in process. It follows then that substance in the sense of an objective principle of unity

1. Cf. Bradley: *Appearance and Reality*, Ch. II.

2. Lotze: *Metaphysic*, Bk., I, Ch. 3.

and permanence beyond and behind changes, relations and attributes, is a figment of imagination and if substance has any meaning in modern science and philosophy it has it only as a logical category of the mind.

3. PROBLEM OF CAUSALITY.

The world appears to us as a system of substances with attributes which stand to one another in various relations of which the relation of interaction or reciprocity is the most important both for science and philosophy. A substance is a real amongst other reals which act and react upon one another. That which acts is regarded as the cause and that which is acted upon as the effect, and the relation that obtains between the two is called the relation of causation.

Though the problem of causation is the central problem of philosophy in so far as philosophy seeks to explain the origin, growth and development of the universe with its living, non-living and conscious contents by referring to a cause or causes, yet in the history of thought the problem of causation has not been attacked always and uniformly in a manner that can satisfy the demands of the true philosophic consciousness. Science and empirical philosophy, though at one with one another in their conception of causation yet fail to furnish us with that comprehensive conception of causality that can satisfy the demands at once of both reason and philosophy.

(a) ARISTOTLE'S VIEW OF CAUSE.

In the earliest European thought Aristotle gave us an account of causes which, though based on an apparently unsystematic examination of the issues involved in it, yet stands out to-day as an exhaustive treatment of the subject. According to Aristotle cause is four-fold and the four-fold character of the cause is based upon the four angles of vision from which any object in its production may be viewed. Aristotle chose for his example a marble statue in the process of its being carved out of a block of marble. The four-fold cause that is involved in the production of the statue, he distinguishes as Material, Efficient, Formal and Final. The block of marble out of which the statue is carved as an effect

is its material cause, the muscular energy and the instruments used by the sculptor in the production of the statue make up its efficient cause, the form or figure to be produced determines the result as its formal cause and finally the end or purpose, namely, the perpetuation of the memory of a person for which it is produced also determines the effect as its final or teleological cause. Subsequently, he subsumed material and efficient causes under concept of efficient cause, and the formal and final causes under the concept of final cause, thus emphasising the two important aspects of efficiency and finality of cause as understood from the standpoint of philosophy. His analysis of the concept of cause, though apparently random and unsystematic gave us at least the essentials of a cause as philosophy understands it.

(b) CAUSE IN EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE.

But with the development of empirical philosophy and science the concept of causality has assumed a distinctly phenomenalist garb to the utter denial both of the idea of power or productivity as well as of purpose or finality which are so necessary for comprehensive conception of a cause adopted by philosophy. Empiricism which reads everything in terms of subjective impressions does not spare cause and effect which are also nothing but two successive mental phenomena, one preceding and the other following. To it a phenomenon *A* will be the cause of another phenomenon *B* which follows upon the phenomenon *A*, if they are repeated in our experience. Such repetitions of two consecutive phenomena begets in us the *habit of expectation* that since one phenomenon *A* has happened, the phenomenon *B* will follow. Hence, to empiricism causal relation means nothing else than invariable sequence of mental phenomena. We do not find in it anything objectively determining *why* the phenomenon *A* should be followed by the phenomenon *B*, but must be simply satisfied to see *how* one follows the other. From this it is also clear that there need not be any *necessary connection* between the cause and the effect. This is the whole of the account of causation as given by the empiricists in general and by Hume in particular. According to the empiricists, therefore, the whole universe with all its happenings is the realm of phenomenal sequence, each phenomenon following another without any objective necessity and connection.

Science, which is a faithful ally of empiricism and cannot accept anything which has not passed through the crucible of external observation and experiment, has come upon the view of causation as merely a case of *motion* and transformation of force or energy. Physics as the most general science of objects of the world and their properties views them as centres of energy or force and their functions as transformation of energy. In the physical world, therefore, when we say that a thing causes another thing we can mean nothing else than transformation of energy of which all things with their functions are composed. When heat expands body the causal relation involved here is nothing else than the fact that the molecular energy in the form of heat disappears only to re-appear in the shape of molar energy. When coal produces steam causal relation involved in this case is nothing else than the transformation of molar energy into molecular energy. This is all that science understands by causation. But when an empirical philosopher endeavours to give an account of the nature and relation of cause and effect he tries to formulate his account by bringing in the ideas of "phenomenon," "invariability," and "antecedence" whereby he characterises the cause in relation to the effect. He also brings into his explanation the concept of uniformity of nature to justify his belief that every event must have a cause and the same effect is produced by the same cause.

(c) A CRITIQUE OF EMPIRICAL VIEW OF CAUSATION.

Now in order to assess the value of the empirical account of causation in physical nature we shall have to analyse each of the concepts used in this connection by the empirical philosopher. The first is the concept of phenomenon. The empirical philosopher to whom everything and every happening comes within the range of his experience necessarily takes a phenomenon in the sense that it is a mental impression in terms of which alone it can be made an object of his knowledge. But since mental impressions are events in time, therefore he is naturally compelled to think of phenomena as happenings in time. Now any two phenomena happening in time must suggest a distinction of priority and posteriority and of the two phenomena thus considered in terms of two successive mental impressions, one that

antecedes is given the name of cause and that which succeeds, the name of effect. What we gather from the above analysis is that the causal relation is entirely subjective, and also the time-order of priority and posteriority that our subjective impressions introduce into it, is also subjective. Further, even if we neglect the subjectivity of time-order and suppose that there is an objective sequence of happenings in our conception of cause and effect, then mere sequence cannot prevent the conclusion as to why there should not be a causal relation between any two consecutive phenomena like day and night. Even the concept of invariability affords no escape to the empirical philosopher because day and night and similar other phenomena are instances of invariable sequence and yet are never regarded as cause and effect. Again, invariability of sequence is an inference from the uniformity of nature as a datum. But the very datum of the uniformity of nature remains to be substantiated. If experience is the guarantee of all propositions then very experience shows that the uniformity of nature cannot be anything more than a mere fad of empiricism. The very experience tells us that no two things in their happenings exhibit a dead uniformity because it is impossible to reproduce exactly identical sets of conditions under which one of them may be said to be behaving similarly to the other. "History repeats itself" is only a convenient manner of speech having no justification in the actual happenings of things. Hence, causal relation which is based on the law of uniformity of nature falls through with it. It remains for us now to examine Mill's qualification of a cause by its 'unconditionality'. A cause is no doubt an unconditional antecedent and is admitted as such by any sane view of causation, but the question is whether any empirical account of causation has any right to this qualification of cause as an unconditional phenomenon. Many instances of external experience like day and night or two consecutive ticks of a clock are such that they offer no opportunity to external experience for discovering the real condition of happening of the phenomena of day and night or of the phenomena of the two consecutive ticks of a clock. The real condition becomes evident to our mind from a source other than experience proper which is very often of the nature, either of deductive inference, or of intuition. In the sphere of physical causation the unconditional character of the cause is evidently a case of deductive inference because it

is deduced from a known higher law. For instance the fact that the rotation of the earth on its axis while it keeps up a position relative to the sun is the cause of day as also of night, follows deductively from the higher law of the solar system according to which all the planets stand in a particular relation to the sun and move in their respective orbits round about the sun. In the psychological sphere the action and reaction between body and mind as cases of unconditional causation are known not by way of deduction from any higher law but by intuition which compels us to believe in the unconditionality of the causal activity either of the mind or of the body as the case may be.

(d) CAUSATION AND CAUSALITY.

The next problem connected with causation is that of time. We are accustomed to believe that cause precedes and the effect succeeds in our experience, so that there is involved a time-sequence in the causal relation. But this elementary notion of cause and effect is quite inconsistent with strictly causal scheme. According to the highest development in physics the physical world is a continuous series of events which admit of no cross-section. Any event in this infinite series has a two-way linkage, one with the absolute past and another with the absolute future. We talk about an event as cause and another event as effect, on the ground that the first precedes and the second succeeds, or on the ground that one is prior and the other is posterior. We forget here the two-way linkage spoken about. Starting with the first event we simply think that this event is prior not only to the second event, but also to all other events which extend towards infinite future, and do not remember that it has a similar connection with other events which extend backward to an infinite past. This is perhaps due to our instinctive tendency to make a distinction of prior and posterior in our time-honoured conception of cause and effect, though there is really no discrimination of prior and posterior and therefore of cause and effect possible in the closed system of the world. In view of this impossibility of temporal discrimination and of the discrimination between cause and effect, modern physicists, like Eddington, have come to make a distinction between *Causation* and *Causality*. To them causation is the name for the ordinary conception of relation of cause and effect in which there

is an assumption of temporal sequence, and the term causality has been conceived to represent the real relation between cause and effect which, instead of being related to one another by way of time, have what is called a *symmetrical relation* in which the whole world, past and future, is conceived as a connected and closed system. All events irrespective of any particular cause and particular effect are determined by causality in this sense and it has entirely replaced the traditional theory of causation. As Eddington puts it, "in primary physics, which knows nothing of time's arrow, there is no discrimination of cause and effect ; but events are connected by a symmetrical causal relation which is the same viewed from either end."¹

From the above analysis what we gather is this that the empirical and phenomenal conception of cause and effect has not only failed to give us a true picture of the actual physical world as a system of events, but also has been guilty of confusion between causation as subjectively conceived and causality as it objectively obtains in nature. Nature is a closed system of relations, but experience, by cross-sectioning it, has not proved a true ally of science which counts so much on the empirical view of the world. It is not sufficient to say, as Hume has done, that there is no objective causation in the world. For causality is there as an objective relation in the real world. It becomes subjective the moment we, in our empirical bias, jettison the world-system into cross-sections and the element of time creeps into the causal relation as its psychological appendage. Modern physics in its analysis of the physical world has come upon the view that it is beginningless as well as endless series of *events* in which it is impossible to introduce any time element in the causal relation without staticising the dynamic flow of events that the world is. Causality and even causal relation are objectively true and science dealing with the objective world can accept only such objective relations. There are no cut-and-dried causes and effects though there are causal relations which describe the events of the world as correlated into an objective system. Hume in spite of his best efforts to picture the causal relation from the empirical and common-sense point of view has given us but a subjective conception of it. Kant in criticising Hume has tried to show

1. Eddington: *The Nature of the Physical World*, pp. 295-97.

that causality is an objective relation determining the events of the world of experience.

But Kant's explanation of the causal relation has tended to give only an 'apparent' objectivity to it, because he has remained contented within the confines of experience like Hume and has never tried to base experience upon objective content. Within the realm of pure reason Kant's 'understanding' never allows him any access to the real world, though, however, in the realm of practical reason the barriers between experience and the real world has been demolished by him. Dr. Whitehead expresses Kant's position in relation to causal relation most aptly when he states that "if experience be not based upon an objective content, there can be no escape from a solipsist subjectivism. But Hume, and Locke in his main doctrine, fail to provide experience with any objective content. Kant, for whom 'process' is mainly a process of thought, accepts Hume's doctrine as to the 'datum,' and turns the 'apparent' objective content into the end of the construct."¹ We see then that we are left by Kant just where we were in the empirical philosophy of Hume in so far as the problem of causality is concerned.

Prof. Whitehead's development of the concept of causality is another landmark in the history of European thought. He starts with the criticism of causality as is done by Hume but points out that if we accept the psychological atomism of Hume, causal relation is bound to be reduced to absurdity. Kant's solution also is no improvement on Hume's difficulty for he tries to save the 'necessity' of causal relation by putting it on the subjective side. Atomistic view of Nature is common both to Hume and Kant, and this view is bound to prevent us from finding any true and necessary causal connection amongst empirical phenomena. The same difficulty reappears in the view of the world as maintained by some of the modern scientists who think of the world as composed of patches of matter spread out in space. If we start with this atomistic analysis of Nature, Hume's conclusion is inevitable and hence Whitehead points out that Hume has made 'nonsense' of modern science. So Whitehead is in favour of a re-orientation of the concept and he holds that reality can never be conceived otherwise than as a process in which everything is connected with every other thing. Our view

1. Whitehead: *Process and Reality*, p. 212.

of nature as made up of discrete and sundered entities is due to what he calls the fallacy of 'simple location'. Thus causal relation according to him is an objective relation obtaining between two 'events', the foregoing one the cause, being continuous with the succeeding one, the effect.

Alexander has given us a distinct view of causality from his own peculiar realistic standpoint. According to Alexander causality is a categorial feature of existents. Existences are motions or complexes of motion, and every motion is continuous with other motions in the space-time continuum. So when a motion is viewed as continued into some other motion, the former is called the cause in relation to the latter which is the effect. Unlike Eddington, Prof. Alexander admits the necessity of the introduction of time-element in causal relation and this element is the most essential element in that relation. For according to him the reality itself is Space-Time. On this ground he objects to the formulation of the concept of causality from the standpoint of *Logical Atomism* as advocated by Russell. To Russell the relation of causality is nothing but one of correlation. What causes what?—this is a question asked at the childhood stage of science. But the developments in modern sciences definitely point to the fact that in the motions of mutually gravitating bodies, there is no such thing as cause and no such thing as effect—there is only *quantitative correlation*. This much quantity is correlated with this much quantity—this is all that is required in an adequate conception of causality. Now an insight into the Russellian position of logical atomism shows that he only rehabilitates the old Humian psychological atomism under a physical garb. The reality can never be viewed as composed of patches of matter spread out in different quantitative proportions but it is a continuity—a fact to which the recent formulation of the Quantum theory and that of internal relations of the Idealistic philosophers clearly point. From the standpoint of *Logical Idealism* the concept of causality has been strongly criticised by Prof. Bosanquet, according to whom the concept of causality, as it is generally understood, has an element of time inherent in it, but this time-element is found on logical analysis to be self-contradictory, as the ultimate reality is not in time. So causality should be shorn of this time-element and be replaced by the relation of *Ground and Consequent*.

The same substitution of the relation of cause and effect by that of Ground and Consequent had already been made by Spinoza and Spinoza's failure to supply us with an adequate conception of causality might have served as a warning to those who propose such substitution. The relation of ground and consequent is a logical relation and it is conceived after the pattern of geometry. But geometry is a science of space and reality can never be approached from that spatial viewpoint. Reality is richer—it is spatio-temporal and hence Bosanquet's suggestion becomes inadequate. The concept of causality has been subjected to a very damaging criticism from the standpoint of metaphysical idealism by Bradley. Bradley says that causation can never be causative. It is a relation that does not relate. Cause can never be continuous with effect, for in that case the marking out of the cause from the effect becomes impossible. Nor can the cause be discontinuous with the effect, for the cause has to depend on some thing else to enable it to produce the effect. But if this third something is sought to make the cause causative, this also will necessitate a fourth something and so on *ad infinitum*. So cause can neither be continuous nor discontinuous which is a contradiction. But Bradley's difficulty is his own creation. Causality is no doubt a relation, but if we treat it as a term, then we are bound to land in an infinite regress. But, as Stebbing very beautifully suggests, we have here not two terms *and* a relation but only two terms *in* a relation. Two events in nature thought different come into relation, as this coming into relation is intrinsic to their very constitution. So causation has no difficulty in being causative. It may be hard to say, as Alexander puts it, "where cause ends and effect begins, yet if cause is itself a process and effect another and different one, the relation between the two is the transition of the one which is earlier into the later motion or group of motions."¹

Now, Prof. Alexander's advocacy of the conception of causality is marvellous and he has displayed great logical acumen in the explication of the different logical sides of the concept. But his position also is not absolutely beyond criticism, and this criticism is called for in view of the fact that his scientific bias has compelled him to visualise the origin and development of the

1. Alexander: *Space Time and Deity*, Vol. I, p. 299.

world absolutely from the materialistic standpoint, though at the same time he could not remain blind to the existence and function of *value* in this ordered and harmonious world. So he has been forced to introduce his 'Deity' under the guise of a *nexus* into his otherwise material and naturalistic world. Thus his introduction of God into the world appears to be quite arbitrary in so far as God has been evoked to save Alexander in his difficulty of explaining values in this materialistic world. But if Alexander penetrated into the heart of the situation and looked to the problem from a more logical and systematic standpoint, it would not have been very difficult for him to find that the reality is not anti-spiritual but it is at bottom spiritual. A spiritual reality moves itself through this material cosmos for its self-expression and when it expresses through this physical world it expresses through a continuous motion—a thesis which Alexander takes so much pains to prove.

Thus our position, as follows from the above criticisms of the different views, amounts to this that there is a Spiritual Reality which is dynamic, and not static as is maintained by Bradley and Bosanquet. Reality is at bottom spiritual and not naturalistic as is upheld by Prof. Alexander. This spiritual reality in its dynamic self-expression manifests itself through the world of different objects, and causality is a relation between these objects viewed in their dynamic aspect, that is, in so far as one object is continued into some other object. The category of causality is applicable only within the world of empirical objects but it can never be applied to the universe as a whole. The ultimate spiritual reality may be conceived as the Prime Mover, itself unmoved, of Aristotle. As spiritual it purposively determines the world by what Bosanquet would call 'pull' and not by 'push' which underlies the concept of causality that obtains within the world of empirical objects.

(e) CAUSALITY AND FINALITY

The above discussion leads us to the question whether viewed ultimately all causality is finality. We would maintain that the ultimate spiritual reality, as the embodiment of the absolute values, determines the origin, order and development of the existents by purposively directing them to itself. Things and events of the world are found to have behind them a reason or purpose which is being realised through the world of becoming. By this conception of finality we are not to mean that traditional finality which Bergson rightly criticised as 'inverted mechanism', but

finality in the sense of a purposive pull on the part of the ultimate spiritual reality which in its ever-creative self-realisation determines the go of the world, itself remaining undetermined thereby. Our view of finality does not deny the field of mechanical causation but only points to its inadequacy and the necessity of transcending it. Martineau's explanation of finality in which the order of the world is said to be determined by the appliances of the Divine Will *ab extra* suffers from the defects which vitiate all deistic conception of the relation between God and the world. We conclude that there are indeed causes and effects mechanically determining each other—a conception so very important for science but their significance is not exhausted in purely mechanistic reference, but points to a wider reference in which we can read a purposive spiritual determination in so far as they, as so many self-expressions, tend towards the realisation and enrichment of the ultimate spirit.

4. PROBLEM OF MATTER AND MOTION.

Upto the last section of the present chapter we were confined to the psychological and logical accounts of what the world appears to us, referring here and there to their necessary metaphysical implications. But now in the present section on *Matter and Motion* along with the next one on Space and Time which is so necessarily bound up with the present one, we are now entering into the *Physics of the World* requiring of us to consider its actual, physical basis. The problem of matter engaged the attention of the ancient Greek philosophers who in their own simple ways approached it and took it, either as one all-pervasive principle giving rise to whatever could be observed on earth, namely, physical, biological and even conscious, or as a multiplicity of independent minute principles which they called atoms, serving as the basis of all. The principle of motion was gradually found as necessary as matter, for the change and growth of things. So the question arose as to where must motion lie and how must it act on matter, so that change and growth may be explained. Among the ancient atomists some maintained that the atoms were self-existent, inert and indivisible smallest entities having no motion in them and that motion was to be imparted into them from the outside. Others again thought that motion was inherent in atoms and avoided dualism between matter and motion. Motion was neces-

sary for explaining collision amongst them, for without collision the independent indivisible atoms could not be made into the world of ours. Now, this principle of motion either external or internal to atoms, conceived as necessary for mutual contact and collision, laid the foundation of later dynamic atomism accepted and elaborated by Galileo, Newton and others. But the Newtonian theory, as it conceived atoms as hard impenetrable particles, regarded action at a distance or attraction impossible. But Cotes and Boscovich who followed Newton inverted the Newtonian theory by introducing elasticity in atoms and thereby making attraction possible. This was a distinct advance on Newton's mechanical theory of atoms, as the fact of attraction was now found to be the basis on which only physical properties of matter were founded. The mechanical theory of atoms was thus replaced by kinetic theory. But even up to this time force was supposed to act upon atoms from the outside, or at best, if considered inherent at all, it was conceived as a name for the rate of change of momentum of one mass referred to the position of other masses in the same field. But it was Faraday who made atoms into mathematical points at which forces, equal and opposite, acted from all possible directions and made atoms centres of forces. He also established by his wonderful electrical researches that wherever matter existed there was magnetic force, and Lord Kelvin found that this magnetic force created a tension in the part of space which it traversed and threw the etherial medium into a state of rotation. This situation Maxwell expressed more clearly when he said that there were 'small portions of the medium which we may call molecular vortices'. These vortices were further found by Lord Kelvin to rotate each on its own axis, the direction of the axis being that of the magnetic force. This discovery of Lord Kelvin, combined with Helmholtz's discovery of the conservation of vortex-motion in a perfect fluid led Lord Kelvin to his famous vortex-atom theory. The net result of these discoveries was that both atoms and ether were resolved into motions of one ultimate fluid having no other properties than inertia, invariable density and perfect mobility ; and that the atoms themselves have within them motion unlike the old static theory of atoms in which atoms were regarded as motionless entities.

But the conception of the structure of an atom has also suffered a great change since the time of Lord Kelvin. The old

idea of solid matter composed of unporous indivisible atoms has been replaced by the theory of modern physics that matter is composed of porous atoms floating in luminiferous ether. The porosity of atoms, however, was not known even up to the end of the nineteenth century though the electrical theory of matter had made a fairly good advance so as to conceive of matter as having very small negative charges of electricity along with positive charges which mainly filled the space inside the solid material objects. But it was Rutherford who in 1911 pointed out that the atoms were able to exert large electrical forces which would be impossible unless the positive charge were concentrated so highly as to be contained in a nucleus, very small in comparison with the dimension of the atom. It was he who for the first time pointed out that an atom instead of being a simple, solid substance like a billiard ball, was rather of the type of a "solar system" complex enough to be dissolved into its elementary constituents, namely, protons and electrons respectively representing charges of positive and negative electricity. This new electrical theory of matter and of atoms has the effect of revolutionising the classical theory of the *Conservation of Mass* which was based upon the indestructibility or indissolubility of atoms composing matter. The atoms at the present day are structurally far more complex than what they were supposed to be in the past, being composed of protons and electrons which are but "tiny specks" floating in ether. The protons and the electrons are not of the same dimension and in fact a proton is about 2,000 times larger than an electron, and compared with the diameter of an atom, that of a proton or an electron is very small, nor is the nucleus very much larger than either of them.¹ The net result of all these latest discoveries comes to this therefore that atoms are centres of electrical forces, no less complex than solar systems and subject to disruption. The old theory of *the conservation of mass* is no longer tenable because the atoms which enter into the constitution of matter are no longer held indestructible, in view of the fact that they are subject to dissolution into electrons and protons, all of which may not be reconcentrated to form once again the original atoms dissolved ; many of the electrons and protons being dissipated into the general electrical fluid which fills the universe. Nor is the *Conservation of Motion* any longer regarded by modern physics as a tenable principle in

1. Cf. Eddington: *The Nature of the Physical World*, Ch. I.

view of the fact that the heat into which motion is transformed often dissipates into the atmosphere beyond recovery. It appears then the principle of the conservation of energy either in the form of mass or in the form of motion seems no longer tenable. Further conservation of energy assumes the physical universe as a closed system and, therefore, tries to explain only transformation of energy within that supposed system, forgetting that there is a beyond to which conservation of energy does not apply. In view of all this the more philosophically-minded scientists have substituted *the theory of Correlation of Energy* in place of conservation. This theory suggests that the universe is much wider than what we mean by our physical world, and the universe as a system implies that any change in any particular part of that system means a readjustment in the whole. Again this theory is suggestive of the fact that energy ultimately may be spiritual and manifests itself both in the spiritual centres as well as in the physical centres, and correlation will mean that not only is there interrelation between one form of physical energy and another but also between physical and spiritual energy of the universe. The correlation theory therefore seems more consistent with the idealistic conception of the universe than the conservation theory which narrows down the universe to the realm of physical energy alone. That the physical world of ours is not the whole of existence and that there is always the *More* in what we know of, are the findings of the most eminent scientists of to-day, among whom Sir James Jeans in his *Mysterious Universe* and other writings and Eddington in his *Nature of the Physical World* have most ably testified to them. The theory of correlation therefore seems a better hypothesis for explaining the operation of energy throughout the universe.

5. PHILOSOPHICAL ORIENTATION OF THE PROBLEM OF MATTER.

The problem of matter was the all-absorbing problem to the first philosophers of Greece. Thales asked—what is the stuff out of which the world is composed? He found the solution of the question in water. Anaximander and Anaximenes only substituted another material entity in place of water, the former holding 'the unbounded' and the latter 'air' as the ultimate stuff. So matter to these 'physicists' appeared as the stuff of the universe. Thereafter we find Empedocles solving the same problem in a different light

when he points out that four elements, *viz.*, earth, water, fire and air by their combination give rise to all things of the universe and he definitely protested against the resolution of the varieties of the universe to one stuff. In Empedocles we notice another interesting point that he introduces for the first time the conception of motion as a distinct principle from matter, though the character of the motion is not clearly defined by him. Sometimes he says that motion is to be conceived after love and hate in man, but these love and hate also are conceived by him in a materialistic fashion. A critical appreciation of Empedocles' conception of love and hate may reveal that he was the forerunner of the conception of attraction and repulsion as visualised in modern science. After Empedocles came the Atomists prominent among whom are Democritus and Leucippus. They make no qualitative distinction among the elements of the world and reduce everything to atoms which, they say, are only quantitatively distinct. Atoms have no motion in them—motion is conceived as a distinct principle added *ab extra* to move the atoms. Thereafter comes Anaxagoras who again shows the inadequacy of quantitative atomism and introduces a sort of qualitative atomism when he says that there are innumerable elements of things and each element is qualitatively different from every other. He tries to prove his position by reference to the varied things of the world which, he says, can never be resolved to quantitative differences. The nature of a thing is determined by the relative preponderance of one kind of element over all others. Nature of gold is determined by the relative preponderance of gold-element though all other elements also are there mixed up with gold-element in gold. Anaxagoras admits the existence of *nous* or spiritual nisus which determines the order and *harmony* of the universe by introducing motion thereinto. After Anaxagoras Greek Philosophy enters into the second period in which we find Plato explaining matter and its characters by reference to *hyle*. Hyle or matter is conceived by him as a flux or flow which is absolutely opposed to the Ideas, the real entities of the universe. Matter is called by Plato 'nothing'—nothing not in the sense that it is non-existent, but in the sense that it is nothing in particular. Changing characteristics of things are derived from matter, whereas the Ideas supply things with relative permanence which characterises these. In Aristotle matter receives a definite and concrete shape and becomes the real stuff of the world of objects. There

is no unformed matter according to him. Matter and form combined give shape to concrete things of the universe. To think of the one without the other is an abstraction. Evolution and Change are explained by him by reference to the relative dominance of form over matter—the higher we rise up in the scale of evolution, we come across increasing preponderance of form, and, at the end, can visualise matterless Form which is identical with God.

No definite contribution to the concept of matter is made by the philosophers after Aristotle until we come to Descartes. Descartes thinks of the world as composed of two substances, matter and mind—the essence of one being extension and of the other consciousness. Extension is equivalent to spread-out-ness and hence he conceives of it as pure passivity. Motion is quite a distinct principle. How can there be motion in matter?—this question appears as an enigma to him. So he is compelled to take the help of God to solve this problem and he points out that God introduced motion into this otherwise passive matter and as a result of the introduction of motion the passive spread-out-ness is disturbed and atoms are formed, atoms afterwards giving rise to the so-called solid things of the world. According to Descartes matter is all-pervasive, there being no space in the world which is not filled with matter. Certain difficulties with regard to the dualism of substances led Spinoza to conceive the world from a different angle of vision and to reduce matter and mind to an attributive status, there being only one Substance, absolutely independent, of which mind and matter are the two attributes. Leibniz strongly criticises the view of Spinoza by whom the universe is conceived after the pattern of geometrical space, having nothing of motion and development therein. Spinozistic philosophy is the logical development of Cartesianism which he calls disparaged philosophy, for the problem of Substance which is the all-important problem receives the most inadequate solution in Descartes who thus becomes the luckless legacy to posterity. Substance can never be properly conceived as something static but always endowed with force. Leibniz finds the adequate solution of the problem of Substance in his monad which he calls the centre of force. The world is full of monads which are dynamic spiritual atoms. Now if the world of monads is spiritual, how is it that we find this material and physical world? Here arises the problem of matter in Leibniz

and he says that spirituality of the monads is obscured by what he calls *materia prima* which acts as a retarding principle on the development of the monads. So matter is nothing real, for at the end of evolution of the spirit matter is altogether eliminated. God is the spirit which is absolutely matterless—or *Actus Purus* as he puts it. So we find the tendency to complete dematerialisation of matter at the hands of Leibniz.

A parallel line of thought begins with Locke so far as the problem of matter is concerned. Locke made his famous distinction between primary and secondary qualities and held that matter is to stand only for the primary qualities which go to make the very constitution of things. In this conception, he admits, he has been strongly influenced by 'judicious Mr. Newton's incomparable book.' To him matter becomes the unknown cause of our sensations. In Berkeley the artificial distinction between primary and secondary qualities receives its death-blow and he bluntly points out that there is no matter in the world—of course he points to the non-existence of matter in the sense in which Locke used it. But by abolishing the distinction between primary and secondary qualities Berkeley reduced all qualities to subjective states of the percipient mind and gave us his famous saying '*esse est percipi*'. This position of Subjective Idealism of Berkeley was put by Boswell before Dr. Johnson. Mr. Boswell said, "Well sir, now we are convinced that we can't accept Mr. Berkeley's thesis. But whether we accept him or not we can't refute him." On this Dr. Johnson retorted "I refute him thus", and he kicked at a stone with all force and by a strong rebound refuted Berkeley. Dr. Johnson's criticism is not as ludicrous as it appears at the beginning. Berkeley's thesis is against our strong commonsense and Johnson's remark is only a protest from that stand-point. One significant contribution is made by Berkeley so far as the problem of matter is concerned, when he rejected the division of primary and secondary qualities, a division that has been the seat of what Whitehead beautifully calls, the 'bifurcation of Nature'—the stronghold of scientific materialism. To Hume the world is composed of a series of impressions which, by the operation of the laws of association, become differentiated into what we call the objective physical world. Thus matter has nothing of materiality in it but it is composed of a series of impressions. Matter was banished by Berkeley from the realm of natural philosophy and Hume also

endorses Berkeley's view on this point. In Kant the same problem re-appears under the garb of experience. To him the external world has nothing material in it but it is the joint product of the contributions of the spiritual things-in-themselves on the one side and the forms of sensibility and the categories of the understanding on the other. In Kant the stubborn rigidity of the external world is explained by reference to the logical way of thinking of the transcendental mind as contrasted with the psychological approach to the same problem by Berkeley and Hume.

We do not like to introduce the position of the Post-Kantian Idealists with regard to the problem of matter, in view of the fact that they have been mostly concerned with the evolution of the universe out of the transcendental spiritual reality reducing matter to be a form of 'otherness', a somewhat self-alienation of the spirit for its realisation. No empirical and scientific approach has been made therein.

Now coming to the recent development in modern philosophers we meet with two great thinkers in the west giving us a new orientation of the problem. Prof. Alexander in his *Space Time and Deity* holds the stuff of the world to be Space-Time and derives matter from that primordial basis. Matter becomes a derivative of space-time—a later emergent out of the spatio-temporal matrix. Space-time which, he says, is pure Motion, gives rise by peculiar configurations to the material things in the universe and his view is corroborated by the classical research of Böhr on the breaking of the structure of material entity which is ultimately found to be an equilibrated state of two motions of antagonistic nature. The most thorough-going analysis of the concept of matter has been made by Prof. A. N. Whitehead. According to him matter is 'what we receive by the senses'. To think of matter as the invisible cause of the experiences of ours leads us inevitably to the much abused bifurcation of Nature. Physics which is a natural science of the highest rank is not to concern itself with the study of matter but it must study nature as we perceive it by the senses. The progress of science will be a progress to higher and more coherent interpretation of our experience. The world appears as a flux but we know it through *sense-objects* at the beginning. Then with gradual ascent in interpretation we know the same world through *perceptual objects*. In perceptual objects, too, we find only an advance in interpretation but not in

sensation. From perceptual object the development of science leads us to *scientific objects* which are the imperceptible entities hypostatised by science, but which are introduced to interpret coherently the sense objects only. So we find the development of science is only one of interpretation and coherence of meaning based on the sense objects which are the incipient materials for further investigation. Thus we must not think of matter as the subject-matter of study for physics or any other allied science and the word 'matter' should be replaced by, 'Nature' in the sense of 'what we perceive by the senses' and in this way we shall be able to tide over the difficulties of falling into any 'bifurcation'.

6. PROBLEM OF SPACE.

The very conception of the external world involves a consideration of space in which the objects of the world are ordinarily observed to exist. But though the space-idea appears to be familiar to us yet it has engaged the most serious thoughts of the greatest of philosophers and scientists from the time of Aristotle to our present day when we have the most realistic conception of it offered by Einstein, Eddington, Alexander, Broad and others, based on physics and mathematics. The question as to what space is, has received the most general answer that it is the receptacle of objects held together in an order of co-existence. The common idea of space as something receiving and holding things together has been approached from psychological and logical standpoints. Psychology tells us that space or extension is perceived by our tactuo-muscular organs ; the local characters of our touch give distinguishable points of an extended object when the palm or any part of our body is brought into contact with it. And our motor experience further reveals that if our finger or any other part of our body is repeatedly moved along it to and fro, we have the confirmation of our idea of the simultaneous existence and resistance of the points of contact already known by our active touch. Our visual perception reveals also the extendedness of the object visualised, though often indirectly, through previous association of visual with motor experience. This psychological account of how objects appear extended can give us only spaces separately and individually and the psychological origin of our space-idea also is responsible for distinguish-

ing the three dimensions of space, namely, length, breadth and thickness of the object perceived.

But to rise from perception of these individual or *perceptual spaces* to an idea of space in general we have recourse to logical abstraction whereby we eliminate individualities from our perception of spaces by thinking away objects contained in spaces and then mentally amalgamate or synthesise spaces into the general idea of space known as *conceptual space*. Now, conceptual space is space in the abstract without any limit and without any spatial relations. It is entirely a subjective construction of our mind without any kind of reality and individuality which our perceptual space possesses.

Towards the latter part of the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth when space became for the physicists a *real and essential* constituent of the physical universe, in its abstract logical aspect it formed the subject-matter of philosophical investigation. Philosophers according to their empirical or rationalistic positions tried to conceive of the space-idea with reference to its origin and content. The *Empirical Thinkers* tried to derive the idea of space from generalised motor experience. They thought that in our impeded motor experience we get the idea of a particular filled space or *plenum* filled with a physical object or objects, and from our unimpeded motor experience we get the idea of a particular portion of empty space or *vacuum* unoccupied by any physical object. Then by generalisation from such impeded and unimpeded motor experiences, according as the particular spaces in these cases are filled or empty, we come to form an abstract idea of space from which individual peculiarities of space-perceptions have been thought away. Such an empirical idea of space as an abstraction from particular spaces has the twofold inconsequence, namely, of making space as such purely subjective and secondly of arguing in a circle. The circular argument is due to the fact that the motor experiences from which the space-idea is attempted to be derived, themselves presuppose space-idea, as motor experience or experience of movement, involves space wherein movement is possible.

The *Rationalistic Philosophers* also have their own way of deriving the idea of space in which, unlike the empiricists, they get it from within the mind or reason, because to them the idea of space like other fundamental ideas of mind must be independ-

ent of experience. For they point out that the space-idea and similar other fundamental ideas make our experience of the world to be what it is, and not that experience makes these ideas possible. Hence the rationalistic thinkers, like Kant, believed that the idea of space is an *à priori* form of intuition making intuition or experience to be what it is, instead of believing with the empiricist that space is a result of generalisation from intuitions. Space is thus a condition and not a result of experience. But though these rationalistic writers are right in seeking the idea of space in inner experience where it is really to originate instead of groping for it in external experience, yet they are also guilty of making space-idea a subjective one. Kant says that *space and time are empirically real but transcendentally ideal*. This conclusion he comes to from the very epistemological position he assumes in his *Critique of Pure Reason*. He thinks that knowledge or intelligible experience is possible within the range of sense-experience. But sense-experience by itself is an inchoate mass as yet meaning nothing, but gets its form and meaning from the ideas of space and time which receive and throw sense-experience into an incipient order awaiting further definiteness of meaning given by the mind's application of the categories of substance, causality and the rest. Now, space and time are called by him empirically real in the sense that they are not only forms of intuition but are intuitions themselves, and that they have a definite sensible nature. They are as much of the nature of data as the sensations themselves which they receive. They serve like the *warp* for a cloth in weaving, the *woof* being supplied by the categories of the understanding. But space and time are also called by Kant transcendentally ideal whereby he means that they are the ideas or *à prior* forms evoked by the mind independently of sense-experience, which give actuality and meaning to experience and without which the latter would have remained a mere meaningless manifold. They are called transcendental because they are the logically prior conditions and therefore transcending knowledge-situation though however their character as logical possibles is rendered actual in relation to the sensuous content. The long and short of what Kant means by space and time in relation to sensation is that though they are made actual in relation to sensations received by them yet they are ideal conditions *antecedent* to intelligible experience.

7. PROBLEM OF TIME.

Just as in connection with space we have stated that space is conceived as the general receptacle of things in order of co-existence, even so we might say that time is the possible condition of events in the order of succession. In our everyday life just as we experience limited spaces so we have finite bits of time in which events, phenomena or changes take place one after another. Psychology gives us an account of how from our experiences of successive events we get the idea of time and in this acquisition of the idea of finite times our sense of hearing plays the predominant role. When, for instance, the college-gong is striking three, the sound of the first stroke gradually diminishes in intensity and we have the idea of the *no-longer* which is next broken in upon by the second stroke giving us the idea of the *now* and suggesting that the third stroke is *not-yet*. Generalising from these ideas of the past, present and the future we arrive at the idea of time as such from the sense of hearing. In this psychological and empirical account we get not only *perceptual times* in the shape of the past, present and the future, but also *conceptual time* or time in the abstract by our generalisation from these perceptual times.

Here in the idea of time in the abstract or time in general as in the case of the idea of space in the abstract or space in general, empirical philosophers are guilty of the twofold inconsequence, one, of making the idea of time subjective and the other, of circular reasoning ; for while they claim to arrive at the idea of time as such from generalisation from perceptual times, they make it a mere concept of the mind without any objective counterpart, as also surreptitiously *assume* it in their data of successive events from which they generalise.

The logical idealists like Kant in their anxiety to save themselves from the empiricist's pitfall of circular reasoning believe time to be an *a priori* idea of the mind independent of experience and yet making experience possible. And the whole tissue of arguments which they put in to establish empirically real and transcendently ideal character of space applies *mutatis mutandis* to time. Time, however, becomes as subjective as space, both being forms of the mind.

But Hegel in accordance with his objective idealism makes space and time, like other categories of the mind, both ideal and

real. They are no doubt ideal in the sense that we have these ideas in our minds *a priori*, but on the other hand since all ideas must have their ideates on the very ground that thought and things are identical in essence, our ideas of space and time must have a real spatio-temporal order in the objective world as their counterpart. The philosophic importance of this ideal-real character of space and time, as that of other categories, is this that spatial and temporal orders of the universe are not reduced to mere subjective constructions but represent at once what things and events are in the actual world and how our conceptions of them are real as well.

8. *THE REALISTIC CONCEPTION OF SPACE-TIME.*

In the two previous sections we have discussed the empirical and idealistic conceptions of space and time based on the classical Newtonian theory which compelled us to consider them separately as space and time. Newton took space to be an absolute continuum with three dimensions of its own, namely, length, breadth and thickness, and time as another independent continuum with one dimension only, the former acting like a receptacle in which things are held together in order of co-existence and the latter connecting events in an order of succession. But the nineteenth century developments in physics and astro-physics have revolutionised the classical Newtonian conception of absolute time and absolute space which were merely the ideal conditions of things and events, and have pointed to the actual physical character of Space-Time which makes up the very stuff of the physical world. In place of the absolute character of space and time we now have Relativity which rules them, and in place of the three separate dimensions of space and one dimension of time in which things and events were supposed to exist and move, we now read the world of things and events in terms of space-time with four dimensions. The entire universe, therefore, which exists and moves, may be described in terms of four sets of relations, namely, up and down, right and left, forward and backward, and before and after. And all events are space-events and all space-points are event-points. It is suggested that the reality of the universe is neither space separated from time, nor time separated from space, but space-time in one. The four-dimensional

conception of the world was first introduced by Minkowsky but was elaborated by Einstein and Eddington and has an important consequence for the theory of matter as well ; for these eminent physicists while formulating the theory of space-time continuum, came upon the further conception that matter is not a separate entity but is only a kind of *irregular folds or wrinkles* in the space-time continuum. The philosophic importance of this new theory of the physical world is that it strikes at the very root of materialism in so far as it points out that matter, instead of being an independent basic principle of the universe, now appears as one of those interesting aspects of reality whose other aspects are space and time or better space-time, and that deeper scientific investigations point more to the idealistic view of the world than to materialistic or naturalistic one.¹ We shall return to this problem of the ultimate significance of matter in the scheme of reality in another section where we shall estimate the value of materialism as a theory of the universe.

9. SPACE-TIME AND RELATIVITY.

The main achievement of the New Physics of Einstein is the establishment of relativity of space and time as opposed to the Newtonian absoluteness of them. Newton had maintained that space and time were absolute entities existing everywhere the same as the very frame-work of our observed world. Einstein has pointed out that space and time are entirely relative to the motion of the observers and the systems of measurement they employ. Space and time have meaning only in relation to the moving system of objects and they vary as these systems do. Considered in this light space and time, therefore, as we get them in our actual experience, are nothing else than the sets of relations, forward and backward, right and left, up and down and before and after, and these relations certainly vary in accordance with position occupied by the observer in relation to the moving objects. To illustrate this we cannot do better than refer to the example given by Lord Haldane in his work, *The Reign of Relativity*: "Big Ben (a. London clock) strikes one and, an hour later, two. For me, sitting hard by in Queen Anne's Gate, the strokes appear to occur at the same place, and to be separated

1. Cf. Eddington: *The Nature of the Physical World*, Ch. XV.

by an hour. This agrees, too, with what my own watch says. But an observer situated on the sun would consider that the strokes had occurred at different situation in space of Big Ben, for he would have seen that the earth had moved in the hour about 70,000 miles along its orbital track with respect to the sun, from which he is observing. In resolving the result of his observation into the space component of the position, he thus resolves it with a different result from mine, for whom, Big Ben being at rest for me, the change is *nil*. If he resolves the space by a different standard of reference, he has also to resolve the time component differently, for space and time involve each other. The watch of the observer on the sun may be constructed on the same principles as my own, but the measurement of time by the units marked on the watch on the sun, though apparently analogous, will have a different meaning. Its apparent agreement with mine will not be real, for the spaces on its dial, to which reference has to be made for measurement in looking for the simultaneities belonging to correspondence in time as indicated on the dial spaces, will not be in reality corresponding spaces, the measurement being made on a different basis of reference. There will thus be two different local time-systems, just as there are two different local space-systems, and the observer in each will measure with reference only to the co-ordinates of his own system."¹

It follows then that according to the theory of relativity space and time have no absolute character but are relative to the observer using different systems of measurement. The conclusions which the theory of relativity has arrived at are also applicable to other items of the physical world like velocity, quantities of atoms and the rest of them, and to the general plan of structure of the universe, though with these latter we are not immediately concerned. The great lesson which relativity as applied to space and time teaches us is that the world as it appears to us in space and time has a deeper reality than what it appears to be, no matter if the picture of the world presented in frames of the relativist's space-time goes against our time-honoured and commonsense picture of the same.

The student of Advaita Vedānta will be interested to find that the conclusions which science, from its earliest to its most recent

1. Haldane: *The Reign of Relativity*, p. 86.

stage of development, has been trying to attain about the world of experience, unmistakably point to the relativity of our knowledge, a relativity which the *Vyavahārika* or empirical structure of our cognition perhaps more clearly reveals. The Absolute Reality which, according to the Advaitin is realisable only by the pāramārthika or transcendental cognition, remains concealed under its facets and phases open to empirical and scientific consciousness. Māyā of the Advaitist is the principle which has its full play in the practical and scientific world and indicates that what we know to be real from one standpoint proves unreal to higher analysis, and what is real from higher analysis proves unreal or illusory to a still higher analysis and so on, until the ultimate or the highest level of cognition is attained. Māyā of the Advaitin thus implies the principle of the relativity of cognition. "Trace the whole history of human attempts to understand the nature and the system of things from the so-called scientific or philosophic point of view either in its outline or in its details, what do we find, but an alternation of truth and untruth, of reality and unreality? And the conclusion with which one is to remain satisfied is, therefore, that truth or reality is only relative to the knower and that truth recedes further and further as the inquirer approaches. This puts one in mind of what the poet said:—

'I am a part of all that I have met ;
Yet all experience is an arch wherethro'
Gleams that untravell'd world whose margin fades
For ever and for ever when I move'."¹

10. SPACE-TIME AS COSMIC REALITY.

The inseparable character of space and time which is better expressed in space-time, and their fundamental importance as aspects of reality established by the physicists and the mathematicians of recent years, have led some of the present-day realistic thinkers like S. Alexander to believe that space-time, instead of being regarded as aspects of reality should be taken as the fundamental dynamic principle of the world itself, the very stuff of reality, the matrix from which motion, matter and even life and

1. The author's article: *The Doctrine of Māyā and the Results of Modern Science* in Sir Asutosh Mookerjee Silver Jubilee Volumes, Vol. I, p. 361.

mind, have emerged. We shall assess this view of Alexander in connection with his theory of evolution in a subsequent section. In the meantime we shall also refer to the tendency of another recent philosopher who made *Time* or *Duration* to be the ultimate principle of reality, just as space-time is regarded by Alexander as the fundamental reality of the universe. Bergson in his *Creative Evolution* has shown us that it is time or duration, which is synonymous with the principle of Life, that forms the very stuff of the universe and makes the universe to be what it is by its eternal flux and flow, and that we can realise Duration as the fundamental reality by means of Intuition which transports ourselves into the heart of it. And all our intellectual attempt to comprehend that reality ends in artificially staticising the really dynamic reality. Our intellect cross-sections the reality of duration into discrete temporal relations which are therefore more of the nature of space than that of real duration suggesting to us the distinction into past, present and future which do not belong really to duration or the eternal flow of Life. An assessment of creative evolution will be made in its proper context.

II. MATERIALISM—OLD AND NEW.

Materialism as the theory of the universe lays down that whatever we find in our experience is born of matter and motion. Matter is the stuff of the universe and has given rise not only to material objects but also life and mind, and that it is guided in all its operations by mechanical laws—by motion and force either inherent in matter or extraneous to it. We cannot tell why matter has so behaved as to produce *this* world of ours and it may be that the world of ours is one of many random products that has been sustained. Life and living beings which exhibit characteristics apparently different from those of gross material objects, as also mind and mental beings which also exhibit far different features, are all the results of matter and force in their more complex stages of structure and function. We cannot say either why matter has grown into the complex world, but can only say that it has grown as we find it.

Perhaps there is no other theory so indefinite and vague than materialism and yet there is no other theory so attractive and so easy of acceptance to those who are impressed by the external world. Long before men liked to be scientific and systematic in

their accounts of things matter, in one form or other, attracted their imagination and occupied the whole field of their thought leaving no room for any other principle whereby to account for things of experience. The reason for being attracted by matter as the supreme principle of explanation is more psychological than metaphysical. But history tells us that the first philosophers believed that there might be certain functions of matter akin to those that they are familiar with in their own life, such as feelings of love and hate, purposive movements. The first enquirers thus felt constrained to make matter or any form of it to be the fundamental principle of the universe though they were not unwilling to accord this fundamental material principle some organic and psychical functions. It is because of this that the ancient materialistic philosophers of Greece have been called hylozoists or those who conceded that matter is not without some incipient modes of life and mind. It is interesting to note that materialism in its primitive form betrayed that fundamental weakness which its later more scientific forms in the nineteenth century have tried hard to overcome.

Science has ever proved a strong ally to materialism and has ever tried to enthrone matter and its laws as the supreme principles of world-explanation. But unfortunately the more arduously it has tried to exalt matter, the more inimical it has become to the interest of matter until it has acquainted us with so much of matter that we have ceased to be materialists.

Historically speaking the ancient atomists of Greece, Leucippus and Democritus, have afforded us what is called the static conception of matter. They believed that if materialism were to be scientific it must be purged off the hylozoistic bias and vagueness with which Empedocles vitiated it ; and that we are not to be satisfied simply with the assumption of earth, air, fire, water as the fundamental particles of matter as Empedocles was, but that we must adopt the principle of division and reach the limits of division called *atoms*. These atoms must be not only indivisible and therefore indestructible because divisibility of a thing means its destructibility, they must also be self-existent, independent of one another, and without weight. And because they are without weight, they must lack tendency to motion. The ancient Greek atomists had no idea of the Newtonian Law of Gravity. Thus the atoms of Leucippus and Democritus were indivisible,

self-existent, indestructible and motionless, independent material particles but responsible for all that we find in the world of our experience. But as it was felt by them that for the purposes of structural contents of the universe the intrinsically immobile atoms must enter into combinations and that motion must be extraneously introduced into them so that they may run into one another and form structures. So motion as a distinct principle over and above static atoms was their next assumption. Again if the atoms were to move they must require space to move in. It was further found, however, that if the atoms were to move indefinitely in one direction through space they may not have the chance of ever colliding against one another so as to form structures. Hence not simply motion as a distinct principle but motion in all directions of space must have to be assumed and lastly it was also found that the present complex world-structure must have occupied time for its formation, so that time must be another assumption over and above space, if the origin and growth of the world into the present form are to be explained. This, in brief, is the materialism of the atomists in general where matter is multitudinous and static, for motion is not inherent in matter but extraneous to it. And it assumes not only the self-existence of the atoms but also motion, space and time for structure of the world. The Epicurean's materialism is substantially the same as the atomism of Leucippus and Democritus with only this difference that the Epicurean's atoms had weight in them and therefore also motion in all directions.

The Epicureans thus laid the foundation of the dynamic theory of matter in so far as they pointed out the inherence of motion in atoms. But dynamism of matter was put on a more scientific basis by the discoveries of Faraday and Lord Kelvin in the early nineteenth century when they demonstrated by scientific experiments that the atoms have intrinsic motion in them. The reader is referred back to the Section Four of this chapter for a detailed account of the dynamic conception of matter and for the latest developments of that conception by the most recent electrical theory of it.

The above is an account of the fundamental presuppositions of materialism—old and new. Now we enter upon its bearings on the problems of life, mind and consciousness, knowledge, morality and the higher values of life.

(i) MATERIALISM AND LIFE

Apart from what the ancient atomists have stated in the most general and vague terms about life and soul as composed of atoms, and from what the Epicureans have curiously maintained that the soul though composed of atoms yet has freedom of will, modern materialism has tried to be more consistent and systematic in its formulation of the pictures of life and mind. Spencer in his cosmological evolution has stated that life has evolved out of matter and force by way of spontaneous generation under the same general principles of evolution, *viz.*, *homogeniety*, *differentiation* and *segregation*. Life is nothing qualitatively different from material antecedents but appears on the globe whenever quantitative complexity of matter conducive to life is attained. Huxley has said that life is an offshoot of matter, only that "tendency to equilibrium of force and permanency of form" are the characters of the non-living physical world, while "tendency to disturb the existing equilibrium to take on forms to succeed one another in definite cycles is the character of the living world." It seems then inertia is the distinguishing mark of the physical world, and effort, that of the living world. In Huxley however we do not meet with Spencerian identity between life and matter but only a tendency to think of living beings in terms of automaton. Tyndall shares in the common materialistic view of life and expresses it in his characteristic way when he says that matter contains the 'promise and potency of life'. Modern naturalistic emergentists make life to be an emergence out of natural antecedents with which it is identical in kind but from which it is different only in complexity of structure and function.

(ii) MATERIALISM AND MIND

To materialists mind like life is a product of matter. Spencer makes mind to evolve from matter under the same principles which govern entire cosmic evolution. Mind is but complex matter, different from matter in nothing else but complexity. Descartes' automaton theory had already reduced mind of animals to practically the same category as the physicist does. Huxley in his *Collected Essays* argues that consciousness is related to the mechanism of the body simply as a 'collateral product' of its working, but does not affect it any more than the shadow of a

moving train affects the train itself. As Huxley puts it: "The feeling we call volition is not the cause of voluntary acts, but the symbol of state of the brain which is the immediate cause of that act." Thus according to the upholders of modern materialism mind is reduced to what they call epiphenomenon of matter—somewhat like a halo behind the head of a saint, having no causative power whatever. Carpenter takes the help of his theory of unconscious cerebration to explain certain mental phenomena which the psychiatrists try to explain by the postulation of psychical causality.

(iii) MATERIALISM AND KNOWLEDGE

From the account of mind and consciousness given by the materialist it follows as a consequence that experience is a mere phenomenon or better, epiphenomenon of the brain-matter and that knowledge amounts to nothing but mechanical sum-total of the otherwise discrete sensations having no intrinsic unity underlying these. Further, unique conscious phenomena will be the only factors and there will be no place for a judgment as unit of knowledge, because perceptual judgments that involve percepts and concepts, particulars of sense and *a priori* universals of the mind, will be impossible from materialistic phenomenism of mind that denies priority of mind and à priority of the categories or universals, which all judgments involve. Hence materialist's account of knowledge will be the same as the sensationalistic account of it, where knowledge will be a mechanical aggregate of unique conscious phenomena without the commonness of standard, intelligibility and universality.

(iv) MATERIALISM AND MORALITY

If materialism postulates matter and motion to be the basic principles of all that is in the universe, then like matter, all its products including life, mind or self and its function of volition will be determined by the same mechanical laws. But the essence of moral life consists in freedom or self-determination. Materialism which explains every phenomenon in terms of mechanical causation cannot make any provision for rational causality of the self where its freedom lies. But the denial of freedom means the denial of morality. And further if the self, according

to materialism, is nothing but a series of externally determined conscious states, it is evident that the self will seek the pleasurable conscious state and shun the painful one. It follows then that pleasure will be the object of volition and materialism will thus strike at the root of duties and virtues and will engrift prudence and selfishness on moral life to the utter disregard of the social good and the higher ideals of personal self.

(v) MATERIALISM AND HIGHER VALUES

A philosophy committed to matter and motion as stuff and principle of all that is, will not only conceive of life, mind and consciousness in terms of physics and chemistry but will naturally regard them as colourless facts without reference to ideals or values. It will make a machine of man, and consciousness, a physiological response, and all the higher functions of thought and reason a habit of language. It will miss meaning and value behind the positive picture of things and events and will fail to inspire the minds of men with any sense of themselves as individual moral agents, having the moral ideal or the good to realise. Beauty as value will cease to inspire them as an objective ideal but will be reduced to mere distribution of form and colour expressible only in terms of physics, chemistry and optics. The admission of matter as the reality of the universe and of the facts of changes as operations of matter leads the materialist to the bare truths of natural facts, mind and consciousness being epiphenomena of the brain agitations, or chemical resultants of physical elements in their aggregation, as the Cārvākas would have them. Truth will be necessarily relative to consciousness as an accidental epiphenomenon without absolute significance but only with pragmatic workability. And as for religious values materialism must be dead to all possibility thereof. Religion to the materialists is a matter of superstition or fraud. Every religion assumes a Universal Spiritual Reality governing the universe and a finite individual self who enters into practical relationship with the Spiritual Reality through devotion or worship. Now because materialism takes matter to be the all-sufficing principle and denies the independent existence of any spiritual reality, it necessarily proclaims all religions as the artificial constructions of the privileged class to exploit the lower classes—an idea which was so strongly voiced by the Cārvākas in Ancient India.

Criticism :—Materialism as a theory of life and the universe presents manifold anomalies to a *complete* and *consistent* view of things. In the first instance atomistic conception of matter as composed of indestructible or indissoluble particles has already been exploded by the electrical theory of the physical universe. According to it the basic principle is an enormously diffused intersteller radiation called cosmic rays in which protons, neutrons and electrons are only specks formed at random here and there which enter into far more complex structures called atoms. The atoms again are disrupted into electrons, neutrons and protons, many of which never recombine to form fresh atoms. Not only has this electrical theory thus undermined the conservation of matter as understood by the old materialists, but conservation of motion also remains an open question because it is proved only within a circumscribed sphere of empirical data beyond which we cannot say whether it is applicable. Again the old theory of matter and motion which took matter as fundamental and motion as its quality or function now appears to be reversal of the true situation. Motion is now regarded as the fundamental principle which gives rise to matter as its product. With the advance of physical science it has become gradually apparent that atomic materialism even as a description of the physical world is hopelessly incomplete. It does not provide for any explanation of the important physical facts of gravitation, magnetic attraction, chemical affinity, latent energy and action at a distance. Even the later nineteenth century physics failed to patch the scheme of atomic materialism by the introduction of the mysterious principle of universal ether ; for it still left many an obvious lacuna in the description and explanation of physical events. The *incompleteness* of materialism even as the theory of the physical universe is not only due to its leaving these obvious gaps, but also to the *uncertainties* that physical science presents in its calculation of physical events in terms of matter and motion. Modern materialism, however, finding that the so-called matter of the atomist is only a product of natural forces of electricity has re-christened itself under the name of Naturalism, maintaining that the physical universe with its contents, its things and events and their functions and operations is resolvable into electrical forces and their laws. It is well said therefore that to-day we know too much of matter to be any longer materialists.

The *inconsistencies* of materialism become apparent when it trespasses into the realms of life and mind. Spencer's theory of spontaneous generation of life from matter and Darwin's mechanistic biological evolution have lent an additional support to modern materialism to develop the science of bio-chemistry which analyses life into chemical forces and makes life only a *quantitatively* complex natural force. But naturalism fails to see that life is a phenomenon which is *qualitatively* different from natural forces and therefore cannot be traced to them, for its origin and growth. Besides, life belongs to the *realm of purpose*, inwardly differentiating itself from protoplasmic nucleated cells into organs, and functioning purposively in its relation to environment. Spencer though a naturalistic philosopher was unconsciously persuaded to the teleological character of the life-phenomenon when he defined life as a perpetual adjustment of the inner to the outer relations. Again if consciousness were a reproduction of physical energy of the brain and if physical energy is a closed system, as the naturalist supposes, then we can put the naturalist on the horns of the dilemma, that either he must abandon his theory of conservation of energy or he must admit that consciousness is a distinct energy by itself. For it is found on experiments that during conscious activity instead of the diminution of so much of the physical energy of the brain as was necessary for the appearance of consciousness, an increased brain-energy is the result. And lastly our conscious life presents a unity which defies explanation from the plurality of the brain atoms, the supposed origin of consciousness.

Knowledge which involves a subject-object relation and implies consciousness of an object by a subject becomes inexplicable from materialist's account. If consciousness is but a momentary flash born of impact amongst the atoms of the brain, appearing and disappearing at each moment, then unity and continuity of conscious life cannot be done proper justice to. The subject of knowledge, which is the unity of conscious life, can never maintain its identity of reference. And the object of knowledge to be an object by itself must also be a unity. But the unity of object is not its own unity but the unity accorded to it by the unity of the subject as Kant has shown. And even if the materialists claim unity in the object, this can never be proved from their standpoint, for according to them we know

only a series of forces in the external world disconnected from one another having nothing of unity in them. But if there be any unity at all, it can only be due to their being elements in a rational system with a purposive urge that the materialists are out there to deny. Now if materialism reduces conscious life to a momentary shadow of the brain, or a series of such shadows, with nothing like a unity of the subject or self, knowledge as subject-object relation stands unexplained.

Materialism as a theory of the universe reduces individuality of man to a pure sham, and, therefore, morality to an illusion. If our mental life from the materialist standpoint is an epiphenomenon or a series of epiphenomena, then personality and personal identity as well as freedom cannot have any meaning, because our mental life is subjected to the same mechanical causation that determines the phenomena of the physical universe. And if the moral agent acts, not out of his reason which is free, but as he is determined by mechanical causation, then self-determination or freedom becomes a fiction. With the denial of freedom man's obligations, duties and virtues become meaningless terms. As a creature of momentary conscious states he will naturally prize those sensations and feelings which would yield him most pleasure ; and prudence and selfishness will get their sanction from his conscience, which to him is nothing but self-love. And the ideal of moral goodness which consists in man's realisation of himself as an individual becomes meaningless, for materialism, which dissipates the self into momentary bits of epiphenomena, fails to account for the unity of purpose which is at the root of individuality.

Naturalism is a death-blow to all ideals and values. The conception of values involves the self as their evaluator, an idea of progress from a lower to a higher stage and a future state of perfection to be realised by the self. Now naturalism at its best makes the self to be a by-product of matter, its thoughts and ideas to be physical and physiological reflexes and the ideals and values are no exceptions to them. While formulating the relation of naturalism to values we have already pointed out that values lose their significance in the scheme of the naturalistic universe. Our present point will be to show whether the problem of value can be ignored, as has been done by naturalism, in any consistent philosophy of life and the universe. Suffice it to say that not

only is naturalism inadequate in its conception of the phenomena of the physical world in so far as it tries to explain the higher by the lower, it betrays hopeless bankruptcy when it aspires to explain the realms of mind and values. Eddington, Sir James Jeans and other recent physicists have conclusively shown that the deeper and deeper we penetrate into the physics of the world the more strongly we become convinced that the physical phenomena have a significance and value which no physics and chemistry at their highest stretch can account for. They point on the other hand to a spiritual reality as the 'home of values' which as eternal powers perpetually create the physical universe as field and opportunity for the self of man to realise those values which are embodied in it. Hence, if naturalism remains within its own bounds and does not involve itself in the charge of usurping what it cannot really claim, then the theory of Values, of Truth, Goodness and Beauty, Immortality and Freedom as objective spiritual forces, will show that natural phenomena and their laws are not meaningless in the larger scheme of the universe but have their relative worth which the human self must utilise and transcend in order that it may realise its destiny as an individual. It is in this proper conception of naturalism that we find that the nineteenth century quarrel between science and religion is dissolved and that lower naturalism, in order to substantiate its claim even as a fragment of a larger experience must yield to *Higher Naturalism*, which is the 'true philosophy' of life and the universe.¹

12. ORIGIN OF LIFE.

In our previous sections we were exclusively occupied with those problems which the inorganic, physical world presents to us, *viz.* problems of matter with its structure and function, of motion extrinsic or intrinsic to matter, and space and time with which matter is so closely connected and above all the problem of causality which has so much to do with change, process and development of the material world. But over and above these there is also the important phenomenon of Life which apparently distinguishes living beings from matter and material objects. Now, the phenomenon of life will engage our attention in the present

1. Cf. Pringle-Pattison: *Idea of God*. Lectures III and V.

and some of the following sections, for the problem of life may be best studied if we divide it into the further problems of its origin, nature and development. We shall begin with the first subdivision of the problem, *viz.*, the problem of the *Origin of Life*.

The question of the origin of life hinges largely upon our general metaphysical view of the universe. We may suppose in the first instance, as the ancient Ionian philosophers did, that matter and life though of different characters are so intimately connected, that life is a necessary accompaniment of matter and material objects, so that whatever may be its origin it will be found present in all matter and material objects. This ancient theory of life as indissolubly connected with matter is known as Hylozoism. This theory, however, did not give us life as having any independent origin of its own but as always concomitant with *hylē* or matter which is fundamental. But still the question remained as to what was the source or origin of life in order to get associated with matter. Life was not traced to any independent origin either in or outside the world of matter which it directed or moved. It was a mere assumption on the basis of a biased outlook which simplified the question of movement and direction of matter.

But more critical amongst ancient philosophers, like Lucretius, who were pledged materialists, thought that life was not a distinct principle necessarily accompanying matter, but arose as a subsequent phenomenon resulting from matter when it was subjected to certain chemical and mechanical processes. Lucretius would think, for instance, that clods of earth when warmed and wetted would give rise to forms of life. He may, therefore, be said to be the forerunner of the modern scientist who believes in spontaneous generation and claims that life could be produced out of non-life. Another suggestion that used to be made as to the first origin of life was that in the past the conditions of the earth were such that no life was possible but owing to changes in these geological conditions we now have life and its various forms. But this is hardly anything different from the theory of spontaneous generation which makes life to come out of non-life.

But the question will still persist: Whence did the first life come? Now this question may be answered in the three following different ways. The first way of answering the question will be

perhaps the same as the above, namely, if now life can be produced out of non-living antecedents in certain collocations, first life must have been produced out of non-living conditions. We shall have occasion to estimate the value of this theory when we shall discuss the question of the nature of life from the purely mechanistic or scientific standpoint. The second way of answering the question of the first origin of life will be to trace it to a highly complex stage in the process of naturalistic evolution, and we shall also have to point out the difficulties in the naturalistic evolutionary explanation of the universe. And the third and the last way of answering the question of the first origin of life will be to suppose that life appeared on the earth from the creative activity of a spiritual principle. Here, again, we must be careful not to suppose that the supreme spiritual principle created life all on a sudden out of nothing just as it is supposed to have created the entire universe out of nothing. The more rational view will be to think that the supreme spiritual principle gradually unfolds itself through all that we find in the universe, and that life appeared as one of such necessary stages in its self-expression. We see that such a view of the origin of life at once avoids the difficulty of the scientific theory of spontaneous generation or of naturalistic evolution, and at the same time the difficulty of the Deistic conception of God which makes God an arbitrary creator of the universe out of nothing, capable of existing without the universe before such arbitrary temporal act of His. Such a view will be found consistent both with the scientific theory of evolution and the type of Idealism we have accepted.

We shall note in passing that there had been other theories of the origin of life maintained by some of the physical philosophers of old. One was that life might have been introduced into our earth from some other planet or star either through radiation of light or through a shooting meteor, which carried life in one of its clefts and dropped it into our earth. But such half-scientific and half-mythical theories we can afford to pass over without comment.

13. *NATURE OF LIFE.*

We concluded above that life appears as a necessary stage in and in drawing that conclusion our statement seemed more abrupt

than expository, but we remained satisfied even with that, in view of the fact that we shall have occasion to offer to the reader more detailed grounds for our conclusion in connection with our discussion of the views of life. In the present section where we shall confine ourselves more particularly to the *nature of life* we shall have to traverse almost the same ground as before though from a slightly different angle of vision.

We propose to start our enquiry by first of all noting the characteristic features which distinguish life from what is other than life. Now these characteristic features which make up the differentia of life will certainly be determined by the philosophical position one adopts. But with regard to life as with regard to other problems of the universe philosophers are not at one with one another. And because of this divergence amongst the philosophers we have had divergent views on the nature of life, principal among which are *Mechanistic*, *Vitalistic* and *Idealistic*. But before estimating in detail these divergent views on the nature of life, we think we would do well to advance at the beginning our view of the nature of life in brief which will be found to be in accord with the specific form of Idealism we have adopted and maintained.

The nature of life according to our standpoint will be best described when it is stated that *Life is that force or power which by its inner self-differentiation into the organs and their functions maintains a unity and equilibrium amongst these organs and functions, purposively adapts the organism to environment, recoups its losses and reproduces itself in other organisms*. In the world of life we have various grades of living objects beginning from the plant-kingdom up to the human level and in all of them the principle of life manifests itself through the above-mentioned features common to them although they may exhibit other more or less complex characteristics dependent on or derived from these fundamental features of community, such as locomotion, speech, etc. In the world of our experience to-day we find, thanks to mechanism and science, many mechanical products which resemble living beings in point of unity and system. Such resemblance has led many scientific thinkers to the belief that a machine and a living being are hardly different from one another and they are strengthened in their belief by supposing that both a machine and a living being can be understood and explained in terms of physics and chemistry. These scientific writers have

attracted and convinced philosophers of the naturalistic school who have developed what is called the mechanistic view of life. We shall subject the mechanical view of life to criticism in the proper context. But in the meanwhile a contrast of a living being with a machine will bring to light the principles by which one will be enabled to see through the mechanistic views as applied to life.

The points of contrast between a machine and a living being are the following. While the unity and systematic character of a machine, such as, a watch, is imposed from outside, the unity and equilibrium of a living being is generated by life-force working from within itself. While the parts of a machine are made outside and adjusted from outside, the organs of a living being are self-differentiations of the life-power itself. While the parts, which make up the whole of a machine, when separated may be utilised and readjusted in another machine, the organs of an organism are never so separable and usable in another organism.¹ While absorption of food from outside, adaptation to environment and reproduction, are characteristically present in a living being, they are conspicuous by their absence in a machine.

From the above mentioned points of distinction between a living being and a machine it appears that in the former we are presented with the unity and individuality of a self-maintaining whole never to be met with in physical objects governed by mechanical laws. But the nineteenth century science is loud in its declaration that it has been successful not only in analysing life-force into chemical and physical forces and their laws, but also fancies that it can be produced out of them in their synthesis in the laboratory. Spencer and his predecessors only assumed the possibility of the production of life from non-living natural forces but the nineteenth century science fancied to have demonstrated it. But the sanest amongst modern scientists have the good sense to look more closely into the matter and to find that life exhibits qualitatively different characteristics conspicuous by their absence in the non-living physico-chemical forces from which life has been attempted to be derived. That life is incapable of derivation from natural forces, from atoms and their laws, has been es-

1. Though, however, instances of external adjustment of an organ of one organism to another organism are not very rare in modern therapeutics and surgery, and modern nursery, yet such phenomena occur only under restricted condition and are not always successful.

tablished by the researches of eminent bacteriologists, Dr. Pasteur and Dr. Lister, who, by their simplest experiments with a quantity of sterilised water kept up for a sufficiently long time in a hermetically sealed-up bottle, came to the conclusion that life could not come out of non-living atoms and molecules ; if it did, then living germs would have been found swarming within the bottle, which however was not the case. The above experiments clearly point out that life has a deeper source than atoms and their laws. Again, the claim of some bio-chemists that protoplasm, while it is found on analysis to be composed of the atoms of C.H.O.N. and sometimes S, can be artificially produced by synthesis of these atoms, still stands unsubstantiated, in view of the fact that 'something' which disappeared from the analysed atoms cannot be retrieved in the synthesis. These are evidences enough to lead one to the conclusion that life is not continuous with matter. After this general discussion as to the nature of life we now propose to consider the three important hypotheses that have been advanced to explain the phenomenon of life.

(a) MECHANISTIC HYPOTHESIS OF LIFE.

Biologists for the last few decades, trained in physical and chemical sciences, applied the general theory of mechanism in their explanation of the phenomenon of life. Life, whether in micro-organisms, plants, animals or men, was to them an instance of the same laws of mechanism which govern the entire universe from its highest mountains to its tiniest motes. Physical and chemical laws laid down by Newton were supposed to explain as well the origin, nature and growth of all life on earth. Life, therefore, however marvellous may be its function and product, is reducible to the dead level of physical and chemical laws, so that there is a continuity of structure and function between the inorganic and the organic and even the conscious levels of existence, only that these levels indicate greater and greater complexities and nothing of qualitative difference. The mechanistic view of life has its foundation on the general materialistic or naturalistic account of the universe and claims as its votaries the eminent scientists, both ancient and modern, from Democritus up to Spencer and Huxley. Huxley and Tyndall have tried to demonstrate with

a great scientific zeal that life hardly differs from matter except in automatic effort which makes its appearance under certain conditions. It is claimed by the mechanistic writers that if life were not explained by the same laws of physics and chemistry that are supposed to explain the other things of the universe then we shall be charged with the violation of the Law of Parsimony, as vitalists have been in supposing a distinct 'vital force' for the explanation of life. The mechanists claim that mechanical theory of life is the *only* explanation that should be accepted in science. Science should be free from anthropocentric or theological bias. If any vital force or 'entelechy' be introduced to explain the otherwise inexplicable 'mystery' of life, it is tantamount to allowing God through the backdoor which is against the spirit of science. So Loeb tries to explain by his theory of *Tropism* all sorts of so called vital phenomena, a theory which is the special application of physics and chemistry in the sphere of biology. The spontaneous response of the organism to external stimuli is explained to be due to a chemical attraction of the source of stimulation and the consequent change of position in the organism itself. The moth, when it flies into the fire, does not fly "consumed by the desire for immortality" as the poets tell us, but it is chemically attracted towards the fire, that is to say, the moth is positively helio-tropic to fire.

By way of criticism of the mechanistic hypothesis for the explanation of life we can mention, amongst its other difficulties, the following. The fundamental difficulty of the mechanistic hypothesis is its acceptance of the naturalistic theory of the universe as a whole which reduces it to matter and its laws. The universe presents to us three fundamental knots, matter, life and consciousness even, the first of which is not adequately explainable in terms of physics and chemistry. When we come to life it presents to us more complex problems of its function, growth and development, and infinitely rich and varied behaviour which defy the subtlest laws of mechanism. And the mechanical explanation of life at its highest cannot escape the charge of hollowness when it has only to offer the concept of 'complexity' only to be told in reply that complexity, however great, marks only quantitative and no qualitative difference. Life is not mere complex matter but an altogether different phenomenon marked by qualities or features which, as already noted, are never amenable to physico-chemical laws.

(b) VITALISTIC HYPOTHESIS OF LIFE. .

The apparent inadequacy of the mechanistic theory of life was responsible for the development of a distinct school of biologists who have proposed 'vital force', as a distinct principle to explain the phenomenon of life. But the history of vitalism shows that it has developed at least two distinct shades of thought as to the nature of the vital principle. Corresponding to these two shades of thought we have two distinct forms of vitalism, namely, *Old Vitalism* and *New Vitalism*. Aristotle, some of the medieval philosophers and even Descartes of modern period, may be said to represent the theory of old vitalism. Aristotle believed that the plant, animal and human levels of existence indicate the presence of a principle called *Entelechy* which may be understood by the term *soul in its widest sense*. To him the *entelechy* in the plant is only a *vegetative soul* hardly distinguishable from life-principle. Animals have in addition to the vegetative soul, a sensitive soul while men have a soul which is not only vegetative and sensitive but also rational. The common element in all of these levels of living being is the vegetative soul and is not amenable to physical explanation. Some of the medieval philosophers too, following Aristotle, preferred the view that life is distinct from any of the physical elements and may be either psychical or spiritual in character. Descartes, among modern writers, seems to have accepted something like vital principle in man when his theory of conscious automaton can be easily extended from animal to man excepting his soul. But although in all these forms of old vitalism there is a tendency to show that the principle of life is not reducible to matter and motion as the mechanists think, yet it is condemned by modern biologists on the ground that there is about it a 'twilight of mysteriousness' which is acceptable neither to science nor to philosophy.

Hence, there has arisen a new school of vitalists with Hans Driesch as its leader, called the Neo-Vitalists, who have revived vitalism once again in a form acceptable to the scientist. Hans Driesch has tried to prove that the principle of life shows characteristics not explainable by mechanical principles. He has re-introduced the Aristotelian term *Entelechy* to designate the life-principle and also used sometimes the term *Psychoïd* for the same. In his use of these two terms for the life-principle we can study the general

trend of his thought which oscillates between the idea of life as the organising principle and idea of life as something of the nature of mind. But on the whole Hans Driesch has been hailed as a propounder of the new theory of vitalism and has been heard by the scientific circles because of the strength and support he has gained by his experimental investigations into the matter. And it is because of this that he has been able to show to the scientific world that life is a distinct principle and that biology is not applied chemistry and physics, but an independent science. Hans Driesch strongly criticises the mechanistic theory, in this that the mechanists commit the fallacy of introducing more in the effect than what is there in the cause itself. The life principle which has some distinct characteristics of *insurgent self-assertiveness* can never be produced by mechanical causes, for, then, the effect becomes more than the cause. Basing his position on this logical postulate that the effect must be less than or equal to the cause and keeping an eye to the experimental researches as to the external behaviours of a living organism, Driesch postulates entelechy as a principle for the explanation of vital phenomena. The entelechy is not a physical entity, it does not occupy space but it acts itself into space or its organising capacity controls the changes of the physico-chemical organism which without its guidance is a dead machine. But Driesch, in spite of his acute analysis of the causal postulate, and of calling his entelechy 'immaterial' still remains within the charmed circle of 'ingrained materialism of ordinary thought'.¹

The vitalistic movement has taken different lines of development of which the vitalism of Henri Bergson may be regarded as more philosophic than scientific ; since according to him the life-principle, or *élan-vital* is the fundamental cosmic principle which by its impulsive flow creates not only living beings, but also conscious and intellectual beings like men. Life is a ground-principle from which these derive their origin, movement and growth. In fact, it is the creative agency and can be likened to the creative agency of God only with this difference that it is an instinctive or impulsive principle of force from which intellectual or rational element has been eliminated. The whole universe is an evolution of life which proceeds in its onward rush

1. Cf. Pringle Pattison: *The Idea of God* p. 80.

differentiating itself into the varied contents of the universe without having initially a preformed ideal of unity to be realised.

But instead of tracing further the lines of philosophic development which the principle of life has inspired, we should concentrate on the immediate question as to whether there is any principle other than the cosmic, which can explain those structures whose functional activity is life. Biology to-day, as an independent science, recognises certain non-mechanical agencies beyond the region of physical and chemical forces. These non-mechanical agencies are sometimes expressed by the term 'conative principle', sometimes by the term, 'struggle for existence' and sometimes again by the term, 'struggle for freedom'. But all these expressions stand for the common principle of organisation and development which characterises life and which is never to be sought and discovered in the blind mechanical forces. This indeed is a happy augury, for it has at least the tendency to dispel the 'mystery' which hangs over the old vitalistic account of life and to suggest that life may be more of the nature of the spirit than of anything else.

(c) IDEALIST ACCOUNT OF LIFE.

The ground which the Neo-vitalists prepare by their conclusion that life is a distinct force of striving and struggling and maintaining an equilibrium of structure and function, which is never reducible to physics and chemistry, requires only a step beyond to approach the idealistic account of life. After all that has been said by the neo-vitalist as to the nature of life, the idealist will complete the picture by simply adding that life is not a product of natural or biological forces. It is only a stage in the process of the self-unfoldment or self-expression of that absolute spiritual principle whose other stages are the material world with its structure and functions on the one side and mind or self with its structure and functions on the other. The one universal spirit in its self-manifestation takes on that specific form of expression which is life. When the idealist says this, he does not mean that the physical basis of life is not explainable in terms of physics and chemistry. He says rather that any organic structure cannot disobey the physico-chemical laws, but that it will be wrong to make a fetish

of matter, motion and its laws and to apply them, beyond their own sphere to the life-force itself which belongs to the higher level of Reality where non-mechanical laws govern its phenomena. It comes to this then that life is one of the self-expressions of the Absolute Spirit. In its self-evolving expression it appears under determinate conditions as living centres. Its structures, reflexes, instincts and feelings form the instruments by which consciousness and then self are evoked. The Absolute Spirit must also appear under certain still higher determinate conditions as a soul with capacity for forming a self, because the very stuff and urge of self-expression cannot be satisfied with anything short of a soul which alone can do justice to them. Mechanistic explanation of life in which it finds nothing more than the mere collocation of physical conditions exposes itself to ridicule, because life which is a higher value is not the result but the pull which draws forth or distributes the physical conditions to form the structural basis of life. Dr. Hans Driesch himself intends to emphasise the evolutionary background of Vitalism when he writes "newly arising elemental agents must be conceived as already pre-existing in some way, so that life cannot arise upon a constellation of known non-vital agents."¹ The idealist account of life does not go against the theory of evolution which maintains that the universe as we have it now is not a shot-out bullet but has come to be what it is with all its contents including life and mind as a result of gradual self-manifestation of one spiritual reality. The idealist explaining the nature of life further points out by his general theory of explanation that the higher cannot be explained by the lower, the whole by the parts, so that physical and chemical conditions cannot explain life, though life can determine and control such conditions. Another great important improvement of the idealist account of life on the neo-vitalist hypothesis seems to be this that when the neo-vitalist claims to explain by his vital principle everything which occurs in a living organism, the idealist cries halt and points to the spiritual principle to which certain behaviours of the living organism must be referred if they are to be explained aright.

1. Quoted by Bosanquet in his *Principle of Individuality and Value*. (p. 191) from Driesch's Gifford Lectures II, p. 234.

14. *EVOLUTION AS OPPOSED TO CREATION*

The problems discussed in the previous sections under the present chapter all related to those aspects and factors of the world which naturally present themselves to us as we face it. Now, those aspects and factors of the world have been considered as they make up the nature of the world as it is. The question of *process*, *growth* and *development* was thrown all along into the background, but process or change or development of the world is as real as those aspects and factors which we have already considered. Now the fact of process and growth was not recognised all through in the history of thought. Creation of the world with its contents is perhaps as old as human thought and when once created the world with its contents was supposed to continue immutable or changeless up to the nineteenth century when the fact of process, change and evolution was brought into vogue for the first time by Huxley and Darwin. Since then *Evolution* has become one of the engaging problems of the world.

In order to understand evolution it seems necessary to understand its opposite, namely, the idea of *Creation*. Now, creation as a theory of the origin and maintenance of the world has all along meant that our world with all its contents was brought into existence out of nothing at a particular point of time by God, and since creation our world with all its contents has remained just the same as it was at the time of creation. Matter, life and mind with their structure and function have been maintaining perfect identity, without changing their own characters and without mutual mutation of one into the other. But the nineteenth century scientists by their observation and experiments, some by the experiments with living beings, others by their investigation into the nature of the physical world, came to conclude that neither the contents of the world nor the world as a whole show any evidences to favour the old view that they remain unchanged and stagnant. In other words, these modern scientists rejected the theory of creation and accepted in its stead the theory of evolution or gradual process of growth and development. These first evolutionists were strengthened in their view of evolution by evidences pouring in from the different departments of nature, astronomical, geological and anthropological. And in spite of findings to the contrary in some spheres of existence the general theory of evolution that the

entire system of the universe is in process, growing and developing, from one common stock or stuff, seems to stand unassailed, and it is further held that evolution means always change from one stage to another, characterised by increasing complexity of structure and function. With these general observations we now proceed on to consider biological evolution formulated by Darwin.

15. BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION OF DARWIN.

Darwin by his experiments with living beings left to their environment found that each of them tried to keep itself in existence, and that in its efforts to do so it acquired certain powers whereby it coped with other living beings and adapted itself to the environment it had to face. It was observed by him that certain living beings in their efforts to preserve themselves acquired certain new powers suited to their successful grappling with their environment. When these living beings acquired such suitable powers for their maintenance in existence, nature seemed to select them for survival in their struggle. It was further observed that when one or a group of such living beings died out leaving their progeny, these successors were also found to have inherited those very powers which their ancestors in their struggle had acquired and repeatedly exercised during their life-time. And these powers were also handed down, along with fresh powers acquired from generation to generation, with the result that after a considerably long time we come across a group of living beings which are different from their original ancestors in point of their organs, structure and behaviour thus developing an entirely new species different from the species to which their original ancestors belonged. This is in brief the picture which Darwin draws about the 'origin of species'.

The principles by which his mechanism of evolution works can very well be gathered from the above picture and they are—First, the *Principle of the Struggle for Existence* which means that each living being has to face and cope with other living beings which are hostile to its own interest and also other surroundings which may not be suitable for its preservation. Second, the *Principle of Modification by Acquired Powers* which means that if the individual living being is to keep up itself in existence, it must acquire

powers of reaction to its environment which will modify its former nature in the way suited to its preservation. Third, *the Principle of Natural Selection* which means that the newly acquired powers of reaction will so favourably equip some of the individuals and the groups of individuals that nature will seem to select them for survival. Further, and the last will be *the Principle of Heredity* which means that the powers of reaction to the environment acquired by a given generation and accumulated through subsequent generations must be inherited by posterity in order that a *new species* of living beings may appear on the scene.

By way of comment on the Darwinian theory of evolution we may remark in the first instance that Darwin himself never used the term 'evolution' although he meant all that is involved in the evolution of a new species. It was Huxley, a contemporary of Darwin, that used the term 'evolution' and made it a common coin. Secondly, the powers of reaction which individuals are thought by Darwin to acquire in their struggle for existence are *all fortuitous or chance-acquired*, not determined by anything external or internal to the struggling living beings, so that in this shape Darwin's evolution of new species is mechanical, though, however, he gave it a different shape later on leading to teleology in the light of ideas which he accepted from the French biologist Lamarck, according to whom the acquired powers are based on the internal *needs* and *habits* of the living beings. Nor was Darwin consistently evolutionistic in so far as he admitted the *creation* of living germs by God. This also goes against his original mechanistic standpoint with regard to evolution. But in spite of the difficulties in his theory mentioned above Darwin may be said to be the pioneer of the doctrine of evolution as applied to the sphere of life until evolution was made a cosmic principle of explanation by Spencer.

16. BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION OF LAMARCK AND SPENCER

According to Lamarckian theory of biological evolution changes in the organ and function in an animal body were not due to fortuitous conditions as Darwin thinks originally, but to the *needs* or *wants* which the animal feels and to the new movement which it undertakes for the purpose of removing such wants and needs and also to the *environment* which acts upon it. It appears then that the variations which an animal acquires are guided by a

hormic or purposive factor tending to make evolution purposive rather than mechanical.

Spencer was a thorough-going mechanistic philosopher admitting either in his biological or in his cosmical evolution no psychical or teleological factor. According to Spencer, therefore, modifications in the living being are *entirely fortuitous or mechanical*, so that he agrees with Darwin so far as the first phase of Darwin's theory was concerned, for Darwin, later on, under Lamarckian influences tended more and more towards teleological explanation of change. Spencer also believed in the inheritance of *all* the acquired powers by the next generation without exception.

17. BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION OF WEISMANN.

But the mechanism of Darwinian and Spencerian evolution came gradually to be found contradicting, among other things, the inheritance by posterity of all the acquired powers of an individual. The individual in its action and reaction with the environment might imbibe many accidental variations like lameness or deafness, but the progeny did not inherit these defects of organs and their functions and this fact disproved Spencerian supposition and pointed to something deeper and more important that determined the inheritance of some particular powers out of the whole lot. Now Weismann, the German biologist, investigated into this problem of inheritance of specific powers and found that every living being has in its constitution certain important cells, called by him '*germ-cells*', and modifications which affect these germ-cells could only be inherited according to him and not all modifications at random as Spencer thought. Thus in the biological evolution of Weismann we have a much nearer advance towards teleological explanation than was suggested by Lamarckian principles. It follows then that there is a purpose hidden in the operation of life-power, so that it is not the accidental and chance inheritance of all the powers by posterity that can truly explain biological evolution. It is rather the selected class of variations affecting the germ-cells of living beings that can account for biological evolution. The principle of natural selection so emphasized by Darwin has to be replaced by what may be called '*rational selection*'. Evolution in the biological world is then after all purposive, illustrating

as it does the general purposive activity of the ultimate spiritual principle which enacts from behind the whole show and expresses its own purposive nature through all the processes of the universe including evolution in the living world.

18. COSMIC EVOLUTION OF SPENCER.

The scientific spirit of evolution which received its first impetus in the stray experiments of Lamarck, Darwin and Huxley with living beings and became concentrated in the comparatively comprehensive biological formulæ of Darwin, did not fail to appeal to philosophic mind of Herbert Spencer who extended its possibilities to all the other aspects of existence and made evolution a cosmic principle of explanation. His 'Synthetic Philosophy' gives us an account from the evolutionary point of view, not only of psychological, ethical or biological problems but also of the whole cosmic world. He was interested in the findings of the great mathematical and physical scientist Laplace and imbibed and incorporated them as materials for his philosophy and evolved from his own speculative mind the laws which govern the process of cosmic evolution. Spencer combined in himself scientific and speculative genius in such a manner that it is difficult to declare whether he was a greater philosopher than a scientist or a greater scientist than a philosopher.

19. THE STUFF AND PRINCIPLES OF COSMIC EVOLUTION.

As a scientist Spencer believed in the self-existence of matter, force, space, time, a 'primitive collocation' and the conservation of energy. With these postulates and with the Laplacian hypothesis of a nebular mass he attempts to explain the growth and development of our universe into the present state and claims that these assumptions will also apply to what the universe will be in the future. And he has evolved his three famous principles of evolution, namely, (i) *Instability of the Homogeneous*, (ii) *Multiplication of Effects*, and (iii) *Segregation*. With the above mentioned postulates and principles of evolution he has shown that matter, life and mind are not three distinct knots in the universe but the second and the third, namely, life and mind, are

only continuous with matter which under these laws of evolution has grown into these more and more complex stages. Spencer defines evolution as "an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion during which the matter passes from a relatively definite, incoherent homogeneity to a relatively definite, coherent heterogeneity ; and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation."¹ Spencer's evolution of the universe as a whole as indicated by his definition may be briefly described as follows. He starts with an original homogeneous material stuff of Laplacian nebula with its inherent motion and takes for granted the theory of conservation of energy and persistence of force with which he identifies energy. He states that the original homogeneous nebula which is nothing definite in itself has a tendency to become definite, but to become something definite, the star-dust composing the nebula must pass from its diffused state to a state of integration in which the particles of the star-dust will be concentrated. But this integration or concentration cannot take place without the particles undergoing dissipation of motion inherent in them. So the first stage in evolution is due to the inherent impossibilities of the original homogeneous mass to continue as such and results in concentration or integration of mass accompanied by dissipation of its inherent motion, explaining Spencer's first principle of evolution, namely, *Instability of the Homogeneous*. Now when the original nebular stuff has attained the first stage it has a tendency to become heterogeneous under the second principle which Spencer calls *Multiplication of Effects*. This simply means that the homogeneous must pass over into the heterogeneous in which details are differentiated. But these details are again nothing else than the differentiations of the original matter and energy into definite but coherent forms. The one homogeneous stuff as cause has now produced many effects, but in producing the multiplicity of effects the original homogeneous matter must have suffered loss or dissipation of the motion which it retained even when it tended to pass from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous state. But this is not all, for, so far the homogeneous in its passing over to the heterogeneous, under the above mentioned laws, has only resulted in integration or aggregation of matter. Since there

1. Spencer: *First Principles*, Vol. II, p. 321

seems to be a necessity of separating the like from the unlike, integration within the heterogeneous mixture, the third principle of *Segregation*, must apply to the process of evolution, so that an orderly heterogeneity may rise out of the vague and the chaotic one. This in brief is the formulation of cosmic evolution of Spencer under his three well-known laws.

Without going into the details of criticism of Spencer's assumptions and the results which he reaches from them for which the inquisitive student is referred to Ward's *Naturalism and Agnosticism* (Vol. I, lectures 8 and 9) we would do well to fix upon the following main points of criticism of Spencer's theory. First, the nebular collocation with which Spencer starts is an assumption only, and one might have started with a quite different assumption against which Spencer can have possibly nothing to say. Secondly, the conservation of energy which Spencer postulates as guiding the entire process of evolution has its application within the limited sphere of our earth beyond which we have no knowledge to justify it. Thirdly, if the principles of Spencer's evolution, namely, the 'instability of the homogeneous', 'multiplication of effects' and 'segregation' are to be applied to the whole course of evolution, they will at best yield to us merely a repetition, or better, repetitive evolution without the newness and creation which characterise the course of cosmic evolution. Fourthly, if life and mind with their varieties of structure and function are to be the results of the cosmic evolution of Spencer, we do not meet with in his theory the reasons why and how life and mind with their qualitative peculiarities of structure and behaviour could be evolved out of the dead and unconscious mechanical principles of matter and motion. To say, as Spencer does, that life and mind are substantially the same as matter and force though with increasing complexities, is not only to miss the significance of life and mind but also to deaden ourselves to values of life and the goal of spirituality towards which evolution in its proper sense is moving the universe. Fifthly and lastly, the very assumption of the specific primitive collocation as the stuff of evolution pledges Spencer to the teleological interpretation of the evolutionary movement in so far as the original nebula has taken *this* course known to us and no other, suggesting a purposive guidance keeping it from going any other way. Spencer has thus been forced into teleology in spite of himself.

20. *MECHANICAL AND TELEOLOGICAL EVOLUTION.*

In the above section on Cosmic Evolution we have hinted at the possibilities of distinguishing mechanical and teleological evolution. Now, we propose to consider somewhat in detail the nature and implications of each and show whether it is possible to reconcile them.

The theory of *Mechanical Evolution* tells us that the universe with its physical, organic and conscious contents has accidentally arrived at the present state as a result of a long course of growth and development from stage to stage and that the stuff from which it has so developed consisted of gross irrational matter and the principles which moved the entire course of development are only blind forces of nature. Given matter and energy, space and time, gravitation, attraction and repulsion, we have the universe evolved in which we live, move, and have our being. From the solar system down to the tiny flower—the entire existence is the result of a blind ballet of atoms and molecules without any meaning of their own and value for the totality of existence. The universe is moving, but from whence to whither nobody knows. If one is to be genuinely scientific in his view of the universe it is claimed that physics and chemistry, dynamics and thermodynamics, are rich enough to inform one that the universe, as it is now and as it may be in the future, will always be the result of the operation of matter and force in space and time without any trace of mind or intelligence to guide it, without any end or purpose to achieve. To bring in any conception of mind or purpose to direct the course of evolution is to make theology of science.

But the inadequacy of the theory of mechanical evolution to explain the nature, growth and development of the universe in all its aspects and factors has led idealistic philosophers to accept the *Teleological Theory of Evolution* according to which the universe is shot through and through with reason and purpose. They point out that every effect must have a cause no doubt but the cause is not exhausted by its mere efficiency. The world of ours is undeniably the effect of the operation of efficient causes constituted by matter and force, but to think that the efficient cause exhaustively explains the world as an effect, is to ignore the complete implication of a cause as philosophy understands it. Finality or purposiveness of the causal operation is an ele-

ment too obvious and too strongly supported by evidences in nature to be ignored by the philosophic outlook on life and the universe. The universe exhibits, in its facts and events, adaptation of one to another, as means to ends, which form, as it were, a hierarchy forcing one to conclude that there is at the back of the material and efficient causes an intelligent design which guides the whole course of the universe to the realisation of values, their consummation and unity. Martineau in his teleological argument for God's existence, Hegel in his theory of the Absolute Idea realising itself through man and nature, and Bosanquet and Urban in their theory that life and the universe tend to the realisation of values, have amply justified the teleological evolution of the universe.

It is interesting to note that teleology is not really antagonistic to the scientific and the mechanical view of the universe, though mechanical interpretation rejects teleology. Idealistic writers who interpret the course of the universe teleologically do not deny the efficient and material causes which the mechanical interpretation of the universe makes too much of. They argue that the ultimate reality of the universe is no doubt spiritual but its nature is such that it realises its true being through the physical, organic and conscious worlds, each of which has its own stuff and its own laws, but all these stuffs and laws only express the different levels in different experiences of that totality of the Spiritual Being, in which the meaning and value of all these different levels of self-expression are maintained and consummated. It follows then that matter and its laws must not be denied their operation and efficiency in the totality of existence, but they should not be allowed to usurp the meaning and value of life and mind, organisation and reason, and that the totality of purpose draws out and unifies them all. Thus, if mechanism and mechanistic explanations are exclusive, rational and teleological explanations of the course of the universe are inclusive and conciliatory.

21. BOSANQUET'S VIEW OF TELEOLOGY.

The metaphysical position we have adopted in our book will not be found in disagreement with the way in which Bosanquet has viewed teleology. But the more important reason for which we resume the question of teleology is apparently this that Bosanquet has given a new term to it. In the traditional view

of teleology we think of a supreme mind which realises its purpose through a series of volitions which nature and mind embodies, so that here the teleological cause is not altogether dissociated from an element of efficiency and is, therefore, considered to be moving the world of nature and the world of mind from *behind* with a "push", as it were. But Bosanquet's teleology is different from the traditional view of it in that the spiritual reality which is the unity of all experiences and values "pulls", as it were, from *before*, the worlds of nature and mind, so that the Spiritual Reality does not plan the universe from beforehand, does not volitionally determine it, but only as a pure final cause divested of efficiency attracts the world towards itself. Experience tells us that the values are realised ideals and also tells us that our individual lives represent the so many strivings or approximations towards the totality of values which attract us. Something of this was indicated by Aristotle's theory of God, as the Unmoved Mover of the universe, but has been more clearly expressed by Bosanquet and Nicolai Hartmann. Nicolai Hartmann says, "Value is at the same time power and a directional point. As something substantial it does not impel the process from behind and push it forward, but draws it to itself."¹ It is because of this pull from before by the values as forces, as against the traditional view of teleology which makes the purpose of a universal mind to push the universe from behind, that the teleology of Bosanquet and of those who share in his view has been termed *New Teleology*.

22. CREATIVE EVOLUTION.

The expression '*Creative Evolution*' is associated with the name of Henri Bergson who made it a common coin, though the idea of creativity had been felt as a necessary element in the idea of evolution by many other writers. If evolution were not to mean mere unfoldment of what was enfolded in the evolving stuff, but rather to mean newness of efficiency in every second stage as compared with any first in the process of evolution then all evolution must be creative. The idea of creativity was given a distinct turn by Bergson when he pointed out that what is going to be evolved must be *unpredictable*. Now, before trying

1. Nicolai Hartmann: *Ethics*, Vol. I, p. 273.

to explain what Bergson exactly meant by unpredictability in the evolutionary process we would like to point out that the evolution as advocated by Bergson and also by the emergentists may both be called creative, in so far as both these forms of evolution are characterised by *newness* or uniqueness in the result as distinct from the traditional mechanistic and teleological forms of evolution which are marked by what is called *repetition* or predictability and are, therefore, called *Repetitive*.

Bergson's theory of *Creative Evolution* may be said to have its origin from the conception of his fundamental reality, namely, the principle of Life and Duration, which, as a dynamic principle, creates *something new* as it moves, and being in itself instinctive and irrational as all life is, defies calculation and prediction by our reason or intellect of what it creates by its incessant onrush. Bergson thinks that evolution as conceived previously to him meant only unfolding of what was lying implicit in the universe, redistribution of what was already there in the universe in one form or another. The mechanical theory of evolution as expounded by Spencer with matter, force and their laws was repetitive in so far as his homogeneous when transformed into the heterogeneous did not give us anything other than and different from what was already contained in it except redistribution of the old stuff in spite of what his principles of evolution achieved. One could very well predict under the known mechanical laws what Spencer's evolution was going to produce. Nor was the traditional teleological evolution helpful in our understanding the true course of development which our universe adopts, for it is stultified also by repetition and predictability. The final cause or reason or Divine Providence which guides the entire evolutionary movement of the universe is supposed to preconceive what it is going to achieve in the future, so that just as we can foretell what kind of a building an architect is going to erect if we know his plan and purpose, even analogically we can, according to the teleological view of the universe, predict the result of the cosmic evolution. Hence, Bergson contends that in neither of these traditional forms of evolution we can trace uniqueness of the result which evolution in its true sense must exhibit. To illustrate his position he has compared the process of evolution to the movement of a rocket bursting forth into infinite number of fiery lines unexpected and uncounted. Another instance, which he has

given us to liken his evolution to, is that of growing sheaves of corn which burst forth into innumerable and unpredictable grains.

Bergson was led to this position regarding his conception of life as an ever-creative principle by way of criticism of the mechanistic theories of biological evolution visualised by Darwin, Lamarck and Weismann. According to them only the material and mechanical conditions determine the course of the evolution of life. Now Bergson contends that if the perfect adaptation of the organism to its environment be the goal of evolution as the mechanistic biologists hold, why did not then evolution stop generations ago? For are not the higher organisms less adapted to the environment than the lower ones? This tendency of evolution to the creation of more and more complicated organisms can never be explained on the mechanistic hypothesis. So Bergson tries to supplement this view with a truer view of life as a dynamic and ever-creative principle, the very nature of which consists in budding forth ever new and enriched creations by moulding the material obstacles according to its needs. So the mechanistic laws do not really govern the life-development, but just the reverse is the case, *i.e.*, the laws rather speak of the courses through which the *élan vital* has passed in its own instinctive way.

By way of criticism it may be pointed out that Bergson's insistence on the absolute distinction between reason and instinct has been a point of attack levelled against him by eminent psychologists like McDougall and others. Experimental evidences do not confirm Bergson's thesis that all interests are irrational, for reason exists in instincts in a rudimentary form. But it must be admitted by every one that Bergson's contribution to our idea of evolution is really bold and attractive. His characterisation of radical finalism or teleology in the ordinary sense as equivalent to inverted mechanism, throws a flood of light on the proper conception of evolution. The goal of evolution must not be set from the beginning but it must be ever created with the gradual approximation to its realisation—this is a point which was not adequately realised before Bergson. The criticism generally urged against Bergson that he does not give us a rationalistic scheme of the universe is beside the point, for the idealistic position which is the source of this criticism is itself subject to the charge of inverted mechanism if the purpose of the Absolute be eternally set for the realisation of which the whole process of nature and

mind is to evolve. We shall have, however, occasion to estimate the worth of this charge later.

23. *EMERGENT EVOLUTION.*

The theory of *Emergent Evolution* which has become current during the last three decades amongst scientists and philosophers owes its origin to the same tendency of the mind as was responsible for making evolution creative. Evolution, if it means anything, must mean that something new and different must come into being or emerge from the immediately antecedent stage in the process. Another reason for the conception of this new theory is that its sponsors were not satisfied with the gaps and jumps which the traditional repetitive theory of Spencer allowed in the really continuous process of cosmic growth and development. The contents of the world, matter, life and mind, with their structure and functions do not admit of any missing link or *hiatus*. Hence, the claim of emergent evolution to improve upon the traditional theory of development seems to be twofold, namely, first it insists on the newness in what emerges from any previous stage in the evolution, and secondly, it supplies the missing links in the innumerable stages that intervene between matter, life and mind, which the traditional theories of evolution did not trace, with the result that the process of evolution instead of being continuous, was left by them as abrupt and 'jumpy'.¹

24. *THE SCIENTIFIC IMPORTANCE OF EMERGENT EVOLUTION.*

The influence of the concept of Evolution on modern thought since Darwin cannot be overrated and has been controlling it almost with a magical charm for the simple reason that the last two generations of mankind are claiming to be more versed in 'Science' than in 'Philosophy'. Prof. Dewey's monograph on "The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy" (1910) among other things laid the foundations of a naturalistic theory of man, reducing all human activities to be responses to stimuli; 'experience being defined as just certain modes of the interaction of natural objects, of which the physical body is one, states of consciousness being replaced by sensori-motor co-ordination of functions and habits of adjustments and readjustments between the human

1. Cf. *Evolution in the Light of Modern Knowledge*, Ch. IV.

animal and its environment."¹ But it is interesting to note that the immediate effect of Darwinism on Philosophy, and its subsequent development into Behaviourism in psychology, Instrumentalism, Naturalism and Realism in philosophy, only tended to make philosophical outlook more naturalistic than evolutionary. "The conceptional apparatus of Darwin's theory of Evolution—accidental variations, struggle for existence, survival of the fittest, etc., has now been dropped, nor have post-Darwinian developments in biology, *e.g.*, the theories of Mendel and Weismann, with all the detailed researches to which they have led or the rise of neo-Lamarckianism, exercised any marked influence on our evolutionary naturalists in philosophy."² Again, the biological concepts of evolution being confined to the phenomena of life alone, the need of a more generalised formula was felt and found its response in the wider cosmic Evolution of Spencer who showed that biological evolution was only one chapter in the whole story. Darwin was a biologist whereas Spencer was a philosopher and evolutionary philosophy owes much more to Spencer than to Darwin. And the combined effort of both Darwin and Spencer has been to transfigure the old Atomic materialism into what we now call Modern Materialism or Naturalism whose aim is to construe everything and every phenomenon physical or mental in terms of natural laws. But the present day evolutionists, however, are loath to accept the grandiosely futile formula of Spencer which involves many a lacuna or gap in its application to the Cosmic System as a whole and have hit upon the concepts, of 'Emergence' and 'Emergent Evolution' which exercise almost a magical charm with them. They are now thinking that Emergent Evolution gives us the most thorough-going history of the sequence of stages through which what Lloyd Morgan calls the "increasing richness in stuff and substance" of the universe has been attained; but so many thinkers of different schools are now converging towards the one common movement of modern thought of which 'Emergence' is the watchword, that it is not easy to give a simple statement of Emergent Evolution. It counts within its camp neo-realists, critical realists, biologists and even organicists, and no two of its exponents agree in respect of very fundamental points.

1. Cf. The Author's work, *Studies in Philosophy*, pp. 62-63.

2. *Philosophy To-day*, pp. 3-4.

25. GENERAL SCHEME OF EMERGENT EVOLUTION.

But although it is hazardous to give a formulation of emergent scheme which will be acceptable to all its exponents, yet we can attempt a statement in outline of the most common features that may fairly be said to represent the main scheme of Emergent Evolution. We may begin the story with a universe made of some physical forerunner of matter which is homogeneous and indefinite, but is distributed in systems of simplest organisations. Now these systems become more and more complex and protons and electrons appear in varied systems. These systems may be supposed to appear as chemical elements, oxygen, hydrogen, iron, sulphur, etc. From these emerge their qualities and properties and from these qualities and properties again new events appear, for instance, water emerges from the properties of oxygen and hydrogen combined. Now water with its peculiar qualities and properties is an emergent, a novelty. But the novelty of water as compared with hydrogen and oxygen is not due to any other element, not contained in hydrogen and oxygen, but is only an actualisation of what was potentially existing in hydrogen and oxygen. It is, therefore, the combination or what the emergentists call *relatedness* that makes the molecule of water, a novelty as compared with the pure state of hydrogen and oxygen. "The new kind of relatedness is *intrinsic* to the system ; the emergence of the new qualities and properties does not depend upon new *external* relations of any kind."¹ Similarly, other chemical compounds emerge such as Bisulphide which emerges from the combination or 'relatedness' of carbon with sulphur, or hydrochloric acid which emerges from combination or 'relatedness' of chlorine with hydrogen. After a period of chemical emergences like the above, some systems of atoms like C.H.O.N. perhaps with P.S.Cl. attained a new degree of complexity to make life emerge. Here also, as before, no element, no energy was added from the outside the system, but only the new kinds of relatedness sufficed for the emergence of life. And as these new kinds of intrinsic relations were established the more and more complex properties of life, such as power of growth, assimilation, metabolism, generation and re-generation and the

1. McDougall: *Modern Materialism and Emergent Evolution*, p. 115.

rest of them emerged. With the lapse of time living systems attained greater and greater complexities which made sentience, the forerunner of mind, emerge. And with the attainment of further complexity by sentience cognition or mind appeared on the scene. Then followed newer forms of experience as a result of the attainment of increased complexity by those systems in which mind appeared. The process continued until the higher forms of intellect, will and moral personality, were attained. And the most interesting feature of the whole story of evolution is that the universe of purely physical reality seems to reserve, even after the alleged successive emergence of life and of mind out of it, large parts of nebular matter or any other matrix in a primordial unevolved condition.²

26. TYPES OF EMERGENT EVOLUTION.

The exponents of emergent evolution, while they accept the above stated general scheme of evolution, have introduced certain concepts which have been responsible for at least three distinct types of emergent evolution. Among these representatives of these three types of evolution we may name R. W. Sellars, S. Alexander and Lloyd Morgan. Sellars gives us a thoroughly naturalistic type, Alexander a semi-naturalistic type and Morgan an idealistic one. We propose to give brief accounts of these three types of emergent evolution in order and to add our words of comment on them.

(a) THE NATURALISTIC TYPE OF EMERGENT EVOLUTION

Prof. Sellars in his *Evolutionary Naturalism* has expounded the most thorough-going naturalistic evolution tracing the psychical novelties to the organisation of purely physical events and the organisation itself emerges from the unorganised physical or mechanical antecedents. Sellars does not seem to spend much of his energies over the question of the emergence of life as one of the important stages in the process though he incidentally speaks of the organisation. His story of evolution is more concerned with describing how the psychical is evolved from a purely physical and mechanical world that has nothing of the nature of mind in it, and how the psychical when it attains the human

2. *Ibid.* pp. 115-16.

level with the high complexity of human brain processes plays its part as conscious thinking, as awareness, as planning and contriving in the total complex of psycho-physical events. When Sellars wrote his book the term 'emergent evolution' was hardly in vogue, yet Sellars formulated the general scheme of emergent evolution and thus anticipated the emergent evolution of Lloyd Morgan at least in so far as the general scheme is concerned.

(b) SEMI-NATURALISTIC TYPE OF EMERGENT EVOLUTION

This type of emergent scheme is apparently represented by Dr. S. Alexander in his famous Gifford Lectures entitled *Space, Time and Deity*. His statement of the emergent scheme is perhaps the fullest and most complete from the scientific and realistic point of view. Alexander's account begins with Space-Time or Motion which is homogeneous in character and therefore nothing definite but is the *primordial matrix* from which all things emerge and contains the possibility of the emergence of God who is yet to come. The first evolute of space-time according to Alexander is *motion*, the next thing that emerges is either *matter or some fore-runner of matter with its primary qualities*. From the primary qualities emerge the secondary ones, namely, colours, sounds, odours, heat and cold. Later comes *life* and still later *mind* which in its higher developments becomes *moral personality* verging towards *Deity*. To Alexander Space-Time is the primordial stuff which has given rise to the entire universe with its organic and conscious contents as we know it and the process is still continuing, as it should, to make the highest emergence possible in the shape of the highest personality combining in itself all the highest possible developments on the mental level, which according to Alexander are the highest intellectual and moral values, so that the highest personality which is the apparent goal of evolution must be God.

One interesting point which distinguishes Alexander's scheme from the purely naturalistic scheme of Sellars is that Alexander assumes what he calls '*nexus*' or *urge* which brings out any second stage from any first in the process and that every second stage is characterised by a *new* quality which he calls '*deity*' using the term '*deity*' in a wider sense. Hence, as Alexander's process of emergence assumes space-time as something indefinite but physical and also assumes '*nexus*' or *urge* of evolution which is

also non-psychical and, as the process of emergence advances under these physical conditions until the level of mind is reached, we may say that up to this limit Alexander's scheme is naturalistic. But as soon as 'sentience' or incipient level of mind is reached the blind physical 'nisus' of Alexander is at once changed into being psychical and teleological. The result is that the subsequent go of events, under the conscious 'nisus', becomes rational and teleological. Mind, with Alexander, is not on a level with the physical structure on which it supervenes, so that complexity or relatedeness of the physical gives rise to the psychical which differs qualitatively from its physical antecedents. It appears then that up to the emergence of the forerunner of mind Alexander's scheme is naturalistic, but so far as the subsequent emergence goes there is the admission of a psychical or teleological urge rendering his scheme *semi-naturalistic*, as we call it. And the student of the philosophy of Emergence will be interested to find that the intelligent 'nisus' which Alexander timidly introduces towards the end of his scheme, was made by Lloyd Morgan the fundamental principle of urge that 'makes emergents to emerge' and was transformed by him into the "Directive Activity" of God.

(c) IDEALISTIC TYPE OF EMERGENT EVOLUTION

The scheme of emergence which Lloyd Morgan has formulated in his Gifford Lectures is incorporated in his famous work 'Emergent Evolution'. The expression 'Emergent Evolution' was first used by him, though his predecessors, Alexander and Sellars gave us in more and less complete forms the principles of emergent evolution without designating their schemes with that expression. The main points of distinction between Alexander's scheme and his own are with regard to the evolving stuff and the nature of the 'nisus' or urge of evolution, although he accepts the general scheme of Alexander. "In the old sense," says Lloyd Morgan, "evolution meant the unfolding of what is already in being but enfolded. In that sense emergence is the coming into view of that which has hitherto been submerged—virtually there but hidden ; latent and not as yet patent. Nowadays the word 'evolution' has supplanted the older word 'epigenesis' and means the coming into existence of something in some sense *new* ; and this something new, is what Lewes labelled 'emergent' as contrasted

with 'resultant'.¹ The emergent,' he claimed, is unpredictable before its *de-facto* epigenesis ; the resultant is calculable before the event, on a line analogous to the so-called 'parallelogram of forces'. In these terms emergent evolution is on the one hand through and through naturalistic ; but on the other hand, it embodies a protest against mechanical, or so-called mechanistic interpretation. Elsewhere he lays down, 'Emergent Evolution urges that the 'more' of any given stage, even the highest, involves the 'less' of the stages which are precedent to it and continue to exist with it.'² It does not interpret the higher in terms of the lower for that would imply denial of the emergence of those new modes of natural relatedness which characterise the higher and make it what it is. And it is too well-known to repeat here the three-fold assumption or 'acknowledgment' he makes along with what Alexander calls 'natural piety' as the necessary postulate of his philosophy of evolution, for according to him all constructive philosophy must have its acknowledgments or postulates to start with. Morgan's story begins with a reality which is one, indivisibly one, a *psycho-physical whole* from top to bottom, a matter-life-mind. While passing from matter to life and life to mind, we cross no gulf, but pass from one kind of acquaintanceship with this reality to the other. According to him there are no physical events, there are no integral systems of physical events that are not also psychical events, and integral psychical systems. 'There is one evolution in both attributes—distinguishable but no wise separable.' And the whole process is guided by a relating and directive activity which manifests itself in evolution "under the conditions of space and time."²

27. MATTER, LIFE AND MIND AS STAGES OF EVOLUTION.

Since evolution came to be regarded as a scientific hypothesis for explaining the origin and development of the world we live in, matter, life and mind, the three knots of existence, among other things, have been brought within the range of evolutionary principles. Spencer's scheme of evolution may be said to have given us all that is best in a purely naturalistic conception of the universe. The original nebular configuration with its inherent

1. C. Lloyd Morgan: *A Philosophy of Evolution in Contemporary British Philosophy*, 1st series, p. 297.

2. Cf. The Author's *Studies in Philosophy*, pp. 65-66.

laws of gravitation, attraction and repulsion has supplied to us an account of the world process in which matter is the starting stuff and which remains qualitatively the same throughout, only rising from the lower to the higher stages of quantitative complexity giving rise to the so-called organic and psychical forms of existence. The entire process of growth may be characterised by what is called growth by epigenesis or accretion. Thus to Spencer life and mind represent but two stages of naturalistic evolution marked by increasing complexity of structure and function whose antecedent conditions were all latent in the original collocation. The result is that while life is more complex matter, mind is still more complex matter. Now if the scientific consciousness trained in Newtonian physics may be satisfied with thinking life and mind in terms of matter and its laws, it is not so easy to satisfy philosophic consciousness which includes, over and above external observation and experiment, an internal experience or introspection and also a far larger outlook on life and the universe which refuse to be smothered and strangulated. Sellars' naturalistic scheme of emergent evolution fares as badly as Spencer's naturalism only with this difference that Sellars has profited by the conception of creativity which ensures newness or uniqueness as applied to evolution since the time of Bergson. To him life and mind are no doubt stages in evolution as they were to Spencer, but each is marked by an added element as compared with its forerunner which we miss in Spencer. But to both Spencer and Sellars life and mind are physical in constitution which runs through them. They are continuous with matter. Alexander's realistic emphasis prevails over his idealistic leanings which occupy a very small corner of his heart, so much so that under the weight of his scientific and realistic preferences his idealistic urges failed to receive necessary expression. The result has been that although he has been led to the admission of the conscious character of sentience and its subsequent development under a conscious 'nisus', yet his space-time matrix does not justify such admission. And to him life is consistently material or physical in character. This shows how his thought oscillates between naturalistic and idealistic schemes, to neither of which he has the courage and outspokenness to give a definite shape. The larger outlook of Alexander's mind however could not shut itself against Values, but values to him are but 'tertiary qualities'

which are neither purely subjective, nor are rooted in the objective world but enjoy subsistence in a half-way house between the subject and the object. They emerge out of action and reaction between body and mind in their compresence without affiliation to the structure either of the physical and of the mental world, for the real structure or frame-work both of the physical and of the mental world according to his own showing lies in matter or any forerunner of matter with its own inherent laws.

But the emergent scheme of Lloyd Morgan presents an entirely different picture of matter, life and mind. His entire scheme being idealistic through and through, the stuff with which his evolution starts is a psycho-physical whole. All that grows out of it has a psychical correlate only in different proportions so that there is nothing in his scheme, no stage in his evolution-process which is not accompanied by mind or the mental. Waiving the difficulty of the Spinozistic parallelism which his scheme involves, as his psycho-physical reality is hardly distinguishable from Spinoza's double-faced substance, we might say to his credit that he has not the hardihood to derive the mental from the material, psychics from physics, and has the sagacity to see that life with its structures and functions, instincts, strivings and feelings has a psychical correlate completely separated from which life, as a stage in the evolution of the world, has neither significance for itself nor for the universe as a whole. Further, Lloyd Morgan's admission of a value-frame in spiritual reality helps his evolution in being intelligible in the sense that evolution can have meaning and significance only as a world-process in which things and events move towards purpose and value. As Lloyd Morgan himself says, "Just as at the naturalistic base of things there is involved a space-time frame, so, too, as I conceive, there is as foundational in Spiritual Reality what I may perhaps call a Value-frame. And just as I acknowledge the space-time-event system as real quite independently of human knowledge thereof, so do I conceive the Values to be Real independently of human folk who are influenced thereby. In other words, just as we do not make space-time-events, though they go to our making, so, too, as individual persons, we do not make Values, but are made by them."¹ But the only thing in which Morgan's scheme fell

1. *Contemporary British Philosophy*, p. 305.

short of the completely intelligible evolution was the *externality* of the 'directive activity' which moves the process. Unless, however, this directive activity were immanent, proceeding from the spiritual reality which immanently determines the stages in the evolving world, no philosophy of evolution can be completely intelligible and can conform to that traditional form of intelligibility that brings the cause and the end, fact and value, in a more ultimate concept or idea.¹ The old evolutionary naturalism gave the privileged position to matter, but it could remain satisfied with that because evolution to the naturalist was interchangeable with reduction or unrolling or unfolding of matter under its forces in its spatial distribution. But the creative or emergent forms of it that arose later on indicate the mind's natural quest of a universal evolution which should not be confined to mere growth and process and therefore were naturally led to higher and higher categories. Hence, Bergson wanted to see all evolution in the creative process of Life and made biological categories to be the world-categories conceiving of matter as the self-created obstacle to Life's onrush and mind as the staticising function of life which it indulges in when it by self-aberration likes to be caught in the midst of its eternal flow. But life-impulse cannot be the guide and goal of a completely intelligible evolution unless the process is extended to mind and values. We think therefore that the spiritual reality which immanently directs the course of evolution cannot restrict the process merely to the distribution of matter under its forces, nor again to life as a blindly creative principle, but must extend it to the evolution of mind and values where its character of totality or individuality is realised.²

28. PHILOSOPHY OF EVOLUTION.

Beginning from the time of Darwin and Lamarck up to the present day much has been written on evolution or development of the world as we know it. We have the theories of biological evolution, evolutionary naturalism, creative evolution, emergent evolution with its naturalistic and idealistic types, theistic evolution and the rest. But in spite of these different attempts at under-

1. Cf. Urban: *Intelligible World*, p. 327.

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 325-332.

standing the origin and development and destiny of the world there has also been revolt against evolution from high quartets as well as low. D. H. Lawrence, for instance, says, in his *Philosophy of the Unconscious*, "The world, my dear friend, does not evolve." Tolstoy did not think that evolution was even the fundamental character of things within the world. Darwinian evolution has been declared by some as a huge non-sense and Spencerian Cosmic Evolution as one of the most unintelligible philosophies ever invented.

The revolt against evolution seems to be due to the confusion between evolution as a *fact* and evolution as a *concept*, between evolution as history of the sequences through which the world passes and evolution as explanation of these sequences in the light of values. Any intelligible or philosophic account of evolution will no doubt take note of the 'origin' of the world, of the sequences through which it must pass, but also of the destiny and 'value', which is the goal of evolution as a process. A science and scientific account of things is always good in its own way but it becomes bad when it usurps the whole field of experience, but can be made better if re-oriented from the stand-point of the larger outlook which is philosophy. Evolution as a scientific account either in the form of evolutionary naturalism or in the form of emergentism divorces fact from value, origin from destiny, and therefore, has come to be disparaged by many thinkers. But if we are to regard evolution as a *concept*, as 'explaining' the origin, development and destiny of the world and not as 'explaining away' many of its important features, then evolution rises to be philosophical and 'intelligible' as Urban calls it. Bergson's evolution, so far as it thought of reality as creating when it evolves, has partially contributed to the intelligibility of evolution but has fallen far short of the mark as it has forgot to give us unity or totality of experience and value. Life is indeed an experience but not the whole of it and the values said to be evolved by his principle of life, find no unity in the totality of experience. Lloyd Morgan's theistic emergence has the larger outlook in so far as it attempts to give unity to our experience in the value-frame of the universe, life and mind being experiences reaching their final destiny in God, the embodiment of values. The only shortcoming that we notice in Lloyd Morgan's otherwise intelligible scheme is perhaps the external finality which his Directive Activity

suggests. And in spite of what Urban has said and of the support he has added to his saying that "a wholly internal doctrine of finality cannot be carried out; finality is external or it is nothing,"¹ we must think that the growth, development and destiny of our world must refer ultimately to the totality of values as a concrete individuality which must attract the world towards itself as its destiny and end, and therefore *must immanently* express itself through matter, life and mind, which appear as so many experiences and values in the course of its self-expression which is another name for evolution as a concept. The greatest sin of evolutionary naturalism is its careless acceptance of the fact that the whole of reality evolves. Evolution even in its scientific or naturalistic sense should remember that it cannot ignore 'environment' under whose influence the "environed" evolves. *The stuff of evolution must not swallow up the conditions of evolution.* The naturalistic scheme of evolution seems to make the whole reality to evolve without reserving anything for environment or conditions of evolution. The idealist reminds the scientific evolutionist of these conditions of evolution which he finds in the reality and the purpose of the spirit. The end or purpose immanently working throughout the course leads the world through life and mind as self-fulfilments or self-expressions of the spiritual reality, which is another name for intelligible evolution or evolution in the philosophic sense of the term as distinct from merely scientific evolution.

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CHAPTER VII

PHILOSOPHY OF THE SELF

1. *LIFE AND CONSCIOUSNESS.*

In the world of living beings we hardly meet with any which does not exhibit consciousness at least in its incipient form. In fact, we are ordinarily accustomed to think as if a living being is identical with a conscious one. Aristotle's *entelechy* was a complex of a vegetative and a psychical soul. Modern researches of biologists point to the conclusion that whatever is living is also conscious. Evolutionists who tried to trace the process of world-development from one primitive stock hesitate to draw a line between organisation and consciousness ; and according to some neo-realist mind is a feeling of organisation of physical and biological factors.¹ These findings of philosophers, scientists in general and biologists in particular, indicate at least a close relation between life and consciousness, if not identity between them. And Bergson of all scientists and philosophers has given us a peculiar theory of the relation between life and consciousness in that he made Life to be the supreme category, and matter and consciousness to be the products of *elan vital*. Matter is regarded by him as the self-created obstruction in the way of Life's onrush, and consciousness as the self-created illumination of Life for illuminating the moments of its ever-creative activity.

Now in order to evaluate the above-mentioned views on the nature and relation of life and consciousness we would do well to see if life may be identified with consciousness, or, again, if consciousness may be regarded as a function of life. All naturalistic schemes of evolution, either repetitive or emergent, almost identify life and consciousness only with this distinction that the level of consciousness exhibits greater complexity of structure and function than the level of life, although in substance they are the same. We need not repeat here our points of criticism of naturalistic scheme of evolution and it will suffice for our present purpose just to point out that life and mind, organisation and

1. Cf. Russell: *An Outline of Philosophy*.

consciousness, instead of being identically the same indicate intrinsic difference of quality. When we say this we do not mean that life and mind are two independent principles having no community with each other, nor again do we mean that consciousness is a product of life, but what we do mean is that life and mind are the two levels of self-expression of one and the same Spiritual Reality which in its realisation of concrete individuality must have these self-expressions and unify them in its totality.

2. CONSCIOUSNESS AND MIND.

In the previous section we have rather loosely used the terms 'Consciousness' and 'Mind' as if they were interchangeable, but that we did only in a rough and ready way. But deeper consideration will point to a distinction between mind and consciousness. In modern times the Behaviourist denies the traditional conception of consciousness and reduces it to physiological reflexes, and the Freudian, to a derivative of unconscious elements of the vital principle. And the traditional conception of consciousness as a kind of substance or primordial stuff out of which mind and everything else are made, or, as the receptacle in which our ideas and other mental things are held together, has already been a back number. What then must be the conception of consciousness that may avoid the difficulties of the behaviourist and the Freudian on the one hand, and, of the traditional conception of consciousness on the other? In answer to this question we may remark, as many of the present-day psychologists do, and very rightly, that consciousness represents inner experience which every mind has in its privacy, for instance, in the cases of feelings or being aware of one's own self or of one's pleasure and pain which are private and personal, not sharable by others ; and that mind will stand for that something in a being which makes its behaviours adaptable to external environment and which, therefore, becomes an object of other's external observation. In other words, *Consciousness* is the *inner* function of awareness on the part of that which we *externally* call *Mind*. This view of consciousness of some of the modern psychologists, like Warren and others, seems to be a reaction against the old metaphysical view of soul as substance of which consciousness is an attribute.

But over and above this psychological account of consciousness it is possible to give an epistemological account of it in terms of a relation between the mind or percipient and the thing perceived. Consciousness or awareness may just be described as a peculiar relation between the knower and the known involving attention and interest. But consciousness, in this sense, varies from simple awareness to the highly complex mental act of interpretation of an object and even anticipation of the future, the variation depending upon the degree of attention and interest. When we are seriously engaged in a thing our consciousness of that thing may be said to be a form of interpretation, that is to say, of discovering the meaning of that thing. But suppose some stranger arrives in the midst of our serious study of the thing, then we become *simply aware* of his presence, our interest and attention being centered upon the object of our study. But if the person who has arrived was expected from beforehand and his nature and activities were also already known to us, our consciousness of the person in this case is not an act of simple awareness, but is a complex one of anticipation involving adaptation of our selves to the future situation which his presence may create for us. Thus consciousness which has its basis in the fundamental relation between the subject and the object, the knower and the known, may vary from simple awareness to the more complex forms of *memory*, *inference*, and *anticipation*. Considered in this way consciousness becomes the most fundamental feature of our *inner* mental life and mind becomes the totality of all that our mental life outwardly does through this fundamental feature.

3. MIND, SELF AND SOUL.

If, as we have seen in the above analysis, mind stands for the totality of externally observable reactions of the subject in its relation to the object, the question naturally arises: What then is the self? Writers differ in their answers to the question as to the nature of the self. Of all the answers that seems to be the most satisfactory which tries to understand by the term self not only the whole of the subject's reactions to the object with which we have equated mind, but also includes a sense of individuality which owns these reactions. The empirical account of mind and the self labours

under the fundamental mistake of denying totality and unity of these reactions as well as individuality which owns these reactions, and of making mind to be equivalent to a sensation or a group of them. To the empiricist mind and self stand undistinguished and both are dissipated into unconnected bits of mental reactions, none of which has anything to do with the other. But while with the empiricist there is no other level behind and beyond the empirical, the idealist has good reasons for admitting a trans-empirical level which lends unity and individuality to these awarenesses or mental reactions. The admission of the trans-empirical at once suggests the existence of something 'more' than mind and the self and by this 'more' we shall understand the soul whose nature we shall presently discuss. In the meanwhile we cannot do better than quote Bosanquet to clarify our position. "We want to think of the individual primarily as mind. And we must learn to interpret 'mind' positively, in its own right, by what it is and does." "What we really need is to accept the significance of mind on its own merits and as *sui generis*, not as a 'thing', nor yet as a mere power or attribute of a thing, say of body or of brain, nor again even as a 'life', however attractive the analogy may be—but as a 'whole' of a special kind, with a structure and concreteness of its own, only to be appreciated by experiencing it where there is a 'more' of it, and entering into the characteristic differences between the more of it and the less."¹

From the above, it appears to have been already clear that as against what the strictest empirical writers have thought about the nature of consciousness, mind and self, and in spite of their attempts to reduce them to a series of unconnected bits of mental phenomena, banishing all ideas of wholeness or totality and individuality we feel constrained to retain the distinction between consciousness, mind and self for purposes, psychological, metaphysical and even religious, and all have their meaning and value in philosophy which will be more and more clear and corroborated as we proceed in our subject. But our immediate concern will be an examination of the idea of what the term 'soul' stands for a little more specifically. Philosophers have not always been definite as to their conception of the distinction between self and

1. Bosanquet: *The Principles of Individuality and Value*, pp. 282-283.

soul, and, in fact, they have used with cogent reasons in most cases the term 'self' to mean the soul and conversely. Yet the most ordinary distinction between self and soul which owes its origin to Plato generally consists in supposing that while self means the aggregate of empirical states and processes, the soul stands for the noumenal reality which is supposed to stand at the back of and to give rise to and unify these empirical states and processes just as a substance underlies and unifies its attributes. In one word, the *self* according to this principle of distinction stands for the empirical or phenomenal and the *soul* for the real and ontological aspect of mental life. The further implication of the soul as an ontological reality given to it by Plato is that such an ontological soul is isolable from its environment and is also independent of other such ontological souls, an implication which further suggests as if such a soul existing somewhere before its embodiment in a concrete being was infused into organism to make it a conscious individual. But the present-day philosophy has outgrown such an isolable ontological soul and looks down upon it as a relic of worn-out metaphysics, and because of this perhaps that many thinkers since Kant have been chary of their use of the word 'soul' which carries with it the idea of a static reality and become insistent on the ideas of conscious functions and evolution. They have preferred in its stead the term 'self' by which they mean a dynamic unity of conscious functions that appears on the human level as a stage in the process of self-expression of the ultimate spiritual reality along with the evolution of the organic from the inorganic, and determines and is determined by the latter and enters into cognitive and active relations with it. In these cognitive and active relations the self realises itself as a value by itself and tends to attain individuality. Such a conception of the self has the merit of making it a concrete reality and an individuality and of making it consistent with the theory of emergent evolution of the idealistic type which regards the entire universe as tending towards the realisation of values.

Modern thinkers instead of regarding mind, self and soul as three independent entities, take all of them as the necessary aspects of the same entity. Philosophic explanation cannot afford to look at the universe and its contents from isolated angles of vision and to run into the risk of abstractionism, but always aims at a system in which the contents of the universe should form a

hierarchy and indicate graded levels of existence in the course of progress towards individuality and value. It is not so much that this term or that is to be stereotyped for expressing this or that element in the universe, as it is the rational and systematic explanation doing justice to the nature of existence and its contents that really counts in philosophy. There is no gap or hiatus in the universe as a system, nor do the inorganic, the organic and the conscious fall in watertight compartments. If, as already indicated, the nature of the ultimate reality is the totality of experience and value, and if the universe is the self-expression of that totality, then the elements of the universe, the inorganic, the organic and the conscious, matter, life, mind and self, will involve and help each other in serving as the graduated expressions of that totality of reality and contribute to its attainment of individuality and value. The inorganic will so function in the universe as to prepare the soil for the organic and the organic will not rest in its functioning until the mind, self and soul find their structural basis prepared for appearance as psychical unity and individuality. No better account of the mutual implications between mind, self and soul can perhaps be found elsewhere than in the following statement of Bosanquet: "Instead of a self-subsistent eternal angelic being we should then be led to conceive of the soul as—to adopt a phrase of Lotze—a perfection granted by the Absolute according to general laws, upon certain complex occasions and arrangements of externality. . . . It is not that the mere lapse of time or the intricacy of changes postulated by evolutionary theory can make a transformation explicable, which would be inexplicable if simpler or more rapid. But it is that the determinate incidents of self-maintenance which necessarily come into being in the constitution of a living and still more of a sentient body—the structures, the reflexes, the instincts, the feelings—are shown as at once the instruments by which consciousness and then self are evoked, and the world with which from their first appearance they are identified. Individuality is there for the observer before it is for the subject ; or, we may say, determinateness, objective continuity, the character of a definite centre of experience, precede conscious selfhood and furnish its pre-supposition and materials. The finite self, then, *qua* finite, is the centre or awakening of a determinate world which is its pre-supposition. We may smile at the

simplicity of the materialist who could explain consciousness as an effect of material combination ; but it seems to remain true on the whole that when the self appears it is "granted by the absolute" as a solution to a definite situation in external arrangements, a solution which could not have been predicted or constructed from the mere observation of physical nature, but which, nevertheless, being given, can in some degree understand itself in correlation with its own experience of the physical order. And we must bear in mind that in the end this being granted by the Absolute upon a certain combination is all that any connection, any form of causation or inherence, can mean. There could therefore be no harm, if we know what the words meant, in saying that matter or externality is the cause of consciousness. It is, in all probability as Lotze says, that if we could observe the germinating soul as the microscopist observes the body, its development would appear to the observer to proceed *pari passu* with the organisation of the body. And in such a view, whether right or wrong in fact, there is nothing whatever materialistic or unspiritual. In apparent cosmic development, whether inorganic, organic or logical, the rule is for the stream to rise higher than its source."¹

4. DOES CONSCIOUSNESS EXIST ?

In our section on Life and Consciousness we have stated that consciousness stands for all the functions, beginning from the simple awareness of a thing up to the more complex forms of memory, of thinking, even of anticipating, considered from the standpoint of inner experience of that totality, which outwardly is the mind. There we have shown that consciousness is the fundamental feature of mind. When we have done so we have implied further that the subject and the object both exist as reals, and consciousness expresses a real relation between the subject and the object. Thus consciousness involves three factors, the subject, the object and a relation between them, each of which is as real as the other two. We have already tried to see in our chapter on Epistemology what the ontological status of the subject and object is and what makes the relation between them possible. For

1. *Ibid.* pp. 189-191.

consciousness, though an outstanding psychological problem, cannot be considered altogether apart from its ontological implications. The standpoint we have adopted does not allow us to accept either purely empirical or realistic or biological arguments which have been put forth for the denial of consciousness as an essential feature of mind, for it is involved in all mentation and distinguishes mind from the non-mental.

We shall now enter upon an examination of those views that have virtually denied consciousness as a fundamental psychical fact. The first and foremost of them is that of William James ; the second is that of Russell and other neo-realists who have elaborated the view of James, the third is that of the Behaviourist and the fourth and the last is that of the Freudians. James in his *Essays in Radical Empiricism* begins his polemic against consciousness as such, and points out the difficulty of dualistic realists like Descartes and others in explaining interaction between two different entities of mind and the world, the subject and the object. His argument is that experience is a fact in which the distinction between the subject and the object is a duplication not only unnecessary but also unwarranted by facts, so that interaction between the subject and the object is only an imaginary difficulty. The term consciousness, as always suggesting the subject which is conscious and the object of which the subject is conscious, raises a problem incapable of definition and therefore of solution. So he prefers the term *experience* in place of consciousness, which he discards as misleading and mischievous. He thinks that experience is a *peculiar kind of relation* of which the terms are the subject and the object, the knower and the known, and which explains all that we understand by the function of knowing. As James himself puts it, "there is only one primal stuff or material in the world, a stuff of which everything is composed, and if we call that stuff 'pure experience', then knowing can easily be explained as a particular sort of relation towards one another into which portions of pure experience, may enter. The relation itself is a part of pure experience ; one of its 'terms' becomes the subject or bearer of knowledge, the knower, the other becomes the object known."¹

American realists like Perry and Holt have followed in the

1. James: *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, p. 4.

main the trend of thought initiated by James, and have come to the conclusion, common with him, that consciousness as the feature of an independent entity called mind is meaningless in view of the fact that there are only 'neutral' entities as the stuff out of which both mind and matter are constructed. Russell is also substantially of the same opinion as James, Perry and Holt only with this difference that though in regard to sensations it is well, according to him, to maintain a neutral stuff of which mind and matter are composed, yet so far as *images* are concerned they should be regarded as belonging to the mental world, while the occurrences, of which we have the images, belong really to the physical world.

But a far stronger objection to consciousness as the essential feature of mind has come from the Behaviourists of whom Watson is the chief. The main contention of the Behaviourist is that there is no such thing as introspection by which we can know ourselves as minds, and that so called minds are but aggregates of physical and physiological movements known through external observation. Psychology to them is a science of external behaviour, and to think of mind as distinct from, but as giving rise to, behaviour is to indulge in a myth. Our perceptions, thoughts and emotions are analysable into physiological reflexes beyond which we need not think of anything like mind or consciousness.¹

But the last, though not the least in respectability, is the objection of the Psycho-analyst to consciousness claiming to derive consciousness out of biological elements. Freudian psychology may in a sense be said to undermine psychology as the science of mind and consciousness. Freudians think that the essential elements of the mental life are not sensations, perceptions, ideas, inferences and the rest, but rather unconscious and irrational elements like impulses, cravings, desires, appetites, interests, all of which have their spring in the biological aspects of our life such as sex, hunger, self-preservation, herd instinct and the rest. And the so-called ideational and rational processes which the civilised human being exhibits are but 'censored' mental occurrences appearing at the conscious level under the influence of

1. Cf. Watson: *Behaviour: An Introduction to Comparative Psychology*.

emotion or of hormic urge, as Freud later on suggests.¹ Freudians thus make the unconscious to be the essence of mind and mental life, and consciousness its insignificant fraction. The great merit of the Freudian psychology seems to consist in giving more attention to many of the psychical phenomena, like dreams and reveries, than what they had received at the hands of traditional psychology, and also in emphasising the importance of the unconscious. Its newness, like all other forms of modernism, appealed to those who claim to be 'all too scientific'. In any case consciousness and mind have lost at the Freudians' hands their traditional connotation.

We shall now try to see if the attempts of the above thinkers are anything but paradoxes in which all modernism in philosophy indulges more to perplex than to clarify issues. We, therefore, propose to pass in review these paradoxes and to establish consciousness as the essential feature of mind. James' 'pure experience', which is supposed to bifurcate itself into subject and object for the purpose of knowing is 'an airy nothing without a local habitation' and his insistence on it as a primordial stuff is only a result of his over-zealous abhorrence for the traditional conception of mind. We do not understand how a relation can develop out of a non-descript experience, which is neither subject nor object to start with, and how knowledge as a relation at all becomes possible. The same remarks hold good of the attempts of both the American and English realists who have only re-echoed James' formula. The whole trouble seems to lie in the realistic conception of mind initiated by James and shared by his American and English followers who reduce mind respectively to be the cross-section of the physical world and the feeling of physico-biological organisation. As for Behaviouristic reduction of consciousness to physiological responses it will suffice to remark that Behaviourism is not bad, if behaviour is kept within its own limits and not allowed to trespass on the forbidden land of mind and the mental. Conscious activities must have their somatic resonance in outward bodily changes which may be called behaviour and are necessary accompaniments of thinking volitional and emotive activities. In this sense all psychology is behaviouristic, and such a behaviourism is, as McDougall calls

1. Cf. Freud: *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*.

it, 'sane'. Behaviourism runs mad when it finds nothing like mind and consciousness behind physiological responses which are necessary expressions and organic conditions of them.¹ The main trouble with the Behaviourist is that he fights shy of introspection and makes man a machine. He combines in himself the extremes of scientific and realistic views of things. External observation is his only instrument of knowledge, and physics and physiology supply to him the materials of which man and the world alike are made, and nothing is real to him which does not appear in his 'test-tube'. Hence, mind and consciousness which reveal themselves to introspection remain a sealed book to him and the so-called consciousness is only a physiological response to a stimulus. What wonder that to him thinking is merely a language-habit, a mechanical play of the speech-organs, feelings of pleasure and pain are but stimulations of certain nerves of the heart in response to vibrations of the physical objects, the higher emotions of admiration and gratitude are only different types of stimulation in response to certain other types of stimuli, and moral life with its motive, desire, intention, choice, willing and responsibility is a convention divested of all psychical connotation! To return to our point, the Behaviourist in distorting consciousness and mind relies on the exploded theory of naturalism as the drowning man catches at a straw.²

In criticism of Freudian attempt to reduce mind to unconscious elements we would point out that Freud in his pathological interest degenerates mind into a biological principle and he finds nothing else than instinct and impulse in generating conscious activities of man. The unconscious part of human life is indeed a large and important one, forming what Stout and others call 'mental disposition' and indirectly determining its conscious activity, but to reduce the conscious to the unconscious, perception, reasoning and sentiments to appetites, desires and impulses, is to confound what is clear and conspicuous with what is vague and obscure. We conclude then that the very question whether consciousness does or does not exist arises from a distorted view of our mental life which no true philosophy can entertain.

1. Cf. Watson and McDougall: *The Battle of Behaviourism*.

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 42-92.

5. MIND AND BODY.

The problem of the nature of mind and of body and of the relation between the two are as familiar as they are at the same time complex. In the world we live in nothing is so familiar to us as our mind and the world including our physical organism, for it is these two fundamental entities that are concerned in all our life's transaction. Psychology tells us how in our perceptions, ideas, volitions, and even in emotions, mind and body enter into intimate relations. A comprehensive understanding of the nature of mind and body and of the relation that exists between them will include metaphysical theories, psychological hypotheses and evolitional explanations if we are to do full justice to the issues involved.

A. METAPHYSICAL THEORIES.

The question involved here is whether we would accept one of these two entities as fundamental, appropriating the other, or whether we would regard either of them as equally fundamental as the other, or again whether we would trace both to another and more fundamental reality of which they are parallel sides or aspects. If we accept the first and the third of the alternative questions, then our standpoint will be monistic, either believing in the reality of one and in the derivative character of the other, or believing in the parallel working of mind and body as aspects of a higher Reality. Thus the monistic theory again will assume three forms: materialism, mentalism or idealism, and parallelism. And if we accept the second alternative, we shall have the dualistic theory of mind and body.

(i) *Materialistic Hypothesis.* According to the materialistic hypothesis we would believe that matter is the fundamental principle underlying everything in the universe. Not only are the physical objects, the table, the chair, the house, the tree, the mountain and the river material in essence and structure, and governed by mechanical principles in their functions and behaviour, but also what we know as mind and mental, our consciousness, our thinkings, emotions and doings, are physical phenomena and governed by the same mechanical principles. Materialism thus denies reality and independence of mind and regards it as a by-product or epiphenomenon of matter.

The Greek materialist Democritus conceived of the soul as composed of material atoms just as all physical objects including our body are composed of them. Haeckel and other German materialists thought that mind is a function of the brain which secretes thought as the liver secretes bile. And it is quite natural that to them psychology instead of dealing with mind and consciousness as such, became a variety of physical science as mind and consciousness are shown to be physical and chemical phenomena. The present-day Naturalism also identifies psychology with physical science because its subject-matter and method of enquiry coincide with those of physical science. Huxley's term 'epiphenomenalism' for expressing the materialistic conception of mind is most significant of the accidental nature of mind in the scheme of the physical world and its movements. For Huxley and other natural scientists believed that physics, chemistry and physiology could exhaustively explain all the phenomena of the universe, consisting of nature and man, so that mind which appeared as an accidental accompaniment of the nervous processes could only be rightly described by the term epiphenomenon or a phenomenon of phenomenon.

But it is evident that materialism making mind to be a product of matter involves itself in a logical-paralogism, in so far as it forgets that matter instead of explaining mind, is itself only explained by mind. As Cunningham suggests, matter, whatever be its nature, is after all a concept of mind, and is never a percept as materialism would make us think. Further latest developments in physics and astro-physics indicate that the ultimate basis of the universe is not properly described by the expression 'material' but rather exhibits characteristics which would incline one to believe that it is more of the nature of mind or spirit than of so-called matter, and that over and above microscope and telescope there is ample scope for 'psychoscope' if we may be allowed to use the expression.

(ii) *Idealistic Hypothesis.* Idealism makes mind and spirit to be the one fundamental principle of the universe which differentiates itself into the world of things and minds as its necessary stages of development or self-expression, so that finite minds and objects are not two essentially different realities without community but are essentially the same in kind.

The above is the general formulation of Absolute Idealism

accepted by Fichte, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Bradley, Bosanquet and Royce, all of whom agree in thinking that the entire universe is rooted in one universal Mind, Spirit, Will, Experience or Self and that the self of man is of the essence of this universal spiritual principle and therefore shares in its spiritual qualities though on a finite scale, but has the potentiality of infinitude. Instead of being absorbed by matter or being an accompaniment of it, self is the primordial stuff of which all else is made. Over and above Absolute Idealism which makes self or spirit the one unitary stuff we have also pluralistic idealism of Leibniz and McTaggart who, though believing mind to be the essence of reality, think that there are an infinite number of souls of which both the mental and the so-called physical world are ultimately composed. James Ward in England, C. A. Strong in America and Paulsen in Germany are all panpsychistic idealists and believe in mind, feeling or consciousness as the very ground of the world, and to them the body and the brain are its own fit apparatus evolved by it for its action and expression.

The important implication of idealistic monism is that mind and body being co-substantial are commensurable with each other, the hypothesis of interaction which is evoked by dualistic writers for explaining inter-communication between mind and body is reduced to a mere gratuitous assumption and its worthlessness is brought to light. Knowledge which always means a relation between mind and body is rendered possible on the ground of their commensurability. Each of mind and body has been given a place and function to discharge in the system of the universe, neither of them swallowing up the other and there is only what is called duality of existence within the unity of the spirit and no dualism between them which calls forth unnecessary hypotheses to bring them together.

(iii) *Parallelistic Hypothesis.* In the monism of Spinoza mind and body instead of being regarded as two entities are attenuated into the two attributes, *viz.*, consciousness and extension of one Substance or God. Spinoza's theory has been called parallelistic because he makes finite mind and body, better known as thought and extension, to be the two parallel aspects of one and the same spiritual reality.

Fechner may be said to be another representative of parallelistic monism but his parallelism between mind and body is different

from the parallelism of Spinoza in that while Spinoza makes body and mind parallel to, but distinguishable from, one another, giving each of them an equal status in his scheme, Fechner has taken away the line of distinction between them. The result has been that there is no material object which is not endowed with consciousness or soul ; from the minute particles of matter, up to the animal and human levels of existence, the whole universe is ensouled. Fechner's view is through and through pan-psychistic, maintaining that everything in the universe has a soul. But the doctrine of Spinoza in spite of its importance in psychological investigations which reveal concomitance of body and mind, has the metaphysical difficulty of giving equal importance and value to mind and body, instead of granting mind supremacy and control over body, a position which allows us equal choice between idealism and materialism.

(iv) *Dualistic Hypothesis.* Descartes admitted two independent entities of body and mind, each having a characteristic of its own and neither having anything in common with the other, so that mind and body normally cannot meet on a common platform. Consciousness or thought which is the essence of mind is opposed to extension of bodies by a whole diameter of being. This hard and fast distinction between mind and body, however, is such that it is difficult to stick to it, seeing that our very being and its daily commerce with the world present to us convincing evidences of their commingling. Our mind-body complex which makes up our very being, brings home to us that our entire psychological life of feeling, thinking and doing is a confluence of psychical and physical forces. It is perhaps this convincing evidence from our psychical life that led Descartes to bring in his theory of *Interactionism* under which he laboured to establish the mutuality of influence between mind and body. It is a common experience too that foods, drinks and drugs, coffee, tea and alcohol stimulate, and an anæsthetic lulls, our mental activities, thus further supporting the belief that mind cannot stand unaffected by physical influence.

It follows then that though mind and body were regarded by Descartes as two different metaphysical entities, it was impossible for him to deny the psychological fact of the mind-body relation which forced him to the theory of *Interactionism*. His dualistic followers, however, were not satisfied with this intervention of

psychological considerations and attempted to keep up the dignity of metaphysical duality between mind and body by having recourse to theological explanations of mind-body relation which was suggested but not developed by him. The *Occasionalists* took the cue from Descartes, and stuck to the dualistic character of mind and body which of themselves were not allowed to act upon one another, and thought that there must be a higher reality *viz.*, God who is the sole real Cause, and must be responsible for their mutual action and reaction. Mind and body as dual existence, could never act and react upon one another, and in fact they have no causal efficiency, but either of them is the *occasion* or instrument which God uses for his thinking and will. When I will to do a thing, it is not I who do it, but God uses my will as an occasion for His producing a change in the world. Both mind and the world live, move and have their being in God and therefore it is not impossible for God to influence one by the other, making either body or mind the occasion for His act and thought. Hence, their theory has been known in the history of philosophy by the name of Occasionalism. A similar attempt was made by Leibniz to account for mutual influence between mind and the so-called body, by his theory of *Pre-established Harmony*. Leibniz argued that though body was apparently distinct from mind yet could affect and be affected by mind, because God established beforehand the law of their co-operation or harmony just as two clocks set together would keep the same time.

But a closer thinking will reveal that the sharp distinction assumed by Descartes between mind and body and the hypothesis of interactionism invented by him to account for mutual influence between them, appear purely gratuitous and could have been avoided by him if he looked into the matter with the eye of an evolutionist to whom consciousness is not an alien function of the bodily organisation but is a necessary accompaniment of the developed organic structure known as the brain. And as for the hypotheses of Occasionalism and Pre-established harmony, it will suffice for us to say that they are worse than useless in so far as they foist upon God the otherwise impossible task of bridging over the gulf between mind and body, instead of satisfying the psychological and metaphysical questions involved in the problem, and are generally stigmatised as *Deus ex Machina* explanations.

B. PSYCHOLOGICAL HYPOTHESIS.

The problem of the relation between mind and body may be attacked from psychological grounds and the solution reached from those grounds seems to be no less convincing than any of those offered by the metaphysical theories. Human personality is so intimate with the relation of its mind and organism that it cannot be shaken from its belief that every bodily disturbance is accompanied by a concomitant mental change and every mental change has its repercussion on the bodily system. It is not ready to forego its belief in the distinctness of its mind from its body but still it is convinced that there is a concomitance between mind and body. The universal parallelism of Spinoza may be rejected on the ground that every mode of extension does not mean a corresponding mode of consciousness, if the body or extension is outside the human organism. But so far as the human organism is concerned there is no denial of the fact that every mental state is accompanied by a bodily one and every organic change is accompanied by a change in the mental life, that psychosis and neurosis run parallel to one another. The psychologist in his investigation into mental phenomena is inevitably faced with their necessary physiological accompaniments. When asked to give any metaphysical explanation of the relation between mind and organism he may be compelled to bring in some of the metaphysical theories, realistic or idealistic ; but he yields to none in his defence of Psycho-Physical Parallelism when he is asked to explain why a mental state goes along with a bodily state and *vice versa*. He may have to refer either to dualistic or to idealistic metaphysics for the ultimate explanation of what body and mind are, but within the province of psychology where changes of body and mind go together, psycho-physical parallelism seems to be most satisfactory theory at hand. It is because of this that Stout, Höffding and other eminent psychologists maintain that the psychological fact of relation between the mind and organism can have no better explanation in any other hypothesis than psycho-physical parallelism which guarantees that mental and bodily states run *pari passu*. As regards Psychological Interactionism we may briefly point out that it is nothing but a corollary of the Metaphysical Interactionism which we have already considered to be inadequate and unsatisfactory. Though some psychologists still accept this psycho-

logical interactionism it has lost much of its popularity in so far as it cannot adequately explain our mental phenomena. Most of the modern psychologists accept the psycho-physical parallelism though with a modest air of leaving the ultimate solution an open question. So we do not think it worth while to enter into any detailed treatment of the psychological interactionism for the metaphysical interpretation of which we refer the reader to our previous discussion under metaphysical theories.

C. EVOLUTIONAL EXPLANATIONS.

But apart from metaphysical theories and psychological hypotheses which we have brought to bear upon the problem of mind-body relation we are to-day equipped with many scientific concepts, specially evolutional ones, which we cannot ignore but must utilise to explain the problem at issue. Evolution since its inception has revolutionised our attitudes to many of the problems of the universe and has taught us to look at them from far different angles of vision from what we were accustomed to adopt in the past. Of all other problems of philosophy, mind and body and their relation have received perhaps the most distinctive handling from evolutionistic writers. In the present sub-section we shall endeavour to picture the mind-body relation under the theories of evolution.

Spencerian account of mind and body may be disposed of by stating merely that to Spencer matter being supreme reality, life and mind, the organic and the psychical, are but accidents appearing and disappearing at random without having anything important to do with the material structure which they accompany, even as the whistle of a running train does not affect the motion of the train in the least. Or, to express this idea of the relation between mind and body in different language, we might say that mind is related to the body just as shadow is to its substance. But a more important contribution to the mind-body relation has been made by the different versions of the emergent theory of evolution. Sellars' purely naturalistic scheme of emergence may be said to have repeated the Spencerian explanation with this difference that it has only traced the increasing complexity of physical structures until the very highly complex physical basis

is reached to exhibit mental functions as its accidental accompaniments. We call these accompaniments mental only by courtesy though their mental character is impossible of derivation from purely physical structure, however complex, to which Sellars traces them. Alexander's explanation of mind-body relation is based on a two-fold assumption. First, mind and the mental which emerge in his scheme are after all of spatio-temporal origin, though Alexander endows them with psychical functions at a certain level of relatedness or complexity in the physical structure. He assumes mind and the mental as emerging from the physical. Secondly, he assumes 'compresence' or what we otherwise call interaction between mind and body, and on that assumption he bases all cognitive and conative relations between mind and body, and also upon the same assumption of compresence he explains moral personality of man and even the values of life. To Alexander, therefore, the psychical is supposed to come out of the physical and when it has come out, it acquires a distinct character, but in spite of the distinction the psychical and the physical are supposed to enter into all relations, cognitive, conative and axiological.

Lloyd Morgan, who is the most elaborate exponent of the emergent scheme, may be said to have cut the scientific knot by at once starting with a psycho-physical principle. As an exponent of the scientific concept of evolution Lloyd Morgan makes the usual promise of all scientists that he would not include within his scheme anything unnecessary or mysterious to explain the problem of the world, but his assumption of a psychical correlate of the physical is an indication of the impossibility of a strictly scientific explanation of the body-mind problem. Dr. C. A. Strong's version of the emergent scheme also makes a similar assumption when he says that all reality is psychical, and that all events we call physical are the appearance to us of events which in reality are psychical. The assumption of the psychical correlate by Morgan and of the intrinsically psychical character of the physical by Strong seems to have no scientific justification except that it avoids the difficulty of emergence of the psychical from the purely physical or material. From the philosophical standpoint such an assumption is certainly necessary, and in fact the most consistent idealistic account of evolution has been justified in its assumption of an ultimate psychical principle as that which in its necessary

act of self-expression evolves the physical and the mental on a rising scale of complexity and connects them together for the purposes of attaining individuality and value. Neither Lloyd Morgan, nor Strong however has worked out in full this philosophic implication of evolution. Neither of them has made an advance either upon the psycho-physical parallelism of Spinoza or showed with consistency that specific relation between the psychical and the physical which our view of teleological evolution demonstrates.

6. WHY MIND HAS A BODY ?

There is perhaps no more interesting and yet startling question than the question: *Why mind has a body?* Men and animals are complexes of body and mind. Psychology, which deals with reactions of the mind to the world through the body *assumes* it as the vehicle through which the mind appears and acts upon the world, but does not explain why the mind should have a body. Because its business as a descriptive science, collecting and recording psychical phenomena conditioned and expressed by the organism, is well carried on by the mere assumption of organism as medium of communication between mind and the world. But the question has assumed such a great importance and value with the evolutionists that they cannot remain satisfied with the assumption of body or organism as psychology seems to have done. Dr. C. A. Strong has taken up the question and has been followed by Durant Drake. Both Strong and Drake have worked out an emergent scheme of evolution, but while Strong starts with a distinctly psychical principle, Drake is hesitant as to the distinctly psychical character of his starting principle. Now we shall undertake to explain how Dr. Strong develops his arguments for mind's having a body from his fundamental psychical principle and point out in what essential respect Drake differs from him. He argues that reality is psychical and that all that we call physical are only the appearance to us of events which in reality are psychical. He points out that mind is also an emergent, and from its incipient form up to its more highly organised ones, it uses the organised bodily structure, which in reality is psychical but appears bodily or physical only to the emerging mind. Mind in all its successive stages of development acquires causal efficacy determining its own bodily structure and function, and bodily structure also receives

from mind increasingly causal determination to serve as a vehicle for the mind's more and more complex functions. In this way the animal and the human organisms which emerge on earth, explain why mind has a body. Body therefore is the result of mind's causal efficacy which determines its structural complexity appropriate to its increasingly complex functioning. In one word, the fundamental principle or stuff of evolution being psychical, body or organism is not a correlate of mind from the very beginning as Lloyd Morgan thinks, but it is the psychical events, precedent to emergence of mind, that appear as body when they are so organised as just to help emergence of mind, and mind as it emerges and grows in complexity, acquires causal efficiency to determine its own appropriate organic structure.

Drake gives almost an identical account of how mind in its course of emergence into higher and higher complexities determines its body. The only difference between Drake and Dr. Strong is this that while Strong admits causal efficacy exerted by mind after its emergence, over the organic structure to make it more and more appropriate to its more and more organised function, Drake does not admit definitely causal efficacy of mind. He goes the length of supposing that even desire and will and other more complex mental events are mechanistic rather than psychical, so that we do not get a definite answer to the question why mind must have its most appropriate body. He, however, believes in an original psychical principle like Strong. But it seems to us that it is difficult to explain why there will emerge any mental events from the originally mechanistic psychical realm which *appears* to us as physical events.

Edmund Noble has given us an account of how "mind appears on the levels of an organised bodily structure which has been designed and constructed in the service of some purpose". Purposiveness or teleology according to him consists in a tendency to produce enduring forms and collocations that are *stable* and therefore *seem* to have been designed. He extends this conception of teleology to wherever such stability of structure and system is noticeable. In fact, according to him, the whole universe is purposive in the sense that there is noticeable some form or other of 'cosmic self-maintenance' which is teleology, and there need not be conscious design, or intelligent action in its restricted sense, as a sign of teleology. "The essence of mind is not awareness,

feeling, consciousness, but the organic modes in which power works towards enduring activities and forms."¹ Noble, therefore, thinks that there is a cosmic purposiveness which pervades the entire existence and characterises the inorganic, the organic and the mental ; and all these levels of existence exhibit orders of self-maintenance by setting up enduring forms, which, in virtue of both process and result, *minus conscious design*, suggest plan, seem as if shaped, aggregated or kept in balanced motion, as the result of purpose. To Noble teleology is thus a much wider category, and consciousness makes no difference, if the structure and organisation seem to have been designed. Thus on the human level when mind appears as lodged in body, the body is no doubt a structural basis of mind, but there is no conscious urge on the bodily level to design it so as to make it adapted to the expression of mind. Noble's teleological explanation of the growth of the universe seems to be discontinuous and disjointed in so far as consciousness seems to have no causal efficacy determining organic structure and process. Mind has the body not as its necessary substructure for the purpose of its appearance, but, it, as it were, finds as supplied for the operation of its fundamental modes of power, the organic structures, in which such powers work towards enduring activities and forms. We shall presently estimate Noble's conclusion establishing mind's need of the body, but in the meanwhile we would remind the reader that Noble's account seems to have a great similarity with the Sāṃkhya theory of evolution in which we notice similar 'unconscious teleology' which guides the structural development of the psychical, organic and physical levels in the universe.² Prakṛti or primordial matter-stuff with its inherent potencies of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, light, energy and inertia, proceeds in its orderly structural development on a scale of increasing complexity and efficacy, though the order is reverse as compared with the order of the general emergent scheme in which the physical rises into organic and the organic into psychical systems. In Sāṃkhya though the primordial matter-stuff is a homogeneity, physical in its constitution through and through, yet the go of the evolution and differentiation has its initiative in the infusion of the psychical into it from Puruṣa, the transcendental

1. Edmund Noble: *Purposive Evolution* (1926), p. 452.

2. Cf. *Sāṃkhya Kārikās*, 11 and 57.

psychical principle. The order of development tends from the cosmic intelligence (*buddhi*) to *Ahamkāra*, the principle of individuation which gives rise to *manas* or the central psychical organ and the organs of knowledge and action as well as the bodily structure and thereby helps the individual psychical centre to attain fuller concreteness and personality. Both the Sāṁkhya scheme and the emergent scheme of Noble have one great feature in common that the structural and functional complexity is reached by the different stages under *teleology without conscious design*. But the more important point, which has a direct bearing upon our present question, *why mind has a body*, can be shown to have received better explanation in Sāṁkhya than in any of the emergent schemes including that of Noble. In all these western emergent schemes our present question, in its reverse order, may be said to have received an answer, because in all of them we seem to rise from the physical and the organic to the psychical. They answer more or less the question, *why body has a mind* and not the question, *why mind has a body*. The only phenomenon they have suggested is that when the mental level has been reached it acquires a causal efficacy which determines the collocation and function of the bodily substructure already prepared for mind. But the point remains that that does not explain fully the question, *why mind has a body*. The substructure of the organic level being already prepared to evolve mind, the mind cannot be said to have anything to do with the very origin and make up of this organic level. Now the Sāṁkhya theory of evolution adopts an altogether different line of explanation as it accounts for the development of the very organic substructure out of the elements of the principle of the Ego (*Ahamkāra*), as a necessary vehicle through which it functions and enjoys the world. Another point which Sāṁkhya philosophy emphasises is very important for our mental life as a whole in relation to body. If our psychical existence is not to be confined within the limits of the present life, if we believe that it is not wholly made up of present experiences but includes psychical effects which extend far back into the past, determining our present instinctive and conscious tendencies and the effects of the present tendencies determining our future psychical possibilities, then transmitted past effects (*saṁskāras*) have a large part to play in its constitution. Now such transmission of past effects must require an organic apparatus through which it

is at all possible. Hence, for the transmission of these psychical potencies which enter into the present psychical constitution and determine its future possibilities we must have to posit, as Sāṅkhya has very rightly done, a *subtler organic substructure* (sūkṣma śārīra) as their locus or vehicle. This sūkṣma śārīra too is evolved from the same psychical principle of Ahaṅkāra as our gross body is. Thus in Sāṅkhya we get perhaps a more satisfactory answer to the question, why the mind or rather the psychical principle has a body. It is sufficiently clear that for the purposes of the fuller play of our psychical life and its continuity the psychical principle does require not only the visible organic structure but also the invisible or subtle one both of which are evolved (vikāras) from the psychical principle of Ahaṅkāra.

7. PANPSYCHISM.

Our considerations of the scientific and psychological issues involved in the intimate connection between mind and body and the support which the idealistic standpoint adopted by us lends to the conclusions we have drawn from those issues, converge to the view that the stuff of the universe is psychical or mental. Whatever we call bodily or physical is either essentially mental or has at least a psychical correlate. This view of the mind-stuff of the universe, or the view that whatever is physical has its psychical correlate is commonly designated by the term Panpsychism, meaning that all that exists is living or ensouled. Panpsychism is not only metaphysically defendable and has received acceptance from all idealists, but also has a great fascination for almost all types of mind from the very dawn of philosophic speculation up to the modern scientific age. It follows then panpsychism is an important corollary of idealism and mentalism. Our reason for considering it in the context of mind-body relation and not under idealism is that panpsychism though a corollary of idealism has received an additional confirmation from many of the scientific-minded philosophers like Fechner and others who have insisted upon 'psycho-physics' and specially from many exponents of emergent evolution like Lloyd Morgan, Strong, Noble and others.

The ancient Greek hylozoists were the first promulgators of the doctrine of panpsychism in its most incipient form. For they

maintained that though the ultimate principle of the universe was some form of matter, yet it and its products contained in them tendency of life and mind. Empedocles definitely maintained that material elements of which the whole universe was composed could not explain integration and differentiation so necessary for the formation of the world, if they did not possess psychical functions of love and hate. Neglecting the random references to panpsychistic tendencies in the mediæval period we can say that Spinoza was the most important pioneer of a full-fledged theory of panpsychism in the modern period. His psycho-physical parallelism has become the most classical source of panpsychism in so far as he maintains that every mode of extension has a corresponding mode of consciousness and *vice versa*. And Dr. Paulsen was an important follower of Spinoza in so far as he has not only defended the incipient panpsychism of Empedocles, but has given an earnest exposition of Spinoza's metaphysically supported panpsychism and himself has held and defended the doctrine of a 'World-Soul' as pervading the whole world. Making allowance for the poetic strain in which Paulsen expresses himself, we are convinced at least of the seriousness of his thinking when he says, "He who lives in the real world himself, will not, if he is at all endowed with a little imagination, find it so difficult to conceive the world as a large animated being . . . Ebb and flow, day and night, summer and winter, are they not life-rhythms, similar to those which the individual life experiences, or rather, do not animals and plants with their little rhythmical vital processes take part in great life of the earth?"¹

Another type of panpsychism has been brought into vogue by spiritualistic pluralists according to whom the entire universe, things and minds with their functions and relations, are all spiritual and have been produced out of soul-units and, therefore, share in their life and consciousness. Among these spiritualistic pluralists we may mention Leibniz, Ward and McTaggart. According to none of them are we to think that mind has come into being as a result of evolution when suitable organic structure has been arrived at, but rather we are to think that everything from the very start is mind or has mind. Mind is universal and every-

1. Cf. For fuller exposition see 'Paulsen's *Introduction to Philosophy*, pp. 94-108.

where in nature. From the smallest particle of atom up to the largest possible object in nature everything is vital and psychical. The apparent distinction between the physical and the psychical can ultimately be reduced to the oneness of a psychical constitution and the physical character of the so-called physical objects is only an appearance or a phenomenon. The stuff of everything is mental or psychical. Leibniz's monadology leads to panpsychism as its necessary conclusion, for according to him monads or psychical units enter into the constitution of everything, and inorganic, organic and psychical levels of existence are all mental in essence as they exhibit an increasing order of life and consciousness according to his law of continuity. One of the important merits of panpsychism is that it solves the difficulty of the dualist's inveterate distinction between mind and body as independent realities, and explains the psychological and epistemological issues involved in the mind-body problem. James Ward, like Leibniz, holds that "the whole world is made up of individuals, each distinguished by its characteristic behaviour."¹ And these individuals are selves with different degrees of self-conservation or self-realisation. As a panpsychist Ward's point is, like that of Leibniz, that all things without exception are essentially psychical and he makes use of the law of continuity to show that there is no gap or leap in the world-order. McTaggart's panpsychism is expressed in his own words, "the only substances are selves, parts of selves and groups of selves."² Without entering into the subtleties of the arguments whereby he has established the impossibility of existence of non-spiritual substances we may state in general terms that according to McTaggart whatever exists being spiritual, being a self or a part of a self or a group of selves, the entire existence is instinct with life and mind. He argues that whatever exists is a substance and the very nature of substance is to include within it, or to give rise out of it to, qualities and relations which are its own parts and a substance as such is always spiritual. It follows then that all that exists is a substance and is also therefore spiritual, and this is McTaggart's panpsychism. He is a pluralist like Leibniz and Ward believing in a plurality of spiritual substances. Reserving at present our criticism of these

1. Ward: *The Realm of Ends*, p. 432.

2. McTaggart's *Essay on Ontological Idealism in Contemporary British Philosophy*, 1st series, p. 251.

forms of panpsychism we would do well to pass on to another important form of it given by Fechner. Fechner's panpsychism has a close resemblance to the panpsychism of Spinoza and differs from the forms of panpsychism just mentioned, in that both Spinoza and Fechner are monists, while Leibniz, Ward and McTaggart are all pluralistic spiritualists. Again Fechner differs from Spinoza in one important respect in so far as he believes in the reality of the physical basis of the universe as body whose inner soul is the Absolute Spirit. He also believes in the real character of the individual consciousness of selves which overlap one another in the universal consciousness of the Absolute. But Spinoza makes his Substance or God to be the only reality and the individual selves and their consciousness and the objects of the world, though unreal by themselves, have a parallelism between them, so that not only any conscious unit has a bodily unit corresponding to it, but also a bodily unit has a correspondent soul-unit. But Fechner's panpsychism satisfies the demands of idealism more satisfactorily than the panpsychism of Spinoza which is based on an abstract spiritualism.

Lloyd Morgan, Dr. C. A. Strong and Prof. Noble have also given us another variety of panpsychism from the standpoint of emergent evolution.¹ Lloyd Morgan's ultimate principle of the universe is a psycho-physical reality in which there is a universal correlation or concomitance of the physical and the psychical, so that there is no physical object which is not accompanied by its psychical correlate and there is no psychical existence which has no physical correlate. The reason for our calling a thing physical or psychical is not that the thing is purely physical or purely psychical, but that it has preponderance of the physical over the psychical or of the psychical over the physical. Lloyd Morgan is thus saved from the dualist difficulty of accounting for how in the psychical world the physical basis of a psychical being enters into the relation of co-existence or of interaction with the psychical, and from the difficulty of the naturalist to account for the derivation of the psychical from the physical. Lloyd Morgan is virtually a Spinozist believing in the universal correlation between the physical and the psychical, with this distinction that

i. Cf. Lloyd Morgan: *Emergent Evolution* (1923).

Dr. C. A. Strong: *Why Mind Has a Body?* (1918).

Edmund Noble: *Purposive Evolution* (1926).

he does not reduce in the last resort mind and body to the unreal modes of the all-swallowing spiritual substance and that he allows evolution of mind and body. As Lloyd Morgan observes, "We also acknowledge unrestricted correlation of the kind Spinoza postulated under his doctrine of attributes. Within the domain of both attributes there is continuous development under progressive emergence. Each ascending stage in the attribute is evolved with that of the other. Neither is evolved from the other." And, "There are no physical systems of integral status that are not also psychical systems ; and no psychical systems that are not also physical systems. All systems of events are in their degree, psycho-physical. Both attributes, inseparable in essence, are pervasive throughout the universe of natural entities."¹

Dr. Strong in his scheme of emergent evolution makes the fundamental assumption similar to that of Spinoza and Lloyd Morgan that there is a universal concomitance or correlation between mind and body. But though similar, yet it is different, and the element of difference which he introduces is significant as it avoids inconsistency of Lloyd Morgan. While Lloyd Morgan acknowledges a generalised form of psycho-physical correlation, Dr. Strong thinks that the physical and the psychical events do not run parallel as two attributes of some homogeneous inconceivable reality, but that reality is fundamentally psychical and the so-called physical facts and events which make up the physical world only *appear* to us as *physical*, though in reality they are psychical. Dr. Strong's assumption of the ultimate reality as psychical has apparently saved him from the difficulty of deriving the psychical from the physical antecedents, mind from the non-mental. Without going into the merits of Dr. Strong's scheme of emergent evolution it will suffice for our purposes to indicate that as a panpsychist he believes that the entire nature is psychical in essence and that the psychical phenomena do emerge from the apparently physical antecedents which are really psychical.

Edmund Noble is a believer in the purposiveness of the universe, but the purposiveness which he ascribes to the universe gives us teleology in a much wider sense than we are familiar with. His teleology consists in what he calls 'cosmic self-maintenance'

1. Lloyd Morgan: *Emergent Evolution*.

Also cf. His article on *A Philosophy of Evolution* in *Contemporary British Philosophy*, p. 278.

which works out its purposiveness by setting up stable or enduring forms *without conscious design*. The entire universe thus appears to us as a realm of what we may call 'unconscious teleology', if such an expression is permissible. Noble's scheme of evolution is thus panpsychistic in so far as it makes us believe in an all-pervasive but unconscious purposiveness, and in nature as presided over by a very incipient form of mind akin to organic or vital function. "The essence of mind is not awareness, feeling, consciousness, but the organic modes in which power works towards enduring activities and forms."¹ However, the scientific mind of Noble, though convinced at heart of the psychical pervasiveness, does not hesitate to attenuate his conviction by mechanistic tendencies which, as a pledged naturalist, he cannot altogether shake off. Yet the scientific procedure of the emergentist writer has not been thoroughly successful to irradicate the panpsychistic conviction supported by experience and reason.

Panpsychism is one of the necessary corollaries of idealistic philosophy not only of the West but also of India. Vedāntism of both Rāmānuja and Śaṅkara is pre-eminently panpsychistic. The Viśiṣṭādvaita doctrine of Rāmānuja conceives God as the indwelling soul of the physical universe which is His body² and which He pervades and permeates. Śaṅkara's conception of God, though a lower category to him than that of Brahman, is such that He is regarded as both the material and efficient cause of the universe and therefore all things in the universe share in His conscious nature in different degrees of manifestation under different conditions which determine their position and function in the universe. The Jainas too believe at least in the all-vital character of the material world which is pervaded by what they call *nigodas*³ or minute life-principles. The *Paurāṇika* and *Dharmaśāstra* literatures of India, following the Vedāntic trend of thought, have made panpsychism the basic doctrine in the light of which they have tried to explain the various problems of nature, society and religion in which they are most interested.

Without entering into any further details of the doctrine of panpsychism we would like to enter upon an estimate of it. Panpsychism may follow as a consequence of our viewing the universe

1. Noble: *Purposive Evolution*, p. 452.

2. *Viśeṣah Sarīram*, as Rāmānuja puts it.

3. Jacobi's Article on Jainism in E. R. E. and Lokaprakāśa VI.

either from the standpoint of pantheism, or from the standpoint of pluralistic spiritualism in which either universal consciousness, or monads or individual selves are conceived as constituting the universe, or from teleological theory of emergent evolution as we have described above. But a consistent panpsychistic doctrine which the best type of idealistic philosophy can maintain with logical cogency will be that in which the universal principle of life and consciousness can be shown to be organic to man and nature. But if the things and minds of the universe are merely shown to be constituted by independent soul-units, the doctrine of panpsychism as following from it will tell us merely that each independent thing and each individual soul is conscious and its consciousness is limited to itself and is not an integral part of a whole of experience in which such individual consciousnesses fulfil themselves and attain significance and value. The mere summation of individual consciousnesses cannot give us the totality of experience which panpsychism in its genuine sense implies. A mere summation of parts or of independent units is certainly never the whole which is always an organic totality. Pluralistic spiritualism either of Leibniz, of Ward, or of McTaggart can never aspire to universal consciousness organically related to physical objects and psychical centres which consistent panpsychism stands for. Any pluralistic spiritual universe can only give us what we may call *Multi-psychism* and never *Pan-psychism*. A numerical sumtotal psychical units is certainly a mechanical whole in which the parts or members are only disjoined but not *conjoined* or *consubstantial* with the life of the whole, which should fulfil itself through them. Pantheistic basis of panpsychism does not fare better in explaining the true spirit of panpsychism. Spinoza made his Substance to be all-pervading consciousness of which the individual consciousnesses are only unreal modes. But in doing so he misses the concrete character of the universal consciousness. It is, as it were, a consciousness without content, a life-principle without pulsation and without heart-beat. The universal consciousness of Spinozistic pantheism is thus all-pervasive without anything to pervade. The fact of the matter is that panpsychism based either on abstract pluralism or on abstract monism of consciousness fails to give us the exact connotation which panpsychism as a necessary correlate of speculative idealism has developed in the later idealistic school of philosophy of which Pringle-Pattison, Bosanquet and Creighton

may be said to be the best representatives. If by panpsychism we mean that all things in the universe are living and conscious, then to prove this we are not to think of isolated units of consciousness to ensoul each of such things. The universal consciousness need not be chopped up into bits, corresponding to the apparently isolated things of the world ; nor is the universal consciousness to be conceived as an indeterminate homogeneous principle from which the physical objects and conscious centres are *somehow* conceived to be derived and by which they are reciprocally related without any causal determination. Hence, panpsychism, if it is to be accepted as a doctrine which establishes the concrete, universal character of the absolute consciousness, must regard every object and every conscious centre of the universe as not only evolved by it but also as holding a living relation with it and fulfilling itself as a value in the universal consciousness which is the unity of all experiences and values.¹

8. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CONCEPTION OF MIND.

In our discussion on the nature of consciousness we attempted to show that it is an essential feature of mind, and all traditional philosophy and psychology have admitted this essential character of consciousness. But developments in empirical science in general and biology in particular have not failed to influence psychology, with the result that the purposive character of our mental life has been thrown more or less into the background and the mental life itself has been reduced either to teleologically neutral series of physical phenomena or to the biological tendencies of impulses, instincts, desires and appetites from which introspective apprehension of consciousness has altogether been banished. This physico-biological attitude towards mental life has been responsible for the development of Behaviouristic and Psycho-analytical theories of the mental life. A third important development in the view of mind has been introduced by Gestalt Psychology which though professedly scientific has taken a more or less teleological view of mind. In the present section we shall try to estimate these scientific theories about the general nature of mind and consciousness leaving out the details to the student of psychology who may be interested in them.

1. Cf. Pringle-Pattison: *The Idea of God*, pp. 187-189.

(a) BEHAVIOURISM.

Behaviourism looks at mind and consciousness from the combined standpoints of empiricism and naturalism. The empiricist denies mind as a subject or psychical centre and discards introspection as the inner source of knowing it, and naturalism reduces everything including mind to physical and chemical laws. Now the Behaviourist in his distrust of introspection and his zeal for naturalism necessarily misses consciousness as what one is privately aware of in his mental life. He draws out mind as subjective centre from its internal subjectivity into the broad day light of external observation and seeks to find it as an object amongst other objects. He applies external observation and experiment to mind as he applies them to other external objects and unfortunately identifies mind with them. But he does not get the mind as he expects to get it like other objects in his test-tube, yet he reads the mind in terms of physics and physiology and defines psychology as the science of behaviour, meaning by behaviour physiological responses or reflexes to stimuli. To him not only sensations, and perceptions, but thoughts and sentiments and even ideals, which are distinctively mental and which make mind to be what it is, become identified with physical and physiological movements, which he collectively calls by the term 'behaviour'. But suffice it to say that the traditional psychologist does not discourage bodily movements and organic expressions, and therefore does not disparage behaviour, yet what he wants the behaviourist to see is that behaviour is only a necessary concomitant of the body-mind complex which our concrete existence is, and is determined by, but does not determine, mind and the mental life. Psychology is not physiology, and has a value of its own in its explanation of many richer and higher behaviours of the mind which physiology cannot even dream to cope with.¹

(b) PSYCHO-ANALYSIS.

Freud's Psycho-Analysis looks to the nature of mind from quite a different angle of vision. To him the mind is not essentially conscious, but like an ice-berg floating on the sea, with most

1. Cf. Watson: *Behaviour: An Introduction to Comparative Psychology*. Watson and McDougall: *Battle of Behaviourism*.

of it submerged under water. The mind, we are conscious of, is only a fragment of that, the major portion of which remains in the unconscious background. The mind is quite a dynamic entity. It is a seat of perpetual conflict and repression among antagonistic forces and tendencies. In the growth of our mental life the biological and social factors play a predominant part. The '*Id*' is supposed to be the psycho-biological basis which is only governed by 'pleasure principle' but when it comes into conflict with the real world, it is compelled by the necessity of circumstances to give rise to the '*Ego*' which is governed by reality principle and which makes all necessary adjustments with reality around the living organism. The part of the mind other than the ego remains unconscious but its motives and impulses all govern the conscious mind.

As regards Jung's¹ contribution to the Psycho-Analytic theory of mind it may be pointed out that he agrees with Freud in fundamentals, but he differs from the latter in one very important point in this that he thinks of the unconscious to consist of two subdivisions, *viz.*, the racial unconscious and the personal unconscious. Thus according to him the individual becomes essentially dominated by two major forces—one coming from the hereditary peculiarities and the other coming from the peculiarity of his environmental conditions. The unconscious remains the all-important agent for the regulation of our mental life, but it becomes more comprehensive than what it was at the hands of Freud. Adler² shares with Freud the views regarding the dynamic nature of human personality, but he holds that it is not the sex instinct or *libido* that dominates our mental behaviours as Freud thinks, but the '*will for powers*' is the dominating urge that from very infancy guides the behaviour of man. Everybody desires to attain power. If the will for power is not satisfied in reality, some imaginary substitute is sought for and thus '*inferiority complex*' arises. Thus the three leading psycho-analysts, Freud, Jung and Adler all agree in holding mind to be a dynamic entity. These psychologists deserve the great credit of bringing to the forefront of our academic discussion the hitherto unnoticed fact that mind cannot be equated with what we are aware of at the moment, but mind has its major

1. Cf. Jung: *Analytic Psychology*.

2. Cf. Adler: *Practice and Theory of Individual Psychology* (1923).

part in the unconscious region which sometimes reveals itself through some peculiar behaviours. Of course, philosophers like Herbart and Schopenhauer had already admitted the existence and importance of unconscious mind but their case was not scientifically justified.

Now though the psycho-analysts have done so much service to the cause of our conception of mind, it may still be said that their interest in studying mind is mainly for the cure of mental disorders and diseases. So their judgments were partly biased in so far as they emphasised the abnormal side of mind. Psycho-analysis must be supplemented by *psycho-synthesis* and the over-emphasis on the unconscious should, to some extent, be lessened so as to give us a true view of mind incorporating into itself the best elements of all theories so far advanced to explain its nature.

(c) GESTALT THEORY.

The Gestalt theory may be regarded as an attempt on the part of the well-known German psychologists W. Köhler, K. Koffka and others to look at mind from a different point of view. The main contribution of this school of psychology is perhaps, first, that its attempt to consider mental processes as so many structural wholes, that is, as connected systems, and not as isolated experiences, and secondly, that these connected systems of mental process are also purposive wholes. The Gestalt psychologists use certain terms of their own coinage like '*forms*', '*configurations*', '*patterns*', etc., to mean these purposive wholes of mental processes. They suppose that our mental life is such that it cannot be an unconnected series of phenomena or phenomena related to one another by an external or mechanical principle of association. Mind is a *creative, synthetic principle* by itself, so that its perceptions, thoughts, ideas and imaginations are formed into organised wholes guided by the *purposive* activity of its own. Thus our mental processes, perceptions, thoughts, ideas and imaginations, are not to be looked at from the point of view of their origin, but from the point of view of their purpose which the synthetic activity of our mind always introduces into them. As A. Wenzl has put it, "the envisagement is therefore not from below upwards but from above downwards." Another peculiarity of Gestalt psychology is that, in its view of the physiological basis of mind also, it applies the principles of teleological synthesis to show that the mental forms must correlate

with physical *forms or patterns* of the nervous system, and the entire mental life with its physical and physiological basis is guided by a purposive creative principle which synthesises its creations to form them into wholes of structure, psychical and physiological. The entire human personality is a result of the synthetic creative principle which creates and co-ordinates mental wholes with their physiological correlates.

Apart from the criticism which may be brought against this school of psychology specially when it does not account for why there will be physiological structural correlates of mental configurations, nor does it clearly distinguish between 'thought-forms' and 'perception-forms', we can point out that Gestalt psychology exhibits at least an attempt to restore the *teleological character* of mental life which it had lost under the behaviouristic explanations. Mind is not an unconnected series of mental phenomena, nor are its essential elements unconscious and irrational. The *Gestalten* of the German School stand for organised wholes of mental structures guided by purpose, and in these purposive mental structures, the influence of Wundt is unmistakable. For it was Wundt, the forerunner of these psychological thinkers, who had already established beyond doubt, in his *Introduction to Psychology*, the fundamental psychological law of 'the creative resultant'. This law states that it is the inherent nature of the combined content of consciousness to develop purposive structures or configurations in its different levels under the creative force of the mental life as a whole, and not as so many external combinations of mental functions.¹ The Gestalt psychology in one word may be described as giving us *scientific pictures of mind and body on the canvas of idealistic philosophy*.

9. SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS OR REASON.

Consciousness we have described above as mind's awareness from the standpoint of its privacy and we have said also that consciousness as a general term includes all varieties of awareness ranging from simple to more complex forms of perception, memory, thinking, imagination and the rest. Now *Self-consciousness* is a much more complex mental act involving not only awareness in

1. Cf. *Philosophy Today*, p. 498.

general but also awareness of self as subject of awareness. Psychology tells us that self-consciousness as awareness of the subject involves also an awareness of the object as well as of the distinction between the subject and the object. Self-consciousness as such is thus a complex mental act and is the exclusive feature of the human mind and is absent in the animal life which is characterised only by consciousness. The animal mind has awareness and its awareness seems to be the awareness of the object alone, it does not seem to rise to be an awareness of the subject and of the distinction between subject and object. Martineau has given us very suggestive terms to express the distinction between consciousness and self-consciousness. Consciousness he has described by the term '*attuition*' and self-consciousness by the term '*intuition*', meaning by *attuition* consciousness directed to external objects and by *intuition*, consciousness of the inner world or self.

The problem of self-consciousness is fraught with important psychological and epistemological issues which require clarification. Psychologically we are accustomed to think that self-consciousness involves cognition of the self and of the not-self as also of the distinction between them. Consciousness of the self is supposed to be impossible without consciousness of the not-self. The self here is the subject, the not-self its object and self-consciousness is thus that single act of consciousness in which the distinguishable but inseparable elements are the subject and the object. But the crux of the problem is constituted by the meaning we attach to the object. The psychological account of it is apparently based on dualistic hypothesis, or at best on parallelistic hypothesis with regard to the nature of and relation between subject and object, self and not-self. And psychology based either on dualism or on parallelism, which is a disguised dualism, between subject and object, seems to think the object as belonging to an external world independent of the subject. But can the external object in its own physical character be cognised by the subject in the sense that it is transplanted from the physical realm into the mental realm? Apparently the answer is in the negative. What then is the meaning of the object as cognised by the subject? It can only mean that the physical object is known only in terms of ideas which are in the subject and not outside it. Hence the externality of the object is dissolved into the internal ideas of the subject, so that when we still speak of the object in relation to the subject it is

not the thing, but the idea of the thing, which the subject holds before it as its object. This is the real meaning of the object for the subject, and self-consciousness is that complex mental phenomenon which consists in the self's cognition of itself as subject in contrast with its object in the above sense. And that self-consciousness should never refer to any consciousness of the external object in the sense that it is out there in the external world, is further supported by the fact of memory when our self-consciousness has no possibility to refer to anything in the external physical world, except the images or ideas which here form the object for the subject. It follows that externality of the object is not a necessary condition of self-consciousness, a fact which has a great bearing on the possibility of applying self-consciousness to the Divine Mind and consequently personality to God involving self-consciousness which we will consider in a subsequent chapter.

But we have not yet touched upon the far more important question whether self-consciousness should involve object-consciousness at all. Descartes in his formulation of the principle of self-consciousness seems to ignore object-consciousness as the indispensable condition of self-consciousness. His 'cogito' is the cognition of self alone in which there is no reference to not-self or object. Critics of Descartes¹ have charged him with a psychological blunder for not having referred to object-consciousness as a necessary element of self-consciousness. Now we may ask: Is this charge tenable? Descartes, it may be noted, was in search of a principle for his philosophy such that he could not doubt. Apparently the principle of his quest was to serve him as the first principle or postulate of all knowing and of all being. Empirical or psychological conditions of knowledge and of reality cannot have anything to do with it. If that be the nature of his first principle, psychological condition of subject-object relation was irrelevant to his first principle. His 'cogito' therefore was identical with introspective self-cognition which is self-evident. Now again the question may be raised: Can there be self-cognition without the cognition of not-self? As we have already argued out, the principle which is the postulate of all cognition cannot depend upon any empirical condition by virtue of its self-validity. A student of Advaita Vedānta need not be told that the self is a

1. Cf. Watson: *An Outline of Philosophy*, pp. 138-42.

self-luminous principle (*Svayam Prakāśa*) and all cognition either of itself or of the not-self is illumined by the self-luminosity of the self. The Sāṃkhya and Jaina systems of philosophy also share the same view of the self-luminosity of the self by virtue of which self-consciousness has been considered as that function of the self which need not necessarily involve not-self as its object. This peculiar function of the self as a self-luminous reality is generally illustrated by the simile of the lamp (*Pradīpa-vat*). Of course similes do not go on all fours. The idea is that just as a lamp while illuminating itself illuminates also objects round about it which may or may not always be within the range of its illumination, similarly self-consciousness which is self-luminous may not necessarily require objects to illumine. Considered in this light we can understand the view that self-consciousness does not necessarily require its antithesis, the not-self for its functioning. Prof. Ferrier¹ seems to have formulated a view of self-consciousness almost akin to what we refer to here. He thinks that the self is always conscious of itself even if the not-self does not present itself, either obtrusively or vaguely, to the self. The psychologist trained in the empirical account of self-consciousness will be shocked by the indifference of the not-self to the constitution of self-consciousness. Kant's transcendental unity of the self seems to suggest the logical antecedence of the self's empirical functions which when brought into relation with sensuous content makes intelligible experience of it. Now Kant also identifies this principle of self-consciousness with reason. Reason with him seems to be the anterior condition of all knowledge. To say this is to say that though the matter of knowledge is supplied by sensibility yet sensibility by itself cannot illumine itself without the logically prior functions of reason or self-consciousness. All these accounts of self-consciousness considered from the epistemological point of view seem to suggest that 'self' may become conscious of itself by its own independent self-luminous character though from the empirical or psychological point of view, it seems that self-consciousness is the result of the relation between the self and the not-self.

1. Cf. Ferrier: *Institutes of Metaphysics*, p. 92.

10. *EVOLUTION OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS OR REASON.*

In our general account of self-consciousness or reason in the previous section, we have noticed that it is the specific feature of the human mind and is conspicuous by its absence in the animal mind. Traditional idealist philosophy has elaborated the function of self-consciousness or reason by pointing out that conception, judgment and reasoning are the three important processes through which the rational mind of man acts in its construction of reality and the animal mind which is characterised by consciousness alone does not and cannot rise to these higher processes of reason.

Now evolutionistic philosophers who make too much of evolution and apply the principles of evolution to explain all the levels of existence, inorganic, organic and conscious, necessarily subject the problem of reason to the principles of evolution. They believe specially that just as our body, as it now is, may be shown to be the result of a long course of development from cruder and less organised forms, as geological and palaeontological evidences show, even so human mind and reason must have grown into what it is now with their most complex functions, from lower and less organised psychical forms that we notice to-day in the different levels of animal mind. In other words, biological and mental evolution have proceeded *pari passu*; and lower forms of body and mind under regular principles of mutation have attained the present complex bodily and mental structures and functions as we find them now on the human level. Among the antecedents of human reason that are generally traced to animal mind, are spontaneous, reflex and instinctive actions which by gradually acquiring more and more purposive adaptation have appeared in man as intelligent rational actions. And the presence of spontaneous, reflex and instinctive actions in human life of to-day shows that the human mind has not as yet been completely rationalised through evolution though the proportion of rational to irrational actions in man is far greater now than what it was in the past.

Spencer thinks that reason of man can be traced to reflex actions of animals. The animal mind is susceptible to reflex actions more than the human mind. Reflex actions are those unconscious, immediate responses to stimuli, that rouse in the animal mind dim feelings of pleasure which actuate the animal mind to repeat them, and long repetition makes the reflex actions to be

more and more self-conscious and intelligent. Bain thinks that intelligence or rational activity is traceable to spontaneous animal actions. Spontaneous actions are motor discharges of the limbs of the animal owing to superfluity of animal energy within the system though there are no external stimuli to respond to. Bain, like Spencer, argues that the originally unconscious spontaneous actions produce accidental pleasure in the animal mind, and being repeated, become gradually intelligent and rational. Spencer and Bain thus believe that reason or self-consciousness has evolved from unconscious and irrational biological functions of the animal life as the result of a long process of repetition. But as against this theory of mental evolution by which reason or intelligence is shown to be an offshoot of unintelligent and biological functions, it may be sufficient to point out that repetition of functions has an opposite tendency of making more and more unconscious and irrational what was originally conscious and rational. Habitual actions are good instances of how originally conscious actions lapse into being unconscious through repetition.

In recent years many psychologists, like Myers and others, are trying to show that there is a continuity between instinctive actions and rational actions. They are of opinion that instinct and reason indicate only degrees of adaptation to circumstances, present and future, and there is a close concomitance between the different degrees of mental adaptations and the volume, weight and complexity of convolutions of the brain-matter in animals and men. McDougall's hormic theory of mind points to the same conclusion that beginning from the lowest forms of animal mind up to the most complex human mind there is present increasing degrees of intelligent adaptation or *horme*, so that it is not possible to draw a line between the animal and the human mind, instinct and reason and that the human mind is only the highest specimen of the products of evolution which rules the mental world as a whole. Our common experience also tells us how animals that are higher on the scale, such as monkeys and dogs, perform actions which can do honour to human intelligence. Hence, they say, instinct and reason are not different in kind from one another but only different in degree of their adaptation to circumstances, and reason of man is only the highest product of evolution which is at work throughout the world of minds developing from the lower to the higher, from the impulses and instincts to intelligence.

But orthodox idealistic philosophy does not accept the above view and argues that though in the sphere of biology it is possible to maintain that human body is a result of a long course of development from lower animal forms and structures, yet reason is not the result of evolution from animal mind, but marks a new beginning on the human level. It maintains that reason is a special endowment of the human mind and works through highly complex functions of conception, judgment and reasoning, not traceable to the animal mind. Conception, judgment and reasoning indicate the highest powers of abstraction involving general ideas or universals which are not confined to the facts and phenomena of the present but always refer to the past, distant and future. The animal mind is generally confined to the perception of the present, of the 'here' and the 'now', and is not capable of representations whose sphere extends beyond the present. Hence, conception, judgment and reasoning which mark the rational life of man, being outside and beyond the powers of the animal mind, are the crucial functions, at once leading us to decide in favour of the view that reason can never have been developed out of the animal mind in which the least trace of their existence is hardly to be met with.

But against these extreme views, the view of the ordinary evolutionist and the view of the orthodox idealist which is against evolution of reason from animal mind, it may be worth noting that reason is a stage like other stages in the purposive movement of the universe towards the realisation of concrete individuality on the part of Reality which is the rational unity and totality of all experience and value. Here as elsewhere we are to remember that the higher is not determined by the lower, the whole by the parts, but rather the higher determines the lower and the whole determines the parts. It is the rational whole of reality which draws out and lends concreteness to every stage in the evolution which it determines *from before* and *not from behind*. This is, quite in keeping with the view of evolution we have maintained throughout our work ; and consistently with our view of evolution reason, like other facts and values is a result of evolution of the self with its functions and appears as a distinct stage in that process, but is never a case of evolution determined from behind and making animal mind to grow into it.

11. INDIVIDUAL SELF AND PERSONALITY.

Closely allied with self-consciousness or reason is the concept of Individual Self and Personality. The individuality of the self consists, amongst other factors, of self-consciousness or reason which dominates over, determines and organises all its modes, its thoughts, emotions and activities into the unity of a psychical existence. An individual self also appears as such amongst other individual selves which make up his social environment. As a rationally determined psychical centre his feelings and thoughts, emotions and volitions, are not isolated and disjointed mental modes but are organised so as to promote his end and purpose as a unit in the society of selves. Each individual self as an organised rational unit in the society develops his personality in reciprocal relations with other such individuals, each of which again is a personality in the same sense. When it is said that such a self-conscious individual is a personality, it is meant that reason is not only the root of his self-consciousness but also of his self-determined activity or freedom. As a self-conscious and self-determined individual, the self is not only conscious of himself as subject of all that he is conscious of, but also as a free moral agent of what he does, and it is self-consciousness and self-determined activity that proceed from his reason, and constitute his personality. An animal self or better animal mind, destitute of reason, cannot rise to be a person in this sense and there are human beings too, whom, in our ordinary parlance, we describe as wanting in personality, for the simple reason that in those individuals reason does not have its free play to develop self-consciousness and self-determination in the fullest degree, and therefore they do not get the fullest scope for promoting the end of society wherein lies their usefulness and value as units of the social whole. An individual self therefore involves the *category of exclusiveness* in so far as his mental modes are owned by him in privacy but develops also the *category of mutuality* by virtue of which he subordinates his private mental modes and entertains the social feelings of obligation and duty, of benevolence and sympathy, towards other self-conscious units, if he is to be a person amongst persons and contribute his quota to the common weal of the society. Thus personality which develops out of one's rationality is a social category which carries with it an alternate emphasis on the categories of exclusiveness and mutuality.

12. THE CAUSALITY OF THE SELF AND FREEDOM.

In our analysis of the concept of personality in the previous section we have pointed out that one of the main factors of personality is freedom or self-determined activity which proceeds from the nature of reason, the determinant of the self as a psychical unit. We shall now indicate how reason in its determination of the self exercises causality, not of the same nature as we are familiar with in the external world of objects. The world of objects is a field of mechanical causation where every object or phenomenon is externally determined by the other. Physical science tells us that beginning from the protons and electrons up to the ordinary objects of our daily experience all objects, or more accurately speaking, all facts and events of which the entire physical world is composed, have come to be what they are and are going to be what they will become, due to natural forces and their laws operating and determining them from the outside. And this external determination is otherwise known as mechanical causation. There are philosophers, the empiricists, the materialists and realists, who, with their enthusiasm for being all too scientific, have also viewed the internal world of selves from the standpoint of external observation and have applied the principles of mechanical and external causation to the internal world of selves, and therefore have been led to believe that selves are as good *objects* as the stocks and stones of the external world, and are as externally determined as the other objects of the world. The self is not a free agent internally and teleologically determining itself, but is being determined externally by the same natural laws as determine external objects. The empiricist makes the self to be a feeling of the moment or at best a series of feelings following one another produced by external stimuli, and to be regarded as effects, like other effects, of external causes. The materialist holds the same view when he takes the self to be an epiphenomenon of matter. And the realist hardly improves upon the materialist's epiphenomenon when he says that mind or self is a cross-section of the world or a complex or joint effect appearing as a feeling of the organisation of biological, physiological and physical forces. In all these accounts the self is made to be what it is by external conditions and does not make itself, does not determine itself. It is an effect produced by external causes and not a *causa sui*.

The idealist view of life and the universe looks at the self, and perhaps consistently, from a different angle of approach. If the reality of the universe is a rational and teleological principle that works immanently within the universe and expresses itself through different levels of existence with their characteristic laws and principles, then the level of self certainly is the nearest level of expression of that ultimate rational principle and must be determined by its own laws distinct from the laws which determine either the organic or the inorganic nature. The self, as the nearest level of Spirit's self-expression, must have *reason* for its own law which determines it inwardly and teleologically, unlike the laws of the organic and the inorganic which are respectively more or less teleological. Thus there is determination in the level of self but it is completely inward and teleological determination which constitutes its freedom. There is causality in the level of self, but it is self-causality or self-determination which is teleological unlike mechanical determination which rules the inorganic realm. The organic world is a realm of partially teleological causality, for life-phenomenon is partly determined by external natural forces, though also partly determined by its own inner law of self-differentiation. In the realm of selves there is causality indeed, but it is entirely rational causality which inwardly determines the self. For here causality is reason and reason is the self itself. When the self is determined by its causality it is determined by its own reason which is identical with itself. So the self is determined by itself or free and its freedom is not inconsistent with its rational causality.

13. DEVELOPMENT OF INDIVIDUALITY.

We have indicated above that by virtue of reason the individual self comes to realise himself as the subject of all that he knows or becomes conscious of, and that he is a free agent of what he does. Now we shall try to indicate how these essential elements of the individual self, his self-consciousness and freedom, are big with potentialities which determine his development and destiny. But his development and destiny depend upon the manner in which, and the extent to which, such potentialities are transformed into actuality by the individual in relation to society. History bears testimony to this fact and abounds in instances of individuals in different walks of life illustrating how self-consciousness and self-determination have led them through various

conditions and circumstances which jointly contributed to the development of their individuality. These conditions and circumstances will fall mainly under the three heads, *social*, *ethical* and *logical*, of which the first two are controlled by the third.

(a) THE SOCIAL CONDITIONS OF INDIVIDUALITY.

An individual self is not an isolated unit but finds himself in the midst of similar other units to which he is intimately related and in which his social environment consists. An individual self is always a member of a society of other selves. Now this introduces us at once to the age-long question of the relation between the individual and the society or between the individual mind and the group mind. A child is born into a society and is infinitely influenced by it. Its parents, its brothers and sisters, and its relations form the family group. Other individuals outside the family, either hostile or friendly, with which it is brought in contact, make up the social group, but more broadly speaking all other selves excepting its own may be said to make up the social group. Now the individual child grows in its interrelation with the social group in respect to its cognitive and conative life. There are differences of opinion as to whether the individual is wholly made to be what it is by the social forces or whether the society is wholly made to be what it is by the individuals. In the latter case, the social whole is a mere aggregate of the individuals and in the former it is an all-absorbing spiritual force swallowing up the identity, individuality and importance of the individuals. Instead of trying to bring these two extreme views into a sharp contrast with one another we would do well to admit that the individual and the society, the personal self and the social self, are so intimately related to one another that one cannot fail largely to influence the other. The individual, if he wants to be a useful member of the society, must share the feelings and sentiments, the ideas and the ideals, of his fellows, must suck the breast of the Ethos, though on the other hand he would keep up his distinctness without being wholly absorbed by it.

(b) THE ETHICAL CONDITIONS OF INDIVIDUALITY.

From this general relation of the individual to the society, the individual develops an ethical consciousness, his duties and

virtues. As an active agent amongst other similarly active agents he is made to feel that he must do or must not do certain things, for he has learnt wherein the common good of the social whole consists. This feeling of restraint or constraint may be said to be the origin of what we mean by his conscience. Further, he feels that there are certain things which he cannot but do, and there are other things which he must not do, as his doing or refraining from doing is followed by approval or disapproval of his fellows. In other words, he develops his sense of obligation. Further, he feels that there are certain things which he is coerced to do by external forces, and again there are other things which by their intrinsic nature demand his doing them. In other words, he comes to distinguish between *the must* and *the ought*, between external coercion, social, political or religious, and an intrinsic oughtness or value in what he does. In this way he comes to develop his ethical virtues or values. But all these virtues or values must refer to the highest good of the individual. Here, as elsewhere, ethical philosophers have differed from one another in their conception of the highest good, and the difference has told upon their difference in conception of the individual. Now if the individual is conceived mechanically as composed of sensations and feelings externally determined, then his highest good will be the most pleasurable sensation. But since egoistic *hedone* seems to ignore the social environment to which the life of the individual is so indissolubly related, the greatest good of the greatest number of individuals inspires the utilitarian hedonist to enlarge his ethical ideal. Though, however, in this way the utilitarian ideal is an improvement upon the egoistic one, in another way it deteriorates man by making him a slave of utility. Social Eudaemonism of modern times makes life "a searching for means without any consciousness of the distinctive end in view." "Man transforms himself into a slave of utility, but he no longer knows for whose use things are done. He has lost the sense for the value which stood behind everything and gave it a significance." "The 'enlightenment' which has led to this kind of morality is in truth a complete veiling of the realm of values. Its spiritual guide, healthy common sense, is too crude a faculty of perception. It cannot see moral values."¹

1. Nicolai Hartmann: *Ethics*, Vol. I, p. 138.

Intuitionistic ethics in its conception of individuality goes to the opposite extreme of identifying it with pure rationality. By severing it from its concrete setting, it seems to be anxious more for its rational exclusiveness even at the cost of social environment. For it fears that social environment is conducive to contamination with social feelings which might mar the categorical character of the moral will. But the purely rational will as a moral value is as empty of content as utility is destitute of a distinctive end in view. The Eudæmonism of Aristotle and Hegel seems to take a concrete view of the individual, for to both of them the individual has for his goal the attainment of well-being of the soul or blessedness as a value which consists, in the case of Aristotle, in the life of a mean between extremes of sensibility and rationality, and in the case of Hegel, in subordinating the natural to the rational self. 'Die to live' is the demand of Hegel.

A consideration of the social and ethical conditions of individuality reveals that the individual in order to grow and develop into personality must think of himself as a self among a society of selves, and as such must develop a social self in so far as he is bound to share the feelings and sentiments of his fellow-selves. But in order to realise himself as a value by itself he must so utilise and organise these social forces as to discover his own place and significance in the totality of existence. Now, such a discovery becomes possible for him only because he is in reality a self-conscious subject distinguishing himself from the object-world, though not dissociating himself from it, and also because he is a free agent of what he does. Self-consciousness and self-determination therefore help him to know his 'station' in the scheme of existence and his 'duties' attached thereto. And instead of making an artificial distinction between the social-values and character-values, as has been done by some present-day ethical writers like Everett who means by social-values those that have reference to individuals other than one's self and by character-values, those which strictly refer to personal duties of the individual concerned, we would do better to take an organic view of the relation between the society and the individual who grows in and through the society of individuals and attains concrete individuality and value by harmonising social and character-values in their proper perspective. The life of the individual is so

intimately connected with the life of the society that the virtues which may be supposed as forming the individual's character cannot be understood without reference to virtues which may be said to involve his social relations. Justice, veracity, freedom of thought and speech, honesty and similar other apparently self-regarding virtues are also implicated with other-regarding or social virtues like abstinence from injury, regard for life and property of other people, patriotism and the rest. An individual is organically connected with his society, so that we cannot take out some of his virtues and make them into his character-values and regard the rest as his exclusive social-values. The point is that the development of the individual and social progress cannot take place without reciprocal effects on the individuals and the society composed of them.

Another point which is closely allied to our present problem is how far *religious values* determine man's development of individuality. Love, wisdom, beauty and power which man can share with God in his repeated or constant communion with the Divine are no doubt great Religious Values which raise him higher than the level of the ethical individual and help the development of what may be called *Super-Individuality* in him. A Luther, a Marcus Aurelius, a Rammohan Roy or a Rāmakṛṣṇa Paramahārīṣa, is not uncommon in the history of development of individuality, in whom social and ethical conditions are absorbed but transcended to develop what we have called super-individuality. Without further discussion as to the nature and relation of religious values to individuality, which we shall undertake at greater length, in our chapter on Values, we would like to discuss another important point in this connection, namely, whether 'circumstances' determine individuality or whether individuality absorbs and transmutes them so as to initiate a line of development of his own, whether an individual is a creature of circumstances or a master of them. Green thinks that self-consciousness is a common character or principle in all ethical individuals and all ethical individuals are the same in this respect, though their difference is due to circumstances, making up their conscious content, that is, to whatever the self experiences, and the experiencing self. By these circumstances Green means to include the empirical data, environment as well as inherited bodily conditions, and his contention is that the self in its development cannot have self-initiative

because it cannot over-master these externally imposed circumstances. As Bosanquet summarising Green's argument puts it, "In short, what determines the individual to be such as he is comes from without and not from within, from surroundings, in the wide sense explained above, and not from self-consciousness. And therefore, in a word, determinism triumphs ; 'the spiritual principle accounts for nothing distinctive ; the body and the circumstances make the man what he is.'"¹ It seems then that Green though admitting self as a self-conscious centre takes a deterministic interpretation, making self to be a creature of circumstances. If the very nature of the self implies its self-determination, or self-determination is an essential feature of the self, circumstances cannot externally make the self to be what it is. Circumstances are undeniable factors in the individuality of the self and so far we agree with Green. But we part company with him the moment he throws self-consciousness into the background and makes circumstances to be the external determinant of individuality. That which really determines the individuality of the self is the drawing force of the rational or spiritual reality of the whole which includes the self and its experiences or circumstances, but always tends the self to acquire greater and greater fullness and to overcome more and more its finitude, its contradiction to circumstances. Individuality is thus progressive, depending on the gradual approximation of the self to the rational whole. It would be wrong to think that selves are all identical so far as self-consciousness is concerned, and that their differences are due to circumstances or content ; for self-consciousness of the self is progressive and differs according to the extent of approximation of its experiences to the rational whole. Taken in this sense self-consciousness is nothing different from "conation towards the unity of a harmonious cosmos or towards the completed system of an eternal self."² This introduces us to what we have called the logical condition of the development of individuality.

(c) THE LOGICAL CONDITIONS OF INDIVIDUALITY

We have pointed out above that the self grows into individuality from no circumstances which may be regarded as external as

1. Bosanquet: *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 324.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 325.

had been done by Green. Self's attainment of individuality means its approximation towards unity and totality of the whole which it achieves through experience of itself and of other things which forms its inner content and not external as Green seems to think. If the ultimate reality is the realised whole of experience then the self as well as the world in their relation to one another and to the whole cannot draw a line of division between themselves. The self must make the world of experience one with itself, no matter what apparent contradiction the world may present to the self, for it is the world with its apparent contradiction that stimulates the effort of the self to approximate to the unity and coherence of the whole. There is thus an inherent *logical necessity* which moves the self towards more and more concrete individuality through solutions of contradictions presented by the world in its gradual approximation to the totality of the rational whole. Self-determination of the self thus becomes identical with its effort to attain rational coherence and unity, or better, individuality of the self means the self-determined activity of the self with a view to resolving contradictions in the rational whole. Bosanquet thinks, and very rightly, that in this gradual approximation to the rational whole through solutions of apparent contradictions presented to the self by the world, we find a striking similarity to the attainment of the *conclusion from premises*, in which a new and richer whole emerges depending on, but at the same time transcending, the premises. He further thinks that the nature of individuality which thus emerges under the above mentioned logical necessity, may be well appreciated if we think how poetry and the works of art are produced by master-minds. For in these two kinds of human achievement nature is presented to the poet and the artist as if it were a contradiction, but nature without continuing as an obstacle to the evolving mind of the poet and the artist, is transcended by it, the result of which is the production of poetry or the work of art. The mind and nature, in both cases, work under the principle of logical coherence and contribute jointly to the production of what we call poetry or any work of art. The mind of the artist or the poet is determined, in neither case externally, but by itself, which in its approximation to the æsthetic ideal takes nature into confidence, as it were, only to rise above the apparent contradiction involved in nature. To quote the admirable lines of Bosanquet, "A self, then, appears

to us as the active form of totality, realising itself in a certain mass of experience, as a striving towards unity and coherence. Its self-determination is that of a logical world, ultimately, in the general type, one with the relation of a conclusion to premises, by which a new and transfigured whole emerges from a mass of data which in one sense contains it, but which in another sense it transcends. The nature which we have claimed for it is more easily identifiable as we appeal to the completest and most triumphant achievements of art and poetry. For the leaps and eccentricities of a purely freakish fancy are from a logical point of view simply possibilities predicated of reality under an exceptional amount of tacit reservation, all of which is formally a breach of logical continuity ; while by the creations of the greatest art the possibilities of man and nature are rather intensified and expanded than wiredrawn into decorative ramifications ; and the logical continuity is therefore apt to be deeper and more thorough, not more fragile and attenuated, than that which passes current in ordinary life. To stigmatise an initiative of this kind as the rattling off of a preformed chain is simply to reject the continuity which makes life interesting. If we want a creativeness more free than this, we shall find no analogy for it in the processes by which anything worth having is produced, in the field of knowledge, of practice, or of art. This, then, is our conception of a self, of 'what it is to be a self', and of 'what it is to be' free or self-determined."¹

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CHAPTER VIII

PROBLEM OF GOD

1. CONTENTS OF THE GOD-IDEA.

There seems to be nothing more hazardous on the part of human speculation than to offer an off-hand conception of God which will satisfy at once all the demands of human life in its all possible relations to the universe. Man as he finds himself in the universe, and the universe as it presents itself to man both had their mysterious past and both have a future which is no less mysterious. The relation between man and man is perhaps far more complex than what exists between one proton and another. There are in the universe huge monstrosities which are as real as the most beautiful of creations. There are love and hate, harmony and discord, the evil and the good, which are as glaring facts of human experience as anything could be. Again there are time and space, matter and motion. There are life and mind, and there are self and soul. There are facts and values, and there are also strivings of the human selves to achieve the values. Now all these demand explanation for their origin and ultimate significance in the economy of existence. Man's conception of God has always aimed at some sort of explanation of all these problems, but with what success it is for history of religions to tell.

We, however, attempt here to proffer a conception of God consistent with the view of life and the universe we have developed in our book. Now as such a conception largely depends on the question whether we identify *the God of religion* with *the Absolute of philosophy*, or we maintain a distinction between them, we would do well to decide this prior question first in a general way and then formulate our conception of God in the light of our decision. The idea of the Absolute is generally associated with a transcendent Being divested of all concrete content, and beyond all categorial determinations, principally spatial, temporal and causal. Such a transcendent Being is an abstract universal, unchanging and unchangeable, not an object of thought or discursive reason, but one of unique experience or intuition.

It is either an indeterminate unity which discourages all plurality and differentiations, or harbours, we know not why, contents within itself not as they empirically are, but only as transformed and transmuted in the whole of experience. Or, again, the Absolute may be conceived as a concrete individuality which is at the same time a concrete universal encouraging reality of all that is experienced, of matter, life and spirit in their relations and inter-relations, allowing no gap or antagonism among these different elements, each of which is directed towards the realisation of values that are embodied in the Absolute. Matter, life and spirit are thus no appearances or unrealities, but are different levels of self-expression in the life of the Absolute. Another feature which distinguishes this conception of the Absolute is that in it the individual selves instead of being appearances or unrealities have been given a scope for approximation to the unity and totality of absolute values. In this approximation lies the progressive personality of the individual self which grows out of an antagonism between the self and the world setting up his rights and duties. The personality of the individual self is progressive because the said antagonism between the self and the world is not ultimately indissoluble.

The antagonism between the self of man and his not-self pursues him, and he is *in* the struggle, so long as the ideals or values he will be striving after will be held out to him as so many external goals. This happens because so long he regards himself as a self-centred moral person. But in a genuine religious attitude the self of man will rise *above* the antagonism and the struggle, for there he will come to realise the very conditions of the 'inner drama' whose outcome has all through been the antagonism and the struggle. The ideals and the values which so long have been actuating him from outside now become inwardly realised as the real creative forces which tend everything, his self and his not-self, his personality and his strivings, to a harmony and perfection beyond the reach of a self-centred ethical individuality. This inward realisation of the presence of the ideal within man may be said to constitute the true significance of Divine immanence in the sphere of religion. In religion therefore the horizon of human ideals is so widened as to merge into the wider sphere of the objective values which are embodied in the being of God. In religion antagonism between the indi-

vidual self and the Absolute reaches the vanishing point, though, however, such a state does not mean annihilation but rather enrichment of the individual self in the Absolute. Religion thus conceived leaves a very thin line of distinction between God and the Absolute.

An analysis of the contents of the God-idea will bring out the following important points which are implied in it. First, God must be one. A suggestion of more than one God not only creates a metaphysical difficulty of explaining continuity and harmony in the world-process but also the religious difficulty of explaining a uniform dispensation to man, his proper responsibility, and his whole-hearted worship and prayer. *Secondly*, God must be an ultimate being and this follows from His oneness, for ultimacy of a being precludes plurality. Two or more beings cannot be said to be ultimate, one of them can only be the ultimate and the rest must be secondary or subordinate. From this it follows that that being which is ultimate is also absolute and self-sufficient depending on nothing outside itself. *Thirdly*, the idea of Being suggests that God is Reality; for Reality in the fullest sense of the term is predicable of nothing else than what confers reality on all that is evolved, but itself remains un-derived as a causa sui. *Fourthly*, this conception of God suggests that God is not a static reality but a dynamic one, whose dynamism consists in his self-objectification or 'self-ingression' as Whitehead puts it, into the world-process or world-evolution as His self-expression. The relation between God and the world is like that between Aristotle's 'unmoved mover' and the world that He moves. In evolving the world God operates as the cause of the universe not as an efficient one, but as a rational or teleological cause drawing it not 'from behind' as all efficient cause does, but 'from before' as a true teleological cause should; it is not by 'push', but rather by 'pull' that God attracts the world towards Himself as the home of values. *Fifthly*, God must be conceived as individual. The individual selves enjoy their limited individuality and personality in their action and reaction with other individual selves but aspire after the absolute individuality in which all antagonism between themselves and other selves, is reduced to a minimum. Here ethical individuality which means moral responsibility and freedom in the relative sense of the terms approximates to the individuality of the Absolute, in which ethical

individuality is transcended ; and approximation to this highest or ideal individuality coincides with religion. *Lastly* God must be conceived as the embodiment of the absolute values. In this conception of God we discover a relation of identity between God and the absolute *values*. We have stated above that the world-process is teleological through and through and tends towards the attainment of values in its different stages. The whole history of the world is a progression towards realisation of values. God as the embodiment of absolute values expresses Himself through the evolution of the world and the higher the world rises in the scale of evolution, it manifests higher and higher values and makes nearer and nearer approximations to the value-constitution of God as ultimate reality.

To sum up the contents of the God-idea then we might state that God is the one absolute spiritual Reality, the ultimate principle of individuality and value, which immanently works out the evolution of the world of things and selves, and tends it to realise the absolute spiritual values whose unity He himself is.

2. *ORIGIN OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF GOD.*

Man's belief in God or gods is as old as his relation to the world. In his transactions with the world he often finds himself so placed that his wishes, desires and activities, his coming into being and passing out of it, his good fortunes and ill fortunes, his health and disease, are often beyond his control. Happenings in nature like the wind and rains, floods and famines, and seasons of the year, also appear to him puzzling and mysterious. They create in him the conviction that he is too small and helpless. He thus comes to believe in a power or powers, which, seem to control the destiny not only of his own but also of the world at large. History of religions furnishes various accounts of why man has come to believe in such power or powers and under what circumstances. Again development of human consciousness in general has not failed to affect his consciousness of God. Then, again, just as there have been gradual transitions from man's herd-instinct to social and from social to individual tendencies, similar transitions are observable in man's attempt to comprehend his God or gods. It is not

within our province to detail all the stages and circumstances in the evolution of man's consciousness of God, but only to trace the main conditions and forces that determine its origin. These conditions and forces have been classified under the two main heads, *viz.*, Anthropological and Psychical.

But before analysing the anthropological and psychical origins of God-consciousness we should understand what these anthropological and psychical conditions imply. By anthropological conditions we mean those which arise out of man's relations to his external environment, material objects, plant-kingdom, animals and his fellow beings. They refer to historic and even pre-historic stages of human existence. By psychical conditions of God-consciousness we mean those mental functions of man, such as, his impulses, his motives, his instincts and his felt needs, his thoughts and his higher experiences that rise from his spiritual nature and make up his inner psychical life. The distinction we make here between anthropological and psychical conditions of God-consciousness should not, however, be taken too rigidly. Man's psychical life is ever determined by his environment and environment receives colouring from his psychical reactions as well. The psychologist cannot ignore the environmental conditions that determine man's psychical nature, and the anthropologist will be unscientific if he ignores all reference to the inner life of man.

(a) ANTHROPOLOGICAL CONDITIONS

Under these conditions of God-consciousness we shall consider the question as to what must have been the environmental reactions to human mind that led to the origin of religion. Writers are divided in their opinion on this question. E. B. Tylor in his work, *Primitive Culture*, is of opinion that *Animism* or man's tendency to attribute a kind of life or soul to every phenomenon in nature, like trees, mountains clouds, rivers and the rest, on the analogy of his own life, is the first source of man's consciousness of a mysterious power which he calls his God. The primitive man feels that this mysterious powerful soul or spirit which presides over all natural phenomena will bring all sorts of earthly good things and remove all obstacles to his success in the struggle of life, if that mysterious spirit could be propitiated. But Tylor's animism as a theory of the origin of

religion is not accepted on the ground that instead of indicating the earliest form of man's reaction to environment as we expect in the most primitive stage of human life, it gives us a kind of philosophical attitude which can appear only when man has already advanced in his view of life and his surroundings. Spencer's theory that religion must have originated in the 'Worship of souls of the Dead Ancestors' is only a particular form of animism. Many savages still believe that the ghosts of their departed ancestors control their destiny and therefore they offer worship to the souls of the dead, for otherwise they fear that disasters must visit them. Thus the fear of the dead, according to Spencer, is the origin of religion. But as against this it may be remarked that though this sort of ancestor-worship may prevail among many savages, it cannot be regarded as the origin of religion, because *religion may be pre-animistic in origin*. The conception of the soul marks a distinct advance in the life of men long before which they must have some form of religion, however, crude may be its nature.

Writers like W. R. Smith in his *Religion of the Semites* and E. B. Jevons in his *Introduction to the History of Religions* have however advanced the view that *Totemism* is the simplest and the most primitive of religions. By a 'totem' is meant a species of animals or plants or even a class of inanimate objects, which a social group or a clan singles out from the rest of things of the world and regards almost as its God. It believes that friendly relations with its totem will bring good things to it. The primitive clan owing to its interest in its totem even has sometimes been named after it.

But *Totemism* is not regarded by others as the most primitive form of religion, and in its place a mysterious or magical power called *Mana* is substituted which is thought to pervade all things. Now this mysterious power has been called *Mana*, and 'mana' has been supposed to be the pre-animistic root of both magic and religion. Anthropologists tell us that 'mana' though very vague and indefinite in its meaning, has been supposed by the North-American savages as the source of all energy which controls the destiny of men. The theory of 'mana' as the first source of religion has superseded totemism, because it has been found by writers on sociology and anthropology that totemism appears after the primitive men have advanced from herd-instinct to group-conscious-

ness and have admitted authority of the society over the individual. For a totem is only a symbol of that mysterious social force which the primitive men came to appreciate when they had made considerable advance in social consciousness. Now, the reason why 'mana' has been given priority as a source of religion is this that opinions are almost undivided as to the magical origin of religion and 'mana' embodies for the most part a magical element in it. Of course all writers are not of the same opinion that magic is the root of religion. Without entering into the controversy whether magic is prior to religion or religion is prior to magic, it would perhaps be wise on our part to indicate that man possesses an instinctive experience of the mysterious forces of the world which inspire him with awe, mystery and wonder, and this instinctive experience naturally takes on the forms of magical spells and incantations by which the magician projects his own will upon the wills of his fellow men who are controlled and regulated by the magician's coercive will. In this way the savage comes to regard magical power or 'mana' as the equivalent to his own will-power. 'Mana' is thus neither a conscious will-power by itself, nor unconscious physical energy by itself, but is only a reflex of the magician's projective will. And the mind of primitive men like the mind of an infant unhesitatingly submits to it and associates with it the qualities of a personal, spiritual energy, though it is in reality an "efficient neutral energy that may be controlled through appropriate means".¹

(b) PSYCHICAL CONDITIONS

Under the psychical conditions we have got to state what the factors of man's inner life are that are responsible for the origin of God-consciousness in him. Here we ought to note that man's psychical life being a continuous one we cannot stop with showing how man's consciousness of God originates, but must show how these inner factors make the development of such consciousness possible. For development in our psychical life is a continuous process within its unity. Hence, the question of how a man first becomes conscious of God is continuous with the question how he has grown in his God-consciousness.

1. Dr. S. K. Maitra: *Studies in Philosophy and Religion*, p. 64.

From the above it is further apparent that if the psychical life of man is a unity or an integrated whole, then religion will be not only born but also developed as a result of reaction of the whole of his psychical being and that religion being the most complex of the psychical attitudes of man, such reaction will always be a highly conscious and complex phenomenon. But in spite of this, attempts have been made by writers on the psychology of religion to trace its origin to *instinct* or to a special *religious faculty* or to a special kind of *feelings*, such as, fear and hope. But all these attempts forget the dynamic or functional character of psychical life and take it as static one and dissect consciousness into separate factors. For when it is said that man has an *instinct* for religion it is suggested that our mind feels the presence of a superior power because it does so, as if there is no other explanation of religious consciousness ; and the instinct theory of religious consciousness degenerates it into what may be called a biological prompting of our being to the neglect of consciousness of the higher values which religion involves. The suggestion that religion has its origin in a *special faculty* of our mind seems to revive the old faculty psychology which used to divide mind into water-tight compartments, each suited to a special kind of faculty and therefore goes against man's psychical life which is always an undivided whole. The fear theory of the origin of religion is liable to the same charge as the faculty theory ; it suggests as if we can single out the special emotion of fear out of the whole psychical context to account for the origin of our religious consciousness. Besides, if fear were set down as the basis of religious life, then we miss love, reverence, amity and other edifying feelings which religion inspires. The feeling of awe, however, is a very important element in the religious attitude of man. It certainly includes something of the feeling of fear, but it is not the feeling of fear as such, but it is fear sublimated and purged off the biological element of flight and also imbued with the feelings of wonder and attraction and majesty towards the object of our worship which infuses into us a sense of utter littleness in its magnificent presence.

It will be seen from the above and from what we are going to consider in the next section that religion has its rise not in any one or other of the elements of psychical life, as the static,

compartmental view of mind suggests, but in the entire conscious life itself. Because God, the object of religious consciousness, draws towards Himself the entire psychical being of man, which in its reaction finds itself in tune with Him and realises through all the higher experiences the higher values which are unified and consummated in Him.

3. *ANALYSIS OF RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS.*

In our survey of the conditions of the origin of religion we have found that though sociological and anthropological writers have tried to trace religion to one or other of the environmental conditions and writers on the psychology of religion, to one or other of the elements or functions of our psychical life, yet socio-logical and anthropological conditions have been found not without reference to psychical conditions, for a social behaviour or a social emblem or even a magic can rouse religious feelings only as it gets its significance in so far as it appeals to the inner life of man. And the above survey also reveals that the inner life of man, instead of being a truncated cone is always an integrated whole of psychical existence. Further, religion, as we understand it to-day, is not this or that particular attitude of man towards this or that particular facet of reality, but it is reaction of the whole of man to the whole of reality. The external world and the life of man constitute with God an organic whole of Existence, so that the entire psychical being of man and nature are organic to God.

It follows then that if religion is reaction of the whole of man to God, then his religious consciousness has to be looked upon as an organised psychical reaction to the Divine. Psychology of to-day in its logical analysis of the organised psychical life has broken it up into three main elements, thinking, feeling and will, for the purposes of its scientific treatment, though such tripartite analysis of psychical life should mean no dissolution or disruption of its synthetic unity. But in spite of this, and because of the peculiar character of religious life, we find writers, who have emphasised one or other of these three elements at the cost of the other two, as the very core of religion. Hence, we undertake to estimate the value of such emphasis on one in preference to the rest of the elements as follows.

(i) *Thought or Reason as the essential element of Religious consciousness.*

Rationalists in general have maintained that the seat of religion is not in our feeling or will but in thought or reason. They have maintained, perhaps with a sense of dignity for man, whom they suppose as pre-eminently a rational animal, that religion of man cannot have its root in anything else than thought or reason which is his essence. Man may have feeling and will as the less important elements of his life, but if religion is not to be degraded to blind or irrational faith, accompanied by his instinctive responses towards his God, rational understanding of the nature and attributes of *his* God can only satisfy him. Without the flash-light of reason his faith is only a dark chamber of his soul in which his being gropes for its God just as one gropes for a black cat in the dark. Again, reason must be the essence of religion for otherwise the truth of man's religion will be purely subjective, and will not rise to be objective and universal ; for it is the test of reason that can guarantee its universality and objectivity. Hegel and some of his followers confine religious consciousness to thought and reason to the subordination of feeling and will.

(ii) *Will or Activity as the essential element of Religion.*

On the other hand there is the tendency to emphasise the aspect of will as the essential element of religion. In the primitive stages of social history this tendency was very strong in so far as it was found that a feeling or emotion is without interest for man unless it issues forth into activity. Feeling demands expression in outward behaviour. This led human mind to believe that religion consists in man's outward activities rather than in feeling. Hence, there developed various methods of worship which resulted in *cults* or forms of public worship. The main two channels through which cult expresses itself are sacrifice and prayer. Now sacrifice and prayer also received various forms with all their details. Many of the semitic religions of old, the ancient Vedic religion and the religion of the Qd Testament bear witness to the fact that religion belongs to the active aspect of our conscious life rather than to its aspect of thinking and emotion.

In the period of Modern European philosophy since Kant established the primacy of will, there has developed a school of voluntaristic philosophers in whom we notice emphasis on the element of will to the subordination of feeling and intellect. Fichte made will or practical ego the basis of religion. With him piety coincided with moral conduct and God with the moral law and order of the universe. Rudolf Eucken identified life with activity, subordinating reason to it, and made religion to consist in a moral strife accompanied by purification of the heart.

Will has no doubt a place in the economy of human constitution and has a necessary part to play in religion too. To deny the function of will in the religious consciousness of man is to ignore the value of worship, which no consistent view of religion can afford to do. But will divorced from reason and thought has a tendency to degrade religion to empty formalism without the inner spirit as the Pharisees of the Old Testament did. Cult without guidance of thought and reason is a mockery of religion. As for Fichte's view of religion that it consists in moral conduct, it may be urged that though his metaphysical position does not deny the importance of the theoretical ego, as one of the two important self-projections of the Absolute Ego whose other self-projection is the practical ego, and, therefore, does not dissociate thought from will, yet he indulges in abstraction the moment he, in religious consciousness, reduces the theoretical ego to the practical ego and banishes reason from will. Indeed religion finds its practical fulfilment in moral conduct, but it is difficult to conceive how religion and moral conduct can have any meaning and significance if the practical ego in its moral activity is not guided by intellect or reason. Eucken's activism in subordinating philosophy to life errs more seriously than Fichte, because the activity he speaks about is more of the nature of the life's urge than of spiritual activity, which is always illumined by reason.

(iii) Feeling or Faith as the essence of Religion.

Religion, however, is conceived by many as originating from the feeling element of our psychical life. It is held that religious consciousness is a state of communion in which man feels himself in immediate or direct presence of the Divine. Just as in our

sense-perceptions we have immediate consciousness of objects, similarly in religion also man has feeling or direct consciousness of the super-sensuous Reality or God. Rational analysis may come in as a later element in religious consciousness when man is asked to communicate his religious experience to others. Religious feeling is almost akin to the feeling of the scientist whereby he hits upon a scientific truth. He also, like the man of religion, brings in the aid of thought or reason when asked to demonstrate the truth of his discovery. The only element of difference between the feeling or faith of the man of religion and that of the man of science, consists in the nature of the content of these feelings. In both cases, the immediacy of conviction is the same.¹ Schleiermacher makes feeling to be the essence of religion. He believes that man with his all-round limitedness and finitude is made to feel the feeling of dependence on a superior power or God. According to Schleiermacher this feeling of dependence is the essence of religious consciousness. But when he says so, he also points out that religion is exclusively a matter of feeling, and thought and will have nothing to do with it. Religion is thus outside the sphere of speculation and practice and has its seat in the emotional nature of man. In religion emotion engages the whole mental field and excludes the elements of reason and volition. It is the unique feeling which is whole and undivided, and metaphysical and ethical speculation should not be allowed to break up the unity of religious feeling. He maintains that just as in psychology feeling in general is the central faculty of the soul from which all other powers of it proceed, similarly religious feeling is the root of all other genuine feelings.

By way of criticism we may point out that first of all Schleiermacher's very psychology is unsound, because he makes feeling to be the central function of the soul forgetting that human soul is not only conscious but also self-conscious. Reason or thought is as important as feeling in the life of the soul. Secondly, his psychology of religion is equally unsound. For feeling of dependence may be possible in various ways, such as dependence of the son on his father, dependence of the servant on his master, dependence of an individual upon society and so on.

1. Cf. Lotze: *The Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 2-5.

Certainly, if feeling of dependence were the essence of religion, then these various kinds of dependence ought to have given us so many sources of religion. Further, in the presence of the Divine the religious man feels not so much the feeling of dependence as the other higher feelings of awe, reverence, love, beauty and the rest, which help him to realise his fuller being and higher values of life. The feeling of dependence may be an attendant feeling but not the essential feeling in religion. And to make the feeling of dependence to be the essence of religious consciousness is to revive in the modern advanced human society the primitive conception of religion, pre-animistic or totemistic, according to which the savage used to be inspired by the feeling of dependence on a superior power or powers which determined his destiny.

But when we say all this we do not mean to deny the importance of feeling in religious consciousness. On the other side we must not make a fetish of reason as the rationalists in their sense of dignity for man as a rational being have done. Nor should we ignore the practical side of religion which issues forth in worship and prayer. What we do maintain is that in religion feeling plays the most essential role in so far as God is an object of our immediate consciousness and is *felt* intuitively before He comes to be an object of analysis by thought. If religion is a matter of personal conviction, then intuitive and immediate consciousness or faith cannot but be a fundamental element of religious consciousness. But if we are to carry conviction to others as to what God is, then thought or discursive reason must be brought to bear upon our immediate feeling of God. Worship and prayer may follow our prior conviction of the divine presence. Instances of genuinely religious men unwilling to subject their inner conviction to rational analysis and to have recourse to worship and prayer are not rare phenomena. The fact of the matter is that our mental life is indeed composed of the elements of thinking, feeling and will and these elements accompany one another in our empirical conscious life, but the presence of the Divine is such that it throws the mental life out of its normal function in which these three empirical elements go together, and fills the whole being of man with a transcendental consciousness which can only be *felt* before being scanned by reason.

4. *FAITH AND REASON.*

Now the question whether this feeling of the religious man is blind or rational has given rise to the controversy as to whether faith or reason is the essential element of religious consciousness. It seems to us that the entire controversy is based on misconception of the respective functions of faith and reason in man's religious life. The term faith also has often been used loosely as an equivalent of mere feeling and its higher function has been lost sight of. If the higher function of faith is realised, then faith can never come in conflict with reason, and 'rational faith' loses its meaning that is ordinarily associated with it. Faith is said to be rationalised when faith and reason are supposed to belong to the same level of our mental life and reason though opposite in nature to faith is yet made to dissect it. Rationalisation of faith happens only when faith and reason are regarded as the collateral functions of the mind. We would like to point out that the genuinely religious feeling is not collateral or co-ordinate with reason, but a superior conscious level, which we may call faith or intuition and to which the mind of man rises on the flights of rational analysis. When the mind has intuited the Divine on that higher level it descends down the flights of reason again and thus renders a rational account of what it has grasped by faith or intuition. Hence, a genuinely religious faith or feeling is neither non-rational nor infra-rational, but supra-rational. The religion of man is of the nature of a discovery, a discovery of the affinity or oneness of his own being with the supreme Being and not a proof or demonstration. A proof or demonstration of the religious truth is not religion but a philosophy of religion. The scientist's discovery of a new fact or a principle may also be called an act of faith or intuition in this sense of a superior dimension of our psychical life. Starting with the rational data he may proceed very far in his researches, but it is the flash of intuition or faith that discovers for him the new fact or principle of his quest which he subsequently demonstrates by ratiocinative verification. Our view-point that faith is above reason, and never contrary to reason, is further illustrated by the fact that the proofs of the existence of God, causal, cosmological and teleological, are but so many futile attempts of human reason to demonstrate what God is ; the moral and ontological

arguments, while indicating the negative value of reason positively establish the efficacy of faith or intuition by telling us "to believe where we cannot prove". Hegel, the advocate of rationalism and conceptual thought, has himself admitted in a way the primacy of feeling in the sphere of religion. He has himself argued that religion which consists in the "feeling of the Eternal" cannot be put into man by any amount of rational philosophy for it is the original endowment of man, just as you cannot put reason into the mind of a dog by making it chew printed pages of a philosophy work.¹ That religious faith opens up a new and higher dimension of our psychical being above the levels of sense-feeling and rational thought is admitted by William James who will be satisfied with nothing short of what is not radically empirical and not understandable by reason. As he puts it, "We have in the fact that the conscious person is continuous with a wider self through which saving experience comes, a positive content of religious experience which, it seems to me, is literally and objectively true as far as it goes. . . . The further limits of our being plunge, it seems to me, into an altogether other dimension of existence from the sensible and merely 'understandable' world. Name it the mystical region, or the supernatural region, whichever you choose."²

5. GOD AND THE WORLD.

We have already pointed out that God must be conceived as one ultimate rational being comprehending all, incidentally remarking that a dualistic or pluralistic conception is fraught with difficulties, metaphysical, moral and theological. If God must be conceived monistically then the question arises: What must be the relation between God and the world, the One and the Many, God as the one creative spiritual principle and the world of things and minds, which owes its being to God?

The monistic thinkers are not all of the same view with regard to the relation between God and the world. *Deism*, *Pantheism* and *Panentheism* represent these different views held within the monistic conception of the universe. We propose to

1. Cf. Hegel: *Philosophy of Religion*, Vol. I, p. 4.

2. William James: *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 515-516.

give below the accounts of Deism, Pantheism and Panentheism in order, with criticisms where necessary.

(a) *Deism*: A band of English theological writers which included among others, John Toland, Tindal and Chubb, revived the teachings of the Bible and accepted its cosmogony. These writers were called the Eighteenth-Century Deists. They believed that God is the one fundamental rational principle who created the world out of nothing by His fiat or will at some point of time before which God was without His world. God, as it were, thought that there should be a world and willed it into existence all of a sudden out of nothing and His creation was a temporal event. While creating it God imparted into it wills of men and forces of nature, and the world since its creation has been going on independently of Him with these wills and forces. God was, therefore, the first cause of the world and the wills and forces are its secondary causes which are responsible for what happens in the created physical and the mental world.

The main contentions of the deistic conception of God are that the world of ours is now an independent reality outside of God and that the wills of men enjoy true freedom because they are not at all interfered with by the will of God, and have their own ways of doing things. The main reason why the deist conceives of the relation between God and the world in this way is that Spinoza in his pantheism had already undermined the reality and independence of the world and of human wills by reducing them to be the unreal modes of the Divine Substance, which in its indeterminate absolute identity is the only reality swallowing up the reality of the world and of man. But the deists make God absolutely aloof from and completely *transcendent* over His world of creation, introducing dualism between Himself and His creation. Deism vindicates the freedom of human wills against the pantheism of Spinoza, but it does so at the high price of dualism, because dualism, which entails a spatial separation between God and the world, limits God by the world and therefore takes away His absolute character and makes Him a finite being unsatisfying to religious consciousness. Again, if God is supposed to be without the world in His state of complete transcendence as deism supposes Him to be before creation, it is difficult to conceive how consciousness can be attributed to Him in

the pre-creation period of His life, for at that time there must have been no object of His consciousness.

Again Deism which re-echoes the Biblical theory that all the contents of the world have remained just the same without any changes since creation, suggests that some order must have been maintained all through the world since creation. Now the maintenance of this order in the world as a system entails action and reaction and constant readjustments amongst its contents. The deist does not go so far as to deny some order in the world system, for creation according to him, as according to the Bible, means transition from a chaos to a cosmos. But it is difficult to conceive how the deist's world can maintain its order through constant readjustment independently of the continuous interference from God. If it could, then it would also have created itself independently of God. It follows then that the arbitrary separation between the world and God is a misunderstanding of the real relation between God and the world.

Further, human will being finite cannot claim absolute freedom which deism suggests. Freedom of the individual will in the highest sense means its harmony and unison with the universal will and is therefore relative. Absolute freedom of man suggested by deism is really a denial of freedom just as in the sphere of politics, too, absolute independence of the individual will, without any accountability and conformity to the state will, ends in anarchy which negates freedom.

(b) *Pantheism*: Pantheism, as a doctrine of the relation between God and the world, literally means that *all is God* (*Pan*, all ; *Theos*, God), or more commonly, the world is God, and God is the world. It is a reaction against deism, which makes an absolute separation between God and the world. Spinoza, is the author of this doctrine in modern philosophy.

According to Spinoza, there is one absolute spiritual Reality called by him Substance, and the world and the selves of men are represented respectively by the attributes of extension and consciousness which the human mind conceives as forming the essence of the Substance. Hegelians like Erdmann and others maintain that the attributes of extension and consciousness are not real or objectively existing in the Substance which is attribute-

1. Lotze: *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 109.

less, but only represent the subjective ways of understanding the world of things and minds in relation to God. The worlds of things and minds, therefore, have no real or substantial existence of their own but are swallowed up or merged in the reality of the Substance. It follows then that every thing, every event, every mind and every mental function, all are God and nothing else. And by simply converting the above proposition we get, *God is all*. When it is said that God is all or all is God, it is further implied that the world with its physical and mental contents is not only not different from God, but also not even an effect produced by God as its cause. Because, cause and effect, the producer and the produced, indicate a causal relation instead of the relation of Ground and Consequent, which according to Spinoza is the proper relation between God and the world. It happens then that God is identified with or immanently present in all that makes up the world. This is the general formulation of Spinoza's pantheism.

Hegel's view of the relation between God and the world has also been interpreted by his left-wingers, like Fechner and others, as suggestive of pantheism rather than of pantheism which is the interpretation of his right-wing followers like Green, John Caird, Edward Caird and others. Fechner, dissatisfied with the tendencies of contemporary science and theology to make an absolute separation between God and the world, tries to identify them on the analogy of intimate relation between soul and body in human personality. He thinks that the entire physical world is the body whose indwelling soul is God. It is apparent that behind and beyond the supreme spiritual organism, nothing else exists as real, and just as our own body is animated by our soul, similarly the entire world which is a body of God is animated by Him. The result is that all things beginning from the stars and planets down to the stocks and stones form His body, and all minds are co-ordinated into His supreme mind. His life and spirit permeates whatever exists in physical nature. This view of the relation between God and the world is not only pantheistic but also the basis of panpsychism of a very important type. Not only does Fechner's account make us think that God is all, but also think that all is endowed with life and soul. Everything according to him is endowed with a soul and nothing is there without body or material basis. Viewed outwardly any object of the universe is a phenomenon to others and viewed inwardly it

is a spirit to itself, and the universal spirit which permeates the entire universe overlaps and influences our individual consciousnesses. An important point of distinction between Spinozism and Pantheism of Fechner seems to be this that while in Spinoza the Substance is a psycho-physical whole in which the physical and the psychical, nature and mind, are regarded as having equal status and as running parallel to one another, in Fechner the reality is also a psycho-physical whole, yet nature is only external appearance or body whose indwelling soul is universal consciousness. The universal consciousness is thus the inner reality and determines nature as its phenomenon. Here we get the cardinal principle of all idealism. *Fechner's pantheism is thus Spinozism idealistically interpreted.* Hence, his pantheism is generally known as Idealistic Pantheism.¹

We next propose to estimate the implications of pantheism both in its traditional Spinozistic form as well as in its idealistic garb as given by Fechner. The basic idea of pantheism seems to be rooted in the spirit of humility and self-surrender of the religious man towards the Supreme Being whose presence is felt as permeating all that exists in the universe. Religion instead of being a challenge of the finite soul to the universal soul for the vindication of its individuality and freedom as Deism is, is more an inspiration actuating the individual to surrender his personality to God whose presence he feels in himself and everything else around him. But though pantheism is thus a high-toned religious view of the universe, yet philosophic and ethical consciousness is not satisfied with it. Philosophic consciousness demands that Reality must be a concrete system in which God instead of swallowing up the reality of the contents of the universe, must provide for their individuality and value and thereby fulfil Himself as a concrete universal. Pantheism of Spinoza makes Reality to be an abstract unity destitute of all contents, so that attributes, relations, and individualities, which should constitute its contents are reduced to illusions and deprived of relative reality. Reality is thus reduced to be a static existence, unmoved and unmoving, like the unconcerned Leviathan covering the whole universe under its colossal expanse, to the detriment of individuality, plurality and diversity of things which the universe teems with. Pantheism makes God *wholly immanent* in the universe

1. Falckenberg: *History of Modern Philosophy*, pp. 602-605.

without reserving for Him any fund of reality whereby He can transcend it. Causal efficacy is replaced by mathematical necessity and all values are reduced to be colourless facts. Our distinctions between truth and error, good and bad, and between beauty and ugliness become meaningless, as the entire system of things is transformed into a realm of mechanism. Moral responsibility becomes an empty ethical concept and freedom a convention of speech. Subject and object, mind and nature are merged in the all-swallowing Substance to the utter impossibility of knowledge-relation.

The idealistic pantheism of Fechner fares no better than the traditional pantheism of Spinoza, except in one respect that the external world of matter is allowed only a dubious kind of reality as it is supposed by him to be the body of the all-pervading universal consciousness which is the truer reality. Individual selves are absorbed within the universal consciousness and with them, also their personality. The ethical consequence of both traditional and idealistic forms of pantheism thus appears to be equally dubious. Hence *Panentheism* whose watch-word is the vindication of the reality of things and minds, of personality and freedom of the individual, has made pantheism an easy target of its criticism. But apart from these metaphysical, ethical and epistemological difficulties which are generally thought to vitiate pantheism, it at least has the unique merit of bringing God into an intimate relation with man and of giving to his religious consciousness that spirit of resignation and self-surrender which man in his deepest communion with the Divine necessarily feels, even when the whole world is flung into destruction.

(c) *Panentheism*: Panentheism is a reconciliatory theory of the relation between God and the universe avoiding the extremes of Deism and Pantheism. It is mainly associated with the name of Hegel and means that *all is in God* (*Pan*, all ; *en*, in ; *theos*, God). The all, that is, the world of things and minds instead of being absorbed in the all-inclusive reality of God, enjoys relative reality discharges its function and realises its values within the concrete reality of God. It does not, like Deism, encourage separation between God and the world and therefore dualism between them, which necessarily gives rise to finitude and limitation of God. It is not mad with the fad of false freedom for finite selves as Deism is, nor does it degenerate the dignity of man as an ethical agent to the mechanism of mathematical

necessity as Pantheism does. It is based upon concrete metaphysics of Hegelian Idealism which takes an organic view of the relation between the infinite and the finite, God and the world. God as a dynamic reality realises His own nature by differentiating Himself into the world of things and minds with its attributes and relations, for therein lie His self-realisation and self-fulfilment. God is both *immanent* in and *transcendent* over the world of things and minds with which He is not completely identified. He reserves an inexhaustible fund of reality whereby He always transcends the world. Man in his religious consciousness never feels himself lost in Him, but attains his fuller being and greater concreteness as he approximates to the infinitude of God or to the unity of the absolute values which God is. His ethical responsibility and freedom as an individual are not bartered in favour of religious absorption, but acquire deeper significance in so far as his moral will harmonises with the universal will. Panentheism is otherwise known as *Concrete Monotheism*, as it believes in one divine reality, which instead of negating the contents of the universe, the things of the world and wills of men, provides for their reality and development as necessary and integral elements of its being. The term *Theism* is also used to mean the same thing as panentheism or concrete monotheism. But the dominant interest of the theistic conception of God seems to be to assign personality to God though panentheism and concrete monotheism, too, by their analysis of the conditions of personality are led to the same position. Thus panentheism presents a concrete picture of the ultimate, absolute Reality evolving things and events, the living objects and selves of men out of its own nature and giving reality of different degrees to all the contents of itself and allowing freedom and personality to human selves. Panentheism does not make distinction between God and the Absolute, because it does not believe in absolute transcendence on the part of the Absolute but thinks that the Absolute or God is both immanent in and transcendent over the universe of his creation.

The world with all its contents is in space and time and so God in His immanental relation to the world includes time and space within Him, though in His transcendence He is above time and space. The nature is organic to man and man is organic to God or the Absolute. Individual selves are persons in so far as they are possessed of self-consciousness and self-determination

and God or the Absolute is the infinite person and His infinite personality consists in His including the experiences of the finite persons and organising them into the unity of His self-conscious existence. This is the sense in which Hegel conceives personality of the Absolute. Hence instead of asserting like McTaggart that though God may be the unity of the human persons, yet such a unity is not necessarily personal, Pringle-Pattison also declares that though the infinite experience of the Absolute includes within itself the time-process and the experience of the finite individuals within that time-process, yet it is beyond human comprehension 'an essential mystery' as to how such inclusion happens and constitutes the personality of God.¹

6. OUR BELIEF IN THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

Keeping in mind the conception of God we have formulated and our conception of the relation between God and the world including the selves of men, we might restate here that man's conscious life is an integral part of the divine consciousness, and that human consciousness, in its attempt to apprehend God, must develop that specific attitude which will not only reveal the nature of God but also justify its belief in His existence. Our conscious life is a complex of feeling, thinking and will, but our apprehension of, and belief in, the divine existence involve that level of conscious life which is essentially of the nature of *suprarational faith* as we have viewed it, and that saving faith stands above the struggle for supremacy of any one of the elements over the other two in the sphere of our belief in divine existence. The point we are driving at is whether the consciousness directed towards the apprehension of the nature of the Divine is identically the same in constitution as that which constitutes our proof for the existence of the Divine ; in other words, whether religious consciousness which apprehends the reality of the Divine is a purely subjective affair or whether it can vindicate the objective character of its content by proving the trans-subjective nature of the Divine.

This brings us at once to the question of the distinction between the origin and validity of religious consciousness. In our analysis of religious consciousness we have concluded that religion has its origin in faith or suprarational intuition which is not sense-feeling nor intellectual knowledge, but a level of psychical being to

1. Pringle-Pattison: *The Idea of God*, Lecs. XIV and XV.

which man in his communion with God rises and which is not against but above intellectual knowledge. Now our present problem is to show whether such unique psychical level which accounts for the origin of religion also establishes the validity of what it apprehends or realises. We would show in the sequel that in the sphere of religion the origin of our consciousness of *God* involves the same psychical factors as are involved in the validity of such consciousness. But the problem of validity of God-consciousness, or, what amounts to the same thing, belief in the existence of God, has not been tackled from the same angle of approach by thinkers on the subject. The rationalistic philosophers who have made too much of human reason, such as, Descartes, Leibniz, Hegel and others, have thought that our belief in the existence of God must be based on exclusively rational powers, which alone can give validity to it. They say that just as ordinary knowledge owes its validity to reason and understanding, similarly our belief in God's existence must be sifted by rational analysis. So we find the rationalists giving us their famous theistic proofs, which alone, according to them, furnish rational grounds for our belief in the divine existence. We shall therefore pass in review these theistic proofs.

(a) The *Cosmological Argument* for the divine existence is based on the *contingency of the cosmos* or the world as we know it, and tries to prove that God must exist as the infinite cause of the finite world, because nothing finite can explain its origin. For if we take any other finite thing to be the origin of that finite then it will lead us to suppose another finite and so on. So to avoid an infinite regress we must fall back upon an infinite cause. Hence God must be the infinite First Cause of the cosmos. The argument from the contingency of the cosmos is open to serious objections. The first objection is that, in tracing the world back to God as the First Cause, it assumes an endless series of cause and effect, and yet gets to the First Cause which does not belong to the causal series. Secondly, it involves an infinite regress which need always be rejected, specially in scientific procedure, which is loath to assume anything in investigation. Thirdly, the cosmological argument believes in efficient causation as it makes God the efficient cause of the universe. The efficient causality of God is believed to be further supported by the second law of thermo-dynamics according to which

our universe with its organised energy is running down, with the result that it will turn into the form of a run-down clock after a considerable length of time when God will have to put in fresh efficiency into it, as He must have done on previous occasions. But despite what cosmological argument claims to have proved and the additional support received from the second law of thermodynamics, it reduces God to be an external mechanist imparting force and energy into the world from outside and this external relation of God to the world is unsatisfactory both to philosophic and to religious consciousness of man.¹

(b) The *Teleological Argument*, or Physico-theological argument as Kant calls it, tries to prove God as the intelligent or purposive cause of the universe on the analogy of a designing artificer producing a work of art. Just as adaptation of parts of a machine and the end or purpose for which it is produced argue the existence of an intelligent mechanist, even so the adaptation of parts and departments of the universe to one another and its harmonious process prove that the maker of this universe must be an intelligent being. The rationalist's claim for teleology to prove the existence of God is perhaps weaker than his claim for cosmological argument. Its comparative weakness is due to two things, the one, that it makes God external to His universe reducing Him to what Plato calls *demiurgus*; and the other, that it proves at best God's intelligence but not His infinitude. To say that we must distinguish between external and internal teleology, and base God's existence on internal teleology, insisting that God as an intelligent maker of the universe has not left it after making it, but is immanently fulfilling His purpose through the universe, does not improve matters. Because internal teleology is an assumption and is not warranted by the analogy of the mechanist and the machine on which teleology is based. It may be suggested also that even the internal form of teleology cannot free God from limitation by the stuff of the world supplied to Him from outside for purposive operation. But it may take refuge against this charge of limitation in the theory of evolution, in which God is supposed to be teleologically evolving out of His own nature, the materials for His purposive activity. But after all the orthodox teleological account, in which God is supposed as the rational and

1. Cf. E. W. Barnes: *Scientific Theory and Religion* (Gifford Lectures 1933), pp. 595-96.

efficient cause, pushing the course of evolution from behind, fails to give us the more consistent conception of God as the embodiment of values which determine courses of events from before, and not from behind.

(c) The *Ontological argument* is another instrument at the hands of the rationalist for establishing our belief in the existence of God. But we see that in the Cartesian form the ontological argument first assumes the existence in our mind of an idea of a perfect being and then passes from such idea to the existence of its ideate and has become chargeable by Kant with dogmatic assumption both as to the necessary existence of the idea in our mind and as to objective existence of God of which it is the idea. Even if we suppose that Descartes answered satisfactorily the first charge, by saying that such an idea is a *necessary* one, he failed to answer the second charge how the idea of God could guarantee the objective existence of God. Hegel's version of the ontological argument does not stick to the process of the finite mind from its idea of God to the existence of God as Descartes did, but makes the argument to yield to us, by dialectic necessity, the existence of God as the logical postulate of all our ideas and of the existence of all things. Thus instead of proving the existence of God as the conclusion from the premise of our idea of God, it really inverts the order and proves the existence in our mind of our idea of God as also his existence as conclusion from God or Thought or Idea as a necessary assumption. Owing to these difficulties Lotze looks at the ontological argument from common sense point of view and suggests that from our idea of a perfect being in our mind we can at best get to God the Beautiful, the Exalted and the Holy, which need not have the predicate of being and far less of personality. He admits that, "as a proof therefore, of the existence of God, his (Anselm's) argument was weak enough; and yet it expresses what is an immediate fact about our minds, namely, that *impulse*, which we experience towards the supersensuous, and that *faith* in its truth which is the starting point of all religion".¹

Empirical philosophy of Hume which makes knowledge to consist wholly of sense-feelings, cannot justify man's belief in God's existence. According to him God certainly does not come

1. Lotze: *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 12. The italics are ours.

within the purview of sense-experience, because He cannot be sensed as other objects are. But a more vital objection he brings against the possibility of proving God's existence consists in pointing out that since an effect cannot contain more reality than what is there in its cause, we cannot pass from our experience of the *finite* world as premise to the conclusion of God as its *infinite* cause—an objection which vitiates the cosmological argument. Kant keeping knowledge within the range of sense-experience refuted Hume's theory of knowing by pointing out that knowledge which is intelligible experience can be established only by organisation of sense-materials by the categories of the mind. But the result of Kant's theory of epistemological dualism has been that he has been forced to restrict knowledge to the world of phenomena, allowing it no access to the world of realities. Hence, Kant from the standpoint of Pure Reason refutes all these theistic proofs and therefore our belief in God as Reality and therefore turns out an agnostic. Spencer's empirical theory of knowledge also leads him to agnosticism. Because, according to him, our knowledge of things rests on comparison of them with other things of the same nature; and knowledge of God, if any, will mean necessary comparison of God with the things of the world. But the things of the world being finite and conditioned, God, to be comparable with them, must also be finite and conditioned. Hence, to know God is to condition God or to condition the unconditioned, which is impossible. In other words, we cannot know God 'in the strict sense of knowing'.

The above considerations point to the one fact that neither empirical nor empirico-rational apparatus of knowledge is competent to give us a belief in God's existence. But at the same time we must note that many of these empirical and empirico-rational writers have admitted another avenue of believing in God's existence, which is *faith*. Hume in the tenth section of his *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* has admitted that reason has no access to what transcends experience and God as transcending experience cannot be proved but only *believed in*. Kant, better than any other philosopher, has also shown that pure reason fails to comprehend God. He therefore must be believed in as a moral governor adjusting rewards and punishments to the human agents in future life according to their deserts. It is not intellectual knowledge, but moral faith in a moral governor that, according

to Kant, assures us of the divine existence. William James, an avowed empiricist, accepting nothing as true which does not come to us through external experience, has made an important confession in his *Varieties of Religious Experience*, when he has said that man has an *over-belief in a More*, and this over-belief far transcends ordinary experience and rational understanding.

Our belief in the divine existence is thus never to be equated with sense-feeling, which reveals isolated and evanescent facts of the moment, nor again requires to be put on the same footing with reason which proceeds by analysis and dissection of reality and insists on logical 'proofs'; for logical proofs always end in attaining the husks to the neglect of the kernel.¹ Our belief in the divine existence is constituted by that faculty of our spirit which far transcends both sense-feeling and reason and even their combination. At the root of the very consciousness that there is a supreme being which not only evolves the world but tends the individual self towards the attainment of his fuller being, there is that inner impulse or goading under which the human mind feels that it has to rise above the ordinary levels of experience and reason to the realm of faith in which God as the supreme objective truth reveals Himself. Such a faith is *not a vision* which carries with it no conviction of certainty but is a direct consciousness in which there is no room for uncertainty and doubt. While analysing in a previous section the nature of religious consciousness we have called it faith, and we have also shown that it has no chance of being irrational or blind, but that it is always supra-rational transcending, but never antagonising, rational knowledge. And at the root of our belief in the divine existence there is the same faith that not only becomes conscious of the Divine but also 'enquiries' into the grounds of God's existence. In one word, faith, in the sense in which we have taken it, not only is the main essence of religious consciousness but also justifies such consciousness in so far as it leads human self, by the hand, as it were, to the conviction that God not only is for the self of the religious man but also for other selves, so that religion is not mere subjective or individual conviction but has an appeal to make to other selves whose significance and value lies in 'being at one with the whole.'²

1. Cf. Lotze: *Outlines of Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 8-9.

2. Cf. Bosanquet: *What Religion is?* pp. 7-12.

7. *GOD AND THE ABSOLUTE.*

All theistic religions, partly inspired by the Biblical conception of personality and partly by common sense, have conceived of God as identical with the Absolute. Hegel, though himself a strictly logical thinker, could not shake himself off from the theistic bias that God is not only Absolute but also personal. Now the question whether God is to be considered identical with the Absolute or must be distinguished from the Absolute, has engaged the most serious attention of philosophers since Hegel. In deciding in favour of the one question or the other, one would do well to consider whether any form of personality can at all be applied to God with logical consistency. One would do well also to be explicit as to one's conception of personality and as to the relation between the world and the individual on the one side and the Absolute on the other.

But before entering into the deeper question of personality on which the distinction between God and the Absolute so largely depends, we would like to point out that there have been put forward, from two very important quarters, arguments denying identity between personal God and the Absolute. One of them is the Personal Idealists amongst whom we may count Dr. F. C. S. Schiller, Prof. Howison, Dr. Rashdall, and A. J. Balfour ; and the other includes Spinoza and F. H. Bradley. We propose to consider the arguments of the Personal Idealists in the following sub-section.

(a) *GOD IN PERSONAL IDEALISM.*

Personal Idealism is a reaction against all those philosophical tendencies which have resulted in abstractions and specially have thrown man and all that is human into the background. Pragmatism indeed has done a great service to the cause of human activity and freedom and to the cause of the world as a real process in time. But it is Humanism that has brought to the fore-ground the personality of the cosmic principle whatever that principle may be, and specially the living concrete experience of man, whose needs and claims must be explained as the central problems in the universe, consistently with this personal conception of the cosmic principle. The Humanist claims that his method is concrete, and philosophy to be of any worth

must adopt this concrete method. Science and metaphysics may be focussed on the concrete nature of man in his relation to the world, with the result that scepticism will be forced to make room for certitude, pessimism for optimism, abstract views of things for concrete picture of the world. The development of the world with man at its centre and God at its circumference will point to the completion of the process, and the selves of men will shine forth as perfected spirits in the light of the countenance of God. The goal of the world-process, according to Schiller, is not the state of inactivity, rest or stagnation, but one of eternal and perfect activity of perfected individuals. Matter in Humanism is not an abstract principle standing as an intractable impediment to consciousness, but it is as much a manifestation of divine purpose as spirit, and as such helps, instead of hindering, the progress and education of spirits. Spirits are a hierarchy of conscious centres, the lower among which seem to have their consciousness limited by matter, but the higher conscious centres overcome it by knowledge which grows in them in their growing activities in the working out of a social order and harmony. Matter thus as a source of evil cannot remain a permanently unconscious principle, but is gradually being transmuted from its abstract unconscious character into being the engine of progress and the instrument in the perfection of the spirit. Schiller is thus an upholder of the doctrine of freedom in that he thinks that spirits in their innate active character have the reality of choice of an environment and by their dynamic character they always strive after amelioration of their conditions, which is the goal of evolution.¹

From the above general account of the Humanist's universe we now come to Schiller's conception of God. The metaphysic of Schiller is evidently pluralistic. He starts with a given world consisting of God and the egos, and of matter as the principle of resistance to the activity of God and the egos. God, the egos and matter are all self-existent and self-created. The world is thus a realm of evil and disorder as much as one of good and order, and there is always a struggle between evil and good, in which good prevails. Now such a metaphysic as that of Schiller can give us only a finite God. His very pluralistic universe is

1. Cf. Schiller: *Riddles of the Sphinx, and Studies in Humanism*.

against infinitude of God, who is only one of the plural factors of which the universe is made. Religion, if it is not to turn out an abstract metaphysics reducing everything to the infinity of God, must not grudge to have a finite God in whom the attributes of personality, consciousness, power, intelligence, goodness, purpose intending the world to perfection, are consistent and compatible. If God were an infinity we cannot account for why there should be these qualities and functions which the religious consciousness demands of its God. If God were an all-complete and all-powerful being as the ascription of infinity to God suggests to us, then everything must be exactly what it should be, making no provision for change and development, nor for active struggle in the life of individual egos and in the life of God. There must be the world as a resisting force to God, so that God by striving against the world must tend it to a perfect system and thus acquire personality which consists in such limitation and overcoming of obstructions. The egos, too, are persons inasmuch as they are engaged in their lives' struggle where similar, though not the same, kind of resistance to matter is involved. It follows that all individual selves and God are persons, only that God being possessed of greatest degrees of wisdom, power and consciousness, must be the foremost amongst persons.¹ As Schiller himself puts it, "By becoming finite, God becomes once more a real principle in the understanding of the world, a real motive in the conduct of life, a real factor in the existence of things, a factor none the less real for being unseen and inferred."²

In Prof. Howison's work, *Limits of Evolution*, we notice a tendency to separate God from the Absolute. Howison seems to think that the conception of the Absolute banishes all element of plurality, but since our universe teems with plurality or multiplicity of spirits the ultimate principle of the universe cannot be Absolute in the above sense. He speaks about God no doubt and endows Him with personality, but he does not go the length of making Him a finite being as Schiller has done. Howison's God occupies a peculiar position in the world-system. According to him the world is composed of a multiplicity of spirits, and self-consciousness with which each of such spirits is endowed, is

1. Cf. Schiller: *Riddles of the Sphinx*, pp. 306-357.

2. *Ibid* p. 348.

the principle of separation and exclusion amongst them. And the mutual recognition involved in the principle of self-consciousness makes each of the selves a person, and the same principle of mutual recognition as applied to God makes Him a personality. But personality being essentially social involves relation to other beings. God as a person must also be related to the selves of men, so that as personal, God is a member of the series of selves. But the society of the selves makes up the eternal or supratemporal life which is God. As a supreme being He is the central or dominant member of the society. He is not thus an absolute being, though He is a person. But God retains His perfection because His relation to the individual selves is only implicit. Thus though God is *limited* by the selves in so far as He is related to them, yet He is *not finite*, because He embraces all finite selves which in their qualitative sense are infinite.

The world is therefore a world of spirits, and what we call nature is constituted only by some of those experiences which selves, that is, men and other finite intelligences, have and organise into an order in their active relation with one another. In thus 'begetting nature' the selves, which are eternal in their character, enter into a temporal series and give rise to an empirical existence. Hence nature is a product of conjunction of the eternal and the temporal aspects of the selves. According to Howison while the finite minds are directly and productively causal of nature, God is only indirectly so. The indirect conditioning of nature by God is due to the fact that selves' constant participation in the perfection of God makes them what they are. To avoid subjectivism which might result from the exclusive character of the self-conscious principle of the selves, Howison assumes the hypothesis of an 'identical content' common to all self-active intelligences and thus tries to bring about order and unity in the universe. This identical content, according to Howison, is due to the common character of intellectual, aesthetic and ethical ideals which all selves as members of an Eternal Republic must entertain, though such an assumption fares hardly better than Leibniz's Pre-established Harmony. To come to our own point at issue, viz., the relation between God and the Absolute as conceived by Howison, it may be pointed out that if God is intimately related to the selves as their *prius* and presupposition, and if He is the

condition of all evolution, natural and moral, and acts as the final cause of the world of spirits, then He should not be supposed as a finite being amongst other finite beings as Schiller's anthropocentric metaphysic compels him to do. He should rather be regarded as the Absolute as the idealists would have Him. Howison of course does not make his God a finite being but at the same time he emphasises His personality. But the account that he gives of God amounts to making God neither an ontological nor a metaphysical but only a logical and teleological principle. He is an ideal goal towards which each consciousness in its external freedom moves. It is difficult to see how such a conception of a logical and ideal principle can be consistent with his pluralism of selves with which God is supposed to be immanently connected in order that the moral freedom of the selves may be possible. Hence, there seems to be an apparent confusion between his idea of God as a personal being and his idea of God as the Absolute.

Rashdall, in his *Essays on Personal Idealism* and in his *Theory of Good and Evil*, makes a distinction between God and the Absolute and takes God in the ordinary sense of a finite personal being. By a two-fold argument he proves the existence of God as the unity of self-consciousness. The first argument is that the world that we know exists in our experience and we cannot say that the world that we know exhausts all possible worlds. For long before we were born and long after we shall be dead, there must have been and will be other worlds which far transcend the world of our knowledge. Now to unify all these worlds, the present world of ours and the larger world of which our world is a fraction, there must be a consciousness inclusive of, but indefinitely larger than, any of our finite selves and that consciousness is God. Secondly our moral consciousness certifies to the existence of an absolute moral ideal contrasted with our ideals which are relative, and the absolute moral ideal presupposes for its existence a supremely moral self who is God. Now from these metaphysical and moral grounds we conclude that God as the unity of consciousness unifying individual consciousnesses must exist. But that does not prove that God is identical with the Absolute, for the Absolute though including God and all other consciousnesses is here not a single self-consciousness but a community of selves. Hence the Absolute may include God and finite spirits, but yet

need not be itself a unity of self-consciousness. "God is thus one of the eache^s, a separate appearance of the Absolute. He has all the limitations of personality. He is finite and limited by other selves, but this limitation is not an arbitrary one from outside but a necessary one springing from his very nature." But it remains to be seen how far the separation between God and the Absolute by Rashdall is justifiable. If the object of God is the whole world and if His creation is due to his self-limitation, then surely God is all, so that the distinction between God and the Absolute vanishes. Rashdall's own theory of creation makes him think of finite selves as derivative of and dependent on God. To Rashdall God is the whole and real and the reality of God includes the reality of all beings derived from Him. Thus God becomes the concrete whole of existence including but never excluding the particulars. Rashdall is anxious to ascribe personality to God, and since, he seems to think, personality involves contrast between the self-hood of the person and the other selves, he has remained satisfied with making a separation between the Absolute and God as a person. But he forgets that such feeling of contrast is not the essential condition of personality.

A. G. Balfour is another interesting personal idealist who out of Christian bias, fed by his distrust of scientific and metaphysical conclusions, has been led to the separatist view of the relation between God of religion and the Absolute of philosophy. He has developed his conclusions in his Gifford Lectures on *Theism and Humanism*, though he had already prepared the ground for such conclusions in his earlier works, *Philosophic Doubt* and *Foundations of Belief*. He has distinguished philosophical systems into religious and non-religious on the ground that in religious systems of philosophy God has been represented as playing a living rôle in the drama of the universe, and in the non-religious systems He is represented as a mere logical unity somehow related to the multiplicity of things and their relations, and as such is installed as the Absolute. According to Balfour theism and absolutism are diametrically opposed to each other and any absolutist conception of God will mar religion. For religion can never be satisfied with anything short of a personal God who must hold

1. Sir S. Radhakrishnan: *The Region of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy*, p. 393.

personal relationships with human beings and must be a spirit among spirits. As a personality He must hold relationships of love and worship with man and must be the unity and support of values, of Knowledge, Beauty and Goodness, which human persons aspire to. To make God an absolute out of all relation with differences and diversities, plurality and individuality which our universe teems with, is to depersonalise God, and reduce Him to a mere logical glue somehow to unify the multiplicity and differences of the concrete contents of our human world. As Balfour himself says, "When I speak of God, I mean something other than an identity wherein all differences vanish, or a unity which includes but does not transcend the differences, which it somehow holds in solution. I mean a God whom men can love, a God to whom men can pray, who takes sides, who has purposes and preferences, whose attributes, however conceived, leave unimpaired the possibility of a personal relation between Himself and those whom He has created."¹ To Balfour then God must be a personality and from the account which he gives of personality He must also be finite, because his main contention is that God must be related to human persons and such relation necessarily implies limitation on the side of God. It follows that God can only be a very big finite, bigger than any of our human personalities. He must, in other words, be a *primus inter pares*, the first among peers. But, nevertheless, Balfour betrays at times his tendency to an unconscious absolutism when he allows that God may be super-personal, and when he also admits that for the explanation and reconciliation of conflicting psychical, physical and social forces of the world, a supreme Reason, in whom this conflict is ultimately resolved, is a necessary assumption.

A critical survey of the positions of the personal idealists, Schiller, Howison, Rashdall and Balfour, reveals that they are all characterised by an overestimate of the modern humanistic claims and by an underestimate of the value of logic and reason. But a philosophic conception of the universe will evaluate with perfect sobriety the claims of emotion and reason giving each its due in the economy of conscious life. Schiller and Balfour in their over-emphasis on the needs and aspirations of human life,

1. Balfour: *Philosophy of Doubt*, p. 21.

have lost sight of the fact that religion of man cannot afford to make his God in his own image and yet to think of Him as the source of all, as a potentiality and a creative synthesis. God taken in the absolute sense can alone account for the development of potentiality under a synthetic unity. The plural and the many can have meaning and value and their discord can be reduced to harmony only on the assumption of unity which explains and reconciles them ; the logical must get over the practical reason, must supplement emotion. If God is to be an explanation of the contents of the world and to satisfy all the demands of human life, practical, emotional and logical, then He must be the concrete unity and force which will at once evolve, sustain and synthesise the things of the world and the selves of men, and tend the entire universe towards greater and greater fulfilment and higher and higher values without impairing His supreme unity and individuality. Such is the conception of God consistent with the Absolute Idealism we have advocated, in which God may be the Absolute without detriment to His individuality.

While Schiller and Balfour altogether discard the conception of the Absolute, Howison and Rashdall only make a separation between the God of religion and the Absolute of philosophy. Howison is not in a position to equate God with the Absolute, because he fails to see how the logical or the ideal goal of unity can be consistent with the immanent unity of God who comprehends the individual selves as fulfilling His own character. The ideal unity of a whole which is the Absolute is beyond time, whereas the unity of the individual selves which is God is in time. But Howison forgets that "If God is the necessary prius and presupposition of every self, if he is the supreme ideal and the defining standard, apart from which no self can apprehend itself, if he is the cause of all evolution, natural and moral, then God cannot be an individual among a number of self-subsistent individuals but must be the Absolute."¹¹

But while Howison is not decisive as to the distinction between God and the Absolute, Rashdall is more trenchant in his separatist conception of the relation between God and the Absolute. The ground of his separation between God and the Absolute, as already noted, is that while God is to be regarded as a self-conscious unity

1. S. Radhakrishnan: *The Region of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy*, p. 390.

of selves or spirits, the Absolute is the unity of God and the selves, but that unity is not the mere unity of self-conscious spirits resembling McTaggart's Absolute which is the impersonal unity of persons. Besides this logical ground which makes Rashdall to distinguish between God and the Absolute, there is, according to him, a religious demand which also compels man to make such distinction. Man's religious fervour does not find satisfaction in the logical principle of the Absolute, but only in a personal God who is responsive to his wishes and worship. But we can only say that both Howison and Rashdall labour under false absolutism, which is responsible for their fear of incompatibility between One and the Many. It unnerves their speculative consciousness with the result that the psychological and pragmatic uniqueness and individuality of things blind their logical insight into their underlying unity. As pluralists and humanists they make God so finite and personal that not only is He degraded to the human level, but He is subjected to the flux and flow of time. But time, though a competent category to explain things and events, and even selves of men in their relations and inter-relations, has no meaning for God, unless of course one is determined to reduce Him to be one of the growing struggling souls that men are. God must transcend all temporal relations which hold good of things and events and which are all within Him. Humanist obsession of personality should not be allowed to run riot to dissipate rational unity of Reality which satisfies all the human experiences and values, ethical, aesthetic and religious, no less than intellectual. The separation of the Absolute as an abstract unity of logical consciousness from God as a concrete personality is but a bankruptcy of human speculation. Absolute idealism rightly worked out cannot encourage such a separation of experience which as a unity by itself can only find its fulfilment in the attainment of ethical and religious and logical values, so that freedom and personality, which apparently involve pluralism and antithesis amongst the self of God and selves of men, are transcended and enriched in the rational unity of the whole, which is the Absolute and is at once a concrete individuality.

(b) GOD IN ABSOLUTE IDEALISM

In Personal Idealism we have noticed that there is an emphasis on the pluralistic conception of the universe in which man, his

needs and aspirations occupy the foreground. The anthropocentric predicament of personal idealism has made God in the image of man and has considered Him as a finite being, though His finitude is not of the same kind as the finitude of man, and in fact He is the biggest finite. The finitude of God is inherent in Him because He is always a person and because all personality implies, according to the personal idealist, antithesis between the self of God and the selves of men. Now Absolutism is based on monistic metaphysics. In it the highest principle, the absolute reality, is Spirit, the Absolute Self. Absolutism will be abstract if we hold that the one spiritual reality it postulates, is abstract and without any attribute and relation, the empirical world of plurality and individuality being either regarded as purely illusory or as a realm of appearances. Again, absolutism will be concrete in which the Absolute is the whole and unity of a spiritual principle, where plurality of things and minds and their inter-relations, form the concrete content of that spiritual whole. As a rational principle it evolves the plurality of its contents as necessary stages of its self-manifestation and self-fulfilment and thereby attains the concrete unity of experiences and values. In this Concrete Absolutism there is no hard and fast separation between God and the Absolute, because the Absolute stands to its concrete contents in the same living relation which God in theism does, and the selves of men attain individuality and freedom in the larger life of the whole which is concrete individuality. In it, however, the individuality of selves is not a case of indissoluble antithesis either between selves themselves or between the selves and the Absolute. The antithesis is ultimately transcended in the progressive approximation to the concrete individuality of the Absolute Self.

In the absolutism of Spinoza Substance is the absolute principle which is identical with the universe and vouches for reality of nothing except itself. Personality, which always involves the reality of the individual selves and antithesis amongst them, is an impossible category, because everything including selves is an unreal mode of the Absolute Substance, which swallows up all. For the same reason as above the question of personality does not arise at all in the case of Spinoza's Absolute and therefore his God is an impersonal reality, and it would not be wrong to say perhaps that such Absolute may be set down as devoid of con-

sciousness as there is no content for the Absolute to be conscious of.¹

In the absolutism of Bradley there is a sharp contrast between God and the Absolute and, therefore, between religion and philosophy, and between practical and ultimate truth. To him the Absolute is not God. The Absolute is related to nothing because all relation implies limitation and therefore imperfection. In religion the finite wills of men stand in practical relation to God as in worship and prayer. Therefore religion, though it likes to regard its object of worship as a perfect being, makes its God imperfect by the very relation of the finite and the infinite will which it involves. It will make its God a personal being in so far as He by His very relation to finite wills, will be a self-conscious centre and do His best towards 'ensuring joy and peace and added strength' to finite wills with limited knowledge and power. Thus religion will be a truth to man but only of lower degree and fall short of the ultimate truth, which is the Universe without any limitation. Hence, the God of religion is a lower category as it involves want of the comprehensiveness of the whole of Experience which is Truth. As Bradley puts it, "For, if God is perfect, we saw that religion must contain inconsistency, and it was by seeking consistency that we were driven to a limited God."² And Bradley here raises the familiar question of personality and discusses its applicability to the God of religion. Personal idealists make much of God's personality and the theists regard it as one of the attributes of God. But Bradley takes a different meaning of personality from what the personal idealists and theistic writers attach to it. Personal idealists emphasise antithesis and not union between finite wills and the will of God. And the theistic writers seem to emphasise union and not antithesis between them. But Bradley thinks that our religious consciousness involves both antithesis and union between the human will and the divine. So he is not categorical in his assertion as to whether the God of religion must be a person. All that he says is that in this double relation between

1. The reader is, however, reminded that Kuno Fischer's 'realistic interpretation of attributes of Spinoza will present quite a different picture of Spinoza's Substance in which it will not be impossible to ascribe self-consciousness and personality to the Absolute and to regard the Absolute as identical with God of theism.

2. Bradley: *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 430.

the divine and the human will one *may* apply personality to God. But he adds that there is a far more essential truth in religious consciousness than God's personality, and that this far more essential truth of religious consciousness is the fact that we feel the presence of God's will in ours, and all of us in our religious communion feel a feeling of satisfaction in common which should not be denied us. And if we are to formulate a conception of personality as applicable to God we are to see that this satisfaction of religious consciousness may not be impaired by such conception, no matter what inconsistency from the point of view of absolute truth may be the consequence. To return to our point, then, to Bradley the God of religion is a finite reality and therefore different from the Absolute Reality which is the Universe, nothing short of which can satisfy philosophy whose goal is the Absolute Truth or Reality. The absolute Reality is thus superpersonal as Bradley calls it, and it matters not if Truth is so. Bradley while attenuating the personality of God, also does the same in the case of man in the religious sphere. His reason is that personality suggests consciousness of struggle and harmony, of discord and concord, involved in the distinction between man and man, and man and God. But in religion our consciousness is a whole and cannot admit of any feeling of distinction between man and man, and man and God, because religious consciousness transcends the opposition of its subordinate elements. To Bradley the independent reality of the individual is an illusion. No individual, either culturally or socially, can regard himself as distinct from, and therefore set over against, other individuals, and far less can he do this in his religious consciousness. For in religion where we are made to feel the presence in us of the self-conscious totality, we cannot divide it so as to set one conscious centre over against another. Hence, personality which carries with it the sense of distinction among selves and God should not be insisted upon, and most specially in religion where God, as the indwelling spirit, absorbs in Himself the finite minds and thus dissolves all distinction and individuality. And if this indwelling spirit is reduced to a mere logical relation between man and man, religion loses all its meaning and zest. This may sound pantheism. But Bradley answers that in all genuine religion pantheism is inevitable, if we are to escape individualism, which, as Bradley has shown, is far more inconsistent than pantheism, inasmuch as individualism

reduces God to be one finite person among other finite persons, and makes the relation of God to other persons wholly external.

We have tried to expound above the view of God in the Absolutism of Spinoza and Bradley. In Spinoza we have seen that God is identical with the Absolute, in Bradley God is different from the Absolute. In both of them personality, whether of man or of God, is an impossible category. Spinoza proved the impossibility of personality on the ground that personality involves the idea of plurality and distinction of selves, and that since nothing else besides God or Substance has reality, plurality, distinction and antithesis of selves are all unreal. Bradley repudiates personality in a different way, for he says that in religion the presence in us of the supreme will dissolves all distinction between self and self, and there is no room left for that consciousness of individuality and distinction which is the root of personality.

Now we propose to expound another type of Absolutism where we shall see that God can be equated with the Absolute, and the limited personality of selves will not be inconsistent with our idea of the Absolute which is at the same time a concrete individuality in itself. According to this view, our selves are distinguishable reals, each of which has a social environment in other selves, and stands with these other selves in an antithesis which is the condition of development of its personality, or better, its individuality. But as the Absolute is a concrete spiritual whole, it evolves, sustains and promotes the development of selves in different degrees according as they, in their interaction with one another, creates and transcends antithesis and thereby attains significance and value in the totality of experience which the Absolute is. Since each self is thus a real centre of free conscious effort within its limited sphere, creates and transcends antithesis or contradiction with other selves, and since the selves are not by themselves self-existent and self-sufficient reals but are factors and elements in a whole of reality, their distinctness and personality are only relative. Through this relative distinctness and personality they strive to achieve their value and destiny and thereby self-transcendence in the totality of experience. Their self-transcendence is nothing else than their realisation of, or approximation to, the totality of experience of the Absolute. That the selves are gradually realising it, that they are more than what they appear to be, is manifest from their social and super-social activities, and

this process of widening their minimum character is progressive through their social, moral and æsthetic activities until it culminates in religion. And by this self-transcendence in religion we are not to mean that the individuals lose their own character as individuals as in the absolutism either of Spinoza or of Bradley. The individuals in their self-transcendence attain greater and greater perfection and enrichment in so far as they more and more harmonise the conflicts which arise in the contents of their experience and thereby make nearer and nearer approach to the Absolute which is the harmonious whole of Spirit. In it individuals are not merged, but attain fuller being and greater value. As Bosanquet has in spite of himself maintained, self-transcendence of individuals is their self-maintenance and not self-annihilation. Now if the Absolute is the totality of all individuals in their various degrees of perfection, then the question may be raised, whether this totality is itself an Individuality. This is also the question with McTaggart, who answered it in the negative. McTaggart thought that the totality of persons with which God has been identified by Hegel, may not be itself self-conscious and therefore personal. The misunderstanding which vitiates the thought of all pluralists like McTaggart seems to be due to their view of external relation between parts and the whole. Our view of the matter is that the whole is not only immanent within the parts but also determines them. The Absolute as a spiritual whole holds together the individuals by its immanent determinations, so that its totality is not like a 'logical glue', but rather like the vital principle which works through the individuals and makes them what they are, as they realise more and more their concrete individuality. The Absolute thus includes the empirical and logical determinations of the individuals and so far is in time, but at the same time it goes beyond these empirical and logical determinations in that these individuals in their realisation of higher values themselves transcend their own empirical and logical determinations. In this sense, therefore, the Absolute as the totality of self-transcending individuals is beyond time. Hence the view of the Absolute we develop here is that of a self-conscious reality, positive and concrete in content and also individual in the full sense of the term. And if the Absolute be such, there seems to be a very thin line of division between the God of religion and the Absolute of philosophy. The Absolute of philosophy need not sharply be distinguished from the God of religion,

for, as our above arguments sufficiently indicate, we need not be deterred, like McTaggart on the one side and Spinoza and Bradley on the other, from applying to the Absolute the concept of personality, or better, individuality. However, we seem to have been pushed back here in our discussion to one of those ultimate questions which Plato has very aptly described as the 'pitfalls of human reason' from which it is difficult to extricate it with any considerable measure of success. Out of all good sense, therefore, one would do better to leave the question here.

8. DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE AND FREEDOM.

If, as formulated above, the conception of God includes within itself the conception of the unity of the individual psychical centres, then it is obvious that the conscious life of God embraces the conscious life of individuals. The further consequence of this is that God knows beforehand what an individual is going to do. In other words, divine foreknowledge apparently comes into conflict with the notion of human freedom which means new creation. As against this we may urge that such a relationship between the divine conscious life and the conscious life of man does not show that choice which is truly spontaneous can be really foretold, for, divine knowledge is not the same as what we understand by human anticipation. Human consciousness in all its operations including perception is never strictly instantaneous, it involves always as certain process, however short. Divine consciousness does not work, we may suppose, as a process which involves time-series, for God is above time and His knowledge is above process and therefore immediate and intuitive. Hence human freedom is not related to divine foreknowledge in the same way as it is to pre-determination. Universal pre-determination contradicts freedom, but universal knowledge which is immediate and intuitive does not. Divine knowledge would have been pre-determining if it functioned as a process. It may visualise in its immediate intuition the whole course of world history ; it cannot be supposed, however, that a particular event, such as the action of a human agent, whether by free will or by mechanical necessity, will make any difference to the immediate intuition of God. And whether human action is mechanically necessitated, or determined by its own reason which is the self itself, we have already shown, when we discussed the

relation of causality to self. The present issue is whether divine foreknowledge contradicts human freedom, and we find in the above analysis that it does not. Again our conclusion of the identity between God and the Absolute may raise the more fundamental difficulty of allowing independence or freedom to the wills of men, for in the conception of God as the Absolute, there would be nothing outside of His absolute will. But to this we can only say that the independence which the human wills enjoy is granted to them by the Absolute will by an act of self-limitation. For it is revolting to our reason to suppose that the Absolute has not the power to limit itself in that way. And the problem of self-limitation is not inconceivable any more than why the Absolute should express itself through things, events and persons, which are but the necessary stages in its self-realising activity towards its concrete individuality.

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CHAPTER IX

PROBLEM OF EVIL

1. *WHAT IS EVIL?*

(Man's life realistically considered appears to be a mixture, an alternation, of good and evil, of well-being and ill-being, happiness and misery. Good appears as such only by the side of evil and conversely. Good and evil are facts of experience and receive significance by comparison and contrast, they are correlative facts. Therefore any attempt to understand evil by itself apart from reference to the correlated idea of good is an impossible feat. Further, evil as well as good does not admit of any objective analysis apart from the subjective colouring from feeling or emotion. Again, we are all aware how our emotions are determined by the intellectual analysis which we put upon objects or events which affect us ill or well. If we believe in evolution of our conscious life we must believe how with that evolution our conception of evil and good is bound to change. Keeping these psychological facts in view we may not be far from the truth if we observe that what we call evil is apparently a case of *maladjustment among facts*, either in the natural, or in the moral and social world, accompanied by feeling of ill-being. In the light of the above observation we may be permitted to say that Physical and Moral Evils are respectively want of adjustment, or disturbance of pre-existing adjustment, in the physical world, as well as in the reason and will of man. And we shall see in the sequel how evils, both physical and moral, are not impossible for man to outgrow, for he is, as a moral individual, pledged to progress, to attain higher and higher values that constitute his destiny. Evils are not illusions but as real factors as anything could be in the scheme of life, only that they require readjustment in the evolution of his individuality.

2. *THE OLD-WORLD VIEW OF EVIL.*

(The theologians of the past generally associated evils with the ways of God to man and tried to justify them. The evils and

their justification formed the subject-matter of what they call Theodicy. The physical evils, deaths and diseases, famines and floods, storms and earthquakes, and consequent sufferings of mankind, and the moral evils or sins, naturally raised for them the question as to how they are to be reconciled with the wisdom and goodness of God. If God were all-wise and benevolent why should such a God allow evils, both physical and moral, to happen in His benign creation? It may be that although He is absolutely good and wise, yet He is limited in power to prevent evils. Or it may be that He is all-powerful, all-wise and all-good, yet He has instituted evils into His world only to teach mankind to be morally good by way of warning and chastisement. According to this view, then, evils serve man as a moral school of probation, so that the institution of evils spells no ignorance and malevolence on the part of God. But this justification of God's ways to man does not stand to reason, because the process of evolution tells us that long before man appeared on the scene, and before evolution of his moral consciousness, at least physical catastrophes were not infrequent, although there were no scholars in this moral schools. Another pseudo-explanation of this problem has been offered in the theodicy of Leibniz who has asked us to weigh the evil and good things of the world and to be convinced that this world of ours is the best of all possible worlds. His argument is that the compossible system of monads which are actualised by the divine will necessarily includes the evils of the world, without which the world would not have been a harmonious and continuous system ; and here lies the characteristic feature of the best possible world.

Almost akin to the above view is that of Hegel who thinks that since the entire universe is through and through rational in constitution, and since evil is irrationality, therefore evil is apparent and not real, and the apparent evil is on the way to being rationalised. Nature through which the Universal Reason realises its own truth is an instrument in the realisation of such truth, so that the truth of Nature is reason and freedom, though apparently alienated therefrom. Lotze, though trained in the Hegelian school of philosophy, has offered an independent explanation of the relation of evil to God from his strong common-sense point of view. He admits the fact of evil as well as the fact of good in the universe. He does not reduce evil to unreality, nor does he make it a disguised good, but thinks that to sit in judgment upon God's

institution of evil into the world is to divine the Divine Mind. The only construction the human mind is in a position to put on this is that the world is the product of the imagination of God¹, whose ways are inscrutable to human reason, so that the existence of evils in the universe as an undeniable fact need not be interpreted as derogatory to divine wisdom, goodness and power, but only as bespeaking sportive spirit of God's creative imagination.

3. NEW ORIENTATION.

(Modern thinkers have begun to take quite a different view of good and evil in that they have learnt to dissociate good and evil from all theological reference. The main factors that are responsible for a new orientation of good and evil are: first, the fact of evolution, both physical and moral ; secondly, the new adventures of life ; and thirdly, the possibilities of man as individual. Evolution has taught us that in the physical realm the things have come to their present structure and configuration by way of a long process of growth and development, and will perhaps develop newer and far more different ones by equally long process independently of any ethical interest for man, so that they are no longer to be construed as a school of moral probation for him. They have their own natural ways of adjustment among themselves and natural evil appears when man, though himself a result of evolutionary process, fails by his ignorance and his exacting nature, to establish an adjustment between the phenomena of nature and his own physical and physiological phenomena. Moral evils or sins may be shown in a similar way to be due to man's ill-adjustment of the structure of his own will to the wills of others in their present stage in moral evolution. God is not to be brought in as one responsible for instituting moral evils in the human level, because here is the same maladjustment of one independent will with another independent will. And social evils are no exceptions to this law of maladjustment between the individual and the social will. Again, our modern life has come to learn that work,

1. Fawcett also in his work "The World as Imagination" has developed a similar view in which he has maintained that the world is the creation of Divine Imagination which though not irrational has the spontaneity of creation, so that human explanations of evil and good are bound to be inadequate for the creative sport of God.

effort and struggle enhance its worth and that inaction and stagnation spell its ruin. In its furtherance of worth modern man is ready to undertake any risk defying death, disease and destruction. The scientist courts death and disease without the least hesitation when he finds that his dangerous experiments will establish new scientific truths. The explorer plunges into fatal voyage to an unknown destination without hope of return. Patriotic nations face to-day all emissaries of death or physical sufferings when their national prestige is at stake. Adventures have blunted the sting of death and of sufferings. Physical evils have ceased to be sources of sufferings and have turned into founts of fortune and felicity. This modern spirit of adventure has changed the repulsiveness of physical sufferings, and has made them attractive sources for impetus and action as against terror and lassitude which the life of past generations felt when it faced the so-called physical evils. Life is no longer conceived as unworthy of living, and a strong optimism guides the life of the modern man. We shall estimate the value of this psychology of optimism when we shall enter into the metaphysic of evil ; but this much is certain that the psychology of the problem of evil has much to do with its metaphysical aspect. Mood and temperament undoubtedly modify our rational view of things.

The new spirit of adventure which seems to have altered man's attitude towards physical evils fails, however, to satisfy the demands of a rational explanation. The physical evils are facts, their reality cannot be ignored under the warmth of adventure. Philosophically, it is not the question of putting a gloss over them, rather it is the question of indicating their place, function and importance in the experience of the individual and the experience of the rational whole. Further, moral evils are no less real, and demand much more acute analysis at the present stage of social evolution which is marked by far greater complexities of moral situation than what men of past generations had to face. In fact, if one is to arrive at a solution of the problem of evil, both physical and moral, one has to face them as real experiences and to investigate their significance in the development of individuality. The old-world view of evils which busied itself in connecting the evils with God as their source, and tried to justify divine wisdom and goodness in their institution, may be said to have given an external picture of the problem. It was merely

satisfied with indicating that the physical evils were there and that the individuals were to suffer from them as punishments or as warnings from God, and that moral evils or sins were only acts of disobedience of God's will on the part of man, to be visited with punishments. In it there was no attempt at showing that evils, both physical and moral, are but integral parts of the experiences of the individual with which his individuality is so intimately connected and through which alone the individual can aspire to what he ought to be. Nor were the more philosophic explanations of Spinoza and of Hegel satisfactory, in that they both practically denied the reality of evils. When Spinoza says that evils are due to our narrow outlook on things, that evils appear as such only because we look at things from the standpoint of a particular interest, but disappear into nothingness when we enlarge our outlook and learn to look at things from the standpoint of the whole or God, he was explaining away and not explaining evils. Hegel also does not fare better when he remarks that evils are only irrational elements tending to become good or rational, because Reality which is rational through and through must see that the irrationality of evils is rationalised. Both Spinoza and Hegel stand charged with making evils unreal illusions. Both of them forget that evils have an immediate bearing on experiences of individuals, and through them an indirect bearing on the experience of the Absolute, which attains concrete individuality through the self-transcendence of antithesis and contradiction which evils entail.

If, as shown above, evils and sufferings are the real experiences of individual selves, what part the evils must play in their lives? In the beginning of our chapter we have suggested that evils are maladjustments in our experiences. We can appreciate these maladjustments as possible, because the individual selves are to encounter the world and selves other than their own, and, therefore, contradictions and antitheses between individual selves and their physical and social environments are inescapable facts. In fact, they are necessary for the growth and development of their individuality. For growth and development of individuality mean harmonising contradictions, readjusting the ill-adjusted, overcoming impediments. The individual selves, as individual, must appropriate all experiences as their own and these experiences are bound to involve contradictions. But they cannot wholly

appropriate experiences or make them their own unless their antitheses, contradictions and ill-adjustments are reduced to a hitchless harmony. Evils which are physical are far less hard instances of disharmony in the experiences of the individual, and in fact, easier to appropriate and to dissolve. Moral evils which have their root in the same antithesis or disharmony require on the part of the individual self more strenuous effort to overcome it. The individual self is a complex of feeling, reason and will, and in its moral transactions with similarly complex individuals, contradiction, disharmony or maladjustment is inevitable. The feeling and will elements of the individual encountering the same elements of other individuals are bound to generate moral ill-adjustments. Telling a lie, misappropriating another's property, killing life and similar other acts of an individual, can be instanced as obvious cases of maladjustments between the feeling and will of an individual and those of other individuals. In these transactions between self and self the function of reason is either at its minimum or inadequate to effect the necessary harmony in which the development of the individual lies. Evil is a disvalue in so far as it is a disharmony, but the value of the individual lies in overcoming or readjusting the disharmony. And the progressive attainment of the good or value means fuller and fuller operation of reason, which brings greater and greater harmony into the conflict of feeling and will, and the development of individuality means nothing else than the progressive operation of reason upon experiences in the life of the individual self in his graduated overcoming of contradictions amongst these experiences, which he comes upon in his relations with the physical and social environments. The different stages in the development of the individual are the progressive adjustments of his experiences and are, therefore, so many values on an ascending scale, attained by him, until he reaches complete self-transcendence in which all evils are outgrown and in which a final destiny of the individual is in sight.¹

4. PESSIMISM AND OPTIMISM.

From what we have already remarked on the problem of evil as newly oriented, it appears that Pessimism, no less than Opti-

1. Cf. Bosanquet's article, *The Reality of Evil* in Robinson's *Anthology of Recent Philosophy*, pp. 265-275.

mism, is a mere emphasis on our attitude to the world. There have been philosophers, poets and common run of men, who have seen only one side of the shield to the neglect of the other. Schopenhauer and Hartmann in the West and the Buddhists in India in general, have looked to the dark side of things forgetting their bright one. Indeed, there are experiences in man's life which easily tempt him to think that the world is full of evils, pains and sufferings, and life is not worth living and to declare that it is better not to be born. As the German poet Hune writes:

"Sweet is sleep, but death is better
Best of it all is never to be born."

It is a matter of common experience that there are many people who have developed definite pessimistic temperament and to whom the tragic side has a greater appeal than its delightful one, and who like tragedies more than comedies, because they think with Shelley that,

"Our sweetest songs are those that tell of saddest thoughts."

The saddest thoughts have what Aristotle called a *cathartic* or cleansing effect upon our minds. But the pessimistic temperament has been considered by many as a mental disease and has been traced to morbid pathological conditions of the body, and if not cured, may develop into insanity. Its physiological explanation is sought in the defective liver and glandular secretion and similar other pathological conditions. Its psychological conditions are frustration of desires, their belated fulfilment, loss of opportunities in life, and very often, in the case of youngmen, the stern realities of facts overpowering the happy idealism of their years of adolescence.

Optimism is just the opposite temperament which always makes man to take cheerful view of things. What is dark and gloomy under ordinary circumstances appears bright and cheerful, and the optimist feels rhythms of response even in the dull inanimate nature which seems to feel with him the warmth of aspirations and ideals. He is always buoyed up with hope and enthusiasm in whatever he undertakes to do. Great achievements that have been done in the different spheres of human life may be traced to an optimistic view of the universe. For hopes and aspirations are great spurs to creation and construction, as despair and depression are sources of inaction and destruction. The physico-psychical conditions of optimistic temperament seem to

be exuberance of health and animal spirits of man, unchecked desires, affluent circumstances and ever-utilised opportunities of life. Life to the optimist is worth living up to its last sand and he makes the most of it every moment and longs for being remembered even after his death.

But, as we have stated above, both pessimism and optimism are but temperaments born of our emphasis on gloomy and cheerful aspects of things respectively, and are purely psychical phenomena. But good and evil with which these two attitudes of mind are often connected have a deeper metaphysical significance in the scheme of the universe. This metaphysical significance we have tried to estimate already in our discussion of the nature and conditions of individuality in a previous chapter, and also in the section on New Orientation of good and evil in the present one. We would conclude by referring to another attitude of life called Melioristic attitude which, we shall see, is in perfect consonance with the conception of the individuality we have already developed.

5. MELIORISM.

Meliorism, stated in most general terms, means that doctrine which believes in the possibility of the betterment of life and the universe in their ethical, social and religious aspects. It is closely connected with the problem of values which may be progressively realised and such realisation lies within the power of individuals. It undermines both the pessimistic and optimistic commitment to the untransformable gloomy and cheerful aspects of things. To it the world is not eternally perditioned to evils, nor is it to be viewed as the permanent home of good things incapable of improvement. The world we live in abides by what we as individuals bring unto it by our energies and efforts, by our trials and errors. If the world is a 'vale of soul-making', the soul is also an energy of world-making. The world not only *makes* the soul, but is *also made* by it, and in this mutual making of one by the other are manifested values, the realisation of which is the goal of the individual.

Now melioristic view of the universe is not inconsonant with the pragmatic view of life, nor with the concrete idealistic view we have formulated in our book. James,¹ the father of modern

1. Cf. *The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life* in *The Will To Believe*.

pragmatism, has shown us in his analysis of experience that conative satisfaction is the inseparable adjunct of experience and this satisfaction determines and lends value and meaning to our experience. Our knowledge and doing may not always get the desired feeling of satisfaction in the present state of things and, therefore, may refer to a better one in which they may find the desired satisfaction and realise better values for experience. Individuals thus in their attempts at realisation of better values will bring about newer and better state of things by this pragmatic necessity of experience. Apart from the inherent defects of pragmatism which takes an external view of the relation between the ultimate principle of reality and our experience, it has at least the merit of suggesting that the world we live in is not irrevocably and hopelessly bad, for the pragmatic urge of human experience is there to ameliorate it, though James nowhere defines the ideals or values to be attained and the connection between the world of values and the real world. But from the concrete absolutist standpoint which takes the view of an organic relation between God and the universe, the betterment of the universe as an inevitable consequence receives a more satisfactory solution. The individual self who encounters the world and other individual selves as the field of his experience, is the dynamic principle of freedom and development which aims at realisation of higher and higher values through such experience. There is always a conflict between the self and his environment and there is always a tendency on the part of the self to overcome this conflict. Now this overcoming of the conflict means attainment of higher values. The life of each individual self is one of conflict and of transcendence of such conflict. But such transcendence means introduction of a better and higher ethical and social order. Experience may sometimes belie such a state of transcendence, sometimes we may find aberration from the path of progress, but that should not put us into despair ; for the nature of the individual self is such that he must triumph in the long run in his effort to attain such transcendence. The specific kind of teleology we have been convinced to accept, rules the life of the individual and the universe of which the individual is an integral part. The ultimate principle as the totality of values so attracts the universe that the individuals cannot resist the attraction and must realise through conflict and its transcendence their

ultimate destiny. In the religious life of the individual which is the culmination of his ethical and social life the realisation of his destiny is almost complete. Hence, we may argue that the individuals in their progressive realisation of the ethical, social and religious values bring about progressively higher state of things which meliorism stands for. In this metaphysical sense meliorism may be said to be free from the defects of pragmatic meliorism of James, H. G. Wells¹ and others.

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3. WILLIAM JAMES: *The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life in The Will to Believe*.
4. LOTZE: *The Philosophy of Religion*.
5. H. G. WELLS: *New Worlds for Old*; *New World Order*.

1. H. G. Wells in the *New Worlds For Old* has spoken of the good things in all walks of life which men by their effort have produced and whereby bettered the conditions of life in the modern age. In his more recent book *New World Order* he has visualised a better state of existence for mankind which, he thinks, is to follow after the turmoil of the present world-war has subsided.

CHAPTER X

THE PHILOSOPHY OF VALUE

1. IMPORTANCE OF THE PROBLEM OF VALUE.

The problem of value has in recent times entered the foreground of human interest. Even amongst the scientific writers on facts and phenomena the consciousness of value is gradually gaining its legitimate ground ; they are beginning to think of things and events not wholly in terms of colourless facts, but largely in terms of values. They are gradually discovering that all our estimations are after all evaluations. Value and evaluation are not foreign to facts, but rather facts reoriented imply values. As Eddington puts it, "We can only speak speculatively of that which I have called the 'background of the pointer-readings' ; but it would at least seem plausible that if the values which give the light and shade of the world are absolute, they must belong to the background, unrecognised in physics, because they are not in the pointer-readings but recognised by consciousness which has its roots in the background."¹ Reality is ideality, existence is worth, only from a different outlook, and one is really inseparable from the other. There can be no existence without value and no value without existence.²

Reality is not exclusively psychical, nor exclusively physical, but a realm in which thought and thing, fact and value, are continuous and inseparable, neither having any being apart from its correlate. This is coming to be realised by most varied shades of philosophical thinking, by Pragmatism, by Idealism, both subjective and objective, and even by some forms of Realism. The growing value-consciousness of to-day, however, is no innovation into philosophic consciousness, but only a legitimate and inevitable development of our estimation of things. So long as the fact was there, there was the value by implication, only that the value was not discernible equally clearly in all ages and by all minds.

1. Eddington: *The Nature of the Physical World*, p. 330.

2. Cf. W. M. Urban: An article on *Value, Logic and Reality*, in the Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy.

To quote Professor Münsterberg, "Through the world of things shimmered first weakly, and then even more clearly the world of values."¹ The concept of value, therefore, is only the fuller stature of our philosophic consciousness developing in its proper environment and direction within the scheme of our estimation of life and the universe.² Plato, as the father of Western Idealism, was indeed the first promulgator of value-philosophy in so far as he made his Idea of the Good, the unity and organisation of Ideas, which supplied the value-frame of the universe and which not only created but also teleologically tended the universe towards them. But the emergence of the problem of value as a distinct problem for modern philosophy was due to Kant,³ and since then it has acquired such a great importance that it may be said to have leavened the whole range of modern thought. "The problem of value up to this day is a growing problem in the West, but it has ever been the settled and central problem in Indian Philosophy. Western thought traces its historical beginning ; in India it is coeval with philosophy. As it is a growing problem in the West, as value is sought somewhere in the circumference of the everwidening circle of life, there has been a considerable groping about it simply to make it all the more elusive ; for the Indian mind it is at the very centre of life's circle and is therefore all the more deep and intricate in conception. Difference in the perspective in which an object of investigation is viewed makes difference in approach as well as in achievement. And such a difference is conspicuous in the view-point, approach and achievement of the Western and Indian thoughts so far as the value-problem is concerned. It is also true that in the systems of Indian thought there is hardly any clear-cut and well defined philosophy of value, though Indian philosophic literature abounds in reference to value

1. Quoted in *Philosophy To-day* by Schaub and others.

2. Cf. The writer's article on *Value and Personality* in his *Studies in Philosophy* (1933).

3. Höffding in his *Philosophy of Religion* writes :—"We are indebted to Kant's philosophy for the independence of the problem of value as apart from the problem of knowledge. He taught us to distinguish between valuation and explanation." Also Kemp Smith observes in his *A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (p. lvi) "what Kant does—stated in broad outline—is to distinguish between the problems of Existence and the problems of Value, assigning the former to science and the latter to philosophy."

in almost all its varied bearings. The reason for this apparently is that the Indian mind ever takes a synthetic view of Life and the Universe in which problems never fall into water-tight compartments." "Hence there seems to be as much truth in saying that in one sense there is in Indian systems of thought no distinct Philosophy of Value, as in saying that in another sense all Indian Philosophy is after all Value-Philosophy. And it is perhaps because of this that we do not find in the history of Indian thought, as we do in that of the Western, emergence, at a particular stage and with the rise of a particular philosophic genius, of a new arena of thought-activities heralding the Philosophy of Value, as distinct from Philosophy itself." "The value problem is so vital and engaging to the Indian mind, that instead of forming an appendix or after-thought as in the philosophy of the West in general, it has exercised and marshalled all its thought-energies so as to make them converge to its developments into being the central problem of Life and Philosophy."¹

2. WHAT IS VALUE?

Though the term 'value' is of very common use in recent philosophy no less than in other spheres of our everyday life, yet it is one of those terms which have been the source of much misunderstanding. The reason is that value is of such a nature that any outlook on life and the universe involves some phase of it. Value from the realistic outlook will be different from value which either the empirical or the idealistic outlook will mean by it. Again, the economist will take an entirely different view of it. In philosophic literature we come across other terms like 'worth', 'good', 'excellence', 'perfection', but to avoid confusion we deem it wise to prefer the term 'value' to cover 'worth' and 'good', and reserve the term 'perfection' to mean consummation of all values.

The Latin valeo originally meant 'strength' and also 'health' which is associated with strength, and then by natural transition it came to mean 'being effective and adequate'. In French the term valeur means 'excellence'. In Italian valore has an honorific

¹ The Author's *Presidential Address* to the Section of Indian Philosophy in the *Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress*, 1939, pp. 1-3.

significance and *valuta* means price. The Greek *agathos* originally meant 'men of valour'. The German *wert* corresponds to the English word 'value', and Meinong uses it in the sense of 'dignity or 'nobility'.¹ But over and above these literal meanings of the term value, it will be seen, it has acquired far different connotations at the hands of different schools of thought, and for all practical purposes, the concept of value has so permeated the philosophical positions of the recent thinkers that it may be said to have been responsible for the 'Great Divide' in philosophy between Realism and Idealism. In the meanwhile we would like to point out that the term value has been used sometimes to mean among other things 'self-maintaining order' of things without reference to any consciousness, sometimes to mean subjective appreciation without any objective reality of its own, and sometimes to mean the objective reality which makes a thing valuable independently of subjective appreciation, because value is the very framework of the world.

3. FACT AND VALUE.

The distinction between fact and value has a great bearing upon our explanation of life and the universe. We may look upon the universe as the realm of things and events as they are, or, we may look upon it not simply as it is, but we may find that it has a reference to an ideal which is not simply a matter of our choice, so that we may or may not think of it in terms of the ideal ; but rather that the ideal is embedded in its nature and in fact determines it. Positive sciences remain satisfied with considering things as they naturally and normally are, and many of the realistic writers think that philosophy to be scientific and rational, must study things in their positive character alone. Facts and phenomena have no ulterior significance beyond what they present to us in external experience. To introduce any such ulterior significance is to indulge in mysticism which philosophy as a purely rational and logical analysis of things cannot allow. Russell, for instance, is averse to any ideals or values which he suspects as extra-logical or mystical elements marring the bare, colourless character of things with which philosophy is really concerned.

1. Cf. John Laird: *The Idea of Value*, pp. xiii-xvi.

But we all know that there are normative considerations of things which our philosophic consciousness demands. Things and events do not exhaust their character merely by being what they are, but suggest ideals or norms or values for their fuller comprehension. The normative sciences like ethics, æsthetics, politics and even logic which Russell and others cannot ignore, are indicative of the fact that behind their actuality, things and events have an ideal reference. Values refuse to be reduced to facts, progress to process. Many scientific writers like Eddington, Whitehead and Lloyd Morgan, are convinced that things and events of the world have, over and above their mechanical framework constituted by matter, force, space, time and causality, an ideal framework or a value-constitution without which they cannot be fully explained. The realms of life and mind convince us more effectively that there is a dimension of their being more consonant with values than with mere mechanical facts.

4. THE CONCEPTION OF VALUE IN DIFFERENT SCHOOLS OF PHILOSOPHY.

From what we have stated it appears that the conception of Value involves the world of things, and the world of minds which evaluate the world of things, and a value-frame of the universe which as a spiritual force makes possible both these worlds of things and minds and their gradual realisation of values. This value-frame is nothing else than the totality of spiritual values which constitute at the same time the Absolute Spiritual Reality underlying every thing. As Absolute Spiritual Reality it expresses itself through things and minds, and the different stages of its self-expression exhibit values of different kinds, so that values are the different self-expressions of the Absolute Spiritual Reality with which the different contents of the world are organically related. But this living organic relation between the Absolute Spiritual Reality and things and minds of the universe has not often been rightly realised. Owing to the differences in conception of this relation between the Absolute Spiritual Reality and things of the world and minds of men, we have different conceptions of value. The Absolute Spiritual Reality has either been lost sight of, or has been given a transcendental status apparently without any living immanent relationship with finite spirits and the world of nature. The

finite spirits or the psychical individuals have been in some cases taken as isolated self-sufficient units over which the outside nature has been set as another and a different entity. The psychical individual again has not been viewed in most cases as an integrated whole of his contents, but rather as a bundle of affections, interests and desires. The result has been that values which lie deep down in the very frame-work of life and the universe have been dislodged from their proper setting and deprived of their proper meaning and function in the system of things. These different philosophical attitudes to life and reality have been responsible for the different theories of values, psychological or subjective, realistic, pragmatic and idealistic. We propose to give below a short account of each of these conceptions of value as formulated by the different schools of thinkers.

(a) PSYCHOLOGICAL OR SUBJECTIVE CONCEPTION OF VALUE

The psychological theories of value define it as a quality of anything that satisfies a human need or evokes a feeling of pleasure, and use it as a synonym for empirical good. The first and the most immediate condition for the origin and development of ideas and judgments of value lies in human desire and feeling, wish and volition, and ultimately in the impulses, instincts, and tendencies which they presuppose. In one word, every judgment of value is dependent on the experiences of the affective-volitional life of man. Value is thus essentially subjective. But if the value of an object consists in its satisfaction of human desire or the fulfilment of interest, the question is raised by the psychologists themselves: How is interest itself ultimately worthy of being satisfied? Thus the psychologists are pushed back to the question of intrinsic value as against the apparently subjective character of value, and even though it is impossible from the psychological theory of value to account for the intrinsic character of it, yet attempts have been made by some writers of this school to give an apparent air of explanation by referring value to a 'biological phenomenon appearing in psychological form', to the utter indifference to the circular reasoning which such attempts involve.

In the psychological theories of value the starting difficulty is its attempt at isolation of the individual psychical centre from

the rest of existence which, however, is an organised whole, and this is the fundamental difficulty under which any empirical or phenomenalist view pitifully labours. But the more characteristic difficulty of the psychological theories of value is that they base themselves upon unsound psychology. Mill, for instance, in his *Utilitarianism* observing that "that which is in itself valuable is in itself desirable," and that, "such are only pleasure and freedom from pain", makes pleasure and absence of pain to be fundamental values. All other values are *derivative* from this value and they serve as means to its attainment. According to the hedonistic theory, as is clear on its own analysis of an act, the objective content of the act is only a means, while the real aim is the subjective feeling of pleasure for the acting agent. The structure of the act of will, in this view, is only *eidetic*, to borrow Husserl's terminology, without an objective reference. But the student of hedonistic ethics needs no reminder of the gross retroversion of the real situation here to discern that it is the objective content that is the real aim of the striving and really attracts the agent as a value. This objective content may in some cases belong to the system of the outer nature, or in some cases to the inner life of the agent, and the feeling of satisfaction is only an index, a sign of attaining our aim. Meinong's psychological account of value that it consists in the subjective feeling of pleasure, errs as much as Ehrenfels' which makes striving, inclination and desire to be the source of value. For while Meinong forgets that feeling is the clothing in which objective values appear in consciousness, Ehrenfels mistakes desires and inclination for the source of values, though they are in fact determined by values, of which, therefore, they are the consequences. The psychology of feeling and volition may give us science of the psychic processes connected with values, but cannot furnish us with an account of values as such. Nor is Perry's 'biological interest' as the basis of value any improvement on the psychologism of Meinong and Ehrenfels. For besides sharing in the difficulties of the above account, it degrades the evaluator to the biological level ignoring the psychical and spiritual aspects of his being which alone can tend him towards his finer fulfilment or higher spiritual destiny.¹

1. Cf. The author's *Presidential Address* to the Section of Indian Philosophy, in the *Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress*, 1939.

(b) REALISTIC CONCEPTION OF VALUE

The Realistic theories of value are also the results of the separatist conception of existence involving two ultimates, spirit and nature, neither definable in terms of the other, or involving an infinity of scattered existents, each independent of the other without making mind or spirit to be the focus of value and valuation. Different realists have offered different aspects of the concept of value, but all of them agree in this that value and judgments of value need not suppose as their precondition the spiritual constitution of the universe. According to Alexander value has no locus and reality of its own, it is not a determination either of the spirit or of nature ; but it emerges as a *tertium quid* or a third something from the intercourse between spirit and nature. The spatio-temporal structure of the universe is neutral or indifferent to start with, but tends, we know not why, towards evolution of values. The universe is subject to a perpetual process of growth into increasing complexity, into higher and higher levels of existence, by the restless movement of Time which he terms *Nisus* towards a higher birth. In this perpetual process of growing every next higher birth is an empirical quality which, as we have seen, Alexander calls *deity*. The deity is a variable quality and changes as the universe grows in time. Each level of existence has its own deity, as some unknown quality, to be realised by the next higher level. When in this way the incipient mental level is attained the deity is the next higher empirical quality of mind and is appreciated as mental or spiritual. Now values are emergents among other emergents, and have their *raison d'etre* in the relation of one reality to another in virtue of which a fresh reality is constituted. As Alexander puts it, "The tertiary qualities, truth and goodness and beauty, though they differ from the secondary and primary ones in being creations of mind, are not the less real. They belong strictly to an amalgamation or union of the object with the mind. But their dependence on the mind does not deprive them of reality. On the contrary, they are a new character of reality, not in the proper sense *qualities* at all, but *values*, which arise through the combination of mind with its object."¹ According to him, "The simplest example of a reality which is compound of mind and a non-mental thing is the *person* itself in

1. Alexander: *Space, Time and Deity*, Vol. II, Ch. IX, p. 244.

which the mind and body are connected together and the person is neither the subject-self alone, nor the object-self alone, but the union of the two."¹ But though values emerge in a person out of the relation between body and mind, as 'tertiary qualities', the mental and the non-mental have neither of them value-constitution. They are thus only relational subsistences.

Laird thinks that there is no need of distinguishing between fact and value, between the actual and the normative, between bare existence of any sort unrelated to any consciousness and conscious appreciation. All facts are values only that they are not indifferent to one another. This is the *Natural Election Theory* of values formulated by Prof. Laird. As he puts it, "I take it to be evident that if two things in nature are utterly indifferent to one another, neither, in relation to the other, has any value at all. If, on the other hand, they are not indifferent to one another, it is likely, if not absolutely certain, that a value exists for one or the other or for both of them, at least of a relative kind."² It follows then that every thing is valuable to itself or what is, is value, because value is self-maintenance based on selection, by affinity, of one thing by another, and where there is repugnance there is disvalue. And that which is the sphere of indifference where there is neither affinity nor repugnance, is most likely the sphere of non-existence. The further implication of Laird's theory of value is this that it is intrinsic, absolute and objective, but independent of mind or consciousness and applicable to anything that is selective.

Another realistic account of value is presented by Moore in his *Conception of Intrinsic Value*. According to him all things possess intrinsic value by virtue of being what they necessarily are. Moore's contention is that "a kind of value is 'intrinsic' if and only if, when anything possesses it, that same thing or anything exactly like it would necessarily or must always under all circumstances, possess it in exactly the same degree."³ The necessity here referred to is said to be neither causal necessity, nor logical implication. It is the kind of necessity which we assert to hold, when we say that 'if a given patch of colour be

1. *Ibid.*, p. 245.

2. Laird: *The Idea of Value*, Ch. III, pp. 92-93. Also compare his *Modern Problems in Philosophy*, Lecture V..

3. Moore: *Philosophical Studies*, pp. 260, 265.

yellow, then any patch which were exactly like the first would be yellow.' Moore, however, is not, in spite of his realistic position, definitely opposed to admission of life and mind as objects of value, nor does he definitely maintain that purely physical states of affair are the only spheres of value. Later in his *Principia Ethica* he himself speaks of the æsthetic value of the beautiful as that which demands the admiring contemplation, and thus definitely includes in his conception of value a reference to mind or consciousness. And Dr. C. D. Broad, despite his realistic outlook, is more pronounced in his recognition of an evaluating consciousness as a necessary factor in the problem of value when he thinks it highly probable that "no state of affairs can be good or bad unless it is, or contains as a constituent, some conscious mental state."¹

(c) PRAGMATIC CONCEPTION OF VALUE

From the pragmatic standpoint value will apparently be synonymous with utility and comes very near to the economic conception of value. The pragmatist's criterion of truth, we know, is its usefulness or feeling of satisfaction. His criterion of value also consists in usefulness. To the pragmatist, therefore, the underlying idea of value is utility just as the underlying idea of truth is also utility. Value is nothing intrinsic in the nature of things, nor is it a reality by itself as an independent essence, but is a result of satisfaction of the different wants and desires of an individual or of the society. There seems to be nothing mysterious about value, but it is a plain result of the agent's reaction to the environment ending in satisfaction of the agent. We owe a great deal to the pragmatist in so far as he has tried to emancipate philosophy and its concepts from the dull formalism of logic and intellect, and has tried to study them in the light of practical and humanistic needs to which they are so intimately related. But pragmatism has erred in so far as it has failed to distinguish between prejudice and a necessary meaning of things. It has introduced in its estimate of things a biological prejudice accompanied by psychological considerations which have made their estimate of truth or of value subjective and individualistic.

1. Broad: *Mind and its Place in Nature*, p. 488.

If utility be the criterion of value for the pragmatist, then utility must be always for the individual concerned. There are indeed moral and æsthetic values which have objective reference, and it is on the basis of the objective reference in moral and æsthetic values that some of the pragmatists, like J. H. Tufts, M. C. Otto and others, have tried to remove subjectivity which utilitarian conception of value necessarily entails. They think that in our judgments like 'he is a good man', 'that is a good act', 'that picture is beautiful', and 'that statue is a fine specimen of sculpture', the moral and æsthetic values that are involved are objective, although they are at the same time intimately connected with utility or usefulness for the evaluator. But we would like to suggest that utility always refers to pleasure and pleasure must refer to an individual. A student of utilitarian ethics is familiar with the difficulty of passing from the pleasure of the individual to the pleasure of the society. So in spite of attempts of some pragmatic writers on value to make value objective on the ground of ethical and æsthetic objectivity, the difficulty of subjectivism attached to the fundamental utilitarian conception of values from the pragmatist position in general remains unsolved. Again, the ethical, æsthetic and religious values are disinterested ideals and therefore intrinsic in their character. They are no means to any ends, but they are ends in themselves. The individual is not the maker of them, but they are made for the individual. The ethical good, the beauty of an object, the ideals of Love, Truth and Wisdom which the Spiritual Reality is conceived as embodying, do not depend upon usefulness for man or society of men, but they are pursued as independent essences or ideals or ends in themselves. One would conclude then that the pragmatist criterion of usefulness or utility as determining values, instead of making values as they are, reduces them to individual biological prejudices, shorn of their objective and intrinsic character and validity.

(d) IDEALISTIC CONCEPTION: VALUE AND REALITY

The Idealistic philosophers have conceived values in a way different from the psychologist, the realist and the pragmatist account of them. The value to the idealist is not a subjective *addendum* to reality, nor is it a part or essence of reality, nor

again is it an indefinable quality attached to reality, as *sensequales* are to objects, nor further is it a form of utility which satisfies our practice. The idealist has gone beyond these conceptions, and perhaps rightly, to think that value is the character or condition of existence and knowledge. The idealist standpoint that makes value to be the determinant of reality or identical with it is known as Axiological. The term 'Axiology' is a recent coinage and as such indicates that the problem of value has acquired in modern times such great importance that to express the inseparability of value and reality none of the old terms is found adequate. The term axiology has, however, acquired at least two different senses. In its wider sense it stands for the theory of value as such and includes all the problems connected with the theory of value, *viz.*, psychological, epistemological and ontological. In another and more restricted sense it stands for the central problem of the ontological status of values.

We accept the wider axiological conception of value and take value to be part of the nature of anything, or something which pervades every thing. "It determines the meaning of the world as a whole as well as the meaning of every person, every event and every action."¹ We cannot think that objects of the world, persons, events and actions are value-free. Value is a logically primitive concept, and as such incapable of definition. It is not subject to rational analysis, but is accessible only to intuition and the only description that we can give of it is that it is in its absolute character identical with reality as such. We maintain therefore that value as Reality is itself supralogical, but stands, like Aristotle's Unmoved Mover, in a teleological relation with the world of things and minds and their processes determining them from before and not from behind. Among those who regard values as objective realities there seems to be no consensus of opinion. Scheler thinks that values are not relations, but peculiar qualities forming a special kingdom of objects with certain relations and ranks. They are thus existences independent of man and are thus objective. They are discovered or realised but not made by man. Nicolai Hartmann substantially agrees with Scheler in his view of objectivity of value when he says that values are *essences*, and that they represent specific quality of things, relations

i. Lossky and Marshall: *Value and Existence*, p. 27.

or persons. "They are not 'formal' or empty structures, but possess contents" ; "they are not capable of being directly grasped by thought ; rather are they immediately discerned only by an inner 'vision', like Plato's 'Ideas'."¹ It appears then that Nicolai Hartmann in this context speaks of values as essences meaning by 'essences' what Plato meant by his 'Ideas'. In another context Nicolai Hartmann speaks of value as *powers*. As he himself puts it, "Values are genuine 'first movers' in the Aristotelian sense ; from them proceed creative energy, productivity, fashioning, actualisation. Value is the power which stands behind the energy of the Ought-to-Be. In the presence of the valuational principle the existent loses its equilibrium, it falls into motion and it tends to something beyond itself. Value is its centre of gravity, the 'first entelechy' of its movement."² But though we agree with Nicolai Hartmann in so far as he admits the identity of value with dynamic reality and makes it objective, yet we beg to differ from him in that values have not merely the ethical Ought-to-Be as their exclusive structure, but also the cognitive and religious structures.

Prof. Sorley, too, is of opinion that God is the embodiment of moral values and reality has a moral constitution through and through, and all values including intellectual, æsthetic and religious, are reducible to moral values. He minimises the significance of the religious values on the ground that when man has attained religious values and has obtained the beatific vision of God, the beatific vision of the transfigured spirit of man seems to be pure blank with nothing to achieve, but man cannot remain satisfied with that. As he himself puts it: "if free minds, when perfected, are to pass away, even for absorption in God, then that value is lost ; and we must ask again the question, with less confidence in the answer, whether the values which the world's history offers are worth the price that has been paid for them."³ The only thing we can say to this opinion of Sorley is that in the religious life of man, in his communion with God, there is the highest value of the beatific calm for which moral values involving strife and stress of life are never too a high price. Our strivings are directed

1. Nicolai Hartmann: *Ethics*, Vol. I, p. 185.

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 272-73.

3. Sorley: *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, p. 515.

to the attainment of perfection and when perfection is reached as the highest good of life, moral efforts and moral value necessarily cease and the individual has overcome all limitations of his being. Hence perfection reached in the calm of religious life is certainly the value of all values and has a reality of its own in the being of God. So we conclude once more by saying that value must have a religious structure in addition to its moral one.

Bosanquet also establishes in his own way the conclusion that value is an ontological reality and permeates the entire universe, the things and events of the world and the individual selves. The universe with all its contents in its process of approximation to its destiny manifests values as so many self-expressions of the spiritual whole which realises its concrete individuality through such approximation. Bosanquet thus has argued that the horizon of man's ideal expands more and more in his social and moral relations with his fellow-citizens and the state. But he has been forced ultimately to admit that the social and moral ideals cannot bring to the human soul the "final satisfaction till it completes itself in the knowledge and thought of God, in union with whom alone the individual comes to be that which he really is."¹

The Indian Idealist attitude towards value substantially agrees with the conception of value formulated above. To the Indian mind in general value is the framework of life and the universe, and permeates every thing, every event and every stratum of being. The ultimate spiritual reality is the home of the absolute objective values and, in its immanent relation with the entire universe, realises its nature through it. The universe is an organic whole. The physical world is organic to the biological, the biological world is organic to the psychical and the psychical world to the spiritual. Life in its organic relation to the world progressively unfolds its possibilities and realises the fuller and fuller stature of its being as it approximates to the spiritual reality of the whole. The spiritual reality in its immanent relation with the world is dynamic, and as such draws forth the world to itself and in this lies its realisation of its fuller and fuller being, and values are but those spiritual entities, even forces, which manifest themselves

1. Cf. Bosanquet: *The Principle of Individuality and Value*. Lecture VII to X and Appendix II, p. 403.

in the course of this realisation. The finite individuals gradually rid themselves of their biological and psychical adjuncts or impediments (*koṣas*) by way of spiritualising them. *Puruṣārtha* is the common term in Indian philosophy for that which is value for the *puruṣa* or finite individual. That which is ultimately valued or prized by the *puruṣa* can only be that in which his true being lies, that which constitutes his highest good or value. The highest good of the *puruṣa* is his fullest nature and the fullest nature is his freedom or *Mokṣa*. Freedom or *Mokṣa* is thus the highest value for the individual self. To the self in its liberated state, Knowledge, Goodness and Beauty as absolute values are manifested, for the liberated self is at one with the highest spiritual reality which is an embodiment of the highest values. In common parlance we are accustomed to say that we attain values, but really they are not attained, but are only manifested, for they are eternal entities independent of process or production. To the Indian mind, then, values are not emergents, and they do not emerge as the spatio-temporal nature grows in fineness and complexity, as Alexander would have them. They are not even creation in the course of the onrush of the blind principle of Life, as Bergson would have them. They only *appear* to emerge as the growing fineness of the life of our self renders it increasingly fitter for their appreciation. It will not be far from the truth to say that the highest values are really the archetypal forces which make up the very constitution of the immanent spiritual reality or God.

Rāmānuja's view of God and of values establishes this kind of relation between values and the spiritual reality. In this immanent conception of spiritual reality or God Rāmānuja provides for supreme personality to God, and individual selves achieve approximations to the supreme personality and share in God's highest values of Knowledge, Goodness and Beauty excepting His Power, because the individual selves become identified with God in all other respects excepting their will. Relative values are also provided for in this immanent view of God in the sphere of the Law of *Karma*, which governs the selves in all their transactions with the world and with other selves, until the Law of Karma becomes ineffective for them in the state of *Mokṣa* where they transcend the Law of Karma, and the absolute values manifest themselves to the liberated selves.

Advaita Vedānta, however, goes a step further and says that the state of liberation transcends the zone of values. Valuation presupposes evaluating persons, so that the sphere of value is the sphere of persons, either individual or universal. Liberation is perfect freedom, but valuation which involves personality involves limitation incompatible with absolute freedom which is *Mokṣa*. The liberated self is at one with Brahman which as Absolute Existence and Pure Intuition, brooks no limitation and is beyond value. Dr. Whitehead, curiously enough, holds almost the identical view with the Advaita Vedānta. To him also valuation means restriction or limitation. Value and valuation do not apply to the Absolute Existence which he calls 'Substantial Activity' resembling the indeterminate and non-valuational Substance of Spinoza ; and 'the three orders of limitation' are its attributes. Of these three orders, the first is the logical order in which the logical relations prevail ; the second is the scientific order in which the relations of cause and effect predominate ; and the third is the order of values which imposes further limitations or restrictions on the system of things. As Dr. Whitehead puts it, 'Restriction is the price of value.' For to evaluate a thing is to impose upon it further restrictions over and above what are involved in our logical and scientific estimate of it. Valuation pre-supposes standards of value whereby to accept or to reject things under valuation, in addition to the logical and causal relations in which things necessarily stand before the evaluating activity. And Dr. Whitehead adds that reason fails to account for why there should be these limitations. It appears then that the world of our experience is the home of the necessary distinctions and limitations which are expressed in terms of logical, scientific and value relations. The category of value, therefore, has its application within the system of events resulting from the self-limiting activity of God. God is Himself therefore not the concrete personality, but an impersonal infinite, the supreme ground for limitations of which the system of events is composed. He is the author of the whole play, but why He makes His play to be such, is more than what we claim to know. 'No reason can be given for the nature of God, for that reason is the very ground of rationality.'¹ The element of transcendence beyond all values

1. Whitehead: *Religion in the Making*, p. 90.

is common both to Advaita Vedānta and to Dr. Whitehead with only this difference that while God with Advaita Vedānta is a lower category making possible the creation of the world which in its immanent relation with God is the sphere of value, God with Dr. Whitehead as an infinite possibility is beyond the actuality of the created world with all its categories of limitation, logical, scientific and valuational, but at the same time being Himself the home of universals and ideal harmony determines the actual world of limitation in a manner which our human reason fails to account for.¹

5. TYPES OF VALUE.

After having considered the nature of value from different philosophical points of view we are now in a position to attack the problem of value from the angle of the objects which we value. There are infinite varieties of objects which force themselves upon our consciousness and demand evaluation from it. They possess in various degrees and forms that particular quality which makes us prize them and demands from us their evaluation, for such evaluation is bound up with our progress towards our highest destiny as individuals. Hence we propose to consider below the different types of value.

(a) PHYSICAL VALUES

Every object, every phenomenon, every event, our physical body not excepted, has a value. Each of them is an integral part of the physical world, and if the entire universe is the self-expression of the Spiritual Reality, then things, events and phenomena cannot but be experiences and values through which the Spiritual Reality of the universe realises itself. Again, if our lives as individuals mean creation and overcoming of antithesis between our selves and the physical world, and the entire social environment, it is obvious how the physical world has a value as contributory to the attainment by us of higher values as individuals. Our body has a special function to discharge in our moral strivings in so far as it is the vehicle through which our selves receive and

1. Cf. *Science and the Modern World*.

react upon the sensori-motor experiences that contribute to the materials for their development. Indeed our body is in a way an impediment to the realisation of the absolute values, but still our body cannot be denied value, at least as helping us in rising in the scale of values and therefore as serving us as scaffolding for the attainment of our highest destiny.

(b) ECONOMIC VALUES

In our life of ordinary experience there is a side which demands exchange of goods between ourselves and our fellow-selves. We need many things which we do not possess, but our fellow-selves do, and our fellow-selves need many things which they do not possess, but which we do. Now, for the purposes of creature comfort, for the satisfaction of curiosity, for the meeting of intellectual and æsthetic demands, a necessity is felt for exchange of goods amongst members of the human society to meet each other's needs. In the primitive society when money was unknown and coins were a curiosity, the system of barter or mutual exchange of goods supplied each other's wants. The goods which could be secured in exchange for other goods had therefore the economic value or value in exchange. In modern society money has replaced the primitive barter system and has acquired economic value. But since money is not an end in itself but only a means to an end, it has no value of its own but only an extrinsic or instrumental value. Economics as a study of means to an end thus gives us only things of instrumental value.

(c) PSYCHICAL VALUES

Over and above the physical and economic values there are what may be called the psychical values. By psychical values we mean those higher values which the self of the individual develops as ideals corresponding to its three psychical functions, namely, thinking, feeling and willing. Again when we speak of psychical values we must not be misunderstood to mean that in the levels of physical and economic values there was no psychical operation involved, for nobody denies that at the root of all valuation there is the valuating consciousness necessarily implied. The special reason for distinguishing psychical values from the physical and economic ones is that psychical values involve an emphasis

on the operation and development of the special psychical functions towards their corresponding ideals. Under psychical values or ideals we may distinguish intellectual value or Truth, ethical value or Goodness, and æsthetic value or Beauty.

(i) *Intellectual Value or Truth*

The psychical life of the individual in its progression towards its destiny must develop its logical ideal and realise what Truth is. The conception of truth as an ideal may vary from individual to individual, but there is no doubt that a progressive individual must form some conception of truth. We need not repeat here the conditions and criteria of truth we have developed in chapter IV of our book to which we refer the reader ; it will suffice for our present purposes to note only this that truth is consistency or coherence amongst ideas which involve correspondence with facts. Its cognition is self-evident or self-valid though it is dependent on correspondence in carrying conviction to others. It is a value because it has a significance in the development of the individual as a self-conscious principle by itself. The individual self in his progression towards his destiny must realise the truth that he is a self-conscious individual amongst other individuals, and as such must appropriate his experiences and transcend antithesis and contradictions in his experiences, and arrive at truth about his place and function in the social whole and in the larger whole of Reality.

(ii) *Ethical Value or Goodness*

The individual in his relation to other individuals finds that his own will stands in antithesis to the will of other selves and also that his will is in conflict with his desires, impulses and instincts which stand in the way of his development as a personality. He finds that the social will imposes certain restrictions on his own will, and also that under the stress and strain of his instincts and impulses, his will is distracted and torn asunder, with the result that he is at a loss to discern what must be the *summum bonum* or the highest good of his life. Sometimes he thinks as if the social good or the good of the greatest number is his highest ideal ; and sometimes his own individual happiness to the exclusion of the happiness of others is his *summum bonum* ; or even sometimes he finds as if his will under the exclusive guidance of

reason to the neglect of his sensible life promotes his life's end. But he is ultimately disillusioned when he realises that the true ethical ideal does not lie in the separation between his own will and the social will, nor in his purely rational will or his purely sensuous will, but rather in the organic development of his will which is a will among wills and is an integral whole of the sensuous and the rational will. The ethical life is not a cross-section, severed from the social context and from the organic whole of its own being, so that its ideal or goodness is a complex product of the social and individual forces at work. Moral Goodness called *Eudæmonia* or beatitude is thus that ideal of development which results from the harmony and interplay of all the psychical forces, personal and social, through which a psychical centre realises itself as a concrete individuality.

(iii) *Æsthetic Value or Beauty*

Just as the intellect and the will of man aspire after and realise their ideals of truth and goodness by a process of development, resolving conflicts and contradictions as they present themselves in their cognitions and conations, even so the feeling aspect of man has an inherent tendency to seek after its satisfaction in the ideal of Beauty. Feeling in its lower form is confined to sense perception of the particular and the present, and is guided by interest which is local, private and personal. To rise from the lower forms of feeling demands on the part of man education and culture of his imagination which discovers a meaning and significance extending far beyond the objects of sense perception. When we say so, we seem to think as if æsthetic feeling is an acquired one and is to be met with only in a cultured society, and is never an innate function of the mind. But we know even among the uncultured savages there is the sense of beauty, and they express it in decoration, dance and music. The question arises therefore whether beauty is entirely dependent upon subjective training or has something in itself which compels appreciation. Thus the problem of beauty has divided thinkers into two camps, one regarding beauty as existing purely in a peculiar feeling of man moulded by tradition and training, and the other holding the view that beauty is wholly objective depending on an *inherent quality* of objects, no matter whether there is or is not mind, trained, or untrained to appreciate it.

There is, however, a third possible view of the nature of beauty which combines the above two and makes beauty depend partly on subjective and partly on objective conditions. An object of beauty must have certain inherent qualities which invoke the feeling of beauty, and at the same time the mind must be trained in a particular manner so as to appreciate the object of beauty and entertain an æsthetic feeling with regard to it. If beauty consisted entirely in the inherent quality of the object then there would have been no variation in æsthetic judgments, and apart from minor differences it is generally true that "the radical difference in the judgments as to Beauty is between those adopted by the savage and the civilised, not between those which are entertained by the latter. Further, we can only explain artistic progress in a nation if there be a standard towards which that progress normally tends."¹ And the subjective-objective view of beauty also seems consistent with facts as well as with principles involved in perceptual judgment. All such judgments imply joint contribution of the environment and of the mind, and similarly our æsthetic judgments, too, are results of the joint contribution from the objects of beauty experienced by us and from associations and imaginations of the mind. We can remain satisfied for all practical purposes with this combined subjective-objective view of the nature of beauty, though there are extreme cases which may incline the more inquisitive mind to have recourse either to the subjective or to the objective account to explain them.

After having considered the views about the nature of beauty we propose now to consider the *Characteristics of the Beautiful* or those features which characterise a beautiful object. We confess we did not undertake the similar task of exhibiting the characteristics of the True and the Good when we formulated our conception of them in this section, because in our chapters on Truth and Reality (Ch. iv) and on the Philosophy of the Self (Ch. vii) we have attempted a fuller treatment of them. The problem of the Beautiful is a comprehensive one, such that it is impossible to enter into a detailed consideration of the issues involved, and the curious reader may consult Knight's *Philosophy of the Beautiful* in two parts with profit. We would simply note in this connection the main characteristics which distinguish a beautiful object. *First,*

1. Knight: *The Philosophy of the Beautiful*, Part II, p. 8.

a beautiful object is characterised by the *symmetry* of its parts. A thing which is beautiful, say a rose, exhibits a definite proportion in the form and structure of its petals, in the order of arrangement of these petals and in the distance between its centre and the outermost points of its petals. Symmetry may assume different forms in different things of beauty, but is never absent from any one of them. It is worth noting that sometimes variety of size and colour in the details of the parts which make up the symmetry adds to the beauty of the thing. Hence, variety in details does not go against the general symmetry of the parts in which the beauty of a thing consists. The beauty of a landscape, of a poem or a drama, of a gallery of pictures, well illustrates our point. *Secondly*, a beautiful object is characterised by *unity*. Unless a beautiful object is one unified whole, the appreciating mind cannot economise its effort, but feels distracted which mars its sense of beauty. Of course, often symmetry of parts in a beautiful object contributes to its unity or unity of the object determines its symmetry, though both symmetry and unity may not always go together, and therefore an ununified object with symmetry of its parts fails to generate the sense of relief and complacence which a really beautiful object imparts to the mind. Here an important issue is raised as to whether the unity spoken of above is the unity of *form* or the unity of *matter*, or the unity of both form and matter of the beautiful object. Indeed any work of art has its form as well as matter. If the object of beauty has its life in unity, then that unity must pervade its form as well as its matter. Unity of form without the unity of matter or unity of matter without the unity of form is indeed a source of the sense of dis-harmony and, therefore, fails to generate the sense of the beautiful, as it hampers calmness of contemplation through which beauty is appreciated. It follows that an object to be beautiful, say a poem, a song or a picture, requires as its fundamental objective characteristic the unity of both form and matter. *Thirdly*, the beauty of an object is characterised by *universality*. Individual liking and attraction do not constitute the feeling of the beautiful. The object of beauty has an appeal to the higher faculty of imagination which is supersensuous and, therefore, above the particular and variable character of sense-feeling and thus compels appreciation from all minds. Beauty always is an ideal, and as such it has an element in it which attracts as a goal all minds alike ; e.g. a rose,

the rising sun, the full moon, each of which is enjoyed by all minds because there is in each of them a feature which it is difficult for any mind to resist. And *lastly*, a beautiful object is characterised by *disinterestedness*. This characteristic follows as a corollary from the universality of beauty. A beautiful object is contemplated without reference to any particular interest of the contemplator. All interests are suggestive of individuality and privacy. If an object of beauty has universal appeal, it is for that very reason independent of any private or individual interest. The beauty of an object is contemplated and enjoyed for its own sake. It is an end in itself and never a means to an end, and therefore it is an intrinsic value by itself. Individual interest which is at the root of extrinsic value can have nothing to do with the beauty of an object.

(iv) *Interrelation between Psychical values*

From the above formulation of the different types of psychical values it should not be understood that the psychical values are entirely independent of one another and that no one of them has anything to do with the other two. It should not be understood either that there is any antagonism amongst them, for fuller and fuller development of the individual selves will reveal the deeper principle of unity and organisation amongst them. Each type of value has its own significance in the progressive realisation by the individual of his own destiny, without one of them being subordinated to the other two. We maintain that there is a co-ordination among the values rather than subordination of any one to the other two. There have been philosophers who have maintained that the moral value or goodness is the supreme value and the intellectual and æsthetic values are absorbed by or subordinated to the moral. These philosophers are of opinion that the individual is essentially a moral being and his ultimate aim lies in the attainment of the highest moral value or the Good. The importance of the intellectual value lies, they say, in this that it contributes to our knowledge of the highest moral value or the Good, and also they believe that nothing which is not good can have truth or reality. It is goodness that lends truth to a thing, so that goodness is the determinant of truth in the sphere of highest values. They maintain, further, that the beauty of a thing also depends upon its goodness and that it receives its fullest development only when it ends

in the promotion of morality.¹ But there are others again, like Croce and Münsterberg, who maintain that *Æsthetics* is 'the fundamental and irreducible form of valuation'.² The immediate result of the supremacy of *æsthetics*, as Croce has shown, is that philosophy to be effective thinking must first of all fix upon expressive concepts, for science and philosophy require that their ideas must be expressed in a perfect terminology which has an aesthetic value of its own. But the deeper consequence of the supremacy of *æsthetics* is that in our evaluation of the beautiful moral considerations have no place. Art must be pursued for its own sake and beauty should have nothing to do with goodness. Nor should the products of aesthetic genius abide by the principles of consistency or truth. But this is reactionary modernism in value theory and errs against the fundamental principles of truth and goodness which seem to guide human interest. *Æsthetic valuation* which brings into operation the emotional side of man cannot be given absolute freedom to have its way defying the demands of truth and morality. Beauty is value indeed, and art no doubt aims at the production of beauty, but true art cannot go against facts and phenomena and their relations discovered by science. It cannot belie the truths of science and bid adieu to logic. Truth must be the guiding principle of aesthetic evaluation as much as of all evaluation. Nor can art be pursued for its own sake without reference to the good of the individual and of the society. True art cannot claim absolute freedom from fundamental principles of scientific ethics. The artist in his production of beauty cannot sever himself from the all-embracing influence of morality which includes or embraces all activities of the human agent. If art is to satisfy the specific demands of emotion it must also satisfy the more general demands of Logic and of Ethics. *Æsthetics* should not be allowed to usurp or defy the more fundamental claims of truth and goodness. To subordinate logic and ethics, truth and goodness, to *æsthetics* is to forget the more fundamental claims of goodness and truth which satisfy the more general interests of human life. The beautiful appeals to us not because of its arbitrary disaffiliation from truth and goodness, but because it satisfies the

1. Plato in the ancient period and many thinkers in the modern period including Bosanquet, Sorley and others entertain this view.

2. *Philosophy To-day* : Article on *Value Theory and Æsthetic*, p. 70.

prior claims of consistency and contributes to the moral evolution of individuals and society. We conclude then that the relation among the values of truth, goodness and beauty is not one of *subordination* of any two of them to the third, but one of *co-ordination* which gives each one of these values its due significance in the realisation of our individuality which is our ultimate destiny.

6. GRADATION OF VALUES.

In the present section we propose to view values from the standpoint of their importance, or as Nicolai Hartmann says, from the standpoint of 'height' and 'strength' of values in the realisation of our destiny as individuals. All values are experiences of different degrees of importance in the development of individuality. The individual in his transaction with his physical and social environment cannot ignore, but must appraise the worth of these experiences as contributory to the realisation of his goal. Hence, from the standpoint of gradation we begin as follows.

(a) EXTRINSIC AND INTRINSIC VALUES

Values are called *extrinsic* in so far as they are pursued not for their own sake but only as means to an end. Under these extrinsic values we may distinguish the physical and economic values. Most things and events of the world are values by us not for their own sake ; nor are the values in exchange, such as goods and money, regarded as having values in themselves. We attribute values to them in so far as they contribute in their own ways to our realisation of individuality. Values are called *intrinsic* when they do not borrow their worth from anything extraneous to themselves. Under intrinsic values we may enumerate, truth, goodness, beauty, individuality, and the like. They are ends in themselves, but never means to anything else. They are pursued for their own sake. It may be noted, however, that the terms 'extrinsic' and 'intrinsic' are used relatively within the whole range of extrinsic values, their relative character being due to the fact that sometimes what is intrinsic from one level of our life becomes extrinsic when that level is transcended. But it may be pointed out that from the highest level of our spiritual development the intrinsic values become identical with Absolute Values.

(b) SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE VALUES

There is another way of grading values and in this gradation we distinguish values into subjective and objective. Values are undoubtedly experiences, but experiences depend not only on the *subject's reactions* to reality but also on the *character* of the objects which are experienced. Empirical or psychological and pragmatic theories of value will make all values subjective, because in each of them experience of value is a purely subjective reaction. According to the empiricist and pragmatist, not only the existence but also the truth, goodness and beauty of a thing are determined by their being experienced and by their affecting the subject, ill or well, or by their satisfying or subverting the needs of the subject. In any case, it is the element of feeling, either in the form of interest or in the more particular form of conative satisfaction, that determines the value of a thing. According to these theories of value all objective values, which are determined by the character of objects valued, are meaningless and illusory. Again, there are some thinkers who believe that there may be objective values in the sense that they are independent of subjective feelings. But there are others who believe that values are purely the creations of subject's private feelings and therefore variable as these feelings are. The same thing or experience may be a value to X, but not to Y. As the common saying goes: 'One man's meat is another man's poison.' Now a value will be objective if it gives rise to a common or trans-subjective feeling of well-being or satisfaction. But this trans-subjective feeling of well-being or satisfaction presupposes a common object of reference which is never the subject's creation. Hence, realists discover an objective ground of valuation in the existence and self-maintenance of things. But they commit the opposite mistake of ignoring the contribution of the mind in valuation. Even when an object is valuable in itself it presupposes an evaluating subject to appraise its value. In this sense, therefore, the realists cannot consistently show their values to be absolutely objective. Their values are after all subjective-objective.

The idealists approach the problem of value from an angle different from those of the psychologist, pragmatist and the realist. They, indeed, make a distinction between subjective and objective values. To them there seems to be an inverse varia-

tion between the subjective and the objective character of values. But they believe that there are absolutely objective values. Truth, Goodness and Beauty, as embodied in the being of the Absolute Reality or Spirit, are indeed the objective entities or even forces independent of the appraisal by finite spirits or subjects. The finite spirits or subjects in their different degrees of realisation of the Absolute Spirit must necessarily have experience of subjective and objective values. The finite spirits in their different degrees of isolation from other finite spirits and from the Absolute Spirit, will make their valuation subjective in proportion as they take their own selves as disintegrated into their feelings, desires and wills, and as they fail to bring reason to bear upon their life of feeling and will. Reason is the universal principle which brings unity and organisation, not only into the distracting feelings and wills of an individual self, but also into all individual selves in their relation to the universe. The higher and higher realisation of the life of reason thus ensures the increasing transformation of values from subjective to objective. When a particular thing or event is valued by man it must be understood that that object satisfies his feeling or promotes his action better than any other thing, though that other thing might equally or even better satisfy the feeling and conation of another man, and therefore is a value to the latter. This individual preference is at the root of subjective valuation. A deeper insight shows that reason, the basic principle of objectivity of things and of their valuation, is either altogether absent or is at its minimum in these cases, and man rises in the scale of objective valuation or grows in consciousness of objective values in proportion as he rises from the life of disintegrating feelings and will to the higher and higher life of the organic unity of the universe rendered possible by reason. In view of the rising scale of rational realisation in man the subjective and objective values may thus be said to bear an inverse proportion amongst them. Hence, as Nicolai Hartmann has held, the stronger the subjective values in man, the weaker is he in his possession of objective values, and the higher man rises in the realisation of objective values the lower is he in the realisation of subjective values. Man's life is a progressive realisation of the objective values of Truth, Goodness and Beauty.¹ They are

1. Cf. Nicolai Hartmann: *Ethics*, Vol. II, Ch. III.

not created by him but they manifest themselves to him when he is drawn nearer and nearer by them as objective spiritual forces which make up the Absolute Spiritual Reality. This brings home to us the absolutist's position that value is Reality and therefore objective, and conversely, Reality is value and constituted of value.

(c) RELATIVE AND ABSOLUTE VALUES

From what has been said above it would be clear that very little remains on our part to indicate for the distinction of relative and absolute values. If by *Absolute Values* we mean Truth, Goodness and Beauty as objective forces that form the very essence of the Absolute Spiritual Reality, and if they are not dependent on subjective desires and impulses, nor upon conative satisfaction, nor again upon self-maintenance of objects in their affinity and selection, but manifest themselves with man's rational realisation of his unity and attunement to the ultimate spiritual Reality, then all other values which fall short of such rational realisation will be regarded as *Relative Values*. The relative values will, therefore, include all physical or bodily values, economic or instrumental values, extrinsic and subjective values. These values are called relative, because they fall short of the absolute values ; because in their origin and appreciation, the factors that are involved, the finite objects and events, the faculties of feeling, will and reason and the individual selves, are all viewed in isolation and not as integral parts of the whole of Reality which is the unity of all experiences and values. Though the spiritual reality of the universe has its essence in the objective and absolute values, yet the nature of such reality being dynamic cannot fail to draw the worlds of things and minds in a process of evolution which represents self-expression, stage by stage, of its concrete individuality. These stages of self-expression, therefore, mark the progressive approximation of the universe to that concrete individuality. But viewed in this light these stages really represent relative values, for they are approximations to, and must fall short of, the Absolute. The relative values, however, are not without importance or meaning in the economy of the universe. Although relative values may be conceived as having gradation in themselves, yet in antithesis to absolute values they may be characterised by the common name,

relative values. We see then that the absolute values are objective in the sense that they are independent of subjective evaluation, but themselves determine subjective evaluation as they determine all other things and events, processes and principles. We further see that if there be any intrinsic values in their ultimate sense, then they are, and must be, absolute values, and that the reality of God, the Absolute, is identical with the reality of these intrinsic, objective, absolute values.

7. *VALUE-CONSCIOUSNESS.*

Having discussed what value is in its different senses we think it worth while to attempt an account of how we become conscious of values. We have to discuss, therefore, in this connection the elements which are involved in such consciousness. We have seen that factual knowledge involves judgment as its unit and that each judgment of fact involves the elements of sense and reason, of percept and concept. We would see that consciousness of value involves judgment of value as its unit. Hence, to understand the elements of the consciousness of value we must understand the elements that are involved in value-judgment. The empirical theory of knowledge denies the judgmental character of knowledge in so far as it denies existence and function of reason in knowledge. Consequently, empirical or psychological theory of value will not recognise any judgment of value and will make a mere subjective feeling to be the only element in the consciousness of values. The pragmatist and the realist will sail in the same boat as the empiricist proper, and will, therefore, make value-consciousness to be a matter of feeling alone. To them also the consciousness of value will not be a judgment which always involves experience and reason. It is the idealist alone who will make the consciousness of value to consist in a judgment involving experience and reason. But it is also suggested that a value-judgment that we ordinarily pass on things valuable, involves also the third element of intuition over and above sense and reason. For it is supposed that although value-judgment involves with intellectual judgment or judgment of facts, the common element of sense and reason, yet before we can judge a thing as valuable, before we can say that such and such knowledge is true, or such and such an act is good, or such and such an object is beautiful, the mind first intuitively realises or

appreciates value in all these cases and then expresses itself in value-judgments, which are, therefore, complex products of intuition, sense-feeling and reason. And perhaps it is not untrue to maintain that our consciousness of relative values also involves over and above sense and reason an element of intuition. Now the sphere of relative values is the sphere of empirico-rational knowledge. But when we are in the realm of absolute values, when we contemplate Truth, Goodness, Beauty, Love, Freedom as values in their absolute sense, we may be said to have transcended the limitations of spatio-temporal-causal world where sense and reason have their rôles to play. In this realm of absolute values, judgments, which always involve subject-object relation, analysis and synthesis, have to be transcended, and relational factors will have no room in the realisation of the absolute values, and the self in its immediate intuition only visualises the absolute values as one does the *Ideas* of Plato.¹ It follows then that the consciousness of absolute values is immediate and intuitive, for when an individual realises ultimate truth, goodness and beauty, he becomes one with them. There is more of the feeling of identification of the self with the absolute values than of analysis and reflection which characterise our consciousness of relative objects. In the realisation of the absolute values the tendency of the mind is not to know so much as to be identical with them. Bergson was very right when he said that in our intuition of reality as Change our self throws itself into the heart of reality. Now the absolute values of truth, goodness and beauty, which make up the essence of ultimate Reality, therefore, demand that in our realisation of them our selves must be of the nature or essence of them. The realisation of absolute values therefore in which the fullest development of our being lies, will mean the intuitive consciousness of these absolute values and in that intuitive consciousness of the absolute values our selves feel identified with these values. But when we say this one should not understand us to mean that by the realisation of the absolute values the selves lose their individuality. What we mean is this that the selves, in their realisation of the absolute values, instead of losing their individuality attain their fullest being as individuals. Rāmānuja, the concrete monist of India, also, has given us to understand that in Mokṣa the self

1. Ibid., Vol. I, Ch. XIV, p. 185.

attains the absolute values of Truth, Goodness, Beauty, Love, Freedom, but retains its individuality without merging in the Absolute Reality and in this attainment of the absolute values, the consciousness of these values will always be 'emotional, intuitive.'¹

8. GOD AND THE ABSOLUTE VALUES.

In section six of the present chapter where we tried to understand the nature of objective and absolute values, we concluded that the values in their absolute or objective sense are identical with the being of God, who is the ultimate unity of them. But this general hint at the relation between God and the absolute values provokes a more detailed consideration. In our consideration, so far, of the problems concerning values we were engaged in describing the nature of values and of realisation of them by individuals ; but we did not touch upon the problem of the *maintenance of values*. We have of course made the bare statement that God is the unity of values, but that does not clarify the issue as to the way in which they remain as elements in the divine life. The question of the maintenance of value in the divine life and for the matter of that, the kind of relation the values bear to the divine life has been brought into the forefront by Prof. Höffding when he, in his *Philosophy of Religion*, defined religion as faith in the *conservation of values*. Apparently, therefore, values according to him are conserved in the being of God, because God is the final home of values, the Supreme Worth, as possessing the fulness of knowledge, beauty and goodness, and whatever is of intrinsic value. According to Höffding then values are maintained in God. But this maintenance of values in God, or conservation of values as he calls it, suggests that no increase of value either in quality or in intensity is possible. We agree with Höffding in so far as he makes God the home of values, for values in their absolute sense can exist only in God who is supreme worth. But unlike Höffding who thus makes God to be the unchanging or static reservoir of values, we like to think that values are progressive and increasing. Through history, through social and moral evolution which we cannot deny, the human individual is progressively realising better and newer values which do not die out, but survive, and are made a means to the realisation of higher and higher values by indivi-

1. Cf. Ibid.

2. Also cf. Srī Bhāṣya on IV. 4. 19.

duals. Höffding was led to the theory of the conservation of values on the analogy of the conservation of energy and to the belief that values are a fixed quantity, which remains the same under various transformation. But what is true of the physical world is not necessarily true of the moral and the religious world. If the values are conservable in this sense then the efforts of man to attain newer values become meaningless. Höffding himself at times seems to think that values are progressive. As a matter of fact the sum of values is not a constant quantity. Values are produced or created and the progress of the individual means creation or production of values where they did not exist. So Prof. Sorley thinks that in the realm of value both increase and conservation are not incompatible. Our moral and religious consciousness will be satisfied to think that new values are created by the strivings of the progressive individuals, and when created they will be conserved because they are worth possessing. And these progressive increase of values and their conservation have a great significance for our conception of God. God, as the home of all values, will be a dynamic principle and He may be thus regarded more as *consummating* than as merely conserving values. As a dynamic principle His nature will be more consistent with consummation in the sense of transvaluation of all values rather than with pure conservation which admits of no increase or decrease or even reinterpretation of them. A mystical view of religion which negates all moral efforts may remain satisfied with the stagnant conception of values which Höffding's conservation theory encourages. But we would like to add that there is even a practical form of mysticism in which it is not impossible to achieve newer values, and to show their possibility of transvaluation in the Absolute Reality.¹ We perfectly agree with Prof. Sorley when he says that Höffding's theory of the conservation of values does not provide for increase of values. But we differ from him when he upholds supremacy of the moral value of goodness and subordinates the values of truth and beauty to the moral nature of man, though he admits as we do, progress and development in the values of truth, beauty and goodness. In support of his view of God as a dynamic Progressive Being ever readjusting and perfecting the objective values he holds to an optimistic faith in the permanence of the

1. Cf. Sorley: *Moral Values and Idea of God*, p. 158 ff.

world-order against the second law of thermodynamics that the planet of ours is running down, for God he thinks, may not be indifferent to what man requires as the conditions of his values. We feel inclined to think that the absolute and objective values, of Truth and Beauty are as real as Goodness ; they are absolute and eternal and self-sufficient entities existing, as it were, by their own right and like 'jewels shining by their own light'. Any attempt at reduction of Truth and Beauty to Goodness or even at subordination of the former to the latter as that of Sorley carries with it a suggestion as if Goodness is the only absolute moral value from which Truth and Beauty seem to borrow their life and light. Prof. Sorley may have been led to this theory of subordination of Truth and Beauty to Goodness from the empirical fact of human endeavour in the creation and realisatoin of goods or values. But, as we have maintained, though creation and realisation of values imply human agents, yet the values which man creates and realises are only imperfect replica of the Absolute Values which in their metaphysical entitative character are never porducible but only capable of approximation. That the Absolute Being or God is Truth as an absolute value follows from 'His being real, for that which is real cannot be untrue. That God is Beauty and Love as absolute values follows from the great Upaniṣadic utterance that "each of our selves loves all things not for their own sake but for the sake of itself," because the self is of the essence of love ; hence our self, as the replica of the Universal Self, when it realises God, realises absolute Love and Beauty. That God is identical with Goodness as an absolute value follows from the fact that it is God as a spiritual force or entity that actuates man to realise the Good or moral value in his relations to the world and to his fellow beings. When we call God the unity of the absolute values of Truth, Beauty or Love and Goodness, we imply that these absolute values have only their distinguishable but no separable characters which are all real. If Truth and Beauty may be said to be reducible to Goodness, Goodness and Beauty may also be said with equal emphasis to be reducible to Truth. Without further elaborating the arguments which attempt at reduction or subordination of any two of the absolute values to the third, we would do well to think that Truth, Goodness and Beauty are absolute realities or real aspects of the Absolute without possibility of mutual reduction or subordination. To judge absolute

values from the human standpoint and to think that all values are ultimately moral because human realisation of them entails moral relations of the individual to his physical and social environment is to confound the province of ethics with those of religion and metaphysics. And, further, religious consciousness is a distinctive dimension of man's experience in which he feels his God as embodiment of *Perfection* where Truth, Beauty, Love and Goodness as real elements receive their consummation.

9. THE NUMINOUS.

Dr. Otto in his *The Idea of the Holy* has given a new turn to the problem of the relation of the absolute values and God. His work contains, among other things, a valuable contribution to the view of the origin of religious consciousness which, he thinks, lies in man's sense of the 'Tremendous Mystery', and unfathomable mysterious power behind the universe. We are not concerned in the present context with the worth or otherwise of his theory of the origin of religious consciousness, but only with his conception of the Holy which has an important bearing on the value of the Good, the Beautiful and the True. Dr. Otto has coined a new term, *The Numinous*, and has done so because the Holy has acquired predominantly an ethical connotation. He is of opinion that the Numinous or the mysterious power is the indefinable reality and is the object of religious consciousness with which the values of Truth, Good and Beauty have only an indirect or secondary relation. The Numinous is beyond all values, is 'wholly other' or transcendent. Human experience with all its phases, within which fall the experiences of the human values, cannot find an exact counterpart in the mystical feeling of the Numinous, because such a feeling is beyond all ordinary mundane consciousness characteristically rational. It is in the religious consciousness which is *sui generis* that the Numinous is only *felt*. The essential feature of religious consciousness is the feeling of our littleness before a tremendously mysterious power accompanied by a sense of awe and terror. It is unique of its kind having no relationship with other types of experience such as those that we have in morality, art and science. Dr. Otto thus makes religious consciousness to consist in a 'non-rational' mystical experience which simply feels, wonders and fears at the

presence of the *Holy*. Religious consciousness is incapable of analysis by our ordinary consciousness of fear and reverence where we can offer a conceptual analysis of what we fear or wonder at. Dr. Otto's *Holy*-ism is thus mysticism and has close parallelism in Williams James' faith or *over-belief* in the *More*. We cannot do better than to express the nature of Dr. Otto's non-rational or mystic experience of our religious life in his own words: "A deep joy may fill our minds without any clear realisation upon our part of its source and the object to which it refers, though some such objective reference there must always be. But as attention is directed to it the obscure object becomes clearly identified in precise conceptual terms. Such an object cannot, then, be called, in our sense of the word, 'non-rational'. But it is quite otherwise with religious 'bliss' and its essentially numinous aspect, the '*fascinans*'. Not the most concentrated attention can elucidate the object to which this state of mind refers, bringing it out of the impenetrable obscurity of feeling into the domain of the conceptual understanding. It remains purely a felt experience only to be indicated symbolically by 'ideograms'. That is what we mean by saying, it is non-rational."¹

Dr. Otto here has made a valuable contribution to the problem of the relation between God and the Absolute Values. He starts by suggesting that in the consciousness of the Numinous there are two elements, the element of the 'mysterious', and the element of the 'absolute'. He argues that those who believe God as absolute think that as an absolute reality God is the embodiment of absolute rational values, and men as created spirits relatively realise in their striving in life the same values as are embodied in God but only of lower degree and quality. Human love, knowledge and goodness are the same in *content* with divine love, knowledge and goodness, but are only different in *form* which marks them as attributes of God and this element of form which distinguishes the absolute attributes of God 'makes them mysterious' and 'wholly other'. Now the nature of absolute attributes is such that they can be thought but cannot be grasped by the human mind, for human understanding can grasp only the relative; and Dr. Otto thinks that though the absolute attributes are beyond our power of rational understanding they can only be

1. R. Otto: *The Idea of the Holy*. p. 61.

thought but cannot be *thought out*, and as such not altogether outside the sphere of the rational. But when we say that the absolute powers of God are mysterious we think that they are altogether outside the sphere of thought and reason. Now Dr. Otto makes capital of his own distinction between what is absolute and what is mysterious, and says that since in religious consciousness the ultimate power of the universe is felt as 'wholly other', therefore it must also be mysterious. It follows then, according to Dr. Otto, that the Numinous or the Holy of our religious consciousness as 'wholly other', must be beyond even the absolute values which belong after all to the sphere of reason and that religious consciousness is entirely mystical and suprarational,¹ though Dr. Otto himself uses the term 'non-rational' to designate it.

Rationalistic writers, like Miall Edwards have taken exception to Dr. Otto's view of the Numinous as 'wholly other,' as transcending the absolute values of Truth, Goodness and Beauty.² Perhaps Miall Edwards has taken Dr. Otto to be indulging in the cheap type of mysticism which is identical with irrationalism, and the reason for his so taking Dr. Otto may perhaps be found in the latter's use of the term 'non-rational'. But a patient reading of the different texts and contexts of Dr. Otto's book will convince the reader that his view is far from irrationalism. The feeling or faith that marks the genuinely religious consciousness is one that has passed through the crucible of reason and therefore one which includes but transcends reason. Dr. Otto in his book is more interested in the analysis of religious consciousness than in giving us a complete metaphysical system where he might have occasion to develop the consequences as to the relation between his Numinous of religion and the Absolute of metaphysics. Dr. Otto admits that he is a mystic, but he warns us against cheap mysticism and says: "Mysticism at the same time retains the *positive quality* of the 'wholly other' as a very living factor in its overbrimming religious emotion."³ Certainly when rationalism is considered as in sharp contrast with the cheap type of mysticism, the former is apt to miss a living relation between God on

1. *Ibid.*, pp. 145-46.

2. Cf. Miall Edwards: *An Outline of the Philosophy of Religion*. Appendix.

3. Dr. Otto: *The Idea of the Holy*, p. 30.

the one side and things and the individual selves on the other, and in view of this sharp contrast Miall Edwards' objection that "to be sheerly transcendent is to be out of all relation to us", seems in point. But there are some sane rationalists according to whom religious consciousness has besides its rational aspect, a supra-rational feeling-content in which the positive side of the transcendent is true in the highest degree, though it cannot be rendered explicit in conceptual terms. Applying this contention of Dr. Otto which is also the contention of some rationalists, we may argue that the conception of the Numinous by Dr. Otto may be freed from the charge of negativating the relation between the Absolute and the world of minds and things. Bosanquet, with all he has insisted in favour of a rational conception of the relation between the world and the Absolute, has also shown, and we think with perfect sanity, the need of a religious experience which he calls 'aesthetic experience' and which has a prerogative bearing on the meaning with which we recognise 'another world'.¹

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CHAPTER XI

PROBLEM OF IMMORTALITY

1. MAN'S DESIRE FOR IMMORTALITY.

Nothing seems to be so dear to man as the idea that he may not be forgotten by his fellow-beings when he passes out of this world. Man in his average life of three score and ten comes to love and prize countless things, achieves innumerable ends, receives honour and glory from his fellow-beings and becomes associated with numberless other things, men and institutions. The idea that death will remove him from the midst of all his dear things, persons and associations to that 'busky bourne' from which no one returns, is certainly dispiriting to him, and he cannot reconcile himself to it but always casts a longing lingering look behind to the shores from which he is compelled by death to undertake this mysterious voyage. Man has thus an inyeterate desire for immortality. The will to live is so strong in him that he dreads death like anything.

There are of course men so pessimistic in their attitude to life and the world who set no store by the sweetest of things and do not hesitate to court death even by suicide. But if pessimism is mind's disease, no normal man can possibly give himself up to the belief that death is our journey's end. The idea of immortality in fact has been an ever-haunting idea for entire humanity from the savage to the savant, from the pauper to the prince. Scientists, philosophers and theologians have all put their heads together to solve the mystery of death and immortality, for round death and immortality are centred life's interest and achievements, and on the question of immortality in particular the value and destiny of the individual depend. The idea of immortality, therefore, has evoked arguments in its support from multifarious sources, but we propose to give below the most salient of them.

(a) ARGUMENT ON THE ANALOGY OF THE CONSERVATION OF ENERGY

The physical science postulates that the quantity of physical energy in the universe is conserved. Matter and motion in which

the energy of the physical universe manifests itself, are a constant ; the different facts and events of the physical world are but manifestations of one and the same principle of physical energy which does not undergo either loss or gain, but what disappears in one form of energy only reappears in another. Any material object when consumed by fire or reduced to powder will exhibit an identical quantity both before and after its consumption by fire or pulvarisation. Mechanical force when changed into chemical or chemical force into electric or electric force into actinic, maintains throughout these changes a quantitative identity without increase or diminution. The result is that nothing in this physical world is lost beyond recovery. On the analogy of this constancy of the physical energy some writers have come to believe that souls of men like the physical objects of the universe cannot be lost for ever at death. But we all know what strength analogical arguments have in proving anything beyond doubt. Again it may be pointed out in criticism that even though we admit that nothing is lost in the universe, and that the factors that entered into my constitution persist in some forms or other even after the dissolution of my body, it is of no avail to me if my personal identity is not preserved. If I, as such and such a person, have no chance of identification it amounts to my annihilation.

¶(b) ARGUMENT BASED ON THE REVELATION OF THE INTELLECT

Man's intellectual life reveals that his thinking, remembrance and imagination are carried on unhindered by the limits of time, space and of bodies in time and space. To think is to apply universal or general notions to our object of thought, but universal or general notions are abstractions from the spatial and temporal conditions of particulars. Thought is not limited to the here and the now, and the higher is the life of thought the more independent does the self feel of the limiting conditions. Memory is another instance of the self's independence of percepts. The self seems to go out in memory from the spatially and temporally circumscribed surroundings into the images of the past, and this suggests the possibility of the life of the soul beyond the present. In imagination and expectation the self's independence of physical conditions is much more conspicuous in that it creates its contents new and different from what it experienced under limitation of

time and space having a reference to the future. These revelations of intellect suggest the possibility of the self to have a life of its own beyond the limitation of the physical world, and that the self can have existence even after the death of its physical vehicle. But a closer consideration points to the fact that this argument puts more in the conclusion than is warranted by the premises. Admitted that the soul has a capacity to transcend the spatio-temporal limitation, is there any justification for holding that this capacity can continue independently of physiological structure which indeed is dissolved in death? A somewhat better suggestion as to the solution of the same problem on identical lines can be had in the Sāṁkhya theory of linga Sarira or subtle body which the Sāṁkhyists hold as accompanying the spirit after its separation from the gross physical body.

(c) METAPHYSICAL ARGUMENTS

The Metaphysical arguments for the immortality of the self include within their range the entire philosophy of the self beginning from that of Plato up to the latest phases of modern philosophy. Plato's view of the soul which had its precursor in Socrates at least in its logical or epistemological aspect acquired such a composite character as made us believe that the soul was not only uncreated and indestructible, but also capable of surviving bodily death and of transmigration. In the first instance ³Plato conceived of the soul as a substantial reality, simple in structure and therefore different from Homeric and primitive conception of an *eidolon*, or the shadowy double of the body. Secondly, Plato believed that soul is of the divine essence and is therefore immortal, and here he has been clearly influenced by the Orphic ideas of the origin and destiny of the soul. Thirdly, Plato's general metaphysical position that Being is sharply contrasted with Becoming, that the eternal world of Ideas is different from the changing world of phenomena, has largely shaped his view of the soul that it occupies an intermediate status between Being and Becoming. The soul has a relation with the eternal world of Ideas because it has a rational nature, but it has also a relation with the world of time and change because it is a concrete existence with body as its vehicle. But although the soul has a

kinship to the Ideas yet it is not identical with an Idea. And lastly, Plato believed in the doctrine that all knowledge is recollection and therefore the soul, when it is said to know, only recollects what existed as a truth, but now obscured by its bodily conditions.

Putting all the elements in the Platonic conception of the soul one would see that his case for the immortality of the soul is more of the nature of special pleading than of the nature of logically supported arguments. His main contention is that since soul is a simple substance without parts, and since all that is composed of parts is subject to dissolution, therefore the soul as a partless simple substance is free from dissolution and death. Descartes advocates the same view in a different form in so far as he maintains that the soul is a substance the essence of which is pure consciousness. Now consciousness can never perish because it is the very essence of the soul-substance, and no substance of the world can perish, as it will go against the law of conservation, but will persist redistributed. Now Leibniz points out that the argument of Descartes can never prove personal immortality. If after my death, says Leibniz, I become changed into a completely different personality without the possibility of identification, what is it to me whether I survive death or not? If I become the King of China after my death and if I do not know what I was, this is tantamount to mortality. We see that Descartes' argument cannot prove immortality in the real sense of the term. Spinoza applies most rigorously his rationalist method to every philosophical problem. Spinoza holds that man is immortal only in so far as he participates in the life of pure reason independently of sensibility. The personality that is composed of passions and prejudices is bound to complete dissolution after death, but the personality that has risen above the reaches of passions and has developed the vision of reality *subspecie aeternitatis* will survive death, for he will look to the real nature of things from the standpoint of eternity and will be intoxicated by the intellectual love of God. Rational personality is the only abiding principle that will survive death. So it comes to this that immortality is the right of philosophers alone and the others will necessarily perish. Leibniz extends immortality to all persons, philosophers or otherwise. To him the monad is imperishable, and the distinctive character of perception and appetition that a monad has acquired,

can never die out for it will involve a break in the continuity of reality. Death is only apparent, not real. The spirit is ever developing into higher and higher perfection towards the fullest realisation of the kingdom of God. The ghost of soul-substance was exorcised by Kant from the person of metaphysics, but it was only for a temporary period. It reappeared in a different form in the philosophy of Herbart. The 'reals' of Herbart have their parallel in the monads of Leibniz. The Soul is a 'real' according to Herbart and as 'real' it is eternal and imperishable. It asserts its existence through certain psychological states and processes, but because it is a 'real' in the world of 'reals', it is self-identical and has no parallel among other 'reals'. Hence its immortality is ensured. Then comes the turn of McTaggart who repeats the old story. McTaggart being an Idealist of the Hegelian School asserts that the Absolute is the ultimate Reality. But this Reality is like a Society or College and the individual persons are the students or members thereof and each member is a self-identical self-sufficing substance. Hence McTaggart does not hesitate to plead for personal immortality, because the souls are self-sufficing substances having a past and a future history of their own. The same substance, though living successive lives through death, after all leaves a gap in psychological connections and associations.

Now though these philosophers approach the problem of immortality from their different metaphysical standpoints, the underlying idea is the same, *viz.*, that they all regard the soul as a substance. A metaphysical atom, as Pringle-Pattison puts it, is shut up within its shell self-sufficient in itself, having only an external and unnecessary relation with other things. Now this conception of Soul, as the relic of worn-out metaphysics, has received its death-blow at the hands of Kant who has clearly shown that such conception of substantival nature of soul involves the fallacy of four terms, as he has pointed out in the paralogism of Rational Psychology. The soul is not a substance, it is only the transcendental unity of apperception, only a logical identity. —'I am I'—a form only with reference to which the manifold of sensibility becomes united, so as to constitute what we call the knowledge of Nature. The developments of psychology, sociology and metaphysics in post-Kantian thought have shown beyond doubt that soul, or better self, is an ever-expanding unity—'soaked' in its environment, having no real existence in isolation. So the

argument for the immortality of the soul, if based on its substantival nature, can prove nothing substantial. The results so far reached from the above metaphysical arguments are only negative. But we shall bring out the positive contribution to the solution of the problem of immortality made from the standpoint of value, the highest metaphysical standpoint, which we shall estimate in a subsequent section.

¹⁰ Kant undermined the idea of a soul-substance in his Paralogism of Rational Psychology and maintained that our mental life is a logical, and not a substantial unity, of our conscious states and processes. Our self is a subject which, as a principle of unity and continuity under its changes of states and feelings, co-ordinates them into a whole in which it realises itself as an identical principle. The soul is never a substance in the sense of a static, unchangeable reality unrelated to its knowing process and to the process of its feeling and doing. The fact of the matter is that the life of the soul is dynamic which in its cognitive and ethical relations to the physical and social environment changes into its states and processes of feeling, thinking and willing, and becomes conscious of itself as a subject and as a moral agent in and through them. As Prof. Pringle-Pattison puts it: "It is, indeed, only the self-conscious spirit—a being who can make himself his own object and contemplate himself as a self—that attains individuality and independence in an ultimate sense."¹¹

(d) MORAL ARGUMENT

Now Kant's contribution to the solution of the problem of immortality does not consist merely in his negative attitude thereto. It is he who brings to the forefront of philosophical discussion the importance of moral value and its authoritative claim. The moral will speaks with the most authoritative tone to the rational agent and demands 'unconditional obedience'. It appears in the form of categorical imperative as distinguished from conditional imperative. The uniqueness of this moral will surprises Kant who praises it from the core of his heart by saying that it is the only gem, on earth, that shines by its own light. The good will

1. Pringle-Pattison: *The Idea of God*, Lectures XIV and XV.

on earth and the starry sky above, are the only things that are good without qualification, he says. Now Kant tries to show that the ideal of this practical will cannot but be real. The categorical imperative must be true, for it would be a 'mad world' if it is false. According to Kant the moral law is supreme in man's practical life and is completely independent of any sensible motives. But the realisation of the *summum bonum* or the highest good by man in the world is the necessary object for him under the determination of the moral law. And the fact that *summum bonum* is realisable by man implies the possibility of the *perfect accordance* of the human nature with the moral law. Now the perfect accordance of the human nature with the moral law is *holiness*. But man as a rational being of the sensible world cannot expect to attain this complete accordance or holiness. So there must be an infinite progress towards that perfect accordance. Hence, man as a rational but finite being, must have an endless duration of his existence and personality, and his life will be an endless approximation towards the *summum bonum*. And "the Infinite Being to whom the condition of time is nothing sees in this, to us endless succession, a whole of accordance with the moral law,"¹ the holiness, which the categorical imperative so inexorably requires of us in this world. So Kant thinks that the realisation of the *summum bonum* is possible only on the assumption of the immortality of the soul as the postulate of moral life. But Kant further says that if man's rational nature implies the possibility of realising the *summum bonum*, it is possible only on the supposition of a supreme moral being or God, who will synthesise virtue with happiness in the after-life, though in this life duty must not be performed with an eye to that happiness. In this world the *virtuous* are not generally rewarded with happiness, but God must be there to make necessary correlation and adjustment between the two. Here we cannot but dwell on an interesting point. Kant, we have seen, demolishes the ontological argument for God's existence by saying that the idea of three hundred dollars in my pocket does not bring into existence these dollars, meaning thereby that what is ideal is only ideal having nothing of reality therein. But, does not Kant go against his original position when he maintains that the ideal of good

1. Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, Ch. II. 4.

will *viz.*, holiness, must be real, that is to say, there must be definite possibility of its realisation, and does he not prove the otherwise unprovable problem of metaphysics on the basis of this ideal? The idealists, like Hegel, put their finger on this inconsistency of Kant and it is for this reason that Hegel ascribes so much value to the ontological proof.)

(e) IMMORTALITY FROM THE STANDPOINT OF VALUE

From our previous discussion it has been clear that immortality of the soul cannot be proved by referring to the substantival character of the soul—for there is no such soul-substance. Every man is a person—his personality being the result of a harmonious synthesis of many factors—physical, social and psychological. The question, therefore, is not whether the soul survives death but whether there is survival of personality. It is an unquestioned fact that the elements which have come together by the process of nature to give rise to a personality will not altogether disappear from the world after death—that nothing in the world altogether perishes. But it is of no consequence to me if I, as I, do not persist. The world is not an accidental product of chance, and humanity is not an idle spectator of the cosmic drama—brought into existence by the capricious play of Nature only to be annihilated at her whim. The world is the manifestation of the Cosmic Reason which rises into higher and higher grades of consciousness through the different levels of beings. The world is 'the vale of soul-making' as Keats was so fond of expressing the truth. It is through man that the cosmic consciousness is fully focussed. The world is here for the actualisation of the Ideal, the realisation of the Spirit, and humanity is the only perfect agency for such realisation. The ultimate reality or the Absolute is the high water-mark of values and humanity is here in this world for the creation of values, to realise the idea of perfection.

Here on this point the two Schools of Neo-Hegelians diverge. Bradley and Bosanquet on the one side uphold the view that personality does not survive death. It depends for its existence on the 'arbitrary' basis of 'flesh'; when after death this fleshly basis disintegrates, personality too is shattered into nothingness. The values that the persons create in the world survive death, not these persons who are here only for the creation of values—and when they have done their task, their importance is over and they

perish. *The Absolute takes account of the values only*, for the Absolute itself is nothing but the highest embodiment of all possible values. In the Absolute, the 'finite centres' are 'transformed and transmuted' or 'supplemented and rearranged' without the least possibility of self-identification, and hence they are 'destroyed and lost'. The Absolute is, in short, 'a whole where all finites blend and are resolved'. In the final chapter of *Appearance and Reality* Bradley says, "We can hardly say that the Absolute consists of finite things when the things as such are there transmuted and have lost their individual natures." Bosanquet, too, sings in the same tune when he says that the 'imperfect individual has to be transmuted and rearranged'. "With more audacious irony" as Pringle-Pattison¹ puts it, "Mr. Bradley speaks of the perfection and harmony, which the individual attains in the Absolute, as 'the complete gift and dissipation of his personality,' in which 'he, as such, must vanish'." "The finite as such disappears in being accomplished." Prof. Bosanquet puts it more picturesquely when he says that the contents or qualities which are distinctive marks of different individuals are, as it were, shaken up together and neutralise and supplement one another. Thus we see that according to Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet personality does not survive death, *it is for the contribution of values that personalities have meaning. In the Absolute, values only remain but personality is 'lost'*.

In India the same truth has been expressed by the philosopher-poet Rabindranath in his marvellous poem, *Sonar Tari*. The reaper having created and collected the best corn stands on the river side expecting that the 'golden boat' will take him in along with his corn, but he finds to his great disappointment that the boatman takes away the corn only, the best results of his toil, without showing the least sympathy towards him. He implores the boatman to take him also in, but the latter refuses by saying that the 'golden boat' has been completely filled up with the corn so as to leave no room for him. The boatman sails away absolutely indifferent to the implorings and cries of the reaper on the river side.

The poem symbolises the truth that the task for which the personalities stand being completed, it is no use taking account of them. The Reality is for the preservation of values,

1. Pringle-Pattison: *The Idea of God*, Lectures XIV and XV.

and not for the preservation of personality which remains though in a different form through its values and deeds. We live in deeds alone, our life in time is of no permanent significance.

As against the view of the Absolutists like Bradley and Bosanquet, the Personalists like Prof. Pringle-Pattison and Josia Royce maintain that the Absolute does not neglect the personality though it conserves the value. Personalities, too, are values to the Absolute and it is in and through them that the Absolute maintains his being. *The Absolute is an all-inclusive harmony of which the individual personalities are so many beats.* The melody of the Absolute is bound to be jeopardised if a single beat is lost'. Professor Pringle-Pattison points out that Bradley and Bosanquet are not justified in regarding the individual centres as *adjectival* to the being of the Absolute, for the individuals have a being of their own, however, 'arbitrary' it may be. It is not merely in self-transcendence that the being of a finite centre or individual rests. It has also its organic basis. This contradiction of course surprises the Absolutists, but it is a fact. Lotze brings out the peculiar and mysterious nature of the finite product when it is said to be "a perfection granted by the Absolute according to general laws upon certain complex occasions and arrangements of externality."¹ How it can be imagined, Lotze says, that an existence is produced which, in accordance with universal laws, not only produces and experiences effects and alternations in its connection with others, but also in its ideas, emotions and efforts, separates itself from the common foundation of all things and becomes to a certain extent an independent centre? This question remains an enigma. Bradley too recognises the gravity of the problem when he admits his inability to explain why there should be appearances at all, when there is to be only one all-perfect all-inclusive harmonious Absolute. But the obscurity of the solution is minimised to a degree when we take into account both the sides of human nature and concede to it the unique importance it so amply deserves in the scheme of Reality. To call the individuals *adjectival* to the being of the only Substance, *viz.*, the Absolute, is to make a misapplication of the word *adjectival*, as Pringle-Pattison points out. Prof. Bosanquet is fond of appealing to the great experiences of the like love, social friendship etc.

1. *Metaphysics*, Section 246 (Eng. Trans. pp. 432-3).

in which the selfish claims do not count, but it is not true at the same time, as Prof. Pringle-Pattison just brings out, that here also in these experiences there cannot be love or friendship if the 'otherness' does not persist. 'Sweet love were slain, could differences be abolished.' The differences must there be always and these cannot be overlooked. To call these arbitrary is only to call these by names, but it does not solve the issue. The real question remains, and it can be answered only when we regard the individuals as so many units which are preserved in the being of the ultimate Reality to which the former are as valuable as the contribution thereof. Prof. Royce¹ emphasises the volitional aspect of human personality, and in it he finds the unique factor which can never totally merge in the Absolute, without the finite wills the Absolute will has no meaning. The Absolute respects the personalities for they form the very life of Reality. Royce further holds that in the Absolute the finite wills know themselves as such, as unique expressions of the Absolute will.

So we conclude that the individuals are not the arbitrary products of chance, nor are they the irrational elements only to be supplemented and rearranged without chance of survival, but they are the unique focalisations of the Absolute, without which the latter cannot be what it is. So the personalities cannot be 'lost' but must be preserved, for identity of will would mean absorption of individuality with the Absolute Self. It is the state of perfection which we otherwise call immortality, and such a state of immortality is thus realisation of absolute values. It does not deny spiritual personality, what it denies is psycho-biological personality. The realisation of absolute values in such a state of immortality may be continuous consistently with the doctrine of consummation, but it is idle on our part to be apprehensive of its endlessness. In Indian philosophy we describe this state of immortality by the term 'moksha' or freedom, because the individual self in this state has shaken off all its bondage or limitation imposed upon it by its psycho-biological conditions which have either been eliminated or spiritualised. That the spirit can get mastery over its psycho-biological conditions is brought home to us by the Indian conception of *jiban-mukta* which tells us how an individual

1. Cf. Royce: *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy* and *The World and the Individual*, Vol. II, Lecture X.

spirit moves and has its being in the universe without being affected by its psycho-biological conditions and realises the absolute values of Truth, Goodness, Beauty and Love in this life, until with the complete dissolution of the psycho-biological conditions he attains *videha-mukti* or disembodied freedom in which state his spiritual personality continues as a distinct spiritual self in the realm of similar other selves, and his realisation of absolute values takes the shape of disinterested contemplation of them without the further process of moral strife. God as the unity of all experiences and values instead of absorbing the spiritual personalities only renders possible the realisation of His own absolute nature and attributes by these spiritual personalities.

2. RELIGIOUS BACKGROUND OF IMMORTALITY.

Here the question before us will be whether belief in immortality necessarily entails one's belief in the existence of God or whether immortality may be believed in without it. Kant's moral argument, for the existence of God, we have seen, is based upon the fact that the present life of man is a case of maladjustment between rewards and punishments on the one side and good and bad actions on the other. But our moral nature demands that good actions should not go unrewarded, nor should bad actions go unpunished. So in order that this anomaly may be set right we must have existence beyond the present one, where perfect adjustment between human actions and their moral deserts may be effected. In other words, human moral agents must have a futurity of existence. But the moral agents themselves are not competent arbiters of their moral deserts. Therefore, there must be a morally perfect being who is not only responsible for the creation of nature and man respectively as conditions and agents of moral actions, but is also adjuster of moral deserts with moral actions. So God must also be postulated as the condition of our moral life. It follows that, according to Kant, morality requires as its postulate the immortality of the soul which again depends on God. Immortality, therefore, has an inevitable religious background for its support.

Bosanquet comes to the same conclusion, though he follows a different line of argument. In the previous section we have seen that according to Bosanquet the immortality of the human

self is possible in the sense that the human self as a moral agent has an endless life of realisation of absolute values without a sense of security. But he adds that it is only in religion that the human self finds that security, for in religious union with God he merges his individuality in Him. Apart from the negative attitude towards individuality which Bosanquet's sense of immortality suggests, the fact remains that it is this union with God that renders such immortality possible even at the cost of personal immortality. Thus Bosanquet agrees with Kant in making immortality dependent on the divine existence. Rāmānuja's theory of '*mokṣa*' or immortality also favours the view that immortality of individual self, depending as it does on the contemplation of absolute values, also depends on God who grants by grace the contemplation of these absolute values.

But the other alternative question we raised was, whether immortality is possible without the conception of the divine existence. Those systems of thought that have offered an affirmative answer to this question, either disbelieve that God is the absolute reality embodying the absolute values, so that immortality as consisting in the realisation of these absolute values does not require as its postulate the existence of God ; or that immortality as an absolute existence means transcending the entire realm of values which involve limitation. In the Sāmkhya system, for instance, there is no postulation of God as an absolute principle and an embodiment of absolute values. The Sāmkhya Puruṣa so long as he is under the influence of Prakṛti, lives within the realm of evaluation. Truth, goodness and beauty in their empirical sense are values to him ; but as they are all empirical they are relative. And all these empirical and relative values obtain within his empirical existence which is the condition of his bondage. To be immortal in Sāmkhya is to transcend Prakṛti and therefore transcend all values born of Prakṛti. In Sāmkhya the attainment of immortality means a long process of culture and purification of the self whereby he rises above the empirical determinations of Prakṛti and attains to a knowledge of his own transcendental character in which there is no beatific vision of God, but only visualisation of his own truth, of his own transcendental consciousness. In Advaita, Vedānta, too, immortality of the soul is without any reference to God. In Advaitism all valuation involves limitation and limitation is bondage and no immortality. God belongs to

the sphere of empirical limitations and of valuations for, as determining the empirical sphere God is determined by it. Jiva or the empirical self is a factor in the empirical world determined by God. But, to be immortal is to be one with the absolute reality of Brahman independent of all limitations and empirical determinations. Immortality is thus complete transcendence of all determinations and of God who determines and is determined by the realm of valuation. Hence, Advaita Vedānta, too, does not postulate God as the condition of immortality.

3. *LIFE ETERNAL.*

The problem of eternal life is indeed more exclusively a *transcendental problem* than the problem of immortality which is often associated with the *moral* ideal of personality. To say this is not to say that eternal life can be considered apart from immortality. The ethical or personal immortality is associated with the idea that the individual self belongs to a process of striving after, or approximation to, the absolute and therefore is in time. Science and philosophy which are concerned with things and events, have a temporal significance. They are concerned with change or movement as related to the changeless and unmoving and therefore are satisfied with analysis and explanation of things in terms of time and temporality. But the highest development of modern physical science has begun to suggest that explanation of things in terms of time and space cannot be final, because time and space are relative, that relativity of time and space is fraught with the implication that there must be an absolute reality, an eternity of existence to which spatio-temporal framework does not apply. The ethical or personal immortality of the self, making moral striving a temporal process of realisation of, or approximation to, the absolute values is suggestive of an ultra-temporal or eternal realm of values which is the final goal of ethical personality. We are not unfamiliar with the metaphysical contradictions which the absolutist philosopher points to, as resulting from our belief in the reality of time, and we are also not unfamiliar with the mystical attitude which the absolutist philosopher feels compelled to recommend when he asks us to apprehend reality beyond time. Hegel describes time as *chronos* creating and devouring things. The Tantra school of Indian philosophy speaks of *Kāla* (Time) as the principle of creation and destruction. But at the same time we

find that Hegel makes his Absolute Reality transcend process and temporality. The Tāntric absolutism also speaks of *Niṣkala*, the Eternal, as the ultimate principle of reality from where all creations of *Kāla*, all changes and phenomena have been banished. Spinoza's *natura naturata* is *sub temporis*, but his reality is *sub aeternitatis*. In Kant space and time are real within the world of phenomena, but ideal within the realm of things-in-themselves. All this points to the conclusion that beyond this world of experience there is the realm of absolute experience and values which are unaffected by time and change. We can say nothing more than this about this ideal eternal realm of experience and values purely from the standpoint of argument.

But such a realm may become an object of direct consciousness to us only in our mystic communion with the Absolute Reality which is also identical with absolute values and there is no denial of it possible by mere logical arguments. Individuals rising to the supreme state of religious contemplation, though rare, bear testimony to the reality of the realm of absolute values which they foretaste in their communion with God. The Indian conception of the *Jivan-mukta* not only gives us a life of such foretaste of absolute values, but also suggests that his life after death, as a *videha-mukta*, is a life beyond time. Our ethical personality is a life of progressive realisation of temporal values, but only in transcendental consciousness in which we have a complete realisation of the absolute values we visualise a mode of eternal life. Now if the individual self's immortality consists in the realisation of absolute values, then it will ultimately mean an eternal life, because, the absolute values being eternal unaffected by time, immortality will also be a life of time-less contemplation of them. Our earthly life, as ethical individuals, may mean pilgrim's progress towards the city of God, but when the city of God is reached, where the absolute values become the direct object of contemplation, process or pilgrimage in time ceases. The individuals have the possibility to reach their highest perfection and owing to the possibility of consummation or increase and enrichment of values, instead of mere conservation, we may believe that the individual selves in this highest state of realisation in eternal life, will necessarily entail enrichment of the realm of absolute values in which consummation lies. Eternal life is thus a life of perpetual contemplation, by the liberated self, of

the absolute values of Truth, Goodness, Beauty and Love, a life of eternal beatitude. It is in religion where, by mystic consciousness we get a glimpse of the life eternal and it is by a continued life of communion and by the ethical life of self-culture and self-purification that we may aspire to an eternal life of absolute values which knows no time and process, but is only time-less contemplation.¹

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CONCLUSION

We have now come to the end of our book. Throughout our attempt we have been led by the aim of intelligibility of whatever we have stated. An inquisitive reader of the book might have noticed that within the limits of space it has not always been possible for us to discuss a particular problem threadbare so as to give him an idea of all the bearings of that problem and of the immediate connection it has with the general picture of life and the universe we have drawn in this book. We must apologise that this is but natural to the nature and purpose of our book. But, nevertheless, he is offered in this concluding chapter a general connective world-view in which he will find an organic interrelation among the problems raised and their solutions offered.

If philosophy is man's thinking attitude towards the universe, and if thinking never means random, incoherent and partial, but always systematic and intelligible experience of things, then philosophy must take such comprehensive view of the elements, factors, processes and relations in the universe that they must all be regarded as a unified whole of experience. For unity of experience is the guarantee of its intelligibility. Man of to-day has been born into a great intellectual heritage of the past. Science has explored the furthest corner of the phenomenal world but finds that there is still a beyond. Matter and motion of old physics have yielded to the cosmic rays of to-day. But interstellar radiation of which the cosmic rays consist only suggests a universe of which all the mysteries are yet unfathomed. Evolution, either creative or emergent, with all its geological, astronomical and anthropological evidences for a continued natural growth and development of the world we live in, has failed to convince the inquisitive mind that the lower can explain the higher without an intelligent creative *nexus* or urge that works from above downwards. Realistic philosophy, old and new, either dissects the universe into two hemispheres of existence, matter and spirit, or into numberless independent existents in which mind or spirit

shrinks either into a cross-section of the world or into a physio-biological response at the cost of unity and intelligibility. Pragmatism with a non-committal attitude to the reality of matter or spirit puts the mind-body complex at the centre, re-habilitates the sophistical *homo mensura* doctrine that man is the measure of all things, and proposes a 'corridor theory' of truth giving you choice between idealism and realism, but reminding you only that whatever experience you may have from whatever source, see that it works. Idealism as a rival claimant against naturalism and realism has not been less prolific than its rivals in its inventions of views of life and the universe. It has sometimes conceived of an infinite number of independent souls, one having nothing to do with the other, but only one having higher reality and function than the other, and God being the first among his fellows. It has at other times made spirit to be the all-embracing unity either swallowing up the entire plurality and individuality of things and minds or reducing them to mere appearances which, if they are to have any truth and meaning in them, must forego their separate individuality and be transmuted and transfigured into the uniqueness of the Absolute Spiritual Reality. Either manyness or oneness of the Spirit serves these extremes of idealism as explanation of the universe. But these forms of extreme idealism, if they were alive to the riddles of the Sphinx, ought to have thought if extremes can meet. Really the problem of the many and the one is the problem of problems, and the main function of philosophy is to avoid the abstractions of monism and pluralism in their extreme forms and to offer an intelligible universe which is one in many and many in one, which is neither the realm of pure particulars, nor the realm of the pure universals, but one of concrete universal in which particulars live in and through the universal which is immanent in them. Hence, we have a third form of idealism which, while it makes the Absolute Spirit to be a contentful universal where particulars do not kill the universal, but makes the Absolute Spirit a living reality where particulars are the concrescence of the universal. We have maintained throughout our book this last form of absolute idealism. We have found that the universe teems with an infinite variety of things, relations and gradations amenable to scientific explanations, realistic admissions and idealistic evaluations, pointing to an intelligent purpose of one Rational Being who is not only

creative, but as an embodiment of absolute values, holds ethical and religious relationship with man and creates conditions and opportunities for realisation by him of moral and religious ideals. When we talk of the creative purpose of the Absosute we do not mean by creation any abrupt event completed once for all, but we mean a perpetual activity needed for the universe in its growth and development so that the Absolute was never without its world of becoming in the past, nor will it be without it at any time in the future. There is thus teleological evolution, no matter if we call it creative or emergent, and no matter in whatever way our world has come to be what it is from the physical to the biological and from the biological to the psychical level. We do not hesitate to acknowledge that the pre-psychical progress of the world was entirely determined by the Divine Will which has tended the world to reach the human level, but rather hold that human progress has been willed by man. For the world is not only "the vale of soul-making" but the souls are also energies of world-making.

In our view we have tried to discuss the nature, function and destiny of individual selves and the relations in which they stand to the Universal Self. Granting that evolution is not inconsistent with the appearance of the self in the scale of beings we have shown also in detail how the self through its cognitive relation to the world and moral relation to other selves attains individuality, value and destiny, in the scheme of the universe. Individual's cognition, or knowledge involves subject-object relation which means antithesis or contradictions for ordinary judgment as the unit of knowledge, and modifies reality by the psychical conditions of the subject. It follows that all our ordinary judgments reveal not the complete, but only partial reality and therefore partial truths and that complete truth which dissolves all contradictions is attainable by the individual self when all contradictions have been dissolved and concrete con-substantiality between the individual self and the Absolute Self is established and attained *in faith*, where the individual self transcends himself and becomes one with the Universal Self. Like the intellectual ideal or value the ethical value of the individual self is also realisable by gradual dissolution of contradictions between the individual wills on the one hand and between the individual and the universal will on the other. We have maintained that it is in religious consciousness that the Absolute Truth and Absolute

Goodness and even Absolute Beauty are realisable by the individual self. Here there is a complete self-transcendence by the self, but unlike some idealists, we have pointed out that self-transcendence does not necessarily mean self-annihilation, but rather self-maintenance. From this metaphysical position we have maintained in our book, the reader is expected to form an idea of the organic character of the relation that has been shown to obtain amongst the elements and factors of the universe as a whole.

We cannot conclude without recording a few words as to the rôle of philosophy in world culture. The votaries of philosophy are discredited in the eye of the modern world which has already developed a distaste for all that is really true, good and beautiful. We are told that every man must have a philosophy of his own, good or bad, because every man has to form a view of the universe in which he lives, moves and has his being. And his philosophy is bound to tell upon his attitude to the world, his relation to his fellows and if possible his relation to the creative energy of the universe. Civilisation of man is the complex result of man's view of life and the universe in their all possible relations to him, and philosophy in its widest sense may be said to coincide with what we understand by culture. From this point of view civilisation is the expression of what man thinks of himself in relation to the universe. We venture to think then that civilisation is the expression of man's philosophy, though thinkers are not agreed as to whether culture is the result of civilisation or *vice versa*. When we pronounce that man's philosophy is his culture, we mean to say that man's philosophy or his view of the universe forms the intellectual force or background which manifests itself through his manifold activities and relations and determines them. And the manifold activities and relations determined by the cultural background may be expressed by the collective term, civilisation.

When we say that man must have philosophy of his own we give him choice. He may have a good philosophy or a bad one, and so there have been different types of philosophy and different types of culture determining different types of civilisation. History bears testimony to these types of culture or philosophy and their products, the different types of civilisation. A materialistic philosophy of the universe is bound to make the mind of man concerned exclusively with what belongs to the material world. A consideration of matter and forces as the only existents of the universe, has

led human mind to a consideration of what they can do for man, of how they can be utilised to minister to the needs and creature-comforts of man, and has led to the foundation of the science, of industries, of industrial organisations, their economic output and consequent control of labour by capital and clash of interests between labour and capital, with jealousy and hatred, revolution and war as their natural consequences. The materialistic outlook has so over-ruled human life that moral virtues, duties and obligations, conscience and common-good, religion and religious ideals, have made room for hypocrisy and insincerity, prudence, pride and prejudice resulting in complete dissolution of social, national and international solidarity. Scientific view of the world is not bad if it is oriented from the higher ideals of the human mind, but it becomes a bane only when the human mind makes a fetish of it. True philosophic attitude does not ignore any level of experience, and science is certainly a level of experience. It augurs well for human civilisation and culture that the world's greatest scientists of to-day are beginning to find that scientific experience is not the last word of man's culture and philosophy, but only suggestive of a wider experience which teaches mankind that behind the facts of science there is a Spiritual Reality, a proper orientation of which raises man from the level of facts and of relative and instrumental values to the level of absolute values. The absolute values are such spiritual forces that they not only give significance and meaning to facts and to relative and instrumental values, but also carry the conviction that the demands of his fuller being remain unfulfilled unless man interprets things ultimately in terms of them. His view of the world gives him only the husk without the kernel if he misses the absolute values in the facts. Thus, if our civilisation is not to lead us to the whirlpool of conflicts of interests, pride and prejudice, revolution and war, it must be broad-based on the solid rock of a philosophy which would view the factors and elements of the universe in their proper perspective, give science its due, but would not at the same time forget that there is the Spiritual Reality which lends significance and value to the individuality of man and renders possible his realisation of the absolute values wherein lies his essence. This is the greatest task before the philosophy of today. For it is such spiritualistic philosophy that seems to be the only force competent to bring harmony in discord, peace in war. It is such spiritualistic philosophy that can inspire

man with optimistic enthusiasm for working out his economic and social problems in the light of a spiritual ideal.¹ It is such spiritualistic philosophy that can teach man to look upon his ~~fellow~~ as members of a spiritual commonwealth where they, like him, have equal right to realisation of their destiny ; and in such a spiritual commonwealth man will cease to suspect man but will love him as his brother and respect him as his divinity and the principle of *homo homini deus* will replace the principle of *homo homini lupus*.²

1. Cf. *An Anthology of Recent Philosophy*: Prof. Radhakrishnan's Address, pp. 55-63.

2. Cf. Author's article on *The Possibility of a New Ethic* in the Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress, 1932.

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